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This study deals with the ways that writers and producers in the modern period 
have represented the pre-modern imperial past. It sets out to pose the question: what 
role has a historical way of thinking inherited from the pre-modern empire played in 
China’s continuous quest for modernity? In describing what in imperial history has 
been represented and how that has been represented during the modern period, this 
study attempts to explain why it was represented this way. It endeavors to theorize the 
historical continuity between traditional empire and modern nation-state, and address 
the tension between them.  
During the long journey of China toward modernity, historical representations 
have played an essential role in redefining China’s self-identity and imagining its 
place in the world. Throughout the modern period, despite different nominal 
characterizations about China’s social reality, be it a semi-colonial, semi-feudal 
society, a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist socialist state, or a market-economy-post-socialist 
country, there is a deeply rooted historical way of thinking that persisted throughout 
the modern era and determined the way modern China developed itself conceptually. 
This historical way of thinking constitutes an “imperial-time regime,” which deems 
unification as normal and takes the morality of each polity as the ultimate standard to 
judge its position in history. 
 Such an imperial-time regime, the normalization of unification and 
moralization of time, encompasses discursive changes in the modern era. It is 
manifested in various historical representations, suggesting that China persistently 
resists being put into the category of modern nation state. 
Weaving textual and contextual analysis with critical theories, this study 
participates in the ongoing debate on China’s past, present, and future within China 
and the worldwide discussion on redefining empire.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
At the turn of the twenty-first century, narratives and images of past Chinese 
empires nearly dominated cultural production, coinciding with the intensification of 
the market economy and worldwide globalization. Intellectuals within China have 
debated whether this has been a collective psychological reaction against Western 
economic/ideological dominance to fulfill national pride as manifested in historical 
glory, or unconscious pursuit of a stable, secure past as a transcendent force of unity 
against the rapidly changing present to relieve an anxiety of emptiness, or, instead, is a 
more enduring issue, an ingrained belief in an underlying historical force that 
transcends this transient historical moment and manifests its enduring power.  
Although a mix of all three explanations may be at work, this dissertation is devoted to 
the third and broadest thesis.  
Literary representations of the Chinese Empire throughout the twentieth 
century have been imagining time and space of the imperial past to identify China in 
the momentary flux and uncertain future of the newly discovered world order. These 
representations, variously manifested in novels, short stories, stage plays, films and 
television dramas, offer a virtual focus to look at modern Chinese history through their 
presentations of the imperial past.  
The two discourses that have dominated twentieth-century China since the 
Chinese door was forced open to the Western (including Japanese) imperialist 
aggression are the discourse of modernity and the discourse of the modern nation state. 
For both of them imperial history has played the role of the “Other” in tension with the 
Western “Other.” Whereas the desire for modernity requires representing the imperial 
past as backward and suffocating, the nationalistic sentiment evokes the pride in 
antiquity and morality of the past Chinese Empire. Such a contradiction in 
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representing the past, therefore, not only manifests the selectivity of contemporary 
ideological needs, but also reflects the function of the past as a crucial factor in 
constructing the present, which has been largely overlooked or understated by modern 
scholars.  
In studying Chinese history, scholars have made efforts to deconstruct the 
modern-premodern dichotomy, but the myth persists that the West has played an 
overwhelmingly dominant role leading to China’s hybrid modernity. They suggest 
either a “Western impact-China response” model or an “internal demand-external 
solution” model.  
By contrast, a “China-centered” approach would bring the imperial past to the 
fore, suggesting that modern China and the past Chinese Empire have been contingent 
upon each other, reinventing each other. Moreover, instead of being a passive “Other” 
to be represented, the past offers a deeply-rooted way of thinking that has shaped the 
modern mentality in constructing the present.  
Through textual analysis, this dissertation shows that, despite the various 
symptomatic manifestations of imperial history in different periods, there is a 
paradigmatic tendency that pervades the entire modern era. It is a transcendent moral 
order that deems unification as normal and takes the morality of a regime as the 
foremost standard to judge its historical significance.  
This normalization of unification and moralization of time constitute an 
“imperial-time regime,” a theoretical term to describe the heritage of a traditional 
Chinese way of thinking about China.  As a moral order, this regime is independent of, 
and transcendent over, specific political and material conditions, which continually 
reveal its unifying, perpetuating function in Chinese history. It is from its beginnings, 
no later than the Warring States era, bound up with the vision of empire, of time, and 
of moral agency, and is resilient enough to produce its own sub-regime to outlive any 
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specific historical periods, including the modern era. In this theoretical framework, 
Marxism was reconceived in China, not to displace Confucianism, but as a 
substitution for Confucianism. With Marxist internationalism substituting for the 
Chinese datong (grand unity) and the discourse of “the People” substituting for the 
discourse of “minxin-tianxia” (Whoever gains the people’s hearts will govern all 
under Heaven), China has persistently challenged the notion of the nation-state and 
resisted being confined within the boundary of a modern nation-state. Through 
modern representations of the Chinese Empire, the tension between empire and 
modern nation state is continually revealed.  
Chapters One and Two establish the argument for such an imperial-time 
regime in terms of historiography and philosophy, Chinese and Western, and for its 
pervasiveness throughout the modern period, bringing seemingly divergent intellectual 
stances into convergence. The succeeding chapters then move to the close textual 
analysis of historical representations in literature and the media. Chapter Three 
surveys literary representations during the tremendous social changes between 1900 
and 1980, and brings to the fore the tension between empire and modern nation state, 
from the works of Wu Jianren, Lu Xun, Guo Moruo and others, to Yan Haiping’s play 
on Li Shimin in the early 1980s, when the discourse of revolution was fading and the 
discourse of “Tianxia” (All under Heaven) reemerged.  For the post-revolutionary 
period, in which the positive portrayals of past emperors participated in positioning 
China in the new global order, Chapters Four to Six explore several media, from the 
historical novels of Ling Li and Eryuehe, to films by Zhang Yimou, Chen Kaige, and 
Zhou Xiaowen, and television series produced by CCTV (China Central TV). Finally, 
Chapter Seven expands the study to literature on imperial history from a minority 
perspective, suggesting that “becoming minority” is a necessary and beneficial 
strategy in building the image of empire. 
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In sum, drawing on intellectual history, critical theories, and multiple artifacts 
from the late Qing period to the contemporary era, this study advances an 
interdisciplinary, cross-media analysis on the rarely researched area of historical 
representations. It not only proposes an intellectual inquiry into China’s identity, but 
also engages with the worldwide discussion on redefining empire. In Western 
scholarship, the shift in emphasis from the military-political domain to the economic-
cultural realm, or, from territorial power to non-territorial power in defining empire 
suggests that a different past is now emerging. What is usually placed under the rubric 
of the traditional has taken on a different valence: not simply the old cultural-imperial 
continuity but a sort of regional-global connectivity. In this sense, this study offers a 
fresh perspective not only to understand China in the process of continuous 
modernization, but also to look at the contemporary world order at large.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
The Imperial-Time Regime: the Eternal Return of the Chinese Empire 
 
Tianxia (the empire, all under Heaven) is not one that belongs to one person, but one 
that belongs to all under Heaven, and only he who shares the benefit with all under 
Heaven can govern it. 
                                                                                           ------ Jiang Taigong (1211-1072BCE) 
 
Perhaps the warlords of the early Republican period were only recent versions of the 
end-of Han or end-of Tang warlords. Perhaps the Nanjing government of Chiang Kai-
shek was the Qin or Sui type of unifying, ephemeral dynasty which paves the way for 
a longer-lived bureaucratic centralized regime. Maybe China is forever China, as the 
saying is, absorbing everyone, and nothing has been new in a crowded century except 
ephemeral detail, spilling over a changeless paradigm of Chinese history.  
                                                                                           -------Joseph Levenson 
 
In a map labeled Outline of Ancient Chinese History,1 the lengthy Chinese 
history is delineated as a timeline twisted into the shape of a spiral. Peter Hessler 
vividly described it this way:  
 
Everything started in the center, at a tiny point identified as ‘Yuanmou Ape-
man.’ After Yuanmou Ape-man (approximately 1.7 million years ago), the 
timeline passed through Peking Man and then made an abrupt turn. By the Xia 
dynasty, the spiral had completed one full circle. The Shang and the Zhou 
dynasties wrapped up a second revolution. The spiral got bigger with each turn, 
as if picking up speed. Whenever something ended—a dynasty, a warring 
state—the spiral was marked with a line and a black X, and then something 
new took its place. There weren’t any branches or dead ends. From Yuanmou 
Ape-man, it took three turns of the spiral to reach the revolution of 1911, 
where the timeline finally broke the cycle, straightened out, and pointed 
directly up and off the page.2 
 
The breadth of the spiral signifies the spatial dimension of the Chinese empire, 
and the division of the transected block consequently indicates the partition of the 
                                                             
1 Drawn by Lu Jixiang, (Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 1997).  
2 Peter Hessler, Oracle Bones: A Journey between China’s Past and Present (New York: Harper Collins 
Publishers, 2006), 13. 
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territory in the time period. Thousands of years, compressed into one current, spiral up, 
like a river flowing ahead, implying a continuous history of China as an organic whole, 
inclusive, unified, swirling around the center. There are no outsiders. The cyclical 
disunion-unification shift not only does not break through the bigger spiral, but rather 
reinforces the all-encompassing cyclical structure and the wholeness of the space. It 
seems not until the revolution of the republic when the last emperor was forced off 
throne is the space opened, turning outside, while the timeline is cut and broken. This 
is nothing other than the well-established myth of Chinese history: long, continuous 
imperial history in a self-centered, isolated space and the discontinuous transition from 
the traditional empire to the modern nation state.  
While the Chinese continually highlight the myth till this day, scholars in the 
West nonetheless have made a lot of effort to deconstruct both parts of the myth: to 
discover an open empire instead of a closed one for ancient history, and to re-bridge 
the historical continuity in the modern period. 3 This is what Paul Cohen called the 
“irony of ironies”: whereas the “outsiders” tried to adopt a China-centered perspective, 
turning from culture to history to approach the economic, geographic, spatially-
delimited historical truth as against the intellectual generalization, the Chinese 
“insiders” insisted on the unity of the traditional culture and the impact of the Western 
factors in the modern period.4 The interaction and negotiation of the ironies manifest 
that, instead of invalidating the myth, the Western scholarly efforts nonetheless in both 
ways buttress the myth in that they are only significant when examined against the 
                                                             
3 Scholars have done a great deal of research trying to deconstruct the notion of the closed nature of 
Chinese empire. For example, Valerie Hansen’s The Open Empire: A History of China to 1600 (New 
York & London: W.W.Norton & Company, 2000). For the continuity of modern history, scholars 
mostly focus on the intellectual heritage from tradition, as manifested among the intellectuals in the late 
Qing transitional period or the May Fourth period. Yet, despite blurring the boundary between modern 
and premodern, and the disagreement on the specific time demarking the modern and premodern, the 
mainstream understanding still holds the assumption that there is a fundamental change in terms of 
political, economic, and social relations.  
4 Paul A. Cohen, Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese 
Past (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984, reprinted with new preface in 1996), 195. 
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Chinese generalizations (and the Western constructions in the earlier period) and thus 
merely add more layers to the well-established constructions. To say it is an open 
empire is to acknowledge the constant interactions between Chinese and non-Chinese 
peoples, to bring to the fore the heterogeneity of Chinese civilization as against the 
vision of a homogeneous one, and to underpin the absorbing and assimilative capacity 
of the Chinese civilization that could digest anything “foreign” into its own cultural 
system. Yet it does not answer the question what constituted the mythic “China,” a 
term that is constantly strengthened to signify an otherwise diverse culture, an entity 
that even seen as an artificial construct has survived thousands of years, and 
continually been perpetuated in the modern period. What makes the myth persistent 
for such a long history?  
On the other hand, the continuity/discontinuity debate mostly focuses on the 
regionally-based social change within China before the Western onslaught. This focus 
seeks to minimize Western impact, and thus to evade the question of intellectual 
generalization about “China” at a national level.5 To investigate intellectual issues, 
research has mostly been done on the late imperial-early Republican period to 
delineate a traditional intellectual heritage, which stresses the positive function of a 
traditional mode of thinking in facilitating, energizing, and legitimating modernization. 
Hao Chang, for example, in his book on Liang Qichao, asserted that “it is mainly in 
terms of a particular set of concerns and problems inherited from Confucian tradition 
that Chinese intellectuals responded to the Western impact in the late Qing.”6 He thus 
reversed the “impact-response” model, turning it into one of “internal demand-external 
solution.” Thomas Metzger went a step further in his study on Neo-Confucianism, 
                                                             
5 Paul Cohen, Discovering History in China. Cohen pointed out that the spatially delimited studies raise 
the question of representativeness or typicality. “Finding a single county (out of some 1500) that fails to 
support these generalizations, therefore, does not in itself disprove the generalizations. All it shows is 
that the generalizations are not universally valid.” 169. 
6 Hao Chang, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and Intellectual Transition in China, 3. 
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arguing that Neo-Confucianism in late imperial China, instead of being a backward 
philosophy responsible for China’s stagnancy, as the May Fourth iconoclasts charged, 
was in effect a transformative ideology, viewed in a certain way.7 Metzger observed 
that the Neo-Confucian intellectuals, regardless of their differences in philosophical 
and political approaches, shared a common cultural orientation, that they experienced 
an inevitable psychological, social predicament in trying to transform the self and the 
society. The Western impact, modernization or even revolution, rather than being the 
destruction of the traditional culture, offered an escape from this predicament. Modern 
Chinese intellectuals, whether liberals or communists, still held a shared cultural 
orientation and for the first time optimistically viewed Western thinking as a solution 
to achieve both the inner moral self-fulfillment and outer social transformation in 
terms of wealth and power. “It is the explosive mixture of this long-frustrated desire 
and the new possibilities of thought and action brought by the West which has fueled 
China’s transformation.”8As much as I agree with Metzger on his observation on the 
“shared cultural orientation,” his assertion of the intellectual “predicament” is not 
firmly grounded, as Paul Cohen rightly pointed out, and his idea of the West as 
China’s redeemer still manifests a mindset based on the imperative of Western 
primacy.9  The problem with Metzger’s study, as well as Chang’s and many others’, is 
that they take China’s interaction with the West as the endpoint of Chinese history, 
casting the West in an overwhelming role yet trying to rebuild an indigenous 
continuity retrospectively. As a result, their researches seem to succeed more in 
reinforcing the modern-premodern, China-West divide delivered by Joseph Levenson 
in 1960s than in establishing the real connection or compatibility between traditional 
                                                             
7 Thomas A. Metzger, Escape from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China’s Evolving Political 
Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 202. 
8 Metzger, Escape from Predicament, 232. 
9 Paul Cohen, Discovering History in China, 91. 
10 
 
Chinese thinking and modern Western thinking. In other words, these researches 
mostly accentuate the incompatibility of Chinese and Western thought and thereby 
essentialize both China and the West to create a hybrid Chinese modern as against the 
original modernity of the West.  
The unexamined assumption that the modern Chinese nation—overly 
determined by the encounter with the West—is both the start and the end of modern 
Chinese history, was most explicitly addressed by Prasenjit Duara. Duara observed 
that the discourse of the nation built upon the ideal of Western enlightenment and the 
conception of a linear, progressive History (Duara used a capital ‘H’ to identify this 
particular conception of history) manifests a fundamental dilemma. The nation as the 
subject of History cannot bridge the aporia in the experience of linear time because of 
“the disjuncture between past and present as well as the non-meeting between time as 
flux and time as eternal.” Therefore, “the nation actually both lives in History and also 
at the end of it.”10 What this implies in the Chinese case is that the encounter with the 
West, the adoption of linear, progressive History, and the awakening of modern self-
consciousness, marks the end, or the closure, of History in China, for the dominant 
discourse represses the alternative discourses in the process of modernization and 
nation building. Duara’s study, both theoretically and empirically, demonstrates the 
process of this normative repression and recovers the alternative, repressed discourses 
of the nation. As much as I was inspired and convinced by his argument, I would like 
to go a step further in order to pose the question of what accounts for the triumph of 
one discourse over the alternatives (e.g. centralized state over federalism), other than 
the overwhelming impact of the West and the discursive negotiation with the West.   
                                                             
10 Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China 
(Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 29. 
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In this study I don’t intend to answer the massive question “what constituted 
the myth of the Chinese Empire,” though my research might be able to come to terms 
with it. Neither am I going to create a persuasive thesis to deconstruct the China-West, 
modern-premodern dichotomy since there is no way to essentialize any of them. Yet I 
hope to propose a model in which history, or historical thinking, develops in a 
multilinear and compatible way. At the discursive intersection of cultures, the 
dominant force of history (as in the Chinese case) will manifest its established pattern 
by adopting the appealing discourse that is completely compatible with its pattern. It is 
not only that the Self (China) manipulates and appropriates the Other (West) to serve 
its own ends, but also that the (manipulated) Other already exists in the Self echoing 
the certain principle of its historical origin. History is always in transit and the end is 
out of reach. A “China-centered perspective,” as Cohen proposed it,11 would take the 
shared cultural orientation as the paradigmatic, driving force in guiding the 
symptomatic social changes into an established pattern. It is not only that the dominant, 
official discourse of modernity and nation (e.g. Marxism) suppressed the alternative 
narratives of reality, but also that the dominant discourse itself was an expression of 
this pre-existing paradigmatic force. I suggest that in modern Chinese history, such 
overpowering historical thinking dominates the discursive social forces and 
determines the way modern China has developed itself conceptually. The 
normalization of unification and moralization of time, which I will term the “imperial-
time regime,” not only structures the cyclical pattern of ancient Chinese history, but 
also enfolds Marxist historical thinking and continually manifests its transcendent and 
pervasive power in the modern period.  
 
 
                                                             
11 Paul Cohen, Discovering History in China, 149.  
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The material-spiritual interplay in modern Chinese history 
Although the aforementioned map separates the modern from premodern at the 
year 1912 in terms of the change in political regime, the tension between the 
traditional empire and the modern nation state could be traced back to the late Qing 
period when China’s universal, self-centered worldview was challenged and smashed 
by Western imperialism (including Japan).  Theoretically, the historical discontinuity 
resulted from the abrupt intrusion of the West, with its military, material power and 
democratic, scientific spirit, which forced China to recognize the global space and 
yield the belief in “China as the world” to “China as a nation.” 12 
Regardless of the continual attempt of the Chinese scholars in the traditionalist 
group trying to reinterpret or reinvent Confucian doctrines to compete with Western 
ideas, and despite the radical iconoclasts’ intrinsic suspicion and doubt about 
westernization that led to the incomplete and bankrupt enlightenment, 13 the most 
influential opinion holds that the discursive development of modern Chinese history 
demonstrated that Western thought as a whole defeated Chinese thought, albeit in a 
selective and modified fashion, and the Western universal (such as Marxism) 
displaced the Chinese universal (Confucianism), which underlined the transition from 
a traditional empire to a modern nation state. As Joseph Levenson pointed out in the 
1960s, intellectual exchange between cultures will generate the expansion of language 
in both cultures, yet how far the new language will “travel” depends on the power 
                                                             
12 Scholars have demonstrated that the discovery of a global space shapes the Chinese nationalistic 
conception of China. For instance, Xiaobing Tang asserts that Liang Qichao’s idea of Chinese history 
was established on the basis of the idea of a global space, which allowed him eventually to perceive 
modernity in a new global imaginary of difference. Refer to Xiaobing Tang, Global Space and the 
Nationalist Discourse of Modernity: The Historical Thinking of Liang Qichao (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1996). Similarly, Edward Wang states that modern Chinese historiography was 
established against a transnational sensitivity. See Edward Wang, Inventing China Through History: 
The May Fourth Approach to Historiography (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001). 
13 For instance, in the Late Qing period, Kang Youwei radically reinterpreted Confucian thought to fit 
into the progressive world trend. In later periods, historians such as Gu Jiegang, Chen Yinke, were also 
trying to blend Confucian thinking with modern Western thought. See Hao Chang, Chinese Intellectuals 
in Crisis, and Edward Wang, Inventing China though History.  
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comparison between two societies. It is the military, political, and economic 
superiority of the West that determined that Western thought displaced Chinese 
thought. In his words,  
 
The effect of ideas in diffusion, the degree of their disarrangement of their 
fresh intellectual environment, depends, it seems, not on their disembodied 
character as abstract ideas but on how much of their mother societies they drag 
with them to the alien land. As long as one society is not being conclusively 
shaken up by another, foreign ideas may be exploited, as additional vocabulary, 
in a domestic intellectual situation. But when foreign-impelled social 
subversion is fairly underway (and that has been so in China, not in the West, 
and in China only in the nineteenth century and after), then foreign ideas begin 
to displace domestic.14 
 
It is fairly convincing to interpret intellectual exchange by means of power 
confrontation. Yet the “displacement model” cannot fully explain the uneasy 
acceptance of Western ideas (including the inventive exploitation of Western ideas) 
and the continual “return” of tradition in metamorphosis. The material-symbolic 
dynamic cannot completely fulfill the psychological need: the strong nationalistic 
sentiment that resisted the shift yielding recognition of China as the world to seeing it 
as a nation. On the one hand, nationalism demanded a glorious past as the basis of a 
shared community, thus it was epistemologically impossible to discard tradition totally 
and embrace foreign ideas; on the other hand, the rootlessness of the Western model 
inevitably encountered psychological resistance, especially in a country like China for 
which identity largely depended on its civilizational heritage.  
Levenson’s assertion, to be sure, has been the target of criticism for decades. 
As I have demonstrated above, Hao Chang and Metzger have reversed Levenson’s 
“impact-response” model, turning it into one of “internal demand-external solution” 
and attempted to bridge the continuity of Chinese intellectual tradition. Yet they also 
                                                             
14 Joseph Levenson, Confucian China and its Modern Fate (Berkeley & Los Angles, University of 
California Press, 1966), 158-9. 
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assigned the West an overwhelming role to rescue Chinese society, so that they failed 
actually to undermine the weight of Levenson’s “displacement” model.  
Just in this regard, I suggest using the term “substitution” instead of 
“displacement.” Borrowing from psychoanalytic theory, “substitution” signifies an 
inseparable relation to the origin. Insofar as “substitution” manifests shifting actions 
so as to at once reveal and conceal the root-seeking or root-questioning endeavor, it 
serves better than “displacement” to describe the discursive development of modern 
Chinese history. In this light, the mainstream Marxist discourse may not “displace” the 
traditional Chinese thinking once and for all, but merely appears as a conceptual 
“substitution” which is parallel and compatible with tradition. The difference between 
the substitutions, then, embodies in itself the theoretical residue that registers in time, 
a historical unconscious that determines the construction of the substitute and overall, 
links to its origin—the ancient Chinese Empire. In fact, as will be shown below, it is a 
traditional way of thinking that determines the triumph of Marxism in China. 
Indeed, from the late Qing on, the intellectuals’ pursuit of a national cure never 
detached itself from their strong nationalistic sentiment and by extension, their 
Chinese origin. Their diversified attitudes toward tradition were nothing other than the 
multifaceted “expressions” of the ever strengthened linkage to the motherland. The 
labels of “traditionalist,” “iconoclasts,” or “liberals” cannot do justice to any of them. 
The traditionalists were triggered by Western scientific knowledge and trying to 
reinvent tradition, the iconoclasts could not escape from their emotional tie to tradition 
to call for nationalism, and the liberals were not wholesale modernists intent on totally 
abandoning tradition.15 Hence, the seemingly rational choice made by any of them 
                                                             
15 Edward Wang, Inventing China through History (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 
2001), 3. 
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unavoidably cast an unconscious shadow that responded to the eternal call of the 
Chinese origin.  
Here, it seems necessary to distinguish “thought” from “thinking.”16 While 
thought could be petrified into a relic of the past which only bears historical 
significance, such as Confucianism, thinking could to some extent detach itself from 
thought and live in the present. While thought could be despised as the laggard in ruin, 
thinking nonetheless would be disguised as the historical unconscious to set the wheel 
of history in motion. It is the traditional way of thinking that consciously or 
unconsciously connected the Chinese intellectuals to tradition and determined their 
way to find “substitutions” for the tradition. This traditional way of thinking, which I 
will term the “imperial-time regime,” deems unity and morality as normal to construct 
a transcendent symbolic order that structures the political imperial order. In other 
words, the symbolic encompasses the material. While the political imperial order has 
been challenged and disdained, this transcendent moral order, detached from 
Confucianism, nonetheless has still organized the intellectual thinking in the modern 
period. In this sense, the continually updated intellectual quests for a national therapy 
were no more than the different prescriptions to respond to the moral call of the 
traditional symbolic order.  
Indeed, even though the intellectuals set out with the desire to search for power 
and wealth, the material-spiritual interplay was nevertheless continually directed 
toward the symbolic, ethical side. The highly mentalistic tendency inherited from 
traditional thinking prompted them to consider the primacy of spiritual, ideological 
power over material development, which was from the beginning against the Western 
scientific spirit, especially Marxism. From the debate on ti (substance) /yong (function) 
(Chinese learning as substance, and Western learning as function), to the debate on 
                                                             
16 Joseph Levenson made the distinction in his posthumous book Revolution and Cosmopolitanism.  
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kexue yu renshengguan (the relationship between science and the outlook on life), to 
the wholehearted embrace of Mr. Democracy and Mr. Science, till the acceptance of 
Marxism, the gradual shift in emphasis from Chinese thought to Western ideologies 
manifested the unsettled desire to find a substitute for Chinese learning that might 
serve as a moral and unifying equivalent, and would transcend the specific political 
regime or national boundary. The transplantation of Marxism, in this sense, was the 
successful answer to that moral call ingrained within tradition.  
Levenson observed that Marxism appealed to Chinese intellectuals in that it 
synthesized the iconoclastic and traditionalistic debate and addressed the 
psychological need of both “anti-feudalism” and “anti-imperialism.”17 By positioning 
tradition into history with only historical significance, “Communism,” Levenson 
wrote, “permits iconoclasm while sheltering an impulse to restore a tie with the 
past.”18 While this analysis is valuable in that it in a way rationalizes the choice of 
Communism in modern China, the antithetic division between China and the West 
nonetheless undermines the psychological dimension originating in tradition. Such a 
psychological dimension was made more explicit by Metzger. Metzger stated that 
Marxism, or Western thought in general, offered the frustrated Chinese intellectuals 
unprecedented optimism to escape from the moral predicament within China. 
Although he still cast the West in the redeemer’s role, he was careful to give credit to 
the indigenous heritage of moral ideas that facilitated the adaptation of Marxism in 
China. Moreover, this adaptation cannot be easily copied by other societies. “Just 
because he [Mao] has succeeded by depending on this heritage,” Metzger wrote, “he 
has failed to devise a universally valid path of development which can be readily 
                                                             
17 Levenson, Confucian China and its Modern Fate, 134-145. 
18 Ibid. 138. 
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followed by societies with basically different cultural traditions.”19 What is implicit in 
this statement is that the seemingly universal Marxism can only be universal by being 
matched with the specific cultural heritage. It is not Western Marxism that “displaced” 
Confucianism, but the deeply rooted cultural orientation that transformed Marxism. 
Indeed, the adoption of Marxism in China manifested itself not so much as a product 
of rational analysis of Chinese society as the continuation of a traditional way of 
thinking. In Marx’s theory, socialist revolution could only take place in a highly 
industrialized society where material conditions prepare the mature working class to 
overthrow the hegemony of the bourgeois class. Infrastructure determines the 
superstructure, and the material condition determines the symbolic regime, not the 
other way around. However, in the Chinese case, at the very inception of Marxism, 
material condition was regarded as secondary to the universal and moral value 
manifested in the revolutionary theory. Arif Dirlik observed that although the Chinese 
intellectuals became acquainted with Marxism as early as the 1910s, “their grasp of 
historical materialism remained superficial through the early twentieth.”20 In other 
words, Marxism in China exhibited a reversal of Marxism by Marx. It is the idea of 
revolution and internationalism that addressed the Chinese intellectuals’ desire to find 
a substitute moral order, the idea that drove Chinese society to develop into 
socialism.21 In a society that lacked industrialization and a mature proletariat class, a 
society that was only later discovered as a “semi-feudal, semi-colonial society” 
                                                             
19Thomas Metzger, Escape from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China’s Evolving Political 
Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 233. 
20 Arif Dirlik, Revolution and History: The Origins of Marxist Historiography in China, 1919-1937 
(Berkeley, Los Angles, and London: University of California Press, 1978), 2. 
21 Dirlik argued that Marxist historical materialism provided a theoretical framework to explain the 
contemporary revolutionary change, which constituted a major appeal of Marxism to Chinese 
intellectuals. Yet I believe that the Chinese “material/revolutionary condition” was quite different from 
what Marx described in his theory. This only proved that the Chinese “discovered” their material 
condition later after they had already accepted the value of Marxism. It is the Idea of Marxism that 
drove the new conception of Chinese society, and the idea, from my view, was but the continuation and 
manifestation of traditional way of thinking.  
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according to Marxist historical materialism, Marxism in China revealed first and 
foremost its moral and universal symbolic value.  
Indeed, as a substitution for Confucianism, Marxism appealed to Chinese 
intellectuals not only for its ethical potential to achieve nationalism against 
imperialism, but also for its universal ideal to establish a utopian world order that was 
beyond narrowly-defined nationalism. Communism, the higher stage of socialism, 
provided such a classless, nationless blueprint for the future, which for better or worse, 
corresponded in their minds to the traditional ideal of Great Harmony or Grand Unity 
(da tong, 大同), an ideal of the unified empire in which all the subjects enjoy material 
and spiritual abundance. 22 
In sum, the interplay between the material and the spiritual, the attraction of 
Marxism in forms of both nationalism and internationalism, unconsciously manifests 
the all-encompassing traditional way of thinking, an imperial moral regime that is 
independent of, and transcendent over, the specific political and material conditions, 
which continually reveals its unifying, perpetuating function in Chinese history. The 
totality of this moral order, which I characterize as the “imperial-time regime,” is from 
the very beginning bound up with the vision of empire, of time, and of moral agency, 
and is resilient enough to produce its own sub-regime to outlive any specific historical 
periods, including the modern era.  
 
                                                             
22 Guo Moruo once participated in a debate with the nationalists about whether Marxism was good for 
nationalistic pursuit. He argued that the higher stage of Communism, like the Confucian notion of the 
Great Harmony, would create a classless, nationless world, which is trans-nationalistic. Yet before that 
utopian world, Communism has to be centered on building the nation state with a proletarian class, 
which is in nature nationalistic. Thus, there is no contradiction between nationalism and trans-
nationalism in Communism. See Guo Moruo, “Xin guojia de chuangzao” (The creation of the new 
nation) in Hongshui (Torrent), Vol1, issue 8. 1926. See创造社资料 (Materials of Chuangzao society), 
伊藤虎丸, ed.,  (東京: アジア出版, 1979), Vol. 6, 255.  
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The imperial-time regime 
Traditionally, the historical consciousness is the one that closely correlates 
with the conception of Empire, whose unification is deemed normal and moral. Since 
the birth of the Chinese Empire, unification and morality have been bound together, 
and the ultimate morality resides in the “Mandate of Heaven” (tian ming 天命) or the 
“Intention of Heaven” (tian yi 天意), a concept that gives the ruling house legitimacy 
to rule and is in tune with the cosmic-imperial order in which Heaven, Earth, and 
Humanity are in harmony. This imperial moral order, articulated and institutionalized 
in the Han Dynasty, was believed to have been perfectly fulfilled in the Western Zhou 
period (1065-771BCE). According to Confucian canons, the early Zhou period offers 
an idealized model of utopian empire with the perfect fusion of unification and 
morality. The later imperial regimes should look up to, and model themselves after, 
this lost utopia in the past golden age to restore or maintain order. The nostalgic 
longing for a nonexistent past not only sets the moralistic tone for the Chinese 
imperial order, but also doubles the imperial vision by differentiating the imagined 
past ideal from the imperfect present reality. From the fissure between the ideal and 
the reality emerges both the moral constraint for the present emperors and the moral 
authority for the past sages. Scholars have suggested that Confucian canons have 
established such a superior moral order transcending specific historical periods that the 
“uncrowned King” Confucius could survive the entirety of Chinese history. 23 
Emperors, and their associated empires, have to insert their political institutions into 
this imperial moral order to justify their rule, not the other way around. 
However, the lasting influence and authoritative power of this imperial moral 
order do not lie in the presence of any absolute moral agency, but in contrast, in its 
absence. The Sage, or rather, the sages, are by and large the instrument of a totalizing 
                                                             
23 Michael Nylan, The Five Confucian Classics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001). 
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morality. Just as Confucius claimed that he was merely a transmitter of the past sages’ 
morals, all the sages function as the messenger, instead of the creator, of this imperial 
moral order. Heaven, as an absolute deterministic figure, fills the void of moral agency, 
which demonstrates its omniscient presence with absence as such.  
For instance, Xunzi (荀子), a prominent disciple of Confucius, once discussed 
the Dao (Way)-in-Heaven mechanism in his rather notorious “Discourse about 
Heaven” (Tianlun, 天论) in this way:  
 
The course of Nature (tian天) is constant: it does not survive because of the 
actions of a Yao; it does not perish because of the action of a Jie. If you 
respond to the constancy of Nature’s course with good government, there will 
be good fortune; if you respond to it with disorder, there will be misfortune. If 
you strengthen the basic undertakings and moderate expenditures, Nature 
cannot impoverish you. If your nourishment is complete and your movements 
accord with the season, then Nature cannot afflict you with illness. If you 
conform to the Way and are not of two minds, then Nature cannot bring about 
calamity….If you ignore the basic undertakings and spend extravagantly, then 
Nature cannot enrich you…..If you turn your back on the Way and behave with 
foolish recklessness, then Nature cannot bring good fortune. Accordingly, 
there will be famine when neither flood nor drought has come, there will be 
sickness when neither heat nor cold has reached you, and there will be 
misfortune even though inauspicious and freak events have not occurred. 
Although the seasons are received just the same as in an orderly age, the 
catastrophes and calamities will be of a different order [of magnitude] from 
those of an orderly age; and you can have no cause to curse Nature, for these 
things are the consequences of the way that you have followed. Accordingly, if 
you understand the division between Nature and mankind, then you can 
probably be called a “Perfect Man.”24 
 
天行有常，不为尧存，不为桀亡。应之以治则吉，应之以乱则凶。强本
而节用，则天不能贫；养备而动时，则天不能病；循道而不贰，则天不
能祸。⋯本荒而用侈，则天不能使之富；⋯倍道而妄行，则天不能使之
吉。故水旱未至而饥，寒暑未薄而疾，妖怪未至[生]而凶。受时与治世
同，而殃祸与治世异，不可以怨天，其道然也。故明于天人之分，则可
谓至人矣。 
 
                                                             
24 Xunzi, Tian Lun. Translated by John Knoblock, in Xunzi—A Translation and Study of the Complete 
Works (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), Vol III, 14-5. 
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According to Xunzi, there is an intrinsic order inside Heaven/Nature, and it is 
the order of Heaven that shapes the human order, the pattern of history. The difference 
between good fortune and bad fortune thus resides in the way human beings obey the 
Heavenly order. If one behaves like the sage ruler Yao following the Way of Heaven, 
Heaven will respond with blessings; however, if one acts like the brutal ruler Jie, 
Heaven will deliver punishment to the kingdom. Therefore, it is the contemporary 
ruler’s responsibility to seek the order of Heaven and follow the way of ancient sages. 
The mechanism of “obey-Heaven-and-imitate-antiquity” (feng tian er fa gu 奉
天而法古) was most explicitly articulated in the Chunqiu fanlu (春秋繁露) by Dong 
Zhongshu (董仲舒, a Confucian scholar-official in the Han Dynasty): 
 
The Dao (Way) of spring and autumn (history, or time) is to accord to Heaven 
and imitate antiquity. Therefore, if you don’t build using compass and square, 
even with skillful hands, you cannot correct the round or square shape; if you 
don’t practice the six tones (liulü), even with alert ears, you cannot set the five 
pitches; if you don’t study the ancient kings, even with great intuition, you 
cannot pacify all under Heaven (Tianxia). However, the bequeathed Way of 
the ancient kings is also the compass and square and the tones of all under 
Heaven! Consequently, the sages obey Heaven, and the virtuous imitate the 
sages, thus is the deterministic way (da shu). If one obtains this deterministic 
way, the world will be in order; if one loses the deterministic way, the world 
will be in disorder. This sets the difference between order and disorder. It is 
said that there is no more than one Way (dao) of all under Heaven, so even if 
there is difference among the sagely rulers, they basically follow the same 
principle. The present and antiquity can communicate with ease. This is why 
the ancient sages bestowed their principles on the later generations.  
 
春秋之道，奉天而法古。是故虽有巧手，弗修规矩，不能正方圆；虽有
察耳，不吹六律，不能定五音；虽有知心，不览先王，不能平天下；然
则先王之遗道，亦天下之规矩六律已！故圣者法天，贤者法圣，此其大
数也；得大数而治，失大数而乱，此治乱之分也；所闻天下无二道，故
圣人异治同理也，古今通达，故先贤传其法于后世也。 
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For Dong Zhongshu, there is only one principle of Heaven which transcends time and 
space and still lives in the present, yet there could be multiple ways of actualizing the 
Heavenly Dao. The one-multiple schema in Dong’s statement at once confirms the 
transcendent Heavenly Way and the contingency of human behavior. The hierarchy 
that he sets among Heaven, sages, and virtuous men in terms of morality suggests a 
temporal gap defined by moral order within the present. Human agency in this regard 
exhibits itself as no more than the limited moral practitioner subsumed under the order 
of antiquity. Falling along a spectrum that ranges between impossible poles of 
definitive agency and inevitable lack, Heaven in this way gives rise to the speculation 
that the ultimate moral subjectivity is time, and it is time with its moral import that 
engenders the enduring centripetal forces along Chinese history.  
Indeed, as Gilles Deleuze observed, time is the ultimate subjectivity. It is we 
who are internal to time, not the other way around. 25  This kind of historical 
consciousness, divergent from the Cartesian vision of the omnipotent human 
subjectivity, has been prevalent throughout Chinese history. However, in the Chinese 
view, far from being a natural, mechanistic, referential parameter outside human 
beings, time is intertwined with human activity. The moralization of time has at once 
stressed human agency and undermined this agency. The association of the past with 
authority and morality on the one hand deprives the present of its innovative agency; 
on the other hand, however, it manifests the temporal nature of this imperial moral 
order. Past legitimizes present and bespeaks future. Together it is time that constructs 
a moral order that is transmitted through the Sage’s mouth, one order that organizes 
the institutional imperial regime to become the instrument for its self-perpetuation. 
Meanwhile, in this moral order, unification is deemed normal and morality associated 
                                                             
25 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2—The Time Image. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson & Robert Galeta, (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 82-3. 
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with order, whereas disunity is seen as abnormal and immorality associated with 
disorder.  Time normalizes unification and universalizes morality, constituting an 
“imperial-time regime” which transcends specific historical periods and continually 
manifests its driving force for unification in Chinese civilization. The imperial court 
has to comply with this “imperial-time regime” to show that they have the “Mandate 
of Heaven” （tian ming天命）or the “Time of Heaven” (tian shi 天时) to legitimize 
the existence of the imperial court. It is time assigned with moral mission that 
continually reproduces itself, articulates itself, and perpetuates itself.  
However, the doubling structure of the “imperial-time regime,” the 
unavoidable gap between the past ideal and the present reality, suggests that time is 
split up as being both morally transcendent and amorally contingent in the present. 
Besides its unity-prone moral tendency, the “imperial-time regime” is accompanied 
with its own sub-regime, from which a morally neutral term “shi” (势) emerges. Shi, 
equivalent with [historical] force, or [historical] trend, signifies both historical 
determinism and the virtual possibilities intrinsic in the determinism. “The historical 
trend (shi) of Tianxia (all under Heaven) is one in which unification is determined to 
follow long-term disunity, and disunity is determined to succeed long-term 
unification.” So reads the opening line of the classic narrative Romance of the Three 
Kingdoms (Sanguo yanyi). Thus shi could point to either unification or division, the 
multifaceted virtuality in time, but unification, with its overpowering moral 
implication, still dominates disunity in the symbolic realm, and renders the imperial-
time regime a lasting one in Chinese history. In other words, whereas the imperial-
time regime as a paradigmatic in time manifests the transcendent moral order, shi, on 
the other hand, demonstrates that specific moments in history may not be transcended. 
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Time, in this regard, exhibits a dialectical interchange within itself between its two 
layers. It is at once concrete and universal, factual and normative. 26 
This notion of time, though institutionalized in Confucian canons, nevertheless 
cannot be reduced to Confucianism. Rather, it is a kind of imperial thinking instead of 
thought, embracing Confucianism, Daoism, and ancient dialectical thinking. On the 
other hand, rather than being impersonal and outside of human beings, the imperial-
time regime, in both its layers, is fundamentally humanistic. The shi, albeit amoral as 
such, is a kind of situational timeliness, not of empirical events but a humanly shaped 
milieu.27 
Indeed, time and history in the Chinese sense was the constant interplay 
between transcendent time and immanent human beings. Witnessing history and living 
in time, human beings immediately realized their limited agency to grasp the 
transcendence of time by means of their everyday moral behavior. By emulating the 
past sages, they were able to experience time in a both immanent and transcendent 
way. Chen Chi-yun described it as “immanent human beings in transcendent time.” 
Drawing a sweeping civilizational contrast between the ancient Greeks who tried their 
utmost to think transcendentally and the ancient Chinese who tended to thinking 
immanently, Chen asserted that the Chinese philosopher, particularly the Confucian 
thinker Xunzi (荀子), inclined to avoid seeking to understand the transcendent, since 
for him “human beings cannot but act immanently.”28 Yet while “knowing that 
‘transcendent time’ may be beyond their empirical reach, the Chinese nonetheless 
made endless trials to figure out their respective standing in time.”29 They were not 
                                                             
26 Chun-Chieh Huang, “‘Time’ and ‘Supertime’ in Chinese Historical Thinking,” in Notions of Time in 
Chinese Historical Thinking, eds., Chun-chieh Huang & John B. Henderson, (Hong Kong: The Chinese 
University Press, 2006). Introduction. 28. 
27 Ibid. 20. 
28 Chen Chi-yun, “Immanent Human Beings in Transcendent Time” in Notions of Time in Chinese 
Historical Thinking, eds., Chun-chieh Huang & John B. Henderson, 60.  
29 Ibid. 63. 
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unaware of the “realm of the transcendent as well as its ontic importance, but thought 
that this (the transcendent) could better be hinted at, or alluded to, rather than clearly 
represented and expressly discussed in mundane human terms.”30 
The “respective standing” of human beings in time, on the one hand 
manifested the consciousness of the impersonal force of time superimposed on human 
beings; on the other hand, however, confirmed the centrality of human agency in 
eliciting moral meaning through time. In fact, even though the historical shi-trend was 
outside individuals and out of control, what one could do was to follow the shi, 
directing it into its trend, and thus accomplish the moral meaning of time.  
Shi, observed Chun-chieh Huang, contained several characteristic features, 
among which events and human agency were two intertwined points that deserve our 
attention. According to Huang, shi, rather than a mere scattered “propensity of things,” 
is the dynamic trend among events. Thus, historians study events, “not because they 
are interested in events per se, but because they want to discern the shi stretching 
among the events.” Meanwhile, in all this inexorability of the shi, human agency plays 
a crucial role in grasping the shi to actualize Heaven’s will. Huang convincingly 
presented the prevalent occurrences of the notion of shi in the early texts prior to and 
during the Warring States period (403-256BCE) and explained the centrality of human 
activities in molding the shi and being molded by the shi. 31 Just as the old saying 
describes it, heroes mold shi while shi shapes heroes. Shi, therefore, is both material 
and spiritual, which constitutes a sense of contingency that allows human beings to act 
relatively freely in accordance with Heaven’s order. “Timeliness in situational flux, 
                                                             
30 Ibid. 65. 
31 Chun-chieh Huang, “‘Time’ and ‘Supertime’ in Chinese Historical Thinking,” in Notions of Time in 
Chinese Historical Thinking, 23. 
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shi,” Huang asserted, “is steered by human beings, whose destinies in turn are decided 
by shi. Such intermoldings constitute the history to be taught in later generations.”32  
Whereas the centrality of human activity is well stressed, it is important not to 
confuse the limited human agency with omniscient human agency in relation to time. 
As the Song Neo-Confucian scholar Zhu Xi (朱熹1130-1200) said, “Following shi to 
guide and lead on—of this only sages are capable.”33 While he acknowledged the 
function of the sages to participate in molding shi in history, the term “following” 
nonetheless gives rise to the ultimate agency as time, as Heaven, whose moral order 
determines the success or failure of the human activity.  
The rulers, emperors, thus, have to submit themselves to this imperial-time 
regime to display their sagely quality, following the shi-trend in order to create a 
peaceful world to fulfill the “Mandate of Heaven.”  Ye Shi （叶适, 1150-1223), a 
Neo-Confucian scholar of the Song dynasty, was explicit about the relationship 
between the emperors and the shi.  In his words, 
 
If one desires to govern all under Heaven without looking at its shi, then 
nothing under Heaven can be ruled…[Now] such ancient rulers as Yao, Shun, 
Yu, Tang, Wen, Wu, [emperors] Gaozu and Guangwu of the Han, and 
[emperor] Taizong of the Tang, all individually accomplished the shi of all 
under Heaven. Although their merits and virtues differed in greatness, [hence] 
their differences in the effectiveness of governance, they still wanted to 
shoulder the shi of all under Heaven onto themselves, not on anything 
outside…. Later generations saw shi to lie in things outside, not in oneself. 
Therefore, when the shi came, it came as if it were a flood and could not be 
stopped. What the rulers did was just to raise all their powers to help advance 
its tide. [This was done until the shi receded, and then fell] so that we could 
only sit and [idly] see [its recession], and no one could stop it, and the nation 
followed it to perdition. In fact, being unable to personally accomplish the shi 
of all under Heaven, vainly trying to solicit private safety by using petty laws 
of penalties and punishment to follow the shi of all under Heaven, this I your 
subject have not seen to work [at all]. 
                                                             
32 Ibid. 23. 
33 Zhu Xi, Zhuzi yulei. (The discourse of Zhu Xi), ed.,Li Jingde, (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981), vol 8, 
Zhuan 139, 3303. 
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欲治天下而不见其势，天下不可治矣。。。。古之人君，若尧、舜、
禹、汤、文、武、汉之高祖光武，唐之太宗，此其人皆能以一身为天下
之势；虽其功德有厚薄，治效有浅深，而要以为天下之势在己不在
物。。。。及其后世，天下之势在物而不在己，故其势之至也，汤汤然
而莫能遏，反举人君威福之柄以佐其锋；至其去也，坐视而不能止，而
国家随之以亡。夫不能以一身为天下势，而用区以刑法以就天下之势而
求安其身者，臣未见其可也。34 
 
Clearly, Ye Shi’s notion of Heaven and time is different from Xunzi’s 
seemingly mechanistic vision of Heaven in the earlier period. The Neo-Confucian’s 
self-reflexive mode to interiorize the moral principle of the world is well manifested in 
this passage. However, although Ye Shi declared the responsibility of the rulers to 
internalize and shoulder the shi of all under Heaven and to steer the shi to a positive, 
moral direction, shi by itself seems to be amoral, which could be flowing in either 
good or evil ways. If the ruler just lets the shi flow without any action or worse, takes 
advantage of the shi to reinforce his personal power instead of concerning all under 
Heaven, his rule will be doomed to being terminated shortly. By contrasting the sagely, 
successful rulers/emperors with the failed ones who could only make use of laws and 
punishment to gain private benefit, Ye Shi in effect distinguished the benevolent, 
moral shi actualized by the sagely rulers, which is connected to the shi of all under 
Heaven (hence the Mandate of Heaven), and the amoral shi which will shape the 
world into a chaotic state.  
                                                             
34 Ye Shi (叶适), “Zhishi” (治势) in Shuixin xiansheng wenji (Collection of essays by Ye Shi), Sibu 
congkan jibu, (Shanghai: Shangwu yishuguan, 1922), vol 2, juan 4.  This quote is also used by Chun-
chieh Huang. Yet Huang takes this quote to demonstrate that human agency is at the core of the 
formation of shi-trend. I take a different point of view. I think for Ye Shi, shi itself is amoral which 
could be steered to either positive or negative directions. It is the ruler’s responsibility to direct (rather 
than form) the shi in a positive, moral way as he interiorizes the moral principle of Heaven. Otherwise, 
if he takes advantage of the shi only to reinforce his own power, his rule won’t last, since he has lost the 
“Mandate of Heaven.” 
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Human agency, therefore, is moral. Only with morality, following the shi of all 
under Heaven, imitating the ancient sage rulers who embodied the Mandate of Heaven, 
could the rulers be able to maintain a unified, peaceful, prosperous empire (zhi shi 治
世). On the other hand, without morality, abusing the amoral shi for personal benefit, 
the rulers will lose the Mandate of Heaven and hence direct the empire into chaos 
(luan shi乱世). 
Such is the imperial-time regime, the symbolic moral order that continually 
enfolds the Chinese Empire (or empires in terms of different dynasties) into its 
ultrastable, cyclical pattern. The transcendent moral time, on the one hand confirms 
the human agency to follow the shi of all under Heaven, which structures the 
centripetal trend to maintain a unified imperial order. On the other hand, however, it at 
once undermines this agency by subjugating it to the remote past. Meanwhile, failing 
to follow the moral past will lead to chaos since the amoral shi will display its 
centrifugal force to pull the empire apart. Time, in this regard, perpetuates moral 
agency and manifests itself in a circular manner: it constantly articulates morality at 
times of unification yet meanwhile produces its own discontent generating disunity 
which again calls for unification. Perhaps, the dynastic cycle of Chinese history best 
annotates this imperial-time regime: its centripetal force dominates the centrifugal 
force and drives the Chinese imperial history into a cyclical, spiral pattern. It is time 
that subsumes the institutional empires and constantly manifests itself in a process of 
continuous folding, unfolding, and refolding. 35  
                                                             
35 The notion of fold was introduced by Deleuze in his discussion on Leibniz’s philosophy and Baroque 
aesthetics. For Deleuze, fold is a temporal concept that signifies the spatial-temporal dynamic in the 
process of subjectivation and identity formation. It is as if in a temporal dimension, a singular identity is 
closed in space yet open in time. It is time that becomes the ultimate exteriority whose folding is what 
constitutes the process of subject formation. See Gills Deleuze. The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, 
trans. Tom Conley, (Minneapolis:  University of Minnesota Press, 1993).  
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It is common to view time in imperial Chinese history as cyclical, yet it in no 
way means mere repetition without progression. As Chen Chi-yun pointed out, “the 
Chinese never claimed that real history (even dynastic history) or time ever ‘repeated’ 
itself.”36 Similarly, after studying the Confucian Classic Yijing (Book of Changes), Liu 
Shu-hsien asserted that the Yijing, famous for its dialectical thinking, did not teach a 
cyclical philosophy of history in terms of recurrent repetition. Rather, “each cycle 
offers a new content, which cannot be seen as a mere repetition or going by circles.”37  
Walter Benjamin once distinguished conceptions of time as pre-modern 
Messianic time and modern “homogeneous, empty time,”38 which inspired Benedict 
Anderson to take time as the point of departure to distinguish the imaginings of 
classical and modern communities.39 For Benjamin, Messianic time means that past 
and future coexist in the instantaneous present in the eyes of God, something eternal 
and omnitemporal.  On the other hand, the concept of “homogeneous, empty time” is 
one “in which simultaneity is, as it were, transverse, cross-time, marked not by 
prefiguring and fulfillment, but by temporal coincidence, and measured by clock and 
calendar.”40  Challenging Anderson’s radical division between the premodern and 
modern time, Prasenjit Duara reconstructed the continuity of history, stating that “we 
in the present together with our caller from the past, are coproducers of the past.” 
Thereby the present consists of the past—“It is more in the nature of a relay, a 
translation or a ‘return call.’”41  Indeed, in terms of its dialectical and morally 
                                                             
36 Chen Chi-yun, “Immanental Human Beings in Transcendent Time,” in Notions of Time in Chinese 
Historical Thinking, 48.  
37 Liu Shu-hsien, “On the Formation of a Philosophy of Time and History through the Yijin,.” in 
Notions of Time in Chinese Historical Thinking, 91-92. 
38 Waler Benjamin, Illuminations. Edited and with an introduction by Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn. 
(New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 263-4. 
39 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. 
Revised edition. (London & New York: Verso, 2006), 24. 
40 Ibid. 24. 
41 Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China 
(Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 73. 
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transcendent nature, the Chinese notion of time diverges from both the Messianic time 
and the homogeneous, empty time. Rather, it is a reconstructive approach to time, one 
that exhibits itself as analogous to Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche’s “eternal return.” 
Since any step further is made in reference to its origin (imagined origin), the Chinese 
time is the repetition with (qualitative) difference, which continually generates the 
ever-expanding spirals, instead of circles, pointing both to the past and the future.  The 
imperial-time regime, therefore, transcends time and space, organizing history into its 
cyclical-yet-progressive pattern.  
 
Historical unconscious: the imperial-time regime in modern times 
The all-encompassing imperial-time regime, as a way of thinking, does not 
cease to penetrate into the modern period. Instead, this double-layered symbolic 
regime reveals its paradigmatic resilience in a rather disguised way in a modern nation 
state. The imperial institution disappears, yet unification and its morality stays; human 
subjectivity emerges, yet the vision of history remains. In fact, the ready acceptance of 
historical teleology is manifested as nothing other than the strengthening 
consciousness of historical determinism. The difference merely lies in that one is 
forward-looking, the other is backward-and-forward-looking (in terms of its 
perpetuating value); one is materially dominant, the other is morally dominant. Yet, 
the moral crisis in the early capitalist development soon found its cure in Marxism. 
Indeed, the triumph of totalitarian Marxism in China proves no more than the 
unconscious survival of an imperial moral order that could both enunciate morality 
and transcend the national boundaries. The appeal of internationalism to modern 
Chinese demonstrates the undying impact of the imperial moral order and China’s 
persistent resistance to being confined within a national boundary.  
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In fact, as demonstrated earlier in this chapter, the adoption of Marxism as a 
substitution of Chinese thought has from the beginning differed from Marxist 
historical materialism in terms of China’s social condition, which nonetheless 
manifests the centuries-long vision of the relationship between the spiritual/moral and 
the material.42  
The significance of historical materialism in the evolution of modern Chinese 
historical outlook was most explicitly discussed by Arif Dirlik.43 Dirlik pointed out 
that the materialist conception of history provided a fundamentally new perspective 
and methodology for Chinese historians to write a “new” history of China. First, 
instead of discerning “moral lessons” from the scattered, non-causal events, the 
socioeconomic approach allowed the historians to “bind events together in a causal 
nexus and treat them as connected wholes.”44 Second, in contrast to Levenson’s vision 
that Marxism fulfilled Chinese intellectuals’ nationalistic sentiment by both negating 
Confucianism and negating imperialism, Dirlik argued that Marxist materialism 
offered a materially based theory to “explain the social dimensions of contemporary 
revolutionary change,” and “it also expressed in the realm of history the new, 
revolutionary paradigm of change.”45 
While there was indeed a materialistic overtone in modern Chinese historical 
thinking, Dirlik nonetheless overly simplified traditional historical thinking and 
shelved the difference between the Marxist principle and the Chinese applications. In 
one sense, the fact that the Chinese historians so overly identified with the ideological 
                                                             
42 The success of the Russian Revolution in 1917 provided a promising future for the Chinese 
revolutionaries regarding the Chinese socioeconomic condition, which prompted them to examine 
Chinese society and rewrite history with materialist sensitivity. Yet as scholars have demonstrated, the 
Chinese intellectuals were first drawn to Marxism for its ideological and universal value. 
43 Arif Dirlik, Revolution and History: the Origins of Marxist Historiography in China, 1919-1937 
(Berkeley, Los Angles, and London: University of California Press, 1978). 
44  E. G. Pulleyblank, “Chinese Historical Criticism,” in Historians of China and Japan, eds. 
W.G.Beasley and E.G.Pulleyblank, (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 152. 
45 Arif Dirlik, Revolution and History: the Origins of Marxist Historiography in China, 1919-1937, 18. 
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function of Marxism instead of its structural, material basis suggests that the 
superstructural ideal dominates the objective infrastructure, which is none other than 
the extension of the morality-driven historical way of thinking. Dirlik admitted that the 
Chinese Marxist historians often selectively ignored or dismissed the data that did not 
fit into their ideologically determinant preconceptions.46 Such a “defective” treatment 
of Marxist historiography unavoidably undermines the fundamental principle of 
materialism. In another sense, the desire to pursue revolutionary change in Chinese 
society was but another manifestation of the desire to seek the shi-trend among 
discursive events in traditional historical thinking.  
The deviation from Marxism in China’s revolutionary practice is keenly 
observed by Slavoj Zizek. Zizek asserted that Lenin’s theory of “the weakest link of 
the chain” extended the original Marxist theory, yet only with Mao was the original 
model radically abandoned.  Although Lenin accepted that the first revolution can take 
place not in the most developed country, but in a country in which antagonisms of the 
capitalist development are most aggravated, even if it is less developed, he still 
perceived the October Revolution as a risky breakthrough whose success could only 
be maintained by being followed with large-scale Western European revolution.47 
However, for Mao, the materialist Marxist model was totally reversed. Not only could 
the revolution be achieved in the least developed country, but the class struggle was 
reformulated as the contradiction between the First World "bourgeois nations" and the 
Third World "proletarian nations." Moreover, since the economic condition could not 
automatically engender socialist revolution, the communist ideal should lead to the 
assertion of the “primacy of politics over economy.”48  In Zizek’s words,  
                                                             
46 Dirlik, Revolution and History, 11. 
47 Slavoj Zizek, “Mao Zedong: The Marxist Lord of Misrule” refer to 
http://www.lacan.com/zizmaozedong.htm. This passage cannot be found in the published version when 
Zizek presents Mao’s On Practice and Contradiction (London & New York: Verso, 2007). 
48 Ibid. 
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The paradox here is properly dialectical, perhaps in the ultimate application of 
Mao's teaching on contradictions: its very underdevelopment (and thus "un-
ripeness" for the revolution) makes a country "ripe" for the revolution. Since, 
however, such "unripe" economic conditions do not allow the construction of 
properly post-capitalist socialism, the necessary correlate is the assertion of the 
"primacy of politics over economy": the victorious revolutionary subject 
doesn't act as an instrument of economic necessity, liberating its potentials 
whose further development is thwarted by capitalist contradictions; it is rather 
a voluntarist agent which acts AGAINST "spontaneous" economic necessity, 
enforcing its vision on reality through revolutionary terror.49  
 
Zizek confirmed the Maoist reversal of Marxism in terms of economy/political 
relations, and he saw the Chinese revision as a historical contingency only to be 
applauded or blamed as necessity later retroactively. Yet he did not resolve the 
contradiction between the “contingency” and “the voluntarist” agency: if the 
(collective) agent is voluntary, how come the revision becomes contingent? What’s 
the psychological conditioning for the agent to achieve such a “contingency”? To 
answer such a question we have to refer to the historical mode of thinking that 
determined this “contingent” change. Perhaps, the paradoxical “ripe” and “unripe” 
condition for the revolution, which is hard to understand in the Marxist framework, 
should be put into the historical shi-trend framework, which emphasizes the moral 
aspect over the economic aspect in the earlier uprisings and shifts of dynasties.   
Needless to say, such a discussion of historical continuity cannot avoid being 
subjectively simplistic, yet what I am trying to describe is a sense of historical 
unconscious that was translated into theoretical substitutions. Indeed, although on the 
surface, there are fundamental discrepancies between traditional historical thinking 
and Marxist historiography, the underlying assumptions on time and history 
nonetheless exhibit a similar pattern. Although the linear, progressive time in Marxism 
ostensibly contradicts the Chinese cyclical time, the Marxist periodization of history is 
                                                             
49 Ibid. 
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in effect perfectly compatible with Chinese historical thinking. Since the entire 
Chinese imperial history could be put into one phase “feudal society” in Marxist 
historiography,50 the cyclical pattern of Chinese history does not conflict with the 
Marxist overview of the progressive historical stages. On the contrary, the class 
analysis from another perspective explains the Chinese notion of shi and the moral 
agency of human beings. For Marx, the antagonism between classes in an exploitative 
society is determined to be intensified until a certain point, based on certain material 
conditions of the society, when the revolution breaks out and a new period comes onto 
the horizon. This periodization implies a sort of historical determinism that the 
revolutionary trend is irreversible and the exploited class will surely follow the trend 
when the revolutionary conditions are ripe. Echoing the Chinese notion of shi, Marxist 
historical periodization nonetheless offers a model to interpret the dynastic shift in 
Chinese history, in both moral and material senses. When the former dynasty has lost 
the “Mandate of Heaven” (usually the starved peasants rose to rebellion, and the 
material revolutionary condition is mature), the sagely rulers will grasp the shi to 
insert a new dynasty (period) into history in succession of the former. In this regard, 
the Marxist historical thinking turns out to be no more than another form of the 
imperial-time regime, with the latter determining the very acceptance of the former.51  
                                                             
50 There were debates on Chinese historical periodization according to Marxist historiography during 
the 1930s and 1940s. Yet after 1949, the five-stage history became the orthodox version of Chinese 
historical periodization. See Arif Dirlik, Revolution and History.   
51 For instance, the Marxist historian Shi Cuntong (Shih Ts’un-t’ung) once introduced the idea of 
historical materialism. Although he stressed the socioeconomic basis for the revolutionary 
consciousness in terms of the conflict between the relations and forces of production, he nonetheless put 
the material conditions as the deterministic element for the revolution. “When the material conditions 
are ripe,” he said, “all questions are resolved.” Material conditions determine the revolutionary 
consciousness and the revolutionary result. For me, this material condition resembles a Chinese notion 
of shi, which is humanly formed yet out of individual control and historically non-transcendable. See 
Shi  Cuntong, “Weiwu shiguan zai Zhongguo de yingyong” (The application of historical materialism 
in China), in Shehui zhuyi taolun ji (Discussions on Socialism) (Shanghai: Xin Qingnian Society, 1922), 
427-8. A more specific discussion on historical time was made by the Japanese Marxist scholar Tosaka 
Jun (1900-1945). In my view, he incorporated Bergson’s notion of duration with Nietzsche’s “eternal 
return” and the traditional notion of “shi-trend.” After arguing that time is heterogeneous instead of 
homogeneous, he asserted that periodization of history depends on the character (content) of history, 
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In fact, since the very inception of Marxism, it has been seen as the arrival of a 
new “historical trend” and it is the Chinese people’s responsibility to grasp this trend 
in order to enter into a new period of history. In 1918, upon the success of the socialist 
revolution in the Soviet Union, Li Dazhao published two articles to celebrate the 
victory of the working class and Bolshevism. For him, it was “the victory of the new 
tide (chao liu 潮流) of the 20th century,”52  and “we should be clear that we can only 
follow this tide, not resist this tide.” (emphasis mine).53 Socialism is the irresistible, 
legitimate trend of the world. “Such mighty rolling tides are indeed beyond the power 
of the present capitalist governments to prevent or stop, for the mass movement of the 
twentieth century combines the whole of mankind into one great mass. The efforts of 
each individual within this great mass…will then be concentrated and become a great, 
irresistible social force… In the course of such a world mass movement, all those 
dregs of history that can impede the progress of the new movement—such as emperors, 
nobles, warlords, bureaucrats, militarists, and capitalists—will certainly be destroyed 
as though struck by a thunderbolt.”54 Such a voluntaristic and deterministic attitude to 
embrace Marxism and socialism, according to Maurice Meisner, manifests Li’s effort 
to resolve a Marxist dilemma over how to reconcile economic determinism and 
political activism. In his comprehensive study on Li Dazhao, Meisner observed that 
                                                                                                                                                                               
which is in turn determined by the material relations and forces of production. Yet the character is not 
something human beings can just think up or create, it is produced by history itself. “Character is like 
the fruit which when ripe, on its own it drops from the tree of history. When it does fall, people must 
catch it without fail. It is best to say that people only discover certain characters within history. But it 
must also be said that in what manner people faithfully receive this fruit depends on the character of the 
people themselves.” For me, this is the Confucian way of thinking about history, the exteriority of shi-
trend and the interiority of human’s grasp of that shi-character. See Tosaka Jun, “Nichijosei no genri to 
rekichiteki jikan” (The Principle of Everydayness and Historical Time) (1934), trans. Robert Stolz. 
Translated from Tosaka Jun zenshu, vol.3 (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1966), 95-104. 
52 Li Dazhao, “Bolshevism de shengli” (The victory of Bolshevism), in Xin qingnian (New youth), Nov 
15, 1918. See Chen Shouli, ed., Zhongguo xiandai wenxue shiliao zhaibian, vol 1, 26. 
53 Li Dazhao, “Shumin de shengli” ( The victory of the ordinary people), in Xin qingnian (New youth), 
Oct. 15, 1918. See Chen Shouli, ed., Zhongguo xiandai wenxue shiliao zhaibian, vol 1, 24. 
54 Li Dazhao, “Bolshevism de shengli,” 26. Also cited and translated by Maurice Meisner in Li Ta-chao 
and the Origins of Chinese Marxism, 68. 
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Li’s pre-Marxian worldview and social activism determined his inventive 
interpretation of Marxist principle. By interpreting China as a “proletarian nation” in 
which the internal proletarian class did not really exist and the collective moral 
endeavor as the fundamental materiality of revolution, Li was able to turn the material 
disadvantage into advantage to achieve the revolutionary goal. In Meisner’s words:  
 
From perceiving Bolshevism as a portent of the long-awaited rebirth of the 
Chinese nation it was but a short step to perceiving this national rebirth as an 
integral part of the universal forces of regeneration, represented by the world 
proletarian movement. Although certain aspects of Marxian historical 
determinism had appeals of their own, Marxist theoretical considerations were 
not to be allowed to stand in the way of China’s alliance with the new forces of 
historical reformation. In Li Ta-chao’s optimistic and dialectical world view, 
disadvantages were converted into advantages to consummate this alliance 
with history. If China lacked a developed urban proletariat to carry on the class 
struggle, then the whole nation must be looked upon as part of the world-wide 
forces of proletarian revolution. If the economic preconditions for the 
realization of socialism were absent in China, then the socialist reorganization 
of Chinese society was all the more necessary to achieve these very 
preconditions. 55 (154) 
 
To Meisner, Li’s voluntaristic and nationalistic interpretation of Marxism was 
indebted to his pre-Marxian world view in which “by activity in the present the 
individual could become identified with the great progressive ‘tide of reality’ and 
reach a future where ‘the universe is the ego and the ego is the universe.”56 This 
metaphysical understanding of time and history, seen by Meisner as one that is similar 
to the philosophy of Henri Bergson,57 compatible with the Neo-Confucian impulse to 
transform the self and the society investigated by Metzger, in effect reveals the 
penetrating power of the imperial-time regime. 
                                                             
55 Maurice Meisner, Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1967; reprinted New York: Atheneum, 1979), 154.  
56Ibid. 51. 
57 Ibid. 49. 
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If Li Dazhao (1889-1927), the early Chinese Marxist and one of the founders 
of the Communist Party, is seen as the immature Marxist in modern China whose 
statement does not represent the evolution of Chinese Marxism, Guo Moruo, the 
prominent Marxist historian and writer in Mao’s regime, still never gave up building 
the link between Marxism and Confucianism, which suggests that there is something 
that allows the two thoughts to be completely compatible. In Guo’s imaginative 
writing, Marx came to China to meet Confucius, only to find out that Confucius was 
his Chinese “comrade.” “I have never thought that two thousand years ago,” Marx said, 
“in the Far East, there was already such an old comrade [like you]. Our opinions are 
totally in accord.”58 Later, in 1948, after Guo had become a more mature Marxist 
historian, he still held the opinion that Communism was but the modern manifestation 
of the ancient Confucian ideal da tong (大同，Great Harmony or Grand Unity). In an 
article addressed to overseas Chinese, Guo juxtaposed Mao Zedong, Sun Zhongshan 
(Sun Yat-sen), and Mencius, implying that they all shared the same ideal about “Great 
Harmony.” In his words, 
 
Please think about it: what is too radical about Mr. Mao’s thought? Isn’t the 
land reform the realization of Mr. Sun Zhongshan’s idea that “whoever works 
on the land will have his own land?” To speculate further, isn’t it the 
realization of what Mencius dreamed about in the well-field system (jing tian 
zhi 井田制) more than two thousand years ago? Mr. Mao is surely a disciple of 
Communism, yet isn’t Communism the reification of what Confucius 
advocated as the Great Harmony or the Grand Unity (da tong 大同) more than 
two thousand years ago? …. Therefore, strictly speaking, Mr. Sun Zhongshan 
should also be a Communist. Even Confucius and Mencius who lived more 
than two thousand years ago might be Communist Party members had they 
been born in the present period.59 
                                                             
58 Guo Moruo, “Makesi jin wenmiao” (Marx came to the Confucian temple) in Hongshui (Torrent) 
1925, Vol1, Issue 7, 1925. See 伊藤虎丸, ed., 创造社资料 (Materials of Chuangzao society) (東京: ア
ジア出版, 1979), Vol. 6, 245. 
59 Guo Moruo, “Wei meidi furi xiang aiguo qiaobao huyu” (To the overseas patriotic compatriots about 
American imperialists supporting the Japanese), in Yingjie xin Zhongguo (Welcome New China), 
(Shanghai: Fudan xuebao, 1979), 53. 
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Critics have pointed out that Guo in fact radically reinvented and reinterpreted 
Confucian thoughts in order to fit into the Marxist framework.60 Yet in so doing, what 
he was trying to accomplish was to insert Marxism into China and legitimize it 
through Confucian doctrine. Confucianism, to him, rather than the feudal thought 
ossified in history, but was a sort of spirit, a way of thinking, one that called for great 
morality and responsibility for the benefit of the people, which was completely 
compatible with Marxism and Communism. The historical continuity he created, 
which on the surface diverted from the historical periodization in terms of materialist 
conditions, in effect manifested the universal historical thinking transcending specific 
time and space. Marxism, instead of aggressively intruding in China to reveal a 
Western universal, was actually drawn into China by legitimizing it as the traditional 
way of thinking. It is the imperial-time regime that welcomed Marxism and testified to 
its being the orthodox ideology in modern Chinese history.61  
 
The vision of moral agency: min-ren-renmin  
To be sure, the Marxist historiography promotes the people as the ultimate 
subject and legitimate agency to push history forward, a vision against the historical 
thinking that the ultimate moral agency resides in Heaven. While historically, the 
sages or the sagely rulers had the responsibility to shoulder the “Mandate of Heaven,” 
the common people, or the petty men, xiaoren (小人) or min （民）, were but the 
                                                             
60 Chen Yongzhi. Guo Moruo sixiang zhengti guan (A view on the whole of Guo Moruo’s thought) 
(Shanghai: Shanghai wenyi chubanshe, 1992),184. 
61 Needless to say, Confucianism was constantly reinvented and reinterpreted in different social 
circumstances. I suggest distinguishing thought and thinking, and distinguishing the hierarchy and the 
Great Harmony in Confucianism. In other words, Confucianism was reinterpreted in different ways. In 
Mao’s regime, especially during the Cultural Revolution, Confucianism was attacked for its hierarchy 
when class struggle was the major concern of the society. Yet when the construction of the nation rose 
to be the highest objective, Confucianism became the unifying force to blend with Marxism in the 
project of nation building.  
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subjects to be led by the gentlemen. Min, according to Xu Shen’s Shuowen jiezi (说文
解字)—one of the earliest dictionaries composed in the Han Dynasty, initially 
meaning “ignorant children,” later referred to those who were illiterate, unenlightened, 
and uninformed.62 Seemingly in opposition to the well-informed gentlemen, incapable 
of recognizing the shi or Dao (the way) of Heaven, min nonetheless were inextricably 
connected to the notion of all under Heaven (tianxia 天下). A ruler who desired to 
govern all under Heaven had to get the support from min. That “He who wins over the 
hearts of people will govern all under Heaven,” (de minxin zhe de tianxia 得民心者得
天下) a saying evolved from Mencius (Mengzi, 孟子),63 not only set a moral 
constraint for the ruler, but also placed the min at the heart of Heaven. Therefore, to 
recognize the shi–trend of all under Heaven was to recognize the importance of 
people’s force. In a sense, the shi, inexorable as if it were coming from Heaven, 
resided in the very heart of the people. The moral agency of the gentlemen and the 
sagely rulers was thus centered on seeking the satisfaction from min in order to fulfill 
the “Mandate of Heaven.” Rather than that the social unity absolutely expressed in the 
“body of the despot” as Marx defined the “Oriental despotism” in terms of Asiatic 
mode of production,64 the emperor unavoidably experienced a sense of dialectical 
                                                             
62 Xu Shen, Shuowen jiezi (说文解字). In ancient times, min (民) was equivalent with meng (萌）。
“民，众萌也。萌，古本者不误。毛本作氓。非。古为民曰萌。。。萌，犹懵懵无知儿也。” 
Annotated by Duan Yucai.  
Refer to http://www.gg-art.com/imgbook/index.php?bookid=53&columns=&stroke=5 
63 Mencius, Li Lou 1 (离娄上). “桀纣之失天下也，失其民也；失其民者，失其心也。得天下有
道：得其民， 斯得天下矣；得其民有道：得其心，斯得民矣；得其心有道：所欲与之聚之，所
恶勿施尔也.” 
Mencius said, “Jie and Zhou's losing the throne, arose from their losing the people (min), and to lose the 
people means to lose their hearts. There is a way to get tianxia (all under Heaven): get the people, and 
tianxia is got. There is a way to get the people: get their hearts, and the people are got. There is a way to 
get their hearts: it is simply to collect for them what they like, and not to lay on them what they dislike.” 
Refer to The Works of Mencius, trans. James Legge, in The Chinese Classics, vol 2, (Hong Kong: Hong 
Kong University Press, 1960), 299-300. Note that Legge translated “Tianxia” as “kingdom,” I believe 
that “all under Heaven” is better.  
64 Karl Marx. Grundrisse, trans. Martin Nicolaus (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), 472-3.  Marx wrote: 
“In most of the Asiatic land-forms, the comprehensive unity standing above all these little communities 
appears as the higher proprietor or as the sole proprietor…the relation of the individual to the natural 
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reversal that involves “a painful ‘decentering’ of the consciousness of the individual 
subject,” to borrow Fredric Jameson’s words, “whom it confronts with a determination 
(whether of the Freudian or the political unconscious) that must necessarily be felt as 
extrinsic or external to conscious experience.”65  
The interdependence between the rulership and the people, though attacked for 
its hierarchy and suffocation of individuality in the May Fourth period, nevertheless 
implies a sense of metastable collective, unconscious acceptance to take on the moral 
agency to push history forward. In fact, this unconscious collectivism never ceases to 
manifest its deterministic or fatalistic power over the individual’s fate. During the May 
Fourth movement, although the iconoclastic intellectuals articulated their enthusiasm 
and determination to free the individual from feudal institutions, the attempt to recover 
the free-loving, humanitarian, individualistic society proved to be no more than a 
bankrupt endeavor. The call for ren (人，human), as against min (people), was aimed 
to draw out the consciousness of individualism in order to enlighten the whole nation.  
However, falling between the extreme poles of absolute freedom and ultimate fatalism, 
the individuals found themselves incapable of achieving the freedom. As Sabina 
Knight effectively demonstrates, the limited, if not futile, moral agency exhibited in 
individual subjects and the constant surrender to fatalism and historical circumstances 
in modern narratives imply the undying influence of the traditional way of thinking.66  
In this light, a socialist collectivism seems to respond to a collective 
unconscious in historical thinking. The construction of a collective subjectivity, 
renmin (the People, 人民), in contrast both to ren in terms of individualism and to the 
                                                                                                                                                                               
conditions of labor and of reproduction…appears mediated for him through a cession by the total 
unity—a unity realized in the form of the despot, the father of many communities—to the individual, 
through the mediation of the particular commune.” 
65 Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), 283. 
66 Sabina Knight, The Heart of Time: Moral Agency in Twentieth-Century Chinese Fiction. Harvard 
East Asian Monographs, (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2006), 274. 
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traditional notion of the unenlightened min, endows the people with both historical 
consciousness and moral agency in pushing history forward. To some extent, renmin 
is the extension of min. While min composes the majority of tianxia (all under Heaven) 
and embodies the shi of all under Heaven, renmin exhibits a similar sense of 
universalism in that it represents all the (working) people in the world. Renmin, the 
people, not only signifies the working people, workers and peasants alike (including 
intellectuals), in China, but also includes the working class internationally. As 
Levenson observed, the notion of renmin manifested a sense of cultural 
cosmopolitanism, bearing both nationalism and internationalism for its class based 
ideological cause.67  
Indeed, the Chinese notion of renmin as the ultimate historical force seems to 
fall back on the ethical/spiritual track in the traditional way of thinking, rather than 
being based on the Marxist definition of a social class determined by the material 
condition. Renmin, the effect of an abstract ideological construction, during the 
Chinese praxis of revolution, first and foremost manifested itself as the theoretically 
legitimate force in building the superstructure rather than the infrastructure. As Mao 
Zedong articulated it in his famous philosophical work “Maodun Lun” (On 
Contradiction), the relationship between the infrastructure and the superstructure is 
one that is dialectical and interdependent, and the determinant position between them 
is interchangeable. Normally the infrastructure, the economic condition and the force 
of production alike, determines the superstructure, yet sometimes, in certain conditions, 
the superstructure, such as theories, the relation of production, determines the 
infrastructure.68 The people’s interests and the relations among them, thus, not only 
                                                             
67 Joseph Levenson, Revolution and Cosmopolitanism (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University 
of California Press, 1971), 7-8. 
68 Mao Zedong, “Maodun Lun” (On contradiction).  
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legitimate the function of the Communist Party, but sometimes determine whether the 
force of production is progressive or backward.  
In 1946, after the nationwide civil war broke out between the GMD (the 
Nationalist Party) and the CCP (the Communist Party), Mao agreed to an interview 
with American journalist Anna Louise Strong. During the interview, he articulated the 
assertion that “all the reactionaries are paper tigers.” The American atomic bomb, the 
American-supported Nationalist army, even though they have advanced military 
technology and newly developed weapons, only seem frightening on the surface, Mao 
said, “but in the long run, the real strong power doesn’t reside in the reactionary 
cliques, but in the people.” “The reason is none other than that the reactionary cliques 
represent reaction, yet we represent progress.”69 The judgment for “reaction” or 
“progress,” hence, does not lie in the level of technological development, but in 
ethical/spiritual superiority. The people’s strength, then, is the materialist conditioning 
on which the victory of the military confrontation relies. It is not that Mao dismissed 
the real power of the new technologies; on the contrary, he knew exactly how difficult 
it was to face such a powerful enemy. What is implied is the historical consciousness 
which transcends the immediate material conditions. “In the long run,” (as long as the 
people consciously pursue their justifiable cause), victory must belong to them 
(renmin).  
Such a collective consciousness, not only interacts with different forces on the 
same battle field, but also resonates with history in time. It is more historical than 
Marxist materialist. Zizek observed that Mao’s philosophy contains a sense of “cosmic 
perspective” in that Mao not only perceived human life as instrumental to pursue the 
national blueprint, but also viewed the entirety of humanity as just a small part of the 
                                                             
69 Mao Zedong, “He meiguo jizhe Anna-luyisi-sitelang de tanhua” (The talk with American journalist 
Anna Louise Strong) in Mao Zedong xuanji (The Selective Works of Mao Zedong), vol 4. 
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universe which cannot change the order of the universe as a whole.70 When Mao 
declared the Chinese people’s confidence to face the threat of America’s atomic bomb, 
what underlay his confidence was the ethical-political spirit in the cosmic order:  
 
The United States cannot annihilate the Chinese nation with its small stock of 
atom bombs. Even if the U.S. atom bombs were so powerful that, when 
dropped on China, they would make a hole right through the earth, or even 
blow it up, that would hardly mean anything to the universe as a whole, though 
it might be a major event for the solar system.71 
 
According to Mao, humanity’s self-destructive behavior will not destroy the cosmic 
ethics at large; or in other words, the justifiable collective moral cause will spiritually 
triumph over the mighty material power since in the long run, “victory belongs to the 
people.”  
This collective, “cosmic perspective” manifests the extreme understanding of 
the imperial-time regime: the interest of the people was abstracted in such a way that, 
not only renmin (the people) became instrumental to the national goal, but renmin 
could triumph over any immediate material conditions to realize the goal. The 
overemphasis on renmin’s force beyond the objective material constraints was most 
badly performed in an irrational and unrealistic way in the Great Leap Forward in the 
late 1950s. It was as if the ideal, or structural, moral superiority, could transcend the 
specific material conditions and guarantee a great leap forward in history.  
But soon history corrected itself. In the post-revolutionary era, Deng 
Xiaoping’s slogan “seeking truth from facts” reveals that history cannot be 
transcended and again fused history with the traditional notion of shi (势), the 
                                                             
70 Zizek, “Mao Zedong: The Marxist Lord of Misrule.” Introduction in MAO: On Practice and 
Contradiction (London & New York: Verso, 2007), 10. 
71 Mao Zedong, “He meiguo jizhe Anna-luyisi-sitelang de tanhua” (The talk with American journalist 
Anna Louise Strong), in Mao Zedong xuanji (the Selective Works of Mao Zedong), vol 4. 
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historical force beyond individual human being’s control. The people might still be the 
subject creating history, but on the condition that time/situation allows them to be.  
If the claim for modern subjectivity and agency proves to be an incomplete, if 
not failed, endeavor, it nonetheless suggests that the ultimate historical agency is time. 
Moreover, the consciousness of time/era and its insuperable transcendence best 
corresponds to the imperial-time regime and its sub-regime. On the one hand, such a 
consciousness undermines human agency, be it individual or collective, as being 
limited in changing historical trends; on the other hand, nevertheless, it articulates the 
enduring power of the transcendent moral order which is fundamentally humanistic.  
This transcendent moral order, manifested in the notion of “Tianxia” (all under 
Heaven), later in “the people,” exhibits a sense of cosmopolitanism, a historical 
unconscious that resists being contained within a national boundary. Indeed, as 
mentioned above, the triumph of Marxism in China is no more than the substitution of 
a universalistic worldview determined by the all-encompassing imperial-time regime. 
Modern Chinese history, may be seen as a break from the premodern period (in terms 
of novel changes in social institutions, literary writing styles, technological 
developments, and disciplines of knowledge, etc.), yet from the perspective of 
historical thinking (in terms of empire and nation state), the imperial-time regime 
nonetheless bridges the gap between the modern and the premodern. Not only was the 
Marxist ideology transplanted and re-centered on Chinese soil so as to be compatible 
with the imperial-time regime,72 but traditional thinking, including Confucian and 
Daoist thinking, continually reappeared to accompany the modernization process. 
Even in the early 1970s when class struggle was the primary concern in Mao’s China, 
Levenson already asserted that historical thinking, specifically one form that was 
embedded in Confucianism, refused to be placed into a museum and petrified once 
                                                             
72 For this point, I will elaborate in the next chapter. 
45 
 
and for all as bearing just historical significance. In fact, this form of historical 
thinking was still alive and managed to survive under harsh political conditions.73 Had 
Levenson lived to witness the revival of guoxue (Chinese national learning) in the 
early 1990s and the blossoming TV representations of the Chinese Empire in the late 
1990s that rearticulate the notion of “Tianxia” (all under Heaven), he might ponder his 
earlier statement about Western thought displacing Chinese thought. 
Indeed, the transcendent imperial-time regime, be it conscious or unconscious, 
embodied in forms of Confucianism, Neo-Confucianism, New Confucianism,74 or 
Marxism, has always remained above and beyond social conditions in various 
historical periods, including modern times. The normalization of unification and 
moralization of time, most explicitly manifested in literary representations, draws the 
modern Chinese history back to its imperial origin, to time, always returning yet 
always progressing. The myth of Chinese Empire, told and retold throughout history, 
instead of being ossified in textbooks, nonetheless continually manifests its 
performative ability to pull the modern nation state into its self-construction and self-
perpetuation. History, in this regard, echoing Gilles Deleuze’s conception of a 
complexity system, is the master of itself, a closed set that folds within it the totality of 
certain social relations, yet meanwhile opens to time awaiting the qualitative change of 
those relations.75 And the change, according to Deleuze, is none other than the “eternal 
return” with metamorphosis. “The eternal return does not bring back ‘the same,’” 
Deleuze wrote, “but returning constitutes the only Same of that which becomes. 
                                                             
73 Joseph Levenson, Revolution and Cosmopolitanism.  
74 It is not my intention to distinguish these Confucian schools. Yet their evolving and differentiated 
existence demonstrates the resilient ability of Confucianism to survive different historical periods and 
social conditions, which from another angle explains the undying traditional way of thinking, rather 
than thought. 
75 Deleuze used to interpret Bergson’s notion of duree in terms of closed sets and open whole. For 
Deleuze, the open Whole manifests duration as universal vibration and flow (in the temporal realm), 
and the isolable sets within the Whole exhibit the characteristics of commonsense space and time (in the 
spatial realm). See Gilles Deleuze. Cinema I: The Movement Image, 20-22. 
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Returning is the becoming-identical of becoming itself.” “Only the extreme, the 
excessive, returns; that which passes into something else and becomes identical.”76 
The extreme, the excessive, in this regard, is the imperial-time regime, the virtual 
Whole that links to the incompossible actualizations of the Empire along history,77 the 
transcendent regime that continually points to the Chinese Empire that is still 
becoming.  
                                                             
76 Gilles Deleuze, Repetition and Difference, trans. Paul Patton, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1994), 41. 
77 I perceive the “imperial-time regime” as a virtual Whole in relation to the different actualizations 
(manifestations) of it in different time periods. For Deleuze, the relation between the virtual and the 
actual registers in time, and the virtual can only be conceived by actualization in space. Along the 
shifting processes of actualization, the virtual would also change, in a process of becoming, yet 
remaining as a Whole in relation to the singular actualizations. About this discussion, refer to Michael 
Goddard’s discussion on fold and monadic point of view. Each monad is absolutely singular and could 
not be encompassed in any over-arching point of view. Therefore, the monadic points of view cannot be 
incorporated in a higher unity in the actual sense. Only in relation to a virtual whole could the 
incompossible monadic points of view be actualized. See Michael Goddard, “The Fold, Cinema and 
Neo-Baroque Modernity,” in Impacts of Modernities (Traces 3), eds. Thomas Lamarre and Kang Nae-
hui, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004), 218-9. 
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CHPATER 2 
 
Between Empire and Nation State: the Symptomatic and the Paradigmatic 
 
We speak of processes rather than practices because, although processes are made up of the 
activities of individual and collective social agents, they operate across extended time-scales, 
and seem at times to work on their own, in performing the work of social transformation. 
                                                                         ---------Stuart Hall, The Formations of Modernity 
 
Modern Chinese literature, might be seen as a discursive practice involved in 
the ongoing formation of modernity, which embraces the formation of the modern 
subject and a modern nation state.78 As the literary critic Li Zehou pointed out, 
modern Chinese literature (1917-1949)79 could be characterized as double practices—
both parallel and alternating—of enlightenment and national salvation.80 Although this 
statement was questioned for its highly reductionist orientation,81 what is at stake is 
that ideas about and ideals of subject formation and modern nation building were 
central to the literary experience. Under the rubric of continuing modernization, 
subject formation indicates the discursive construction of individual subjectivity and 
collective subjectivity, which could be traced in the transformation of terminology: 
from “min” (mass, or people) to “ren” (human, or individual), then to “renmin” (the 
People), the transformation that plays out the changing relations between social 
                                                             
78 It is not my intention to define “modernity” or “modern nation state,” which is beyond the scope of 
this study. I only use the terms loosely for their conceptual values. 
79 Scholars on mainland China usually take 1917 (the eve of the May Fourth Movement) as the starting 
point of modern Chinese literature, and 1949 (the founding of the People’s Republic) as the endpoint. 
After 1949, it is considered as contemporary literature. I would take both the “modern” and the 
“contemporary” as “the modern period,” and, as many scholars in Chinese studies suggest, include the 
late Qing transitional period in the modern.  
80 Li Zehou, “Qimeng yu jiuwang de shuangchong bianzou” (the doubling practices of enlightenment 
and national salvation), in Zou xiang weilai （走向未来Toward the future） (Chengdu: Sichuan 
renmin chubanshe, v1, 1986). 
81 Cheng Guangwei, ed., Zhongguo xiandai wenxue shi (Modern Chinese literary history). (Beijing: 
China Remin University Press, 2000). He suggests that the enlightenment movements and national 
salvation create the tension under the rubric of modernization, yet not the only tension during 
modernization process. 4. 
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structure and human agency;82 the project of nation building, on the other hand, brings 
forth the tension between the traditional empire and the modern nation state, the 
tension that continually comes to terms with and destabilizes the conceptual model of 
the modern nation state.  
In both processes of subject formation and nation building, modernity appears 
to be a theoretical guideline that continually negotiates with the discursive 
developments over time. Modernity, according to Stuart Hall in his Formations of 
Modernity in the epigraph above, refers to multifaceted processes in which hybridity 
and heterogeneity are intrinsic characteristics of this conceptual model. To 
characterize it as “formations” rather than “practices,” then, privileges the temporal 
dimension over the spatial dimension during the process of modernization, privileges 
structural change over emergent social phenomena, and finally, privileges the 
paradigmatic over the symptomatic. “Formations,” he states, “then, in our title refers 
to both the activities of emergence, and their outcomes or results: both process and 
structure.” (Italic in the original text.)83   
In fact, the term “formation,” in its emphasis on temporal process [although 
form/ation is fundamentally a spatial concept], refers to both the Foucauldian 
discursive field (in which multiple social forces work together to construct temporary 
spatial relations)84 and the Deleuzian complexity field (in which temporal relations 
take over and history manifests its own pattern).85  Deleuze suggests that history 
                                                             
82 I have discussed this transformation in the previous chapter. 
83 Stuart Hall, Introduction of The Formations of Modernity, eds. Stuart Hall & Bram Gieben, (Oxford, 
UK: Blackwell Publishers Ltd & the Open University, 1992), 7. 
84 Although Foucault also emphasizes the temporal process of a social structure formed by different 
discourses, he mostly takes it as a universal historical model to construct one paradigm, rather than 
cross paradigms. So basically his model privileges spatial relationship over temporal relationship.  
85 Deleuze’s “Complexity theory” primarily appears in his A Thousand Plateaus, and his conception of 
time can be found in Repetition and Difference, Cinema 2—the Time Image, etc. For Deleuze, time is 
the ultimate subjectivity. It is that we live in time, not the other way around. The “complexity theory” 
suggests that the intrinsic paradox between structure and agency can be perceived in time. There are 
two parallel processes involved in this complexity field: one is the structural axis (power structure, 
domination, hierarchy, war machine, etc.), the other is the ethical axis, which is the life-affirming 
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develops itself along two paralleled axes: one is structural, in his term “stratification,” 
which means that the signifying regime determines hierarchy, domination, war 
machine, etc; the other is ethical, which is the life-affirming or life-destroying process. 
Inextricably intertwined and locked, these two axes over time will inevitably reach 
some “threshold” that generates “bifurcations.” A non-dialectical and open system, as 
it is described, this political-ethical evaluation in historical development nonetheless 
best annotates ancient Chinese history, revealing its cyclical pattern through a unifying 
moral regime. However, in the Chinese context, the interplay between the ethical and 
the political manifests a pattern that is not so much parallel or dialectical; rather, the 
ethical transcends and organizes the political. The normalization of unification and 
moralization of time transcend time and space, independent of specific historical 
situations. It is an imperial-time regime that not only proceeds along the political 
structural change, but is itself an all-encompassing paradigm transcending 
symptomatic social phenomena. It is in this sense that I propose to take modern 
Chinese history as an ongoing process of formation, under the rubric of modernization, 
in which discursive forces bring about different social symptoms and developments, 
yet history still manifests its own pattern, one that is moral and imperial.  
In this part, I am going to focus on the tension between traditional empire and 
the modern nation state manifested in historical narratives during 1900-1980. From the 
literary narratives emerged the unsettling negotiations between the transcendent 
imperial-time regime and the contingent desires to represent the present.  In this regard, 
modern Chinese history in these representations, appeared as a process of grounding, 
an enduring process to ground China in time and space. The discursive representations 
                                                                                                                                                                               
assemblage. I borrow the term “complexity field” to stress the ethical dimension of historical 
development, which is most obvious in Chinese history. For an introduction of the “Complexity 
theory,” refer to Mark Bonta & John Protevi, Deleuze and Geophilosophy—A Guide and Glossary 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004). 
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of China on the one hand manifest the spatial relations symptomatic of social reality; 
on the other hand, however, temporally speaking, they carry the paradigmatic 
historical unconscious resistant to being confined in the representation.  
 
Representation, history, time, and agency 
In fact, at times of profound social turmoil and disorientation, literature 
appeared as a discursive practice of both representing and defining reality. On the one 
hand, it is part of the popular culture responsive to the contingent social demands; on 
the other hand, however, it also continues the traditional function of literature—as a 
subjective medium carrying the Way (Wen yi zai Dao 文以载道)—helping construct 
the “nation,” the “individual,” and “the people.” To describe it in a schematic way, it 
is both symptomatic and paradigmatic. Whereas the symptomatic function of literature 
manifests the discursive practice in different social circumstances, the paradigmatic 
function nevertheless reveals the moralistic, universalistic orientation in both literary 
practice and nation formation. In other words, out of the yearning for defining “the 
time and space” in order to situate and construct China in the world order, literature at 
once serves as the representation and agency to spatialize temporality, to delineate 
social relations, and to characterize the disquieting national-global interactions. As 
Prasenjit Duara pointed out, the acceptance of the discourses of the nation and linear 
history in general is “a complex project of repressions and recreations.”86 Literature, 
as a legitimating practice, suppresses as it expresses, it destroys as it constructs, and it 
asserts its own social function yet at the same time acknowledges its inadequacy.  
In his influential essay “DissemiNation,” Homi Bhabha proposed an 
apprehension of the “double and split” time of national representation to challenge the 
                                                             
86 Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China 
(Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 33. 
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homogeneous and horizontal view normally associated with the representation.87 He 
stated that “in the production of the nation as narration there is a split between the 
continuist, accumulative temporality of the pedagogical, and the repetitious, recursive 
strategy of the performative. It is through this process of splitting that the conceptual 
ambivalence of modern society becomes the site of writing the nation.” 88 
The “ambivalence of writing the nation,” the intrinsic paradox of “repressions 
and recreations” in literary practice, hence, gives prominence to the double claim of 
representation. On the one hand, as representation, literary work, be it theory or 
creative writing, denies itself as reality; on the other hand, however, in asserting its 
own lack of reality, literary representation claims that the world it represents must be 
original, complete, and real.89 To grasp the real, social thinkers and literary critics took 
pains to come to terms with the past and the present, borrowing or inventing words, to 
name the Chinese society, to label the social relations within and without, and to typify 
the exemplary characters in creative writings. The slippery and reductionist naming 
and typifying practice, though at times being canonized in the discursive field, is 
always subject to renaming over a longer period of time. Put otherwise, the upsetting 
double structure of representation, the paradox between agency and representation, not 
only reveals the gap among different representations in the same historical time in 
portraying reality, but also determines the continuous representations of the same 
reality along time. As a result, the human agency, the authorial voice, in any 
representation, will be accompanied with a shadow of self-doubt, hesitation, and 
instability manifested through time. In one sense, there might be gaps between the 
author’s intention and his writing; in another sense, the author, or a group of authors 
                                                             
87 Homi Bhabha, ‘DissemiNation: time, narrative, and margins of the modern nation,” in Homi Bhabha 
ed. Nation and Narration (London & New York: Routledge, 1990), 295. 
88 Ibid. 297. 
89 Timothy Mitchell, “The Stage of Modernity,” in Timothy Mitchell, ed. Questions of Modernity 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 18. 
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may not be consistent over time. (For instance, a critic at age forty might negate what 
he wrote at twenty). 
In this light, the metaphoric scene from psychoanalysis might be helpful to 
understand the discursive formation of modern Chinese literature and history. Donald 
Spence observes that during the psychoanalytic treatment, there is always a gap 
between the narrative truth and the historical truth in that the psychoanalyst has to 
piece together the imagined historical truth from the patient’s fragmentary narrative.90 
The process of finding the “truth,” which is more often than not related to the primal 
scene that has been suppressed in narrative, demands time. It is through time that the 
psychoanalyst could “de-translate” and “re-translate,” to use Laplanche’s term, the 
patient’s narrative to find out the historical truth. Insofar as the “sick man” or the 
“madman” was the popular image of Chinese in the literature of the early republican 
period, perhaps, their representations of China are just the patient’s narratives, through 
which, and only through which, the historical truth, the truth that links to the 
(imagined) origin, could be elicited through time.  
Perhaps, here, we encounter the theoretical obstacle in dealing with history, 
agency, and psychoanalysis. It is commonsense that history and psychoanalysis are 
two seemingly universal yet contradictory fields. Both are centered on seeking origin 
and truth, they nevertheless diverge in the vision of agency, which in effect articulates 
the fundamental tension between the two competitive models of modern thinking 
traced back to Marx and Freud. Marx’s historical perspective of linear progression 
presupposes human subjectivity and his historicity, regarding historical determinism 
as the universal principle. On the other hand, psychoanalysis assumes psychical 
process as a timeless universal model regardless of any historical trend. These two 
                                                             
90  Donald P. Spence, Narrative Truth and Historical Truth: Meaning and Interpretation in 
Psychoanalysis (New York & London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982). 
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seemingly incompatible theories have both been criticized as too formalist and 
totalizing, and each one criticized the other according to his own principle. In fact, 
where they diverge is also where they intersect: the vision of time, time’s relation with 
space, and the function of human agency. For Marx, time could be reduced to history 
and therefore is always localized and actualized in space, the temporal-spatial 
representation consequently manifests its very historicity. Human subjectivity, social 
and collective, is what pushes the wheel of history forward. Freud takes the same 
assumption of time in relation to space. However, for Freud, history, or truth, is not 
completely representable. The unconscious is outside time, non-locatable in 
representation, and thus outside history.91 The human subject, the individual rather 
than the social formation, is intrinsically split, with no way to form a homogeneous 
subjectivity. Distinct as such, the two theories nevertheless reach a common 
intersection—time and its representation. The question becomes whether time could 
be freed from history, or whether the unconscious could be accounted for, or how to 
characterize the relationship between time and human subjectivity. Such a question, or 
a set of questions, has been encouraging the deconstructive or poststructuralist 
philosophers to link these two principles together, to elaborate the ambiguous 
relationship between time and history, between time and space.92 However, the 
fundamental tension between history and psychoanalysis remains unresolved. 
As much as I was inspired by Foucault and Deleuze for their discussions on 
history and subjectivity, I found that they also diverge in the treatment of time and 
psychoanalysis. As a historian, Foucault is known for his radical historicizing of 
                                                             
91  Mary Ann Doane, The Emergence of Cinematic Time, 37. 
92  For the discussions on time and history, refer to Lyotard, The Inhuman (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1988); Elizabeth Grosz, The Nick of Time: Politics, Evolution, and the Untimely 
(Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2004) ; Mary Ann Doane, The Emergence of Cinematic 
Time: Modernity, Contingency, the Archive (Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press, 2002); 
and Gilles Deleuze’s cinema books. 
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psychoanalysis. In the field of history, insofar as history could only be approached 
through representation, time is inevitably subordinated to space as a homogeneous 
measure to record movement and events. Therefore, the attempt to historicize social 
events determines that the historians privilege space over time, privilege the social 
over the individual, and privilege the effect over the cause. Inasmuch as the 
unconscious is unrepresentable, history appears to be the result of the conscious 
negotiations among different social forces. Unlike Marx, Foucault focuses more on the 
individual subject rather than the collective subject. The individual is the product of 
the discursive power constructions—normalization of knowledge and disciplinization 
of the body, for example93—and the active agency could only manifest itself in the 
subversive performativity. As described in the History of Sexuality, talking and 
confession of forbidden sexual conduct actually proves to be a subversive force 
against the dominant power. 94  However, for Foucault, power domination and 
performative subversion are both in themselves homogeneous, even though they 
operate in the opposite directions. In other words, the collective subject (power 
domination) and the individual subject (performative subversion) are both 
homogeneous, defined by their positionality in the web of the power formation. In this 
sense, history appears to be the discursive, discrete representations of social events, 
and there is no intrinsic, continuous cause for the transformation of the same subject 
along time. 
On the other hand, Deleuze takes a more welcoming attitude toward 
psychoanalysis. More significantly, he frees time from history and representation. 
Inspired by Bergson, whose notion of “duration” takes time as a central concern and 
links psychoanalysis with the issue of subjectivity, Deleuze is able to regard history as 
                                                             
93 Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977). 
94 Foucault, The History of Sexuality (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978). 
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a continuous yet qualitatively changing process.  For Deleuze, instead of being a 
homogeneous measure to record movement, time is heterogeneous, continuous with 
multiple directions, and is the ultimate subjectivity of history. 
Indeed, when time is taken out of representation and remains as an automatic 
determinant, it envelops both history and psychoanalysis, in an epistemologically 
novel way. Since both history and psychoanalysis have been submitting time to space, 
to representation, there is no common ground to account for the unconscious and 
subjectivity. Freud, later Lacan, for instance, deals with a subjectivity based on loss 
and lack, which is unrepresentable and therefore outside of history. While Freud is 
concerned more with the traces of memory and their discontinuous interaction with 
consciousness, the construction of subjectivity falls into a paradoxical relationship 
with time. In one sense, subjectivity depends on the unconscious, which is timeless; in 
another sense, it also depends on consciousness, which is incompatible, or 
“incompossible,” with the unconscious yet is linked to time or temporality. Although 
Freud employs a spatial model—the writing pad—to describe the formation of 
subjectivity, it is not clear whether the subject is in time or time is in the subject.95  
If for Freud, time is merely a by-product of the psychic process, for Bergson, 
time nonetheless plays a crucial role in the delineation of subjectivity. It is through 
Bergson that time starts to manifest its heterogeneous nature independent of space, 
hence enfold the splitting subjectivity. Bergson introduces a notion of duration to 
describe the continuous, dynamic, and interpenetrating relations between past and 
present. In effect, the concept of duration signifies the interdependence and the 
continuum between the binaries of past and present in a multifaceted double structure: 
time vs. matter; memory vs. perception; difference in kind vs. difference in degree; 
                                                             
95 Mary Ann Doane, The Emergence of Cinematic Time, 37. 
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qualitative vs. quantitative; virtual vs. actual; temporal vs. spatial, et cetera.96 The 
coexistence and interchange between these binary aspects, on the one hand, frees time 
from spatial representation, manifesting its splitting nature between past and present; 
on the other hand, reconfigures time into spatial categories, indicating the interaction 
between inside and outside. For Bergson, duration does not refer to psychological 
introspection, but rather, it is the continuous negotiations between body and mind, and 
between mind and nature.97 Consequently, there is no clear-cut boundary between the 
inside and the outside, since we are simultaneously experiencing time inside 
psychologically and moving in it as an outside medium. Just as perception takes us 
outside ourselves to where an object is in space, memory places us in the realm of the 
past in duration. The movement between the inside and outside is thus no less outside 
us than in us, “and the self itself in turn is only one case among others.”98 Time and 
subjectivity are therefore inseparably bound up in continuous movement and 
negotiation, or in Deleuze’s term, in the process of becoming.  
In light of Bergson’s thought on duration, yet disagreeing with the model of 
reconfiguring time into space, Deleuze conceives time as the ultimate subject that is 
independent of space and outside us. For Deleuze, time is crystalline in nature: it at 
once contains the past that is preserved and the present that is passing. The past is 
registered in the realm of the virtual, and the present is registered in the realm of the 
actual. All the pasts have been contracted into present, each of which remains a 
totality of the past, and each of which constructs a singular circuit with the present. All 
the virtual-actual circuits interact with each other and negotiate with each other, 
                                                             
96 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul & W. Scott Palmer (Mineola & New 
York: Dover Publications, 2004). 
97 David. N. Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 
1997), 127. 
98 Deleuze, Bergsonism (New York: Zone Books, 1988), 75. 
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ultimately drawing the subject into their non-localizable temporal realm.99 In this 
respect, the Bergsonian interiorization of time merely grasps the actual aspect of time, 
namely, to sink the past into memory and the present into perception, which means, 
the interior time still registers in the spatial realm, while the real virtuality of time, the 
crystalline nature of time, the differentiating power of time, still remains outside. In 
Deleuze’s words:  
 
The only subjectivity is time, non-chronological time grasped in its foundation, 
and it is we who are internal to time, not the other way round…. Time is not 
the interior in us, but just the opposite, the interiority in which we are, in which 
we move, live, and change. Subjectivity is never ours, it is time, that is, the 
soul or the spirit, the virtual. The actual is always objective, but the virtual is 
subjective: it was initially the affect, that which we experience in time, then 
time itself, pure virtuality which divides itself in two as affector and affected, 
‘the affection of self by self’ as definition of time. 100  
 
This understanding of subjectivity of/in time is fundamentally different from that 
manifested in history. It questions the legitimacy of history in representation and calls 
for a new mode of thinking. It takes history as a continuous process, discursive in 
actuality yet unknowingly determined in virtuality. History is the history of becoming. 
In other words, the represented history is the discrete history recorded in events, the 
after effect of time being actualized in space, while the real cause of history, the 
virtuality of time, cannot be grasped in space, but can only manifest itself in time, in 
the process of becoming.  
In this sense, human agency is no more than the splitting manifestation of time, 
whose continuous transformation could only be perceived in a longer period of time. 
That means, in representation, human agency appears discursive, discontinuous, and 
subject to contingent spatial relations. Yet the real virtuality is determinant, continuous, 
                                                             
99 Deleuze, Repetition and Difference.  
100 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time Image (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 82-
3. 
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and paradigmatic over time. It is in this light that I put modern Chinese history in both 
the symptomatic and paradigmatic frameworks, and examine literature—as the 
discursive agency in subject formation and nation building—in a more transcendent, 
historically determined way. 
Hence, in any specific historical moment, there is a tendency in representation 
of the spatial over the temporal, of the modern over the traditional; nevertheless, over 
time, the universalistic and moralistic character in representation exhibits the pattern 
of Chinese history. During the predominant process of modernization (including 
enlightenment and national salvation movements), literature and literary critics were 
caught up in a discursive field of signification, both constructing and being 
constructed, while the gap between their subjective position and the objective world 
registers in time, through which the imperial-time regime manifests its penetrating 
power. 
In this part I intend to analyze the historical plays/novels in the modern period 
to discuss the unsettling negotiations between history and the making of history for the 
purpose of the present. In other words, my focus is not only how history is imagined 
and constructed through literary representation, but also how history conditions and 
shapes the representation. Whereas the modern “nation state” as a referential category 
dominates the discourse of nation building, it is but the effect of representation visible 
in the discursive process of linguist construction.101 The fact that the unity-prone, 
morality-based portrayal occupies historical representations implies that the historical 
empire refused to be confined within the frame of a modern nation state and continued 
registering its surplus value in time. In this light, the historical narratives not only 
                                                             
101 Lydia H. Liu, Translingual Pratice. Liu suggests that when Western terms “travel” to China, they 
are unavoidably reformed or reinvented to fit into the Chinese context during the process of translation. 
In this sense, the Chinese term “guojia” bears a different connotation from the “nation state.” 
60 
 
mirror the social relations in different historical stages, but also present the ceaseless 
staging of the Chinese Empire.  
Lest my readings on historical narratives espouse ahistorical universality 
entailing facile generalization and whitewashing the complexity of specific historical 
circumstances, a brief discussion on intellectual characterization of time and space in 
modern times seems to be necessary. Without denying the intellectual creative agency 
in defining China and finding the national cure, I am more interested in the gap and 
discrepancy in their novel inventions along time. My interest also lies in the 
ambivalent moral agency, one that intellectuals adopted yet at once paralyzed by 
subjecting themselves to a larger historical trend. To some extent, the ambivalence 
registers in the tension between tradition and modernization, which set in motion the 
inextricable involvement of tradition in both enlightenment and national salvation 
movements. It is the wildly-discussed “tension between nationalism and 
iconoclasm.”102 Whereas nationalism requires a construction of benign history for a 
sense of shared community, iconoclasm depicts the core of that tradition as a 
malignant tumor demanding immediate elimination. The inextricably intertwined 
contradiction between nationalism and iconoclasm therefore not only determines the 
heterogeneity and complexity in Chinese modernization, but also undermines the 
absolute agency of intellectuals in their treatment of tradition. Cultural revolution in 
China, in Kirk Denton’s language, “has in practice seemed to restore the traditional 
more than it has succeeded in destroying it.”103 The treatment of history or tradition, 
hence, not only reveals the intellectual ambivalence that spills over the confinement of 
nation building discourse, but also conceals it as the theoretical residue only inhabited 
in a subconscious, historical level. 
                                                             
102 Kirk Denton, ed. Modern Chinese Literary Thought: Writings on Literature, 1893-1945 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1996), General Introduction, 7.  
103 Ibid, 11.  
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Between the traditional empire and the national empires: spacing the temporal 
interval 
From the late Qing on, the collapse of the “China-centered” worldview—
which tended to universalize Chinese time (in terms of the cyclical, dynastic 
calendar)—and the urge to localize global time associated with Western imperialism 
(including Japan) engendered the problematic of formulating the present. The 
consciousness of time for the intellectuals challenged the centuries-long moral 
principle in confrontation with the imperialist aggression. In fact, as scholars have 
demonstrated, Chinese nationalism arose as a response to Western imperialism, which 
went hand in hand with iconoclasm. It at once advocated the negation of the past 
rooted in the moral, cultural system and promoted the idea of a modern nation based 
on notions of domestic wealth and power.104  However, as Prasenjit Duara has shown, 
the challenge merely roused intellectuals as subjective agency to modernize and build 
the nation out of the traditional empire, in a fashion that is completely compatible with 
the traditional morality in that the agency is still moral. 105  Though Yan Fu’s 
translation of Huxley’s social Darwinism and the later enlightenment movement 
confirmed linear, teleological, and progressive historical development,106 past moral 
                                                             
104 Joseph Levenson and Theodore Huters both suggest that Chinese nationalism grew as the response 
of Western impact. Levenson argues that modern nationalism negates the traditional “culturalism,” in 
which unity was derived from a set of cultural values embodied in sacred texts explicated by an 
intellectual elite, modern nationalism provides an alternative basis for unity. Huters also holds the idea 
that modernity in China includes both the need to reject the past and the idea of national salvation from 
imperialism. Joseph Levenson, Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: A Trilogy (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1965). Theodore Huters, “Ideology of Realism in Modern China: the Hard 
Imperatives of Imported Theory” in Liu Kang and Xiaobing Tang, eds. Politics, Ideology, and Literary 
Discourse in Modern China: Theoretical Interventions and Cultural Critique (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1993), 147-74. 
105 Prasenjit Duara, “De-constructing the Chinese Nation.” In Australian Journal of Chinese Affaires 30, 
(July, 1993): 1-26. 
106 Yan Fu, Tianyan Lun. Translation of Thomas Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics.  Scholars have recently 
demonstrated that Darwin’s evolutionary theory demonstrates more than linear development. Yet in the 
past, it was received as the scientific portrayal of linear development, in both China and the West. Here, 
I still adopt the past interpretation of this theory.   
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principles were still alive and were regarded as the primary factor in pushing history 
forward.  
The consciousness of time was best manifested in Liang Qichao’s poem The 
Song of the Twentieth Century Pacific written during his travel over the Pacific on Jan. 
1st, 1900:107 
 
All of a sudden I wonder when and where it is now 
It is the threshold of the new and the old centuries 
In the middle of the East and West hemispheres 
Neither prior to nor after, I am 
At the spot of the most crucial position in the world 
…… 
The trend has come that only the competitive survives 
 Either good or bad; either rise or fall 
There must be a hole first before the mercury could penetrate into the 
ground 
There is no place for the worm to hide if something does not decay 
from within 
……. 
We have 450 million compatriots 
How could we passively wait for defeat? 
……. 
 
In the poem he adopted a panoramic view describing thousands of years of 
world history, placing China in the increasingly connected global system. However, 
ironically, along with the ready acceptance of global time, he situated himself in the 
center of the world. As the product of the encounter between empires, Liang emerged 
as an omniscient subject engaging himself in the project of re-centering China in the 
world. For Liang, even though he accepted the doctrine of social Darwinism, he 
believed that the fall of the country must start from the erosion from within. To carry 
out the project of building a new nation, the intellectuals should lead the mass to 
                                                             
107 Liang Qichao, “Ershi shiji Taipingyang ge” (The Song of the twentieth century Pacific). In Liang 
Qichao quanji (The complete collection of Liang Qichao’s works) (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1999), 
vol. 9, 5426-7. 
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construct a “young China,” as opposed to the “old empire.”108 The “old” and the 
“young”/or “new” were not two exclusive entities as in a creation process, but 
appeared as a temporal renewal or inversion between them. For instance, in the widely 
cited literary piece Shaonian Zhongguo shuo (On the Young China), Liang suggested 
that the old empire and the young state were in fact the two sides of one coin, 
depending on how you perceive it. In his flowery language:  
 
The Japanese are used to calling our China the old empire, over and over again. 
They might get this idea from the Westerners. Alas! Is China indeed old? 
Liang Qichao says: Oh, what kind of understanding is this! What kind of 
understanding is this! I have a young China in my heart.109 
 
Then he went on to list examples of greatness since ancient times, for instance, the 
great emperors like Qin Shihuang and Han Wudi, the great literature inherited from 
the Han and Tang dynasties, and the great martial achievements during Kangxi and 
Qianlong’s reigns in the Qing Dynasty, to emphasize that there was this creative, 
progressive, and youthful energy inside China throughout history. From the 
perspective of this youthful creativity that is inside the Chinese Empire, China is 
young and hopeful. To call for the new, then, does not mean to discard the whole 
established regime, but to accentuate the new inside the old, to discover the interiority 
of the national essence through an inversion of perspective. For him, the new grows 
out of the old. It is the long, glorious history that demonstrates and nurtures the pride 
and confidence of the young China. 
                                                             
108 Liang Qichao, “Lun xiaoshuo yu qunzhi zhi guanxi” (On the relationship between fiction and the 
government of the people) and “Shaonian Zhongguo shuo” (On the young China), in Liang Qichao 
shiwen xuanzhu (Selected poetry and prose of Liang Qichao), edited and annotated by Wang Quchang. 
(Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 1987), 244-63.  
109 Liang Qichao, “Shaonian Zhongguo Shuo”. See Wang Quchang, ed. Liang Qichao shiwen xuanzhu 
(Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 1987), 175. 
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Favorite disciple of the Confucian scholar Kang Youwei, Liang in his earlier 
age shared a worldview similar to his master’s. Kang, in his philosophical works, 
sought to revive Confucianism by radically reinterpreting some of its canonical works 
and portraying Confucius, who was conventionally glorified as the “uncrowned King” 
longing to restore the ideal rule of the ancient sage-kings, as a progressive, utopian 
reformer.110 What was latent in Kang’s thought was the triumph of a historical 
consciousness that favored progression and the future over the past. It was a 
consciousness that nonetheless placed the imperial moral system in a transcendent, all-
encompassing level. Confucius and Confucianism, albeit reinvented and reformed, 
survived time and space and still shaped the modern social order.    
The mix of progression and traditional morality, ineluctably locked in tension 
between the West and China, in effect manifests not so much the victory of the 
Western ideal as the appropriation of the West into the Chinese historical 
consciousness. In 1903, Liang Qichao published an incomplete novel Xin Zhongguo 
weilai ji (the New China’s future) to carry out his political blueprint. Full of lengthy 
speeches and debates in promoting his political ideal, it is hardly a novel in the literary 
sense. Yet it provides a good source to perceive Liang’s vision of time and history. 
The novel begins in a retrospective fashion. The narrator opens the story in a way as in 
a historical yanyi, only to set the narrative time in the future:111 “Let’s say it is the year 
1962 in the Western calendar,112 2513 years after Confucius was born. It is the first 
day of the renyin year (Chinese lunar calendar), and we are celebrating the 50th 
anniversary of the political reform.” Then he continues to depict the prosperity of 
                                                             
110 Kang Youwei, Xinxue weijing kao (1891), Kongzi gaizhi kao (1897) and Datong shu, are important 
examples in this regard. These works are his intellectual basis for a utopian nation built upon 
parliamentary democracy.  
111 Liang Qichao, Xinzhongguo weilaiji (The future of new China), in A Ying, Wanqing wenxue 
congchao (The collection of late Qing literature) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1960),  vol 1. 
112 In the original novel, it is the year of 2062. I think he miscalculated the year.  
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China at that time after the success of the reform. Since a world peace conference and 
China’s historical exposition are being held in Nanjing and Shanghai, China becomes 
the central place to draw worldwide attention. Political leaders of powerful countries 
are coming to congratulate China on its accomplishment, and the Chinese universities 
are full of foreign students from overseas. Following this exciting portrayal of China’s 
present (future), the protagonist, or the diegetic narrator Kong Juemin, a prominent 
scholar who is the descendent of Confucius, starts to make a speech, reflecting on the 
difficult years at the beginning of the reform 60 years before (the contemporary time 
of Liang’s novel). In Kong’s understanding, the fundamental factors that determine the 
success of a nation reside in the people’s virtue, intellect, and spirit (min de民德, min 
zhi民智, min qi 民气), among which the most crucial one is the people’s virtue. 
Without virtue the nation is doomed to be weak and defeated.113 Let alone a utopian 
vision of China-centered world future, the correlation of the Confucian morality with 
the new nation demonstrates the pre-occupation with imperial-moral vision speaking 
through Liang’s nation building project. Although he embraced social Darwinism and 
believed that mighty forces were determining the final outcome in the global arena, as 
manifested in his Pacific poem, he attributed the backwardness of the Qing Empire to 
the moral decay from within.   
It is noteworthy that this novel portrays the future in the form of a historical 
yanyi, propagating an ideal political regime hitherto non-existent in China yet 
supported by moral justification embedded in Confucianism.  The coexistence of 
Western time and Chinese time, as revealed in the opening sentence of the novel, 
symbolically exhibits China’s localization of a global time, and at the same time 
resituates China at the center of the world. However, this promising future can only be 
brought to life through morality, with the moral judgment tracing back to Confucius 
                                                             
113 Ibid. 5-6. 
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and personified in Mr. Kong. In other words, the future in a sense is not built up on the 
present, but rather on the absence of the present (in terms of the lack of morality in the 
present), and it is the past that deems this imagined future meaningful.  
However, this juxtaposition of the past and the future not only reveals that the 
future is conditioned by the past, but also displays an intrinsic paradox in his vision of 
time: on the one hand, the future is created out of the desire of the present for a better 
world; on the other hand, the inability to characterize the present makes the future 
groundless. The incorporation of the past with the future manifests the refraction of 
time here: whether history will develop linearly or cyclically remains unsettled. It 
seems for Liang, the only tangible and graspable ground for the present is (the lack of) 
morality, which is deeply rooted in the Confucian unifying imperial regime registered 
not so much in the past as in the transcendent time, and which, as in Kang Youwei’s 
revision of Confucianism, refuses to be confined within the category of “tradition” or 
“modern.” 
The Future of New China remained unfinished, maybe because of the author’s 
inability to characterize the present, which unfortunately invalidates his design of the 
future. As Liang admitted in the preface of the novel: “Both a nation and a people are 
organisms whose phenomena are subject to constant changes. Even Guan Zhong or 
Zhuge Liang could not predict what would happen in the next year, not to mention 
predicting fifty years later, so how could some student like me to predict it!”114 The 
yearning for a predictable future went hand in hand with the realization of its 
unpredictability, rendering the belief in the future problematic; at the same time, the 
ever-changing present makes the prediction even more groundless.  
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Needless to say, Liang’s political ideal changed over time in his life,115 typical 
of many intellectuals in modern Chinese history, and his anxiety to grasp a tangible 
present and future has also been a common problem for his and later generations. 
Indeed, modern Chinese intellectual history, complicated as it is, could be seen as a 
discursive process of grounding—to ground China in global time and space. The 
linear Darwinian time meets a cyclical, transcendent moral time, only to create more 
refracted times, which continually direct intellectuals toward a hermeneutic return to 
the past. 
Much has been said about Chinese intellectuals in crisis,116one that, by and 
large, came from the frustration in trying to ground the present. However ironically, it 
is precisely the impossibility of grounding the present that makes the practice of 
grounding possible. From the late Qing period, followed by the May Fourth, a lot of 
theorists and multiple media, magazines and newspapers alike, devoted themselves to 
producing the “new literature,” “new fiction,” “new drama,” “new youth,” etc, to 
announce the break from the past and characterize the present. “Era” or “times” 
(shidai) became a fashion word to formulate arguments in literary debates. For 
instance, Zhou Zuoren suggested that “era” be the only key term and standard in 
judging literary works when he advocated “humane literature” in 1918.117  Cheng 
Fangwu argued that literature should shoulder the mission of the “era.”118 And Shen 
                                                             
115 In his early age, Liang stood with his master Kang Youwei advocating a regime of constitutional 
monarchy. Yet later, he changed his mind and embraced the People’s Republic.  
116 Hao Chang, Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis (Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of 
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Escape from Predicament.  
117 Zhou Zuoren, “Ren de wenxue” (Humane literature). In Xin qingnian (New youth), Vol 5, No.6. Dec 
15, 1918. Collected in Chen Shouli, ed. Zhongguo xiandai wenxue yundong shiliao zhaibian (The 
selection of historical documents of modern Chinese literary movements) (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 
1985), vol. 1, 30-31. 
118 Cheng Fangwu, “Xin wenxue zhi shiming” (The mission of the new literature) in Chuangzao 
zhoubao (Creation weekly), May 20, 1923.  See Chen Shouli, ed. Zhongguo xiandai wenxue yundong 
shiliao zhaibian (The selection of historical documents of modern Chinese literary movements), vol. 1, 
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Yanbing (Mao Dun) emphasized that “Mr. Era” would not allow the restoration 
of/reversion to the past (fu gu) in literary movement.119  
However, the “era” they understood was not the present they saw in China, nor 
the present in the modern Western world, but rather the temporal gap between the 
ideal world and China’s present. As Cheng Fangwu described it in 1923, “our era is an 
era governed by law of the jungle, in which mighty powers silence justice, social 
conscience withers, and a sense of honor is lost. It is an era that is material-seeking, 
cold and cruel.”120 And it was the mission of literature to bridge this gap by calling for 
social conscience and curing the illness in the society. Thus, it was this desire to 
ground the “era” that directs the literary practice to represent the present and present 
the future. This future, universally individualistic and humanistic as advocated in the 
May Fourth movement, demanded to free the individual from the “feudal” 
institutions—family and the Confucian constraints—to construct the individual as a 
real “human,” a modern citizen. This real “human,” nonetheless, did not approve of 
the law of the jungle manifested in Western imperialism, but tried to live an 
individualistic, ethical, moral, and universally loving life in harmony within the whole 
of humanity (ren lei).121 Ironically enough, while the May Fourth intellectuals worked 
hard to negate tradition, what they broke with was but the hierarchy and inhumane 
constraints of the feudal institutions, not the universal and moralistic tendency 
intrinsically existing in tradition. Iconoclasm, based on an essentialized and 
absolutized notion of tradition as obsolete and incapable of self-regeneration, 
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nonetheless promoted the surplus value of tradition that is deemed timeless and 
transcendent. For instance, when Zhou Zuoren articulated his understanding of 
“human,” he referred to Mozi’s conception of all-embracing love (Jian’ai兼爱) as 
theoretical support.122 The attempt to embrace the universal, ideal future thus is 
grounded at the juncture between the Western humanistic ideal and China’s universal 
conception of morality in tradition. The iconoclastic enlightenment movement 
therefore appears to be no less a re-figuration of suppressed moral order within 
tradition than a wholesale Westernization movement. In fact, as demonstrated in the 
first chapter, it is the perceived compatibility of the Western ideal and China’s 
universal moral order that co-determined the way modern China developed itself. 
However, the embrace of a linear, progressive global time demands suppressing the 
cyclical, traditional time into unconsciousness, which, like the surplus value of a 
commodity, cannot fit into the frame of the consciousness of a modern time.  
The War of Resistance to Japan (1937-1945) broke the utopian dream of 
modernization (Westernization), resulting in a nationalistic turn in literary practice.123 
Literature shifted its focus from an “individualistic, humane” literature to a “national 
literature,” and the construction of individual subjectivity gave way to the construction 
of collective subjectivity.124 Not only did history appear as the mirror of the present 
national crisis on the visible stage, but tradition was also seen as the necessary site to 
educate and incorporate the people into the project of national defense and nation 
building. In his “Chinese style and Chinese manner” (Zhongguo qipai yu zhongguo 
zuofeng), a title referring to Mao Zedong’s speech, Ba Ren articulated the necessity of 
                                                             
122 Ibid. 
123 Before the War of Resistance to Japan, there was already a revolutionary turn in literary practice 
after the May Thirtieth Incident in 1925. For the purpose of discussing the conception of time in 
relation to the representation of history, I skip this period here, yet will refer to the revolutionary 
movement and the acceptance of Marxism in the next section. 
124 Cheng Guangwei, eds. Zhongguo xiandai wenxueshi. 5. 
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breaking away from tradition in the May Fourth period and the necessity to re-
incorporate tradition into literary practice in the contemporary era. He argued that 
although Lu Xun opposed young people’s reading traditional literature at the 
beginning of the May Fourth movement for the purpose of introducing new literature 
from the West, Lu Xun’s own literary works were nonetheless nurtured by traditional 
Chinese style and Chinese manner. The discontinuity in form and continuity in 
essence in literature, then, manifested the different demands of different eras in the 
discursive practices of literature.  Now it was time to re-articulate the Chinese style 
and Chinese manner, the national characteristic which includes both national essence 
and national form to create the people’s literature and art.  “The People’s literature and 
art is the higher stage of the new Chinese literature,” he wrote. “It is neither inferior to, 
nor regressive from, the demand of the May Fourth humanistic literature. From the 
May Fourth period, to the emergence of the revolutionary literature around 1927, till 
the development of the people’s literature today, it is the negation of negation.”125 
Though he described the re-appropriation of tradition in a Hegelian dialectic way, on 
the visible level, the underlying assumption in this statement is nevertheless the 
immanent presence of tradition rendered invisible sometimes in the subjective literary 
practice. In fact, during all this time, the historical dramas in traditional forms in the 
musical theater had always been popular in the entertainment horizon, albeit erased in 
the mainstream literary discourse.126  In other words, tradition had always been 
accompanying literary movements, yet the temporal gap between the ideal and reality 
                                                             
125 Ba Ren, “Zhongguo qipai yu Zhongguo zuofeng” (Chinese style and Chinese manner). In Wenyi 
zhendi (Post of literature and art), September 1, 1939. See Chen Shouli, ed. Zhongguo xiandai wenxue 
yundong shiliao zhaobian, 94. 
126 Cheng Huaping, Zhongguo xiaoshuo xiqu lilun de jindai zhuanxing (The modern transition in 
theories of literature and musical theater) (Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue chubanshe, 2001). Cheng 
argues that the revolutionary attempt to reform the traditional musical theater resulted in limited effect 
in practice. Since the reformers are usually not the experts in musical theater, their reform mostly 
remains at a theoretical level. Yet the musical theater with traditional dramas still remains as a popular 
form of entertainment.  
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renders the literary practice always in a process of becoming and grounding. The 
construction of the “individual,” the “nation,” and the “people,” espoused by the 
“negation of negation” of “tradition,” is but the effect of “becoming the individual,” 
“becoming the nation,” and “becoming the people,” while history and tradition, in the 
form of metamorphosis, continually speak through the process of becoming. In the 
later period, “socialist realism” as a mainstream almost encompassed the visible field 
of literary circles. However, as discussed above, the temporal interval between ideal 
and reality more often than not directed intellectuals to return to tradition for moral 
justification, which endlessly echoes the powerfully unifying and moralistic imperial-
time regime.  
In this sense, historical narratives in effect perform the function of “spacing the 
intervals” in bridging history with the present, or ideal with reality. They imply, time 
after time, an undiscernable ghost that haunts the representation of reality, adding an 
ambiguous shade to the mainstream literary discourses.  
   
Between nation state and empire: Marxism in China 
Initially lacking recognition of the internal boundaries within the empire, 
intellectuals were forced to draw a binary opposition between China and the West 
when facing Western imperialist aggression, which consequently caused confusion 
and ambivalence in delineating ethnic boundaries from within. Scholars have 
characterized the late Qing period as the transitional period of the awakening of 
nationalism. Two types of nationalism were discussed: one was “reactive nationalism” 
or “state nationalism,” which grew mainly as a reaction against imperialist aggression 
in China.  The other was “ethnic nationalism,” which arose to express the resentment 
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against the domination of China by the Manchu ethnic minority.127 Yet scholars also 
found out that both conceptions of nationalism, albeit useful in probing into Chinese 
intellectuals’ minds, were insufficient as characteristic categories. Both Don Price and 
Hao Chang observed that the late Qing intellectuals carried some “universalistic” 
orientation that cannot be reduced to nationalism in either sense.128   
Indeed, Liang Qichao’s The Future of New China might have implied 
universalistic surplus value beyond “state nationalism.” As for “ethnic nationalism,” 
the category itself is groundless from its very inception. In fact, the anti-Manchu 
sentiment manifests an intrinsic paradox that it is neither reasonable nor practical. On 
the one hand, to make the non-Chinese (Manchu) responsible for China’s failure 
against the third party (Western imperialism) not only puts Manchus in a non-place 
within China, but also renders the understanding of “China” problematic. To put it in 
another way, the anti-Manchu sentiment appears not so much an anti-foreign attitude 
to define China as to express hatred toward the inability of and the lack of morality in 
the leadership within China. Sun Zhongshan’s republican model of the modern state, 
one that shifted from “driving out barbarians (Manchus) and resurrecting China” to 
“the republic of five peoples,” suggested this oscillation and ambivalence toward other 
ethnicities in the project of nation building and the final triumph in maintaining an 
imperial border.  
If the “universalistic” orientation of nation building at any rate reveals the 
imperial moral order inherited from history, and the modern nation state proves no 
more than an analytic and theoretical category in the modern period, the embrace of 
                                                             
127 Hao Chang, Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis: Search for Order and Meaning (1890-1911) (Berkeley, 
Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1987), 2. 
128 Don Price, Russia and the Roots of the Chinese Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1974), 7-28. Hao Chang, Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis: Search for Order and Meaning (1890-1911) 
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Marxist internationalism by no means appears as just a discursive accident. Timothy 
Mitchell demonstrates that in history, the term “internationalism” appeared prior to 
the spread of the term “nationalism,” which was coined by an anti-colonial movement. 
The idea of “the international” was popularized in London in 1862, when the world 
exhibition of that year was named the Great International Exhibition. A delegation of 
Parisian workers sent to the exhibition met with London trade unionists and borrowed 
the new word, forming the Working Men’s International Association under the 
leadership of Karl Marx.129 The Word “nationalism” appeared two decades later, 
introduced by the Irish Nationalist party as it launched the struggle against British 
colonialism.130 What is implicit in these findings is that “internationalism” appeared as 
a universal moral structure signifying a utopian world order, one that is prior to, and 
transcends, the narrowly defined “nationalism.” 
It is no coincidence that the notion of “internationalism” appealled to Chinese 
intellectuals. The transition from late Qing intellectuals’ “universalistic” perspective to 
the later conceptions of an enlightened, humanistic, and socialist China manifests a 
significant semiotic shift in the project of nation building, one that persistently resists 
being confined within the boundary of a modern nation state. Contrary to Levenson’s 
understanding that the reason Marxism appealed to Chinese intellectuals is because 
Marxism, due to its Western anti-capitalist origin, fulfilled at once the Chinese desire 
to destroy the past (anti-feudalism) and to combat the West (anti-imperialism),131 the 
enduring imperial notion of unity, morality, and universality might have allowed the 
fundamental ground for Marxism to grow in China.  
                                                             
129 Karl Marx, “Address and Provisional Rules of the Working Men’s International Association” 
(London, 1864), reprinted in Karl Marx, The First International and After: Political Writings. Vol. 3, 
(New York: Vintage, 1974), 73-84. 
130 Timothy Mitchell, “The Stage of Modernity,” 4. 
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74 
 
In 1918, upon the success of the socialist revolution in the Soviet Union, Li 
Dazhao published two articles to celebrate the victory of the working class and 
Bolshevism. For him, it is “the victory of humanism, the victory of pacifism, the 
victory of reason, the victory of democracy, the victory of socialism, the victory of 
Bolshevism, the victory of the red flag, the victory of the world working class, and the 
victory of the new tide of the twentieth century….”132  This exciting statement, 
grouping different universal ideals together, exhibited his enthusiasm toward an 
internationalist spirit that transcends any national boundary: “The word Bolshevism, 
although invented by the Russians, manifests the spirit of all the enlightened people in 
the world.” 133 In his eyes, and later leftist intellectuals’ eyes, socialism was the future 
trend (chao liu) of the world. To grasp this trend and resituate China in the global 
order, China had to be transformed into a socialist nation which was ideologically 
advanced and morally superior to the capitalist world. 
Li’s particularly ecstatic response toward the October Revolution, as Maurice 
Meisner observed, manifests his pre-Marxian worldview and his understanding of time. 
His writings “were less concerned with what the millennium was to look like than 
with the fact that it was being created in the here and now,” Meisner wrote. “He 
conceived of the revolution not so much as a revolt against particular oppressors but as 
a great, universal and elemental force that was transforming the entire world order.” 134 
This universalistic, moralizing tendency and the recognition of the historical trend in 
effect best annotate the imperial-time regime that penetrated into modern intellectuals’ 
minds and displayed itself as Marxist internationalism. Yet it seems that the Western 
origin of this universal continually met with resistance from Chinese intellectuals. Not 
                                                             
132 Li Dazhao, “Bolshevism de shengli” (The victory of Bolshevism” in Xin qingnian (New youth), Nov 
15, 1918. See Chen Shouli, ed. Zhongguo xiandai wenxue yundong shiliao zhaibian, vol. 1, 26. 
133 Ibid.  
134 Maurice Meisner, Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism (New York: Atheneum, 1979), 69. 
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only Marxism, but also other seemingly universal ideas from the West always 
encountered resistance in China. From the late Qing on, the wholesale idea of 
modernization, or Westernization, constantly clashed with refusal and doubt not only 
from the attempt to recover tradition (fu gu),135  but also from within the group who 
promoted the idea of enlightenment and Westernization. In 1927, Lu Xun clearly 
expressed his disbelief in social Darwinist evolutionary theory. He thought that 
progress was always accompanied with retrogress, and his evolutionist belief finally 
“collapsed.” 136  In terms of the enlightenment project, he doubted that an 
individualistic, enlightened society would be realized in China. It seems to him that 
“[in China] the time when everyone could be encouraged to develop his individuality 
has not yet come,” and he was not sure whether such a time would come in the 
future.137  
The tension between the Chinese universalistic tendency and the Western 
origin, not only engendered doubt and resistance, but also brought forth creative 
invention and reinterpretation of Western ideas and ideals, as Xiaomei Chen 
characterized it, a sense of “Occidentalism” that bestowed on Chinese intellectuals an 
active agency to manipulate and appropriate the Western terms to serve the Chinese 
society.138 Chen suggested that the May Fourth generation actively appropriated the 
Western ideals and the idea of the West as a lever from which to negotiate between the 
Chinese past and the future of a modern nation state. Although Chen took 
Occidentalism as a counterdiscourse negating both the West and tradition, it 
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nonetheless uprooted the ideas from their Western origin and transplanted them into 
the Chinese historical landscape. The negotiation between the past and the future, as 
well as the transplantation of the Western universal, controversially and continually, 
manifested the universalistic and moralizing tendency in Chinese historical 
consciousness deeply rooted in tradition.     
The acceptance of Marxism in China also experienced such a process of 
transplantation. Yet it seems that it was not until the outbreak of the War of Resistance 
to Japan that the intellectuals found a way to deal with this Western universal and re-
center it into China. During this period, a dialectic conception of Marxist universality 
and Chinese particularity grew into fruition, which artistically resolved the tension 
between the world historical trend (shi shi 时势) and China’s domestic situation (xing 
shi 形势), and between China’s past and present. In 1938, Mao Zedong openly 
articulated his understanding of Marxism and its relationship with China’s history: 
 
China today has developed from the China in history; as we are believers in the 
Marxist approach to history, we must not cut off our whole historical past. We 
must make a summing-up from Confucius down to Sun Yat-sen and inherit 
this precious legacy….Communists are internationalist-Marxists, but Marxism 
must be integrated with the specific characteristics of our country and given a 
national form before it can be put into practice….If the Chinese Communists, 
who form a part of the great Chinese nation and are linked with it by flesh and 
blood, talk about Marxism apart from China’s characteristics, that will be only 
Marxism in the abstract, Marxism in the void. Hence how to turn Marxism into 
something specifically Chinese, to imbue every manifestation of it with 
Chinese characteristics, i.e. to apply it in accordance with China’s 
characteristics, becomes a problem which the whole Party must understand and 
solve immediately.139 
 
Before this talk, the Communist Party had experienced enough frustration in its 
confrontations with the Nationalist Party, which finally led to the Long March, 
                                                             
139 Mao Zedong, Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung (London: Lawrence & Wishart LTD, 1954), Vol. 2, 
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retreating from urban areas to the countryside to save itself. During the Long March 
(1934-1936), the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) leadership decided to adopt Mao 
Zedong’s idea of initiating the revolution from the countryside instead of cities, which 
determined Mao’s leading status in the Party. Mao’s revolutionary model, as opposed 
to the Russian model dogmatically advocated by Wang Ming, Li De, and other 
Marxists coming back from Russia, was believed to be the right model considering 
China’s particular situation. Practically tested, Marxism with Chinese variation had 
gradually gained authority within the CCP. After the outbreak of the War of 
Resistance to Japan in 1937, Mao took steps further to theorize his model of “Marxism 
with Chinese characteristics” to promote the Communist Party’s status and attract 
support as much as possible throughout China. On the surface, he differentiated 
Chinese particularity from universal Marxism, yet by emphasizing Chinese history and 
national form, he successfully grounded Marxism in China, in Chinese history. It is in 
effect an event of universalizing the particular. The Western origin of Marxism was 
finally re-planted in China. In fact, the inventiveness of the Chinese revolutionary 
practice has been characterized in such a way that in later decades Mao’s thought 
became the synthesis of Marxism and Leninism, and the Chinese practice, along with 
the other revolutionary practices in the developing countries, became the moral and 
theoretical ground to counter the American and the Soviet hegemony in the world. As 
Wang Hui pointed out, Mao’s concept of Chinese Marxism had always been 
positioned on the global horizon and been the moralistic narrative to oppose world 
hegemonic power. In Wang’s words, “The ‘Three Worlds’ theory did not only posit 
the Third World as a political subject, which, through links and breaks with elements 
of the Second World, would oppose the two hegemonic powers, the USA and USSR, 
and form a new kind of international relations. It also sought, through theoretical 
investigation, political debate and moral appeal, to break the ideological power and 
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prestige of the American and Soviet systems. The practice of counter-hegemony 
implied a contestation of cultural authority.” 140 
Such is the trajectory of the legitimizing and grounding process of Marxism in 
China. What it implies is that, although a certain development of history could be seen 
as the result of discursive negotiation among different forces within the signifying 
regime, in a longer period of time, the negotiations among diversified interests still 
manifest the imperial pattern: the imperial-time regime disguised in the Maoist 
Marxism continually articulates the moralizing and unifying tendencies in the name of 
the modern nation state. As I have suggested in the prior chapter, Marxism in China is 
none other than an unexamined substitution of the traditional way of thinking.  
However, there is always a tension between the moralistic cyclical time and the 
linear historical time as conceived by the modern intellectuals. Falling between the 
two polarities of either past or future as the authoritative force to make judgment, 
intellectuals found themselves in the middle of the negotiations among competing 
discourses and aware of changes along history. The hesitation to characterize the 
present casts a doubtful shadow in their ability to effect a novel and creative change in 
the modern world. Hence, the conscious belief that history develops in a progressive, 
linear trajectory is always accompanied with the unconscious specter of history 
unfolding itself in its way, and (limited) human agency can only make sense when 
conforming to the historical trend (shi势). 
As a result, although the historical novels and dramas were written to reflect 
reality, and most often, the authors openly articulated their intention, there are still 
many areas in which the authors wrestled with doubt and ambivalence in portraying 
the present and figuring the future: the ethnic tensions in treating national crisis, the 
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competing discourses vis-à-vis moral choices, and the poetics of martyrdom to 
promote morality while not falling into fatalism.  
 
History as negative exemplum: both hermeneutic and rhetoric 
There is a long tradition in China that history serves as the exemplum for the 
present, and the person with great morality will be the exemplar for the later 
generations. As the Tang Emperor Taizong said, “A bronze plate as mirror can make 
one adjust hat and clothing; history as mirror can tell one the pattern of rise and 
fall/replacement [of the empire]; a person as mirror can remind one of his achievement 
and shortcomings.”141 What it implies is that through history one can delineate the 
pattern of cyclical development of the empire, to recognize the shi-trend (historical 
trend 势) and shi-time (historical time时), and by following the great moral exemplars, 
one can grasp the trend and benefit the empire. The metaphor of the “mirror,” similar 
to the Lacanian “mirror stage” in the sense that it situates the individual in the 
symbolic regime that is history, gives prominence to the consciousness that one lives 
in history, though one is not in a state of psychological split confused about the 
imaginary and the symbolic.  
Nevertheless, an exemplum is not merely a mirror in the hermeneutic sense, 
but is itself rhetorical. It aims to cause action, to provoke reflection, imitation, and 
transformation of the individuals. On the one hand, it understands the priority of 
antiquity to be ontological as well as historical: past experiences are seen to be sources 
of universal value and morality which the present must appropriate through a 
hermeneutic motion of a leap across time. On the other hand, it is rhetorical. The 
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为镜，可以明得失”。 
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exemplum can be seen as a kind of textual node or point of juncture, where one’s 
interpretation of the past overlaps with the desire to form and fashion the present.142  
In this regard, the fact that imperial history was constantly refashioned into 
modern literary representations manifests the desire to call for morality at times that 
lack morality, and to emphasize unity in times of disunity. Indeed, it is the 
impossibility of ultimate morality that makes morality possible and meaningful. The 
Southern Song and Southern Ming histories, owing to their complicated ethnic 
encounters that characterized the crisis of the ethnic Han Chinese Empires, became the 
mirror of China in the modern period, especially during the late Qing and then the War 
of Resistance to Japan. In the historical fiction and drama of these periods, morality 
takes the form of loyalty and unity as the crucial factors in saving the country from 
foreign invasion. From a Han-centered perspective, moral crisis outstrips national 
crisis, and the contrast between patriotic heroes and disloyal traitors dominates the 
Han/non-Han contradictions. In fact, the voice for morality is so predominant that 
ethnic tensions became secondary in mirroring the national crisis in reality.  
In this respect, the anti-Manchu or anti-Mongol messages manifested in the 
historical novels and dramas could be read in a metonymical way: the Manchus or the 
Mongols are but the foil of the Chinese, whose lack of morality and unity from within 
resulted in the loss of leadership in the empire. On the other hand, the fact that the 
Yuan and Qing dynasties are taken as part of Chinese history grounded on the same 
Confucian morality demonstrates the competing discourses within the Chinese Empire: 
the transcendent moral judgment on unity and the recognition of an amoral historical 
trend (shi势) that justifies contingent behavior associated with particular situations 
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(quan bian权变). In other words, the confirmation of both morality and amoral 
situation constitutes the basic paradox in the historical narratives, which only gives 
rise to the poetics of martyrdom as the highest form of morality, and as a comparison 
with reality, a way to incorporate the individual, or the people, into the project of 
nation building.  
In fact, I suggest that the poetics of martyrdom best manifest the imperial-time 
regime that permeates the authors’ writings, regardless of their subjective intention, 
because martyrdom at once asserts the moral agency of a hero and debilitates that 
agency in history.  
There are roughly four periods in which historical novels and dramas were 
relatively abundant during these eighty years. During the late Qing period Wu 
Jianren’s Tongshi (Painful history, 1902-1906), Liang Jin yanyi (The Story of Western 
and Eastern Jin, 1906-1908), and Li Liangcheng’s Re xuehen (The trace of warm 
blood, 1907) are the most influential novels.143 During the May Fourth period, there 
are Lu Xun’s Gushi xinbian (Old tales retold, 1922-1935) and Guo Moruo’s dramatic 
trilogy Sange panni de nüxing (Three rebellious women). During the War of 
Resistance to Japan, there are historical plays written by Guo Moruo (Qu Yuan 1942, 
Hufu 1942, Tangdi zhi hua 1941, etc.), A Ying (Bixue hua 1939, Haiguo yingxiong 
1940, Yang E zhuan 1941, etc.), Ouyang Yuqian (Zhongwang Li Xiucheng 1941), and 
Chen Baichen (Dadu he 1943), etc. During the Maoist socialist period, there are Guo 
Moruo’s plays Cai Wenji (1959), Wu Zetian, and the revised Gao Jianli, Tian Han’s 
Guan Hanqing, Cao Yu’s Dan jian pian (Courage and sword), and Yao Xueyin’s 
novel Li Zicheng.144 
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Chronologically speaking, there is a thematic shift in these historical narratives 
from ethnic contradiction to class contradiction. Symptomatic of the national crisis 
during the first half of the 20th century, historical narratives at that time usually take a 
defensive position resisting the external threat and criticizing internal splits in the Han 
Chinese group, thus playing out the tension between empire and modern nation state 
in terms of national, ethnic, and cultural boundaries. The later historical narratives, on 
the other hand, are devoted to confirming a multi-ethnic, unified, socialist country 
with a gradual march toward the telos of class-based literature of political utility 
enshrined in Maoist thought. The shift of focus, however, far from showing the 
explicit contradiction in the discourse of nation building, on the contrary, continually 
articulates unity and morality as the transcendent symbolic regime that organizes the 
new nation. 
 
The transformations of narrative forms: the specter of modernity 
A great deal of work has been done on the transformation of narrative forms in 
modern Chinese literature. The impact of Western literature enabled Chinese writers 
to make use of the first-person narrative and discover the interior psychology of 
characters, which along with the linear causality of emplotment and other narrative 
techniques mark the decisive change in form from the premodern to modern. 
Historical narratives seem to be no exception. The advent of Lu Xun’s short stories, 
the blossoming of spoken drama stage plays, and the success of modern novels 
provide multiple platforms to represent history in the modern period.  
                                                                                                                                                                               
period. For instance, Gao Yang’s historical novels in Taiwan, Jin Yong’s martial arts novels in Hong 
Kong, Lin Yutang’s Biography of Wu Zetian published in the United States in 1959, and so forth. Since 
they were not available in the mainland until the late 1980s, I exclude them from the discussion in this 
chapter.   
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In addition to such aspects, in terms of temporal-spatial configurations, 
traditional form and modern form also manifest different patterns. Traditionally, 
historical narrative, evolved from the early forms of storyteller’s scripts—from the 
Tang bianwen (变文), Song and Yuan huaben (话本), to the later form of historical 
yanyi (演义), was subordinated to official historiography, which emphasized both 
factual recording of events and moral judgment of the historians. As a result, fiction 
writers imitated historians in elaborating various events which may or may not directly 
relate to the central theme.145 Consequently, two contradictions constitute the open 
structure of the traditional narrative: one is the discrepancy between the detailed 
portrayal of events (moral or immoral) and the intrusion of the authorial voice to call 
for morality, which makes the process of indetification problematic; the other is the 
tension between the cluster of events and the overall structure, which results in the 
lack of concern for overall structural coherence. As Andrew Plaks pointed out, the 
traditional Chinese narrative manifests a pattern that resembles the Chinese Empire 
with “ceaseless alternation,” “complementary bipolarity,” and “cyclical recurrence,” 
or “multiple periodicity.” In his words:  
 
What we observe in the structural patterning of Chinese narrative is an 
interminable overlapping—a dense web of intermingled events and non-events 
which obviates any sense of unilinear plot development and hence clouds the 
perception of artistic unity… It is not a lack of movement (or development), 
but the totalization of temporal flux which dispenses with a clear sense of 
direction and hence creates the impression of motionlessness. (italics in the 
original text)146 
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David Der-wei Wang interpreted this “motionlessness” as the effect of imitating the 
storytelling to “synchronize the continuous diachronic sequence.” 147  What this 
“motionlessness” implies is the spatialization of temporality and an overlapping 
between narrator and author. It is as if all the events are taking place in the present, 
while the narrator articulates his authorial moral judgment as a sort of collective 
unconscious. Such a “motionless” form, seen by Lin Qingxin as a “spatial 
narration,”148 manifests the heterogeneous time in representing the Chinese Empire: 
the transcendent, omnipresent moral time and the amoral shi-trend in the present. The 
multiple characters (usually quite numerous) hence embody the hierarchy of morality, 
exhibiting the differential temporality in the typology of the empire.  
In contrast to traditional “spatial narration,” Lin suggests that modern narrative 
displays a sense of “temporal narration” in that the plot usually unfolds a linear 
causality, while the movement of the characters in space manifests “homogeneous, 
empty” modern time. The intrusive authorial voice mostly disappears, and the moral 
message, as I will show in the following sections, is articulated implicitly or explicitly 
through the characters. Instead of an all-encompassing, open structure inviting 
multiple readings, the modern narrative demonstrates a closed structure exhibiting a 
temporal sequence to construct a meaningful totality.  
However, the boundary between the two forms, to borrow from Lin, the 
“spatial form” and the “temporal form,” is not clear cut in modern historical narratives. 
Not only does the moral message become even more unitary and monolithic, only 
manifesting the “collective consciousness” (as opposed to the “collective 
unconscious”), but the narrator also remains omniscient in portraying the events. In 
                                                             
147 David Wang, Xiangxiang zhongguo de fangfa: lishi, xiaoshuo, xushi (The ways to imagine China: 
history, fiction, narration) (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1998), 90. 
148 Lin Qingxin, Brushing History against the Grain: Reading the Chinese New Historical Fiction 
(1986-1999), (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), 17. 
85 
 
terms of narrative medium, the stage play is designed for performance, itself being a 
“spatial” form to unfold relations among different parties in different settings/places. 
Moreover, the novel, due to its huge capacity for narration, often manifests a dialogic 
feature of heteroglossia, which diverts from the unilinear totality. For instance, it is not 
hard to see the traditional heritage in Yao Xueyin’s Li Zicheng.  
Furthermore, in terms of time manifested in the narrative, rather than a 
homogeneous, linear time, scholars have discovered that modern narrative nonetheless 
bears the capacity to exhibit heterogeneous time. Sabina Knight observed that with the 
techniques of “foreshadowing,” “backshadowing,” and “sideshadowing,” modern 
writers were able to construct ambiguous narratives in contrast to the seemingly 
unitary structure.149 In the case of historical narrative, I would suggest distinguishing 
“effectiveness” from “effect.” In other words, the modern historical narrative may 
have been successful in creating a homogeneous, linear and progressive time, meaning 
it is “effective” in participating in the project of modernization, yet the “effect” it 
projects onto the audience nevertheless manifests a differential time against the 
present. Between the past and the present emerges the synthetic differential time 
which counters the “homogeneous, empty” modern time. In fact, the genre of 
historical narrative, owing to its moralistic agency, instead of representing a petrified 
history with mere historical significance, as a whole casts a shadow of challenge on 
the project of modernity. 
In sum, although there is change in the narrative form in the modern period, 
and although the writers were obsessed with modernization in both form and content, 
historical narrative, just as imperial history itself, not only participates in the 
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inevitably hybrid Chinese modern, but also manifests the long lasting penetrating 
impact of tradition.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Staging Empire: Literary Representations of Imperial History (1900-1981) 
 
This manner of portrayal is simply the artistic expression of that genuine 
historicism—the conception of history as the destiny of the people—which motivated 
the classics. 
                                                          ----Georg Lukács. The Historical Novel  
 
What has happened to the historical figures—the past emperors, ministers, 
generals, peasant rebels—in the modern period when the Chinese Empire has ceased 
to exist and modernity gained hegemony? How did they participate in the projects of 
enlightenment and nation building? Writers at various historical moments constructed 
historical characters to serve their conscious purposes, but also revealed 
unacknowledged anxiety and ambivalence in their dealing with history. This chapter 
will direct attention to several historical novels and plays in chronological order, to 
explain that for almost a century, regardless of the discursive formation of a modern 
nation state in different time periods, the imagination of China manifests its imperial 
pattern through time.   
 
Between China and Tianxia: Wu Jianren’s Tongshi (Painful history) 
In the late Qing period, along with the blossoming of the “new fiction” which 
focused on representing social reality and translating foreign works, historical 
narratives also drew great public attention. Among them Wu Jianren’s Tongshi 
(Painful history), Liang Jin yanyi (The story of Western and Eastern Jin dynasties), Li 
Liangcheng’s Rexue hen (The trace of warm blood), and Tongku sheng II’s (Crying 
man II) Choushi (The history of hatred) deserve investigation. All depicting periods of 
crisis in history, these novels aim to mirror the critical situation of early twentieth-
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century China and call for nationalist sentiment to rescue the country from Western 
imperialist aggression.150 
Published in New Fiction (Xin xiaoshuo) during 1902-1906, Wu Jianren’s 
Tongshi was regarded by A Ying as the best historical novel in the late Qing period.151 
Depicting the fall of the Southern Song (1127-1279 AD) to the Yuan Empire (1271-
1368 AD), Tongshi was written to mirror the corrupt society in the late Qing period in 
order to arouse nationalistic sentiment against Western imperialism. Using a story-
teller as narrator in the first chapter, Wu attributes the fall of a nation to the lack of 
morality within. Although he embraced the law of the jungle and acknowledged the 
might of forces from outside,152 he nonetheless believed that unconditional loyalty to 
the country, fearless fighting spirit, and unity from within would save the country 
from falling. In his words: 
 
As long as everyone in the country has backbone (zhi qi志气), and is 
determined to fight until the last person, then the country will not fall….I am 
angered that many of our fellow Chinese so lack courage and uprightness (xue 
xing血性) that they often voluntarily sell out the country to the enemy, and 
even bring the enemy to slaughter their own compatriots. Rather than feeling a 
bit ashamed of themselves, they are even proud of their betrayal! I have no 
way to understand what kind of material their heart is made of, so I intend to 
portray their stories in order to mirror the present.153 
 
To some extent, the novel is a portrait of the negative exemplars, national traitors, and 
the corrupt ruling house in the Southern Song period. The confrontation between the 
Song and the Mongols is manifested in the encounter between the Chinese—the loyal 
                                                             
150 A Ying, Wanqing xiaoshuo shi (The history of late Qing fiction). In A Ying quanji (the complete 
collection of A Ying’s works).  (Hefei: Anhui jiaoyu chubanshe, 2000), Vol 8. 
151 Ibid. 163.  
152 In the opening paragraph of the first chapter, he naturalized the competition among countries and 
acknowledged that the winner was usually the most powerful. Yet he took a defensive position from the 
perspective of the weak country, promoting martyrdom to defend the country from falling.  
153 Wu Jianren, Tongshi. In Wu Jianren quanji (The complete collection of Wu Jianren’s works) 
(Beijing: Beifang wenyi chubanshe, 1997), Vol. 4, 3. 
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fighters in the Southern Song and the conspirators who choose to serve the Mongol 
court. Portrayed as an uncivilized, culturally inferior, and militarily aggressive people, 
the Mongols are rarely present in the narrative except that they are mentioned as 
assimilated barbarians to be incorporated into the Chinese Empire whereupon they 
become the (il)legitimate rulers. In chapter one, the narrator introduces the process 
through which the Mongol tribal federation developed into the Yuan empire. Assisted 
by an official named Liu Bingzhong, who was ethnically Chinese, Kublai Khan chose 
the Chinese character “Yuan”—from the Chinese classic Book of Changes—as the 
title of his empire and adopted the whole political structure from the Chinese imperial 
regime (5). Insofar as Liu inherited and transmitted Chinese culture to the Mongol 
ruler, his loyalty to the Mongol court is seen by the narrator as a misplaced loyalty 
defined within the Chinese moral regime. Culturally expansive and inclusive yet 
politically defensive and resistant, Wu Jianren’s narrative manifests his fundamental 
ambivalence in understanding the relationship between the Chinese Empire and the 
emerging idea of nation state in his time.    
Compared to the comment on Liu Bingzhong, whose family had served non-
Chinese powers for generations and whose loyalty to the Mongols is granted 
legitimacy due to his transmission of Chinese culture, Wu’s attitude toward the Song 
officials who surrendered to the Mongol power was much harsher. Among those 
people whom he termed “evil officials” (quan jian 权奸) and “traitors” (han jian汉奸), 
Jia Sidao was especially corrupt, dominating, and disloyal. Wu celebrated his death in 
a toilet as “leaving his stench for ten thousand years” (yi chou wan nian 遗臭万年) 
and treated the avenging murderer Zheng Huchen as a hero. 154  Similarly, the 
capitulating officials Zhang Hongfan and Liu Mengyan were seen as those who have 
                                                             
154 Wu Jianren admits that in the official history, Zheng Huchen, who killed Jia Sidao, was captured and 
prosecuted later. Yet in his narrative, he treated Zheng Huchen as a hero who continued heroic, secret 
operations against the Mongol ruling house after he killed Jia.  
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betrayed their ancestors and deserved to be condemned for centuries. This attitude is 
best articulated in Zhang Gui’s words in Chapter Eight. Facing the tempting rhetoric 
of surrender from Zhang Hongfan, Zhang Gui convincingly reprimands Hongfan for 
his lack of responsibility towards the Zhang ancestors. Juxtaposing the Zhang lineage 
with China, Gui criticizes Hongfan because the latter not only betrayed China, but also 
stigmatized the reputation of the Zhang family (34). Later in Chapter Eighteen, after 
Zhang Hongfan has defeated the Song army, he orders his name to be inscribed in 
stone to glorify his military accomplishment. The inscription appears as “Here is the 
place where Zhang Hongfan defeated the Song.” Following this passage, the narrator 
sarcastically inserts an episode from the later Ming Dynasty when a scholar changed 
the inscription into one that reads: “Here is the place where Zhang Hongfan of the 
Song defeated the Song.” The glory of helping establish the Yuan Empire is thus 
immediately transformed into the villainy of disloyalty to the Song. The coexistence of 
different historical times, the juxtaposition of military accomplishment with lack of 
integrity on this monumental stone, entails the all-encompassing moral assessment 
transcending time and space. It prompts the narrator to intrude immediately following 
the episode: “Right now [late Qing] those ‘gentlemen’ who are flattering the 
foreigners should be cautious that, someday later, there might be another scholar who 
would insert ‘Chinese’ in front of their titles [should they succeed in helping the 
foreign country to defeat China]!” (166) 
The moral judgment from the authorial voice displays the generic tradition in 
historical yanyi narrative where the author or the orator superimposes his moral vision 
onto the stories he is telling, regardless of the open, episodic structure of the narrative. 
155 Yet what is latent here is the omniscient view of time—past and future—that 
                                                             
155 See the discussion in the previous chapter comparing the different narrative modes: historical yanyi 
and modern play. 
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oversees and defines the present. It is not so much the author who elevates himself to 
insert his own perspective as it is time being endowed with transcendent moral 
judgment that enfolds the author. Indeed, the reference to the ancestors and the future 
generations has linked the past and the future together to form a continuous historical 
consciousness which constitutes a moral eye to see through the present reality. This 
eye, historically transcendent and morally universal, confines the individual within its 
powerful horizon and places him in history. It is through this all-encompassing moral 
eye that Wu Jianren created the positive and negative exemplars to make them 
performative figures triggering emulation or disdain. 
In contrast to the immoral officials and the incapable ruling house that together 
resulted in the fall of the Southern Song, there are also many heroic figures praised as 
loyal and righteous fighters standing up for the country.  Minister Wen Tianxiang, 
General Zhang Shijie, Scholar Xie Junzhi, and the fearless warriors hidden on Mount 
Xianxia together construct a collective picture of heroes. Though they are from 
different social status, they share the common characteristic of unconditional 
patriotism considering loyalty and righteousness more valuable than life. Facing a 
devastatingly overwhelming situation, they choose to fight until the last minute when 
death completes, and continues, their spirit.  
Indeed, in situations when morality is impossible to achieve in life, death 
becomes the possible agency to accomplish the moral mission. Death is not the end of 
life; rather, it is the continuation of the moral life which addresses the living to act in 
emulation. To some extent, death is valued more than life in that it places the hero in 
history, immortal. Wu Jianren obviously followed this poetics of martyrdom to 
dramatize, even mystify, the moral death in order to express his strong moral judgment. 
For instance, Wen Tianxiang’s death is portrayed as something of a miracle, one that 
proves his undying morality that overpowers the Mongol intruders. As the widely 
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adored prime minister of the Southern Song, Wen Tianxiang is unfortunately captured 
by the Mongol army led by Zhang Hongfan. No matter how hard the Mongol officials 
try to persuade him, he would rather die than to serve the Mongol regime. Reluctantly 
accepting the fact that Wen Tianxiang would not surrender on whatever alluring 
condition, the first Yuan emperor Kublai Khan finally decides to take Wen’s life. Yet, 
admiring his upright spirit, he grants Wen a posthumous title and orders a memorial 
ceremony to be conducted for him. However, no sooner does the ceremony start than 
the clear, sunny sky suddenly becomes darkened by thick, black clouds. Following a 
deafening thunder, pouring rain falls and a gust of wind blows away Wen’s memorial 
tablet inscribed with the posthumous title given by Kublai Khan. Shocked and 
threatened, the Mongol officials immediately replace it with another tablet with Wen’s 
former Southern Song official title. Mystically, the sky soon clears up again. In the 
meantime, on the execution ground, people of the Southern Song discover that Wen’s 
face appears as if he were alive and his body continuously emits a fragrance after his 
death, which vividly demonstrates the idiom “leaving a fragrance for a thousand 
years” (liu fang qian gu  流芳千古).(179)  
This imagined scene, needless to say, is both inconsistent and supernatural. It 
is inconsistent because the Mongol court admiringly worships Wen’s spirit according 
to the Chinese ritual, yet heartlessly discards his body on the execution ground. It is 
supernatural for its mystical descriptions of “Heaven’s anger” and Wen’s immortal 
dead body.  Nevertheless, it at once glorifies Wen’s virtue and demonstrates the 
assimilative power of this China-originated virtue to the barbarians. Meanwhile, on the 
Chinese side, the portrayals of Jia Sidao’s stinking corpse and Wen Tianxiang’s 
fragrant remains best illustrate the stark contrast between disloyalty and loyalty, 
between immorality and morality, and between transient life and immortal death. By 
literalizing metaphors (fragrance and stench as the metaphors for one’s posthumous 
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reputation), Wu Jianren disrupts the conventional relation between the signifier and 
the referent, and directly addresses the physical senses to arouse people’s 
consciousness. The boundary between the spiritual and the material is blurred, and 
immortality turns into a sensory reality. The materiality of the body, is thus imbued 
with both historical consciousness and universal moral judgment, and transformed into 
a performative site registered in time and being instrumental for its own perpetuation. 
However, beneath the transcendent moral judgment exists the contingent 
situation. It brings to the surface the competing discourses that challenge the 
hierarchical configuration of the morality, and stresses the individual moral agency 
that renders the reconfiguration of the hierarchy meaningful. For instance, in a 
situation in which the imperial family is corrupt and weak, loyalty to what or whom 
becomes a discursive yet meanwhile historically determined choice. Not only does the 
rhetoric of the saying that “the capable bird chooses the better wood to inhabit” (liang 
qin ze mu er qi 良禽择木而栖) destabilize the discourse of loyalty, but the amoral shi-
force in the contingent situation (xingshi 形势) and the irreversible historical shi-trend
（dashi大势） also problematize the hierarchy of the moral system. The “better 
wood” that attracts the capable bird, like the rising Mongol power in the novel, usually 
represents the promising shi-force, yet whether it also follows the historical shi-trend 
depends on a more-encompassing moral ground and historical recognition. In Tongshi, 
the hierarchy of morality is established in this way, from lower to higher levels: 
pursuing individual interest—loyal to the Song emperor—loyal to the Song Empire—
serving all under Heaven (Tianxia). Once there is some contradiction between the 
levels in the middle, as in the case that the emperor could not represent the empire any 
more, for example, the higher level determines the moral choice. In the novel, to save 
the Song from falling, the loyal officials set up several young emperors in succession 
as the legitimate representatives of the Song even when the former emperor Deyou is 
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still alive and kept by the Mongols as hostage. In the end, when nobody in the imperial 
family is available to be the emperor, the discourse that “China is the China of all 
Chinese, anyone who is especially moral could govern it” emerges to surface. This 
choice, on the one hand, manifests the traditional notion of contingent decision（quan 
bian权变）following the discursive situation (xingshi形势); on the other hand, the 
choice nonetheless reveals the overpowering, unifying morality that determines the 
significance of the decision.  
One could see the emergent notion of modern nation state in Wu Jianren’s 
writing, which implies more an egalitarian sovereignty rather than hierarchical 
imperial sovereignty, as manifested in the heroes hidden on Mount Xianxia. Yet 
interestingly enough, the modern nation state he tried to imagine is not only fully 
embedded within the Chinese imperial moral regime, but also rendered self-
contradictory when he attempted to assert a national boundary. Just before the ending 
of the novel, which he never completed, Wu shifted the discourse of the nation to the 
discourse of “Tianxia”: “‘Tianxia’ is one that belongs to all-people-under-Heaven,” he 
wrote through Zhao Zigu’s mouth, “only he who is virtuous could govern it.” (235) 
Zhao stresses the continuity of Chinese imperial history by asserting that the first 
Emperor of the Song Dynasty, Zhao Kuangyin, inherited the empire from the ancient 
Zhou dynasty, implying that the legitimacy of Zhao’s rule was determined by the 
imperial-time regime: morality and unity granted a significant place for the emperor in 
history (235). The confrontation with the Mongols thus leads to the question whether 
the Mongols should be included in “Tianxia” (are they civilized enough?) and whether 
they are moral enough to rule. The narrowly defined ethnic nationalism therefore gives 
way to the Chinese notion of “Tianxia” in the imperial moral order.    
Tongshi was never completed, partly because Wu Jianren could not resolve the 
contradiction between ethnic nationalism and the more universal understanding of the 
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Chinese Empire. His strong identification with the Song heroes’ fighting spirit and the 
ambivalent vision toward the Yuan constitute the fundamental tension in the novel. He 
later changed his anti-Manchu attitude,156 as it is groundless in the anti-Mongol 
narrative. As a result, Tongshi became an incomplete statement of the unsettled 
tension between modern nation state and empire, and a testimony to the undying 
imperial-time regime working through the modern transition, regardless of the 
discursive imagination of a modern nation state imposed from Western discourse.  
 
Between the rhetorical and the real: Lu Xun’s Gushi Xinbian (Old tales retold)  
If the imperial-time regime acts out the social unconscious latent in the late 
Qing transitional generation, Lu Xun’s Gushi Xinbian (hereafter Xinbian) nonetheless 
poses the question whether it is possible to escape the all-encompassing and all-
consuming power of this regime. Written from 1922 to 1935, Xinbian contains eight 
short stories from ancient mythology and history re-told in the form of national 
allegory to mirror the reality of his society.157 In other words, the collapse of the 
distinction between the past and the present temporalities has rendered the narrative a 
timeless history, one that transcends both past and present, posing questions about the 
future. 
Indeed, the temporal dimension in these stories casts a doubtful shadow on 
both past and present, which underscores Lu Xun’s ambivalent attitude, which is not 
only skeptical about past civilization, but also pessimistic about the current 
enlightenment. Critics have noted that Xinbian was written at a time when Lu Xun 
constantly experienced personal and social crises. Coexistent with other contemporary 
works that manifest his iconoclastic fighting spirit, Xinbian exhibits Lu Xun’s deepest 
                                                             
156 A Ying, Wanqing xiaoshuo shi (A history of late Qing fiction), in A Ying quanji, 163. 
157 Cheng Guangwei, Zhongguo xiandai wenxue shi, 65. 
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suspicion about the innovative change in society and the possibility of enlightenment. 
As both a fighter and doubter, Lu Xun found himself being caught in his vision of 
history and Chinese civilization in general.158  
Among the eight stories, “Bu tian” (Mending the skies) was written in 1922; 
“Ben yue” (Flight to the Moon) and “Zhu jian” (Forging the swords) were written in 
1926. Accompanying his enthusiastic heralding of the iconoclastic enlightenment 
movement and calling for an individualistic, humanistic society, these three stories 
nonetheless reveal Lu Xun’s fundamental distrust of the enlightenment, the doubt that 
is deeply ingrained in the Chinese civilization. Written about heroes in ancient times—
Nüwa the Goddess-Creator, Houyi, the legendary archer who shot down nine suns in 
the sky, and Meijianchi, who successfully avenged his father’s death, all three stories 
pose the question: what would have happened after the heroes accomplish their 
extraordinary deeds. In comparison with the reality of Lu Xun’s time, the question 
then becomes the quest for the future after the enlightenment movement and the 
destiny of the heroes. All three heroes experience unavoidable adversity and 
eventually loss. And the efforts of the first, their forerunner, prove to be no more than 
a futile attempt. Not only does Nüwa encounter criticism and misunderstanding when 
she tries to repair the sky, but she also suffers the exploitation of her body and name 
after she dies of her exhausting work. Those who she created yet once criticized her 
now reside in her belly for its rich resources, claiming to be her legitimate descendents. 
The supposed immortal mountain she placed on the turtle’s back also turns out to be 
the barbaric islands.159 The great blueprint to create civilization manifests itself as no 
more than delusion and miscomprehension.  
                                                             
158 Qian Liqun, Gushi xinbian man tan (A casual reading of Old tales retold). A talk given in 
Guolinfeng bookstore. Electronic access: http://www.univs.cn/univs/hust/content.php?id=101551  
159 Lu Xun, “Butian” (Mending the sky). In Lu Xun quanji (Complete works of Lu Xun) (Beijing: 
Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 1991) , Vol 2, 354.  
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Similarly, in “Benyue,” after Houyi destroys nine suns and all the big animals, 
he finds himself useless and depressed. He benefits neither the world, nor his family. 
His heroic behavior ironically eliminates his own resources for survival, which finally 
results in his wife’s betrayal.160  
The hero’s self doubt and frustration best manifest themselves in “Zhu jian” 
(Forging the swords). As the Dark Man (hei se ren) tries to convince Meijianchi to 
trust him, he articulates his motivation for revenge that not only comes from his anger 
toward the hypocritical outside world, but also from within. “I always knew your 
father, just as I have always known you,” he says, “but this is not the reason why I 
want to take revenge…What’s yours is mine, and what he was I am too. I bear on my 
soul so many wounds, inflicted by others as well as by myself, that now I have come 
to hate myself!”161 This ambiguous statement of the dark avenger is seen by Leo Ou-
fan Lee as being without any rational basis and so incomprehensible that it only serves 
to contribute to the creative surrealism of Lu Xun’s writing.162 Yet it is this statement 
in the story that immediately wins Meijianchi’s trust with his life and sword and lays 
the foundation for the success of the later revenge. The crucial function of the 
statement implies that Lu Xun had given a lot of thought to it to carry the power of 
determining life and death. In fact, just as the Dark Man trenchantly comments on the 
discrepancy between the rhetoric and reality, the mental anguish manifests the society 
as ill projected on one’s mind. “Oh, kid, please don’t mention these stigmatized 
terms,” the Dark Man says to Meijianchi after he suggests helping him take  revenge, 
                                                             
160 Critics usually pay more attention to the background of this story, taking the story as Lu Xun’s 
response to a young writer Gao Changhong at that time. Although Lu Xun admits that the stories in 
Xinbian are not serious historical writings, overly emphasizing the contingent events in his life will only 
obscure his serious thinking on Chinese civilization. I take this story as the product of his historically-
oriented thinking about the enlightenment movement. For another reading of this story, see Leo Oufan 
Lee, Voices from the Iron House: A Study of Lu Xun. 34. 
161 Lu Xun, “Zhujian.” In Lu Xun quanji, Vol 2, 426. 
162 Leo Ou-fan Lee, Voices from the Iron House: A Study of Lu Xun (Bloomington & Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1987),36. 
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“righteousness (zhengyi, 正义) and sympathy, things like that, were once clean, but 
now they have all become the capital for high-interest loans [to get more repayment]!”  
Unlike the madman in “The Madman’s Diary,” whose inversion of madness 
turns out to be the sober perception of the illness of the society and who appears to be 
the detached, enlightened individual,163 the Dark Man fails to detach himself with a 
transcendent or interior view of society. Rather, he finds himself tormented within the 
very heart of society, without any language to justify his action. Inasmuch as the 
language is manipulated and exploited as pure rhetoric, he is in a non-place of 
symbolic power. He is not only in a position that is against the king, but he himself is 
situated within the symbolic order that the king represents. If the king justifies himself 
as moral and orderly, there is no language left for the Dark Man to claim his righteous 
stance. Meijianchi’s personal enmity, shouldered by the Dark Man, is in this sense 
elevated into a social, structural one. By the end of the story, the structural pitfall 
exhibits itself in such a way that there is no way to distinguish the good from the evil, 
self from other. The overwhelming symbolic order merges everyone into its melting 
pot, suggesting that only a return to the primitive could provide justice, grotesquely 
and speechlessly. It again proves nothing more than the futile attempt to escape 
civilization. The image of three unidentifiable skulls in the boiling water vividly 
mirrors the troublesome social reality Lu Xun envisioned. To some extent, the big 
caldron with boiling water creates an imaginary, allegorical world as opposed to the 
symbolic world outside the cauldron. Outside, the courtiers, the concubines of the king, 
and the people who witness the funeral procession, together construct a symbolic 
social order. In this order structured by language people are blind, ignorant, 
hypocritical, and incapable of distinguishing the king from the assassins. Only within 
                                                             
163 There is also ambiguity in that story. Since the madman finally recovers to become “normal” in the 
introduction of the narrator, he is hardly an enlightened hero who can escape from the old regime. 
99 
 
the cauldron lies the truth, implying that justice can only be done in a primitive, 
violent way. It blends the good and evil together, refusing to be characterized in any 
terms that exist in civilization. It is interesting that the revenge is finally accomplished 
through a battle among three heads, and the only weapons they have are their mouths 
and teeth! The image suggests the grotesque demonstration of the pessimistic and 
sarcastic attitude Lu Xun held toward the intellectual debates and the enlightenment 
movement.  
In her study on Lu Xun’s work in this period, Shu-mei Shih pointed out that Lu 
Xun employed Freudian Psychoanalysis in his experimental writing. 164  Lu Xun 
himself once explained why he created the character Nüwa the way he did in “Bu tian”: 
he meant to show how the “primordial incipience of the sexual urge resulted in 
creation and death.”165 Beyond sexual desire in the ahistorical, Freudian sense, Shu-
mei Shih observed that the Freudian content in Lu Xun’s work nevertheless bears 
specific historical significance. Lu Xun’s use of Freudian psychology “echoes 
Kuriyagawa Hakuson, in whose conception the repression of desire and life force in 
the libido produces anguish, and the expression of this anguish in symbolic form is 
art.”166 Shih interpreted Lu Xun’s creation of madness and grotesque images as the 
manifestation and embodiment of anguish. By constructing madness in grotesque 
images, Lu Xun was able to release unconscious fears and desires and make manifest 
the latent content of Chinese society.167  
Focusing on Lu Xun’s experimental writing using psychology and other 
Western techniques, Shih convincingly identified Lu Xun as a complete Occidentalist 
                                                             
164 Shu-mei Shih, The Lure of the Modern: Writing Modernism in Semicolonial China, 1917-1937. 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, & London: University of California Press, 2001), 89-91. 
165 Lu Xun, “Wo zenme zuoqi xiaoshuo lai” (How I started writing fiction) (1933), in Lu Xun quanji 
(The complete works of Lu Xun), Vol 4, 513. 
166 Shu-mei Shih, The Lure of the Modern, 90. 
167 Ibid. 90. 
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who confidently borrowed foreign knowledge and technology without the anxiety of 
cultural contamination or subjugation. 168  However, she was not convincing in 
identifying him as a steadfast believer of evolution and progress who only embraced 
linear development. Freudian psychoanalysis does not signify any sense of historical 
development as linear and progressive; on the contrary, the repressed, condensed, and 
displaced desire manifests itself repeatedly in disguised forms. What psychoanalysis 
conveys is the never-ending pursuit for origin, unfulfilled desire for return, and a non-
linear time flow, which appealed to some Chinese intellectuals not only for its insight 
on individual psychology, but also in its function to be employed to express anxiety 
and denunciation of society.169 Shih also acknowledged that psychoanalysis did not fit 
seamlessly in the May Fourth ideology of progress. 170   Lu Xun’s conscious 
employment of psychoanalysis on the other hand exhibits his unacknowledged doubt 
about progress and linear development. Just as the grotesque image of three heads 
signifies the unspeakable horror and violence of civilization beyond comprehension, 
Lu Xun’s use of psychoanalysis casts a doubtful shadow on his enlightenment project.  
Moreover, Lu Xun’s Occidental universalism, crystallized in his notion of 
“grabbism” (na lai zhu yi拿来主义), manifests a broad sense of selectiveness. 
“[D]efined as borrowing from other countries with confidence, like a master who 
chooses freely according to his needs and not like a neurotic who fears the loss of 
indigenous tradition or enslavement by what is borrowed,” 171  the concept of 
“grabbism” does not take the West to be a homogeneous and righteous entity. Rather, 
it separates the good from the evil, with the good serving for China’s enlightenment 
and the evil threatening to destroy that enlightenment. Seen in this light, both the 
                                                             
168 Ibid. 86. 
169 Jingyuan Zhang, Psychoanalysis in China: Literary Transformations, 1919-1949 (Ithaca: Cornell 
East Asia Series, 1992). 
170 Shu-mei Shih, The Lure of the Modern. 63. 
171 Ibid. 86. 
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boundaries of China and the West become porous. The West is not all together 
advanced and admirable, and Chinese civilization is not totally corrupt and disposable. 
In this sense, Lu Xun’s iconoclastic stance may be less radical than it appeared to be 
and his later Marxist turn may become more comprehensible. 
Not until the 1930s did Lu Xun's historical fiction manifest more of the 
positive side of Chinese culture and his collective consciousness. The five stories in 
Xinbian that were written during 1934-1935 shift the focus from an individual hero's 
destiny to the whole philosophical foundation of the civilization. Still maintaining a 
sarcastic and pessimistic tone toward the intellectual discourses, Lu Xun nonetheless 
separated the real from the hypocritical, distinguished the merely speculative from the 
practical, and turned to the pragmatic, hard-working people he considered as the ridge 
of the civilization. In these stories, intellectual discourses like Confucianism and 
Daoism are ruthlessly attacked for their rhetorical face value. While Confucius’s Dao 
(the Way) appears to be so hypocritical that it forces Lao Zi to leave in order to avoid 
Confucius’ suspicion and jealousy, Zhuang Zi’s Dao turns out to be merely 
speculative, so that it cannot deal with the simple problems in reality. In “Chu Guan” 
(Cross the Pass), far from being a glorified sage with a perfect personality, Confucius 
seems to be mediocre and invidious, which diverts him from the moral principle in 
Confucianism. In “Qi Si” (Resurrection), Zhuang Zi cannot resolve the tension 
between nature and culture. Even though he believes that naturally, clothes are not 
necessary for the human being to embrace the Dao (the Way) and harmonize with 
nature, he himself insists on dressing formally to meet authority while refusing to give 
his clothes to the naked man he reincarnated.  
In other stories, the trenchant sarcasm toward intellectual discourses 
nonetheless gives way to the optimistic portrayal of heroes. Self-sacrificing and 
courageous, these heroes sincerely care about the people and take great pains to solve 
102 
 
practical problems at times of adversity. Yu-the-Great in “Li Shui” (Pacifying the 
water) and Mo Zi in “Fei Gong” (Against aggression) belong to this group. Hard 
working while not expecting personal benefit, they are for Lu Xun the real heroes in 
Chinese civilization. As Lu Xun passionately described them in his essay, “Since 
ancient times, there have always been people who are hard working with their head 
down, who stick to their way even at the cost of their lives, who dare to challenge 
authority for the benefit of the people, and who sacrifice their lives to pursue justice 
and truth. They are the backbone of China.”172 Rather than throwing away the entire 
intellectual heritage and Chinese civilization, Lu Xun nevertheless distinguished the 
genuine from the fake, the fighter from the speaker, and the sincere believer from the 
hypocritical talker. What he was sarcastic and pessimistic about is the dark side of 
ideology or discourse which was usurped to rule people, not the moral values 
promoted in the discourse.  
However, for Lu Xun, the boundary between the genuine and the fake were not 
always clear-cut, since he had a deep-rooted suspicion and distrust of human beings 
and the conditional nature of the traditional moral code. The ambivalence of his 
attitude best manifests itself in “Cai wei” (Plucking ferns). “Cai Wei” reproduces the 
story of Boyi and Shuqi recorded in Shiji (The Records of the Grand Historian). 
Drawing on other, unofficial historical sources across time, “Cai wei” compresses 
different perspectives into one tale, which not only casts a doubtful shadow on the 
protagonists’ character, but also reveals the conditional nature of the moral system in 
traditional culture.  
In the original Shiji record, Boyi and Shuqi, sons of Prince Guzhu in the 
kingdom of Shang, are portrayed as steadfast believers in moral integrity and the 
                                                             
172 Lu Xun, “Zhongguo ren shi qu zi xin li le ma?” (Are Chinese losing confidence?) in Qiejieting 
zawen (Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 1952), 113. 
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persistent practitioners of unconditional loyalty toward authority. Disappointed with 
King Wu’s disloyalty and conquest of the Shang, they vow not to eat the rice of the 
Zhou, the new kingdom replacing the Shang, and hide themselves on Shouyang 
Mountain, plucking ferns for survival. Almost exhausting the ferns available, they 
finally starve to death in the mountain. Sima Qian finished this story in Shiji with a 
cool, detached tone without obvious personal judgment, yet he did record the 
comment by Duke Jiang Taigong in the Zhou who regarded them as the “righteous 
heroes” (yishi 义士). However, Lu Xun referred to other historical sources in Gushi 
kao (the evidential reference of ancient history) and Lieshi zhuan (the biography of the 
martyrs), suggesting that they might not die of their stubborn belief in moral integrity, 
but of a less noble desire intrinsic in their characters. According to these sources, Boyi 
and Shuqi in the end stopped plucking the ferns because they were told by a village 
woman that even the ferns belong to the Zhou kingdom. Trapped in the Zhou yet loyal 
to the Shang, they have no choice but wait to die. Nonetheless, seeing their righteous 
behavior, Heaven sends a female deer to feed them with milk. Yet, lured by the deer 
meat, Shuqi secretly attempts to kill the deer one day. Sensing his intention, the 
offended deer disappears forever. This causes the two recluses to starve to death.  
It is not hard to see that the episodes recorded in Gushi kao and Lieshi zhuan 
were later constructs trying to justify the rule of Zhou by challenging the moral 
integrity of Boyi and Shuqi. On one level, it suggests that the absolute loyalty to one 
lord leaves no room for survival at times of political transition. Moral integrity 
consequently has to be conditional or else it is inhumane.  On another level, the 
involvement of Heaven gives reassurance that their moral integrity transcends time 
and space, that Heaven rewards them with a non-place of the Zhou for survival. 
However, it is not the Zhou Kingdom or Heaven that causes them to die, but their own 
desire that is against benevolence and righteousness that kills them. In the latter sense, 
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the episodes not only promote unconditional morality as a rewarding political 
orthodoxy, but also shift the focus of moral interrogation from the King of Zhou to 
Boyi and Shuqi.  
Yet, instead of favoring any of the narratives, Lu Xun put all these episodes 
together into an ambiguous plot. The story of the deer is told by a maid called Ajin. 
Without testing Ajin’s honesty, the story remains an uncertain one. If Ajin is telling 
the truth, then Boyi and Shuqi appear to be somewhat hypocritical gentlemen who are 
not as righteous as they claim to be. However, if Ajin is lying, the attitude of other 
people becomes more interesting. Upon hearing the story, other people in the village 
feel relieved, implying that in fact people like to believe what Ajin says. Since the 
moral standard they embody is too high for others to follow, in a society that tends to 
moralize every human behavior, their existence only places huge pressure on other 
people. On the other hand, if people really believe that the King of Shang is corrupt 
and immoral, a ruler who is not qualified to be a king and deserves to be overthrown 
by the Zhou, Boyi and Shuqi’s rigid loyalty then appears no more than a tragicomic 
farce, one that fails to realize the conditional nature of the moral discourse.  
Here lies Lu Xun’s deepest doubt about the overpowering moral regime. On 
the one hand, morality is conditional and flexible due to different situations and 
subject to hermeneutic and rhetorical explanation, which will inevitably be turned into 
an ideological tool to suppress people; on the other hand, the moralistic regime in 
Chinese society enfolds every individual in its centripetal current, leaving no room to 
escape. The blurred boundary between the authenticity and inauthenticity of morality 
renders it almost impossible to make moral choice. Falling along a spectrum that 
ranges between absolute moral integrity and unavoidable hypocrisy, Lu Xun found 
himself being caught in a suffocating web woven with multiple discourses, unable to 
escape the shadow of tradition. Heroes, like Lu Xun himself, might feel that they are 
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working for history, to change history, yet Lu Xun was pretty much aware that they 
merely lived in history. The history is the iron house he referred to in Nahan (A Call 
to Arms) in which there is no escape.  
 
The continuous history in A Ying’s Nanming shiju (The historical plays on the 
Southern Ming)  
If Lu Xun’s historical fiction maps the relationship between the individual 
subject and the iron-house-like culture—individuals living across time and space yet 
still sharing the same destiny—the historical plays during the War of Resistance to 
Japan nonetheless portray the relationship between individual heroes and the people, 
and between the people and the nation. 
National defense as a literary topic became the predominant goal in 
intellectuals’ consciousness following the Japanese invasion of Northeast China in 
1932 and later the outbreak of full-scale warfare in 1937. In the meantime, the serious 
national crisis rendered the friction between the CCP (the Communist Party) and the 
GMD (the Nationalist Party) even more striking. In order to call for unity within China 
to fight against the common enemy, historical plays were chosen as the weapon to 
address reality, especially in the areas where direct comments on war faced harsh 
censorship.173 Writers like Guo Moruo, Ouyang Yuqian, A Ying (Qian Xingcun), 
Yang Hansheng, and Chen Baichen devoted themselves to the creation of historical 
plays, advocating patriotism, criticizing capitulation, and promoting an upright 
spirit.174 These plays usually depict historical heroes who remain righteous and loyal 
to the country in times of crisis. Like the narratives in the late Qing period, instead of 
focusing on the confrontation with external enemies, the plays almost always 
                                                             
173 In the Japanese-occupied cities like Shanghai and Beijing, writers encountered Japanese censorship; 
in Chongqing, literary works were to be censored by the GMD authority.   
174 Cheng Guangwei, Zhongguo xiandai wenxue shi. 342. 
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dramatize the internal contradiction within the country. Thus, the failure of the heroes 
and the fall of the country are not seen resulting so much from the mighty power of the 
external invasion as from the immoral betrayal of the traitors. In fact, the resentful 
sentiment toward traitors and capitulation was so prevalent that the writers couldn’t 
help but intensify individual relations among characters in terms of political crisis, no 
matter how obscure the “foreign enemy” was defined.  
Indeed, as Edward Gunn has convincingly demonstrated, in these plays, the 
notion of the “foreign” is but an abstract concept. 175 The enemy cannot be reduced to 
any specific “foreign” category. It only vaguely refers to the powerful outside group 
who lack legitimacy to rule from the protagonist group’s perspective, one perspective 
that privileges the unity of the empire and represents the people. Such a socialist turn 
in portraying a unified empire is most explicitly manifested in A Ying’s plays at a time 
of national crisis.  
During 1939-1941, A Ying (Qian Xingcun or pen name Wei Ruhui) remained 
in Japanese-occupied Shanghai and wrote several plays on late Ming and late Qing 
history. The Southern Ming histories include four plays: Mingmo yihen (The eternal 
regret of the late Ming, or Ge Nenniang, Bixue hua), Haiguo yingxiong (The hero of 
the ocean kingdom, or Zheng Chenggong), Yang E zhuan (The biography of Yang E), 
and Xuandai shenyuan (or Zhang Cangshui). Dramatizing different heroes associated 
with different short-lived Southern Ming emperors, the four plays document the 
enduring effort to recover the Ming Empire after the Manchus occupied Beijing and 
founded the Qing.  All attribute the fall of the Ming to the internal split rather than to 
the external Manchu enemy, who merely appear to be the immoral, illegitimate, 
background placeholder of the traitors’ soul rather than the powerful foreign invader. 
                                                             
175 Edward M. Gunn, Unwelcome Muse: Chinese Literature in Shanghai and Peking, 1937-1945 (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 127. 
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Besides the Southern Ming histories, Hong Xuanjiao, written in 1941, covers the story 
of the Taiping rebellion in the late Qing period. By the same token, the Manchu court 
is taken as no more than the illegitimate ruler of the Chinese Empire. Should the 
leaders of the peasant rebellion remain unified and far-sighted, they would be able to 
overthrow the Manchu rule to resurrect the Chinese Empire. In the same spirit, Li 
Chuangwang, written in 1945, depicts the peasant rebellion in the late Ming. 
Regarding both the Ming Court and the Qing Court as disqualified rulers owing to 
their exploitation of the people, the play endows the peasant rebels with strength and 
justification through the people’s support. However, the moral decay and the internal 
contradiction within the peasant leadership finally deprive them of this justification, 
which ultimately results in the failure of the rebellion.  
It is noteworthy that although all these plays portray the predetermined 
breakdown of such righteous attempts, they all have an open ending, suggesting that in 
their wake the people will bring hope for the future. The failure or death of the heroes, 
hence, calls on the people to learn the lessons from the past, to inherit their moral 
integrity and upright spirit, and to believe that such spirit transcends time and space to 
be the moral essence of the Chinese Empire.  
The moral call in these plays, no doubt, is closely related to the social reality 
during wartime, yet the moralizing tendency nonetheless manifests the undying 
imperial-time regime handed down from antiquity. However, unlike Wu Jianren’s 
Tongshi, in which the poetics of martyrdom undermines individual agency to change 
an overwhelming situation, A Ying’s plays focus more on the consciousness of time. 
They pay more attention to the future, a future that is not only based on historical 
continuity created in a linear fashion, but also the product of the Marxist outlook that 
defines the present.  
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The most appealing example is the play Haiguo yingxiong (The Hero of the 
Ocean Kingdom). Written in 1940, this play depicts the effort to recover the Ming 
Empire led by Zheng Chenggong. As the adopted Son of Emperor Longwu and 
bestowed with the emperor’s surname, Chenggong represents the righteous group to 
resurrect the Ming Empire. However, his birth father Zheng Zhilong, the dominant 
official who controls the military force, betrays the emperor and cooperates with the 
Manchu general Boluo. At the threshold of moral choice, Chenggong places loyalty to 
the emperor and the Ming Empire ahead of filial piety. He criticizes his father and 
tries to convince him to fight against the Manchus. In fact, Chenggong appears to be a 
moral paragon embodying multiple virtues in the play in that he still remains a filial 
son trying to rescue his father even though his father betrays him. Inspired by his 
righteous spirit, Chenggong’s army is considerably expanded and strengthened, having 
won several important battles. Yet, because the Manchus initiate a devastating sneak 
attack at night violating their promise of armistice, Chenggong has no choice but to 
withdraw to Taiwan to continue his mission. Toward the end, Chenggong hears that 
his father and the whole family have all been killed by the Qing court. Deeply 
saddened, he advises his children to carry on the mission of recovering the Ming 
Empire, patiently and persistently, with the support of the people represented by the 
unofficial organization Tiandi Hui (literally, The Heaven and Earth Society).  
This play gained great success on stage yet also received mixed critical 
reception, both praise and criticism, in wartime Shanghai. Besides the positive 
comments from the literary critics, there are two types of negative criticism: one is that 
the play foretells the doomed defeat in the war against Japan, the other challenges its 
aesthetic value as a stage play. In the prefaces of the published version, A Ying 
responded to the latter criticism while Liu Yazi reacted to the former.176 
                                                             
176 A Ying, Haiguo Yingxiong in A Ying quanji, Vol 10, 3-15. 
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In Liu’s preface, he not only highly praised the accomplishment of the play, 
but also strongly attacked the vision of defeatism held by other critics. For Liu, instead 
of propagating defeatism, this play anticipated a destined victory in the future. Since 
Zheng Chenggong’s persistent spirit was handed down by the people’s organization 
Tiandi Hui, which later evolved into Sanhe Hui, then Xingzhong Hui, and finally the 
Tongmeng Hui led by Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan), the success of Sun Yat-sen’s 
revolution thus rightly testified to the victory of Zheng Chenggong. In his words, “The 
righteous spirit of the three generations of the Prince of Yanping [Zheng 
Chenggong]’s family and the revolutionary system of the Taiping rebellion were 
finally inherited by our national founding father, Sun Zhongshan, who continued to 
carry forward this spirit.” Moreover, Liu asserted, Sun Zhongshan’s followers would 
definitely win the war against Japan and take back Taiwan from the Japanese. 177  
Needless to say, the historical continuity he created among Zheng Chenggong, 
the imperial prince, Hong Xiuquan, the failed scholar leading the peasant Taiping 
rebellion, and Sun Zhongshan, the founding father of the republic, is problematic. 
What are at stake here are the common traits these people share: the anti-Manchu 
sentiment (Sun changed his attitude later) and the fighting spirit. Yet for Liu, the 
Manchus deserved to be blamed not only because they were illegitimate as rulers of 
the Chinese empire, but also due to their losing Chinese land (including Taiwan) to 
foreigners. The Manchus could be anything but “foreign” to sell out the country. The 
ethnic nationalism in this sense gives way to the desire to maintain the integrity of the 
imperial territory, one that could be traced back to history.  
The temporal and the spatial dimensions manifested in this play are indexical 
to the imperial-time regime, in which unity and morality transcend time and space. It 
at once verifies the vision of the present and legitimizes the prediction of the future.  
                                                             
177 Ibid. 5. 
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It goes without saying that the morality is to some extent updated owing to the 
modern perspective. In ancient times, social hierarchy is paralleled with moral 
hierarchy, with the latter legitimizing the former rhetorically, not practically. In A 
Ying’s plays, the common enemy, or the empirical situation, causes the transformation 
of the social hierarchy into a more egalitarian one, in which morality has the absolute 
power to call for social mobilization. The more righteous, the more support from the 
people. The relationship between the individual heroes and the people not only echoes 
the Tang Dynasty Emperor Taizong’s metaphor of a boat on the river, but also goes 
beyond that metaphor to place the people as the real force in pushing history forward. 
On the other hand, the treatment of women figures and gender relations bears 
significant modern characteristics. For instance, in Haiguo yingxiong, A Ying 
portrayed a talented, patriotic, and sweet girl, Zheng Yu, as Zheng Chenggong’s 
daughter. Yet in reality Yu should be Chenggong’s concubine. Reluctant to dismiss 
such a character, as A Ying greatly admired the upright and virtuous Yu in history, he 
transformed her into Chenggong’s daughter in order to improve Chenggong’s image in 
a modern audience’s eyes.178 
The transformation of Yu in the play not only draws Yu out from Chenggong’s 
private family to the public space, but also presents her as an independent subject to 
carry out the mission of recovering the Ming Empire. As one representative of the next 
generation, Zheng Yu, together with her brother Zheng Jing, is also incorporated into 
the project of the revival of the empire.  
                                                             
178 Ibid. 127-130. According to a historical document Fan Tianlu Conglu (The documents from Fan 
Tianlu), Yu was Zheng Chenggong’s concubine, pretty and talented, good at writing poems. After 
Chenggong died, Yu lamented him with the poem: “His bare hand used to lift the Sun and the Moon of 
the Ming Empire, his cordial heart still shines through the universe of the Han.” A subordinate general 
tried to persuade her to marry him, yet Yu refused him and remained chaste for Chenggong. She finally 
died as a nun in a Buddhist monastery.    
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Much has been written about how women were incorporated into nation 
building during the modern period. From May Fourth enlightenment to the national 
salvation movement, the women’s emancipatory practice proved to be no more than 
another male-centered attempt to mobilize women, first liberated from the institution 
of the family, to participate in saving the country.179180 Yet the erasure of the gender 
difference from another angle demonstrates the predominant goal of unity required by 
the new nation building, a nation that persistently refuses to be confined in the 
boundary of a modern nation state and constantly refers to the past for legitimation.  
 
The imperial legacy: the intellectual’s voice in Guo Moruo’s Cai Wenji. 
If the wartime historical plays unavoidably exhibit both ambivalence and 
contradiction, and ambiguously define compatriot-enemy boundaries due to a 
complicated social context from both within and without, the literature of imperial 
history during the Maoist period nonetheless manifests a more homogeneous tendency 
serving to legitimize modern China’s boundary and identity.  
However, the mission of asserting a socialist nation, as negations of both the 
capitalist countries and the Chinese traditional empires, requires the construction of 
the People, a category that demands homogeneity and totality that erases differences. 
On the other hand, the recurrently strengthened class struggle nonetheless makes it 
explicit that there is a split within the People. The intrinsic paradox between the nation 
as a transcendent totality and the People as a class-conscious category alert to 
difference constitutes the basic tension in the historical representations in Maoist 
                                                             
179 Dai Jinhua and Meng Yue, Fuchu lishi dibiao: xiandai funü wenxue yanjiu (Emerging from the 
horizon of history: modern Chinese women’s literature) (Beijing: Renmin daxue chubanshe, 2004). 
180 During the 1920s, Guo Moruo wrote several historical plays portraying rebellious women who dared 
to challenge authority, made their own choice for love, and articulated resistance to the patriarchic 
society. Nie Ying, Wang Zhaojun, and Zhuo Wenjun, are the heroines in his plays. Yet instead of 
reincorporating them to society, as in his later plays, he saw them as merely rebellious and 
individualistic enough for self liberation. See Guo Moruo, Sange panni de nüxing (Three rebellious 
women) (Shanghai: Guang hua shu ju, 1926). 
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China. Whenever unity was stressed to mirror the newly-founded nation, historical 
individuals, political or cultural elites alike, became heroes to be applauded,  such as 
Hai Rui, Guan Hanqing, and Xie Yaohuan; whenever class struggle or the internal 
sociopolitical conflict dominated other concerns, as during the Cultural Revolution 
(1966-1976), these historical figures could be seen as the enemy of the socialist 
revolution, and as a consequence, history turned out to be a very sensitive and 
dangerous site capable of destroying the writers. In the latter case, such notoriously 
unjust cases as Wu Han’s Hairui baguan (Hai Rui dismissed from the office), Tian 
Han’s Peking Opera Xie Yaohuan, and Meng Chao’s Li Huiniang, which were subject 
to suggestive analysis and condemned as “anti-Party, anti-socialist poisonous weeds,” 
cautioned the writers from writing history during the Cultural Revolution.181 
However, before the dramatic and traumatic weight of the allusive historical 
analysis fell upon literary production, during the late 1950s and early 1960s, when the 
predominant goal was still to build a multi-ethnic, unified, socialist country in 
competition with the western capitalist countries and the Soviet Union, historical plays 
                                                             
181 In November 1965, Yao Wenyuan in the Shanghai newspaper Wenhui Bao (Mercury) condemned 
the historian and deputy mayor of Beijing, Wu Han, for representing a positive portrait of the Ming 
Dynasty official Hai Rui in the opera Hai Rui Baguan (Hai Rui dismissed from office). Yao Wenyuan’s 
article, condemning Wu Han for justifying Hai Rui—a representative of the landlord class in his view—
in Hai’s fight against the corrupt official and managing to return the land to people, was later criticized 
as the bad model of  “suggestive historiography.” (yingshe shixue). That means, Yao Wenyuan attacked 
Wu Han with the excuse that Wu Han was making use of this historical play to disapprove of the 
contemporary land policy and people’s commune system, trying to compromise class contradiction, and 
crying out the injustice done to the disfavored general Peng Dehuai. According to Yao, since Hai Rui 
baguan does not completely follow the historical facts, there must be some reason for this literary 
transformation. Under the assumption that all literature reflects the author’s class identity, this literary 
transformation must have manifested the author’s intention to justify the landlord class and criticize 
contemporary policy. This logic, dominantly political and absurd as it seems, forms the essence of the 
so called “suggestive historiography.” By linking the historical situation with the contemporary class 
struggle, and linking Hai Rui with the contemporary, politically incorrect official, Yao Wenyuan was 
able to transform a historical play into a dangerous bomb capable of initiating a political disaster for 
many intellectuals in that period. In the same spirit, Guan Hanqing’s Xie Yaohuan and Meng Chao’s Li 
Huiniang underwent the similar attack by bringing forth the social conflict to the stage, which was 
charged as “anti-Party” and “anti-revolutionary.” 
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revived in the cultural landscape mainly to mirror the contemporary spiritual greatness 
and practical difficulties. Rather than making clear allusion to contemporary political 
figures, as suggested in most readings of those historical plays, be it in the Cultural 
Revolution or the later scholarship, the flourishing of historical plays in this period in 
my view was symptomatic of the particular cultural-political atmosphere within China, 
which served more to assert the role and status of intellectuals themselves in the new 
nation than to praise or criticize the great leader Mao Zedong.  
In 1956, the CCP announced the Hundred Flowers policy to let “a hundred 
flowers blossom, and a hundred schools debate,” encouraging creativity and diversity 
in cultural production. Yet, soon after in 1957, the “anti-rightist” movement dampened 
the enthusiasm of the writers for their creativity. Many young writers were sent to the 
countryside to accept re-education, which signified the delicate status of the 
intellectuals in the new socialist nation. In 1958, the intense movement of “the Great 
Leap Forward” once again pressured the writers to increase cultural production. Partly 
for the purpose of following the policy route, partly in order to navigate in a politically 
sensitive arena, historical plays were produced to mirror the reality yet avoid 
representing the reality directly. Meanwhile, they helped assert the intellectual’s status 
as the legitimately moral voice transcendent of political authority.182 
During this period, many famous writers devoted themselves to the creation of 
historical plays. For instance, Tian Han’s Guan Hanqing, Princess Wencheng, and the 
Peking Opera Xie Yaohuan; Guo Moruo’s Cai Wenji and Wu Zetian; Lao She’s Shen 
quan (Divine fists); Cao Yu’s Dan Jian Pian (Courage and the sword); and Liu 
Chuan’s Dou E yuan (The injustice done on Dou E) all drew great attention from the 
                                                             
182 Rudolf Wagner observed that during this period, historical dramas were produced as perplexing 
political texts that needed to be deciphered to serve as social critique due to the sensitive political 
environment. Refer to Rudolf Wagner, The Contemporary Chinese Drama: Four Studies (Berkeley, 
Los Angles, and Oxford: University of California Press, 1990), 2-3. 
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audience. Primarily focusing on individual heroes of imperial history, these plays all 
depict these heroes as the representatives of the people, which presumably lays the 
foundation for the unified empire, and by extension, the modern nation state. The 
ethnic nationalist sentiment prevalent in the prior periods faded from the historical 
scenes; rather, ethnic unity became the assumed precondition with no need of further 
explanation, and the major contradiction shifted to the conflict between the vile 
officials and the people.  
Written in 1958, Tian Han’s Guan Hanqing gained major success. Depicting 
the great dramatist Guan Hanqing in the Mongol-ruled Yuan Dynasty, this play 
portrays a courageous, upright cultural hero who dares to challenge authority to cry 
out against the injustice done to the common people, even at the cost of his own life. 
Unlike the historical narratives in the prior periods, anti-Mongol sentiment is nowhere 
to be found in this play. On the contrary, the Yuan Empire appears to be the legitimate 
successor and the mirror image of the Han Empire. In critics’ eyes, Tian Han created 
the character Guan Hanqing to mirror himself as a modern intellectual. A modern 
playwright writing about a dramatist writing historical drama, Tian Han successfully 
produced a multilayered text with a disguised social critique of the contemporary 
sociopolitical circumstances.183 Identifying with the people, the identification that 
bestowed upon him ultimate righteousness and morality, he was able to articulate the 
elitist function of the intellectuals within the people.184  
Among these representatives of the people, Guo Moruo’s Cai Wenji merits 
more attention. This play tells the story of the poetess Cai Weiji returning to the Han 
                                                             
183 For a more comprehensive analysis of this play, refer to Rudolf Wagner, “A Guide for the Perplexed 
and a Call to the Wavering: Tian Han’s Guan Hanqing (1958) and the New Historical Drama” in The 
Contemporary Historical Drama (Berkeley, Los Angles, and Oxford: University of California Press, 
1990). 
184 Chen Sihe, Zhongguo dangdai wenxue shi (A history of contemporary Chinese literature) (Shanghai: 
Fudan daxue chubanshe, 1999), 114-116.  
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Court during the period of the Three Kingdoms. Daughter of an influential official-
scholar in the Eastern Han dynasty, Wenji was captured by the Xiongnu Hun invaders 
and forced to stay married to Prince Zuoxian of the Xiongnu Hun for twelve years. In 
208AD, Cao Cao sent envoys to take Wenji back to Han China.  
The play opens with the emotional turbulence of Wenji upon returning to the 
Han court. Saddened by the feelings of leaving her beloved husband and children, she 
cannot help remain wavering and contradictory over the idea of return. Her husband 
Prince Zuoxian, angered by the determination of the Chanyu (the chief of the Xiongnu 
Hun) to send Wenji back, also appears irritable and uncooperative. Not until the legate 
of the Han, Dong Si, who turns out to be Wenji’s childhood friend, tells them that the 
great minister Cao Cao expects her back to compile her father’s incomplete historical 
work is Wenji convinced to go back to Han China. Her husband also makes good 
friends with Dong Si. On the way home, Wenji cannot refrain from missing her 
children, so much so that she stays up late composing poems and playing music to 
express her sorrow. Sympathetic with her feelings, Dong Si comforts Wenji and 
encourages her to transfer her energy spent on personal mishap to work for Tianxia 
(all under Heaven). However, out of jealousy, the other legate, Zhou Jin, slanders 
Dong Si to Cao Cao over Dong’s friendship with Prince Zuoxian and his close 
relationship with Wenji. Infuriated, Cao Cao orders Dong Si to kill himself. Hearing 
this news, Wenji comes to Cao Cao to explain the whole situation and rescues Dong Si. 
In the last act, eight years after Wenji has returned from the Xiongnu Hun, her 
children are brought back to the Han court, suggesting that the Xiongnu and the Han 
are incorporated into one family. Cao Cao in this circumstance convinces Wenji to 
marry Dong Si since Prince Zuoxian has died in a battle with the Xianbei (another 
minority ethnic group). 
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There are several ways to approach this five-act play. First, the destiny of the 
intellectuals invites attention. Guo Moruo admitted in the preface to this play that he 
intended to portray Cai Weiji as the mirror image of the intellectuals, including 
himself.185 The transformation of Wenji from a sentimental poetess to a productive 
historian recording the greatness of the Han Empire parallels the transformation of the 
modern intellectuals who finally devote themselves to building the socialist country.  
Second, the friendly relationship between the Han court and the Xiongnu Hun 
reflects the modern ethnic policy. Not only does the return of Wenji and eventually of 
her children back to the Han undo the previous tragedy in the ethnic confrontation, but 
the decision of the Chanyu to stay in the Han in the end also demonstrates the 
centering position of the Han in terms of ethnic relations. Unlike the historical plays 
during the late Qing and the period of the War of Resistance to Japan in which ethnic 
relations remain ambivalent and contradictory, this play consciously and affirmatively 
takes a Han-centered perspective to incorporate the minorities into the boundary of 
China. Instead of barbarizing the minorities, the Xiongnu are portrayed as an 
understanding and peace-loving group who share the same moral standard as the Han 
people. For instance, in Act Two, Wenji recalls her being captured by Xiongnu 
soldiers and rescued by Prince Zuoxian. Prince Zuoxian appears to be a righteous hero 
who criticizes the moral decay and political turmoil in the Han and finally convinces 
Wenji to go to the Xiongnu with him. However, after Dong Si tells both Wenji and her 
husband about the great deeds Cao Cao has accomplished and how peaceful the Han 
Empire is, Prince Zuoxian’s negative attitude toward the Han is completely reversed. 
He supports Wenji to return to the Han to compile historical works and promises to be 
cooperative with the Han afterwards. It is noteworthy that Prince Zuoxian’s change in 
                                                             
185 Guo Moruo, Cai Wenji xu (Preface to Cai Wenji), written in July 1959. In Guo Moruo lun 
chuangzuo (Guo Moruo talks about creative writing) (Shanghai: Shanghai wenyi chubanshe, 1982), 464. 
Guo admits that Cai Weiji is the image of himself.  
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attitude is not due to the Han’s military power or diplomatic strategy, but owing to the 
accomplishment of Cao Cao, who is presented by Guo Si as a humane, capable, and 
legitimate ruler. Governed by morality, unity is well preserved, with the Han at the 
center of this political-cultural landscape.  
Prince Zuoxian’s voluntary submission not only manifests itself in his change 
of attitude toward Wenji’s return to the Han, but also in his will. Before Prince 
Zuoxian dies, he asks his son to bequeath a mirror, initially from Wenji as a symbol of 
love, to Guo Si, suggesting that he wishes Guo Si to take care of Wenji. The transfer 
of the mirror symbolically displays the transfer of Wenji from a Xiongnu husband to a 
Han husband. Wenji is hence not only re-incorporated into her homeland as a valuable 
individual, but also re-reunited with a Han husband to create a family as the basic unit 
of the empire.186 Wenji’s marriage arrangement, therefore, is not just made by Cao 
Cao, but already determined by Prince Zuoxian, whose wholehearted admiration of the 
Han builds the moral foundation of the ethnic relations within the empire. 
Besides all these aspects, Cao Cao’s image is greatly improved in this play. 
Rather than being an immoral crook emerging out of turbulent times, as represented in 
history and popular literature like Romance of the Three Kingdoms, Cao Cao is 
portrayed as a widely loved and praised leader who is capable of achieving unification 
and peace with a farsighted vision. Through Guo Si’s depiction, Cao Cao not only 
cares about the soldiers and the common people, but also initiates several land reforms 
to improve peasants’ life and social stability. His army is called the “army of 
benevolence and righteousness,” only fighting for justice. Even the former enemy, the 
                                                             
186 In the 1920s, Guo Moruo intended to write a play on Cai Wenji, aiming to portray her as a tragic 
figure who was betrayed by her Hun (Xiongnu) husband and had to be separate from her children. Guo 
meant to create such a character to attack the patriarchal, feudal system and advocate the emancipation 
of women. This play has never been written, yet it is obvious to see that his intention was to emphasize 
the friction and contradiction taking place in Wenji’s life, rather than the unity and harmony manifested 
in the later play Cai Wenji. See Guo Moruo, “Xie zai sange panni de nüxing houmian” (Postscript to 
Three rebellious women), 1926. In Guo Moruo lun chuangzuo (Guo Moruo discuss creative writing), 
360-362. 
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Wuhuan, are reformed by his moral power so that they become part of his army. 
Indeed, it is Guo Moruo’s intention to “reverse the verdict” (fan’ an翻案) for Cao Cao. 
In his own words:  
 
I really appreciate Cao Cao’s accomplishment. He gradually created 
social stability during the chaotic period at the end of the Han dynasty. He also 
restored and developed the order of production in the region of the Huanghe 
River so that the refugees could enjoy a peaceful and settled life. Although he 
once fought against the Yellow Turban Rebellion, the Yellow Turban rebels in 
effect upheld him….In sum, Cao Cao indeed made massive contributions to 
the people of that era, and he contributed greatly to our national and cultural 
development.187 
 
In this light, the justification of Cao Cao starts from his close relationship with the 
people, then his effective policy to create unity and peace, and finally his contribution 
to history by means of building a concrete foundation for the reunification of the 
empire. In Guo’s eyes, Cao Cao was a national hero with historical limitation, who 
was constructed by history and reformed by the people. It is the historical trend (shi势) 
that determined his accomplishment since he was the one who was morally qualified 
and strategically competent to become a legitimate ruler. 188 
To reverse Cao Cao’s image from the popular negative one to a positive one, 
Guo particularly emphasized Cao Cao’s relationship with the Yellow Turban rebellion. 
Though Cao Cao built his career on suppressing the Yellow Turban rebellion, Guo 
argued, he nonetheless was also influenced by the peasant rebels. And it is the 
interaction with the peasants that later directed him to follow a right path welcomed by 
the people.  
                                                             
187 Ibid, 467. 
188Ibid, 467.  Guo Moruo points out in the preface that Cao Cao changed his career due to the historical 
situation. Initially Cao Cao was hoping to be a reclusive scholar, then he thought he could be a great 
general to glorify his family name. Yet the historical trend (situation 时势) finally determined that he 
suppressed the powerful local families, refrain land from merging, and became the most powerful 
minister who accomplished the unification of North China.  
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Guo’s reasoning on cause and effect (he carried out land reform because he 
was influenced by the rebellion) is questionable, since in doing this, he reversed the 
temporal order, which diverts from the methodology of historiography. However, it 
nevertheless reveals Guo’s long-established ideal of historical representation. As both 
a historian and playwright, he distinguished historical research from historical plays 
by characterizing them as “pursuing authenticity from the facts” (shi shi qiu shi 实事
求是) and “pursuing the similarity at the expense of the facts” (shi shi qiu si失事求似), 
respectively. He believed that a historical playwright should be a “concave mirror” in 
which many historical traces converge and at the same time diverge toward the outside, 
and in that way he could create a “virtual focus” which is the intersection of history 
and creativity. 189  In historical research, if some record or evidence is missing, 
historians have to leave the research with a question mark; yet in literary 
representation, it is the playwright’s obligation to create causation and emplot history. 
Unlike Hayden White’s metahistory which links history with literary emplotment to 
construct history as a whole sequence of causation,190 Guo on the contrary contrasted 
historiography with literary creation. For him, historical research could remain 
fragmentary due to incomplete records, while historical plays have to be a totality in 
terms of emplotment.191 The creation of the totality, thus, relies on the “virtual focus,” 
the point of juncture between history and reality. 
This “virtual focus,” on the surface favors the present over the past, yet it in 
effect disrupts the temporal order. It does not simply reverse the temporal order by 
                                                             
189 Guo Moruo, “Lishi, shiju, xianshi” (History, historical plays, and reality), written in 1942. In Guo 
Moruo lun chuangzuo, 501. 
190 Hyden White, Metahistory: the Historical Imagination in Nineteeth-century Europe (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973). 
191 In fact, here may exist the fundamental difference between traditional Chinese historiography and 
the western historiography. Charles Gardner suggests that the Chinese traditional historiography more 
often than not remains fragmentary in terms of causation in historical events, albeit they keep sufficient 
historical records for it. While the western historiography centers on the causation of events, Chinese 
traditional historiography centers on individuals with moral judgment. See Charles Gardner, Chinese 
Traditional Historiography (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938). 
120 
 
projecting the present onto the past, but refracts time by reflecting the projection back 
from the past to the present. As a result, the totality is by any means the product of the 
synthesis of the past and present.  
In Cai Wenji, the “virtual focus” or the totality lies in the centuries-long vision 
of unity, from a Han-centered point of view. To justify Cao Cao is to justify the 
winner who established the foundation for reunification during a long period of 
disunity. People may speculate on the resemblance between Cao Cao and Mao Zedong, 
given the particular historical context, yet the preference for unity over disunity is a 
persistent force through Chinese history. As Guo Moruo articulated it in 1941, 
“desiring unity while detesting disunity is the common wish since the start of the 
republican era, it is also the common wish of the past generations since the origin of 
the Chinese history. Inasmuch as it is common to both the past and the present, we can 
speculate on the past from the present, and borrow the past to mirror the present.”192 
This argument was to explain his imaginative creation in his wartime play Tangdi zhi 
hua (Cherry blossoms—symbol of sibling love). It also provides an interpretation for 
the common theme in all the historical plays in the modern period. Besides the 
historical fiction and drama already discussed in the previous section, Guo’s wartime 
plays, including Qu Yuan, Hufu (The tiger symbol), and Tangdi zhi hua (Cherry 
Blossoms), all disdain the separatists or traitors in order to represent reality during the 
War of Resistance to Japan.  
It deserves attention that the “reversal of the verdict on Cao Cao” in Guo 
Moruo’s creation is also through moral justification. By linking Cao Cao with the 
people, Guo turns Cao Cao into a benevolent and righteous ruler as against his 
malevolent image in Romance of the Three Kingdoms and other unofficial sources.  
                                                             
192 Guo Moruo, “Wo zenyang xie Tangdi zhi hua” (How I wrote Cherry Blossoms) in Moruo juzuo xuan 
(The collection of Guo Moruo’s plays) (Beijing: Remin wenxue chubanshe, 1978), 80. 
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In his comprehensive study of the historical dramas in this period, Rudolf 
Wagner continued the tradition of suggestive reading of the plays. He made direct 
associations between Mao Zedong and the ruling figure in various texts, be it Cao Cao, 
Kublai Khan, Empress Wu Zetian, or Emperors Qianlong and Wanli. 193  The 
multifaceted images of authority in the texts, for Wagner, reflect the different attitudes 
toward Mao Zedong in reality. As such, there are intertextual dialogues among the 
historical plays and all these plays closely interact with the contemporary political 
situation. It is as if Mao Zedong directed his Propaganda Department to produce 
literary works praising unity and upright spirit yet received multiple products that 
intended either to flatter or attack him. 194  Closely related to the immediate 
sociopolitical environment, the historical narratives hence flow from the center and 
fold back to the center, creating a closed loop which leaves no room for literary 
autonomy beyond the suggestive interpretation. The problem in this kind of reading is 
that it collapses the distance between history and the present, rendering the historical 
representation an actual battlefield directly pointing to specific individuals in the 
present. It proves to be nothing other than the notoriously allusive tradition during the 
Cultural Revolution when these historical representations received arbitrary treatment, 
one that resulted from matching the identities of all the characters in the plays with the 
real political leaders in the present according to their political positions. For instance, 
for Wagner, Tian Han’s Guan Hanqing was a critique of Mao’s bureaucratic regime 
                                                             
193 Rudolf Wagner, The Contemporary Chinese Historical Drama (Berkeley, Los Angles, and Oxford: 
University of California Press, 1990). 
194 In the late 1950s, it was Mao Zedong who promoted Hai Rui’s “daring to keep the truth and daring 
to speak,” which later was characterized as the “Hai Rui Spirit.” Therefore, the literary productions 
about Hai Rui, including Wu Han’s Hai Rui Dismissed from Office, were the direct products of Mao’s 
speech, though the outcomes were tragic for these playwrights. In Wagner’s reading, following the 
interpretation made during the Cultural Revolution, the writers portrayed Hai Rui’s story in order to 
challenge Mao’s policy. It is as though Mao called for an attack on himself, and the writers were pretty 
aware of the risky consequences. Similarly, Guo Moruo wrote about Cao Cao because Mao had praised 
Cao Cao. So every historical play was the product which could be traced to Mao and folded back to 
Mao, as if there is no room for literary autonomy beyond suggestive interpretation. See Rudolf Wagner, 
The Contemporary Chinese Drama, 258-9. 
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while Mao himself was ignorant of the misdeeds of his bureaucrats; on the other hand, 
Guo Moruo’s Cai Wenji sang praise to Mao, suggesting that Mao was Cao Cao. While 
both seem reasonable in terms of the writers’ characters and their popular reputations, 
a problem still emerges from this abrupt identification. In one sense, Mao never took 
himself as the equal of the emperors in the past; on the contrary, he saw himself as the 
modern superior of them since he achieved the people’s democracy. In another sense, 
if writers wanted to flatter Mao, they could have chosen great, successful emperors in 
history like Emperor Wu in the Han Dynasty or Emperor Taizong in the Tang Dynasty 
instead of ambiguous figures like Cao Cao and Empress Wu Zetian as Guo Moruo 
did.195 If the writers intended to criticize Mao’s policy, they could have written about 
periods of crisis in the past dynasties to ring the alarm bell as they did during wartime.  
Perhaps, to answer these questions, we need again to ponder Guo Moruo’s 
theory of the “virtual focus.” A “virtual focus” is the juncture between the past and the 
present which allows difference that reveals the temporal gap. To completely overlap 
the picture of the past with the picture of the present is to willfully create an “actual 
focus,” which eliminates the historical depth manifested in the open representations. 
Perhaps, more reasonably, from the playwright’s perspective, rather than positioning 
Mao and his regime in history to identify Mao with the past emperors and compare the 
contemporary commune system with the past land situation, the plays for the most part 
serve to situate the intellectuals, as the representatives of the people, in the newly 
                                                             
195 As shown in Wagner’s study, images of Emperor Qianlong and Emperor Taizong did appear on 
stage during this period. Yet they were not portrayed as wholly positive emperors. Emperor Qianlong 
was in a Peking Opera entitled Da Qianlong (Trouncing the Qianlong Emperor) staged in Jiangsu 
province. In this piece, Emperor Qianlong is smacked by a young woman when he is trying to seduce 
her with his identity hidden in common clothes during his inspection trip to the South. The ending of 
the opera is that the people teach the emperor a lesson so that he is made fun of and forced into a 
shameful retreat. Emperor Taizong was also in a Peking Opera Tangwang na jian (The Tang Emperor 
Accepts Remonstrance), in which the upright prime minister Wei Zheng and the empress together teach 
the emperor a lesson so that he realizes his fault. It is noteworthy that both stories were not new on the 
opera stage, which usually served as the entertainment for the people. And in both pieces, the emperors 
are portrayed not as the ultimate heroes; instead, they need to listen to the people or righteous officials 
to correct their mistakes, as is common in other plays.  
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founded nation state at a time when the intellectual’s status became fragile and 
ambiguous.196 The playwrights now identified with cultural heroes like Guan Hanqing, 
Cai Wenji, or the upright scholar officials like Hai Rui and Xie Yaohuan, as a 
righteous moral voice confronting and correcting authority.197 Even Cai Wenji, who is 
presented as a submissive intellectual who finally sings praise to Cao Cao in her poem, 
dares to stand up for Dong Si to challenge Cao Cao’s mistake, not to mention other 
upright officials who risk their lives to remonstrate while remaining absolutely loyal to 
the emperors and the empire. The emperors need them, since they are the transcendent 
righteous voice with which, and only with which, the empire could maintain unified 
and prosperous. In this light, the intellectuals were in effect continuing their political 
function by recovering the imperial legacy. Through the historical representations, the 
intellectuals attempted to secure a place for themselves while making their voice heard 
by authority, even though that authority was vaguely defined, as in the wartime period, 
when the “foreign” was abstractly referred to.  
In her study on Guo Moruo in the May Fourth period, Shu-mei Shih made a 
keen observation that the selective employment of Western universal knowledge (e.g. 
psychoanalysis) provided the intellectuals (e.g. Guo Moruo) with extra cultural capital, 
which distinguished them from the masses.198 Intellectuals like Guo Moruo or Lu Xun 
could identify themselves as “global humans” (shijie ren),199 freely choose western 
theories/concepts to express their desire for modernity and progress, and establish a 
                                                             
196 Wagner articulated the sensitive area of the intellectual’s status during this period in his reading of 
Tian Han’s Guan Hanqing. Similar to the Yuan Dynasty, when the literati scholar’s social status was  
low, ranking “ninth” in the social hierarchy, in the contemporary period, the intellectuals were also 
called “the stinking ninth” (chou lao jiu) during the Cultural Revolution.  
197Both Tian Han and Guo Moruo had claimed that they identify with their intellectual protagonists, 
Guan Hanqing and Cai Wenji. Wu Han had stated in the preface to Hai Rui dismissed from office that 
he was “ a Hai Rui,” and Meng Chao also claimed that “Li Huiniang, that is I; I have given her my 
heart’s blood. I have also given my feelings to Pei (Huiniang’a lover, a righteous Confucian student); 
therefore I am also student Pei.” See Wagner. The Contemporary Chinese Historical Drama. 312. 
198 Shu-mei Shin, The Lure of the Modern. 97. 
199 The term “global humans” (shijie ren) was in Lu Xun’s essay No. 36. In Lu Xun quanji (The 
complete works of Lu Xun), Vol.1, 307. 
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sense of Chinese cosmopolitanism. However, Shih argued, this cosmopolitanism is in 
nature asymmetrical. Since the third world intellectuals have to know the world (the 
West) in order to be “cosmopolitan” while the Western intellectuals have no such 
demand to know the non-West, it is merely another manifestation of a Western-
dominated world view.200  
Identifying the West as being universal and cosmopolitan, Shih undermined 
the long-lasting universal thinking embedded in Chinese history and culture. For Shih, 
the Western universal intervened in the continuity of Chinese history, and thus 
rendered the Chinese intellectual discourse fragmented and unpredictable. She took Lu 
Xun and Guo Moruo’s early iconoclastic appearance and their later Marxist turn as 
intellectual ruptures rather than continuity in their lives. Especially for Guo Moruo, 
Shih saw no connection between the early cosmopolitan—the aesthetic vanguardist, 
the pantheist, the champion of art for art’s sake—and the later Marxist ideologue.201  
As much as I agree with her notion of “asymmetrical cosmopolitanism,” I would 
suggest that Chinese intellectual thinking manifests a more self-reflexive 
cosmopolitanism. The interaction with the West constitutes and complements the self-
reflexivity rather than completely destroys the continuity. In fact, as discussed in the 
first chapter, Guo Moruo’s Marxism was far too Chinese compared with the original 
Marxism, and his vision for the nation could never be strictly contained in the 
boundary of a modern nation state. The play Cai Wenji conveys his ideal blueprint for 
a country—unity and harmony, which is consistent with his early cosmopolitanism. 
As early as the 1920s, Guo had promoted his idea of the “supranational” (chao guo jia). 
In an essay titled “The National and the Supranational” (Guojia de yu chao guojia de, 
1923), Guo reasoned, as the nation state had increasingly destroyed individual’s 
                                                             
200 Shu-mei Shin, The Lure of the Modern, 97. 
201 Shu-mei Shin, The Lure of the Modern, 98. 
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freedom, we need to turn to the supranational, which guarantees humaneness, 
harmony, and peace among nations by erasing the boundaries of the nation states, and 
which has been ingrained in the traditional Chinese spirit.202 Repeatedly articulating 
his vision of the cosmopolitan—in his essays, historical plays, and radical 
reinterpretation of Marxist theories, Guo manifested time and again the traditional way 
of thinking in building the world order and the position of the intellectuals.  
In this regard, it is the imperial-time regime that articulates its pervading voice 
in the modern period. The over-powering moral regime, surviving through the 
iconoclastic criticism of its downside of hypocrisy and hierarchy during the 
enlightenment movement, continually reveals itself in forms of authenticity and 
democracy in the historical representations, which serves the project of nation building. 
The individual heroes, emperors and officials alike, nonetheless, have to be inserted 
into this all-encompassing imperial-moral regime to become performative and 
inspiring for the present imitators. It is as if history speaks through the present than the 
other way around. 
 
Peasant rebellion revisited: Yao Xueyin’s Li Zicheng  
If Guo Moruo’s “virtual focus” emphasizes fictional creativity at the 
intersection of history and literature in order to represent a contingent reality, Yao 
Xueyin’s Li Zicheng claims to recover the universal historical truth under the guidance 
of Marxist historical materialism. Distancing himself from the discursive social reality, 
under Mao Zedong’s direct protection,203 Yao Xueyin was able to maintain a relatively 
                                                             
202 Wang Xunzhao et al., eds. Guo Moruo yanjiu ziliao (Research materials on Guo Moruo) (Beijing: 
Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1986), Vol 1, 147-155, 172-178, 192-194.  
203 In 1966, after the publication of the first volume of the novel, Mao told people who were in charge 
of the Cultural Revolution to protect Yao Xueyin from the revolutionary campaigns in order to allow 
him to continue writing the novel Li Zicheng. In 1975, feeling that his writing could be discontinued 
because of the outside Revolution, Yao wrote to Mao Zedong asking for help and received Mao’s direct 
protection. See Nie Hualing. “Qishi niandai de gushi” (The story of the 70s), which is an interview of 
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quiet environment in which to write Li Zicheng and gained success for the novel 
during and after the Cultural Revolution.  
As the first historical novel since the May Fourth period,204 Li Zicheng 
contains five volumes, more than three million words.205 Ambitiously determined, Yao 
spent almost 40 years to finish this novel. The first volume was published in 1963, the 
second one in 1977, the third one in 1981, and the last two volumes did not reach the 
readers until the late 1990s. Over the course of tremendous social change within these 
40 years, the novel received dramatically different treatment from its inception to its 
completion. This is partly due to the loose structure which requires reader’s dedication 
and patience, partly due to socio-political change, which brings about varying spiritual 
and aesthetic pursuit. Generally speaking, the first two volumes were more successful 
both in terms of the writing skill and critical reception.206 In 1982, the second volume 
of this novel was awarded the first “Mao Dun Literature Prize.” The prize 
demonstrates the institutional recognition of the novel in both political and literary 
senses, and legitimizes the status of the epic narrative on peasant rebellions.207 
However, by the 1990s, when the representations of the past emperors gradually 
emerged and proved more successful, the publication of the last two volumes of Li 
Zicheng generated little interest.  
There might be multiple reasons that contribute to this silent reception. First, 
the huge, comprehensive plan of the novel might have been beyond the writer’s 
capacity. Such encyclopedic writing requires skillful manipulation of knowledge, 
                                                                                                                                                                               
Yao Xueyin by Nie Hualing and Paul Engle in 1978. In Guanyu changpian lishi xiaoshuo Li Zicheng 
(About the historical novel Li Zicheng) (Shanghai: Shanghai Wenyi chubanshe, 1979), 335-336. 
204 Shen Yanbing (Mao Dun), “Guanyu changpian lishi xiaoshuo Li Zicheng” (About the historical 
novel Li Zicheng), in Guanyu changpian lishi xiaoshuo Li Zicheng, 158. 
205 In fact, it is 3.26 million words. See Wang Aisong, Zhengshi shuxie yu lishi xushi (Political writing 
and historical narrative) (Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo dianshi chubanshe, 2007), 240. 
206 Wang Aisong, Zhengzhi shuxie yu lishi xushi, 238. 
207 Tang Zhesheng, Zhongguo dangdai tongsu xiaoshuo shilun (History of Chinese contemporary 
popular fiction) (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2007), 279. 
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structure, and literary technique, which exhausted Yao’s talent and energy, especially 
in his later age. Second, the writer’s method of composing might have impacted the 
literary value of it. The novel was first produced through the writer’s oral recording 
and later edited by his assistants. Such a method could result in violating the 
coherence and literariness of the novel. As Liu Zaifu has commented, Li Zicheng’s 
literary value keeps deteriorating, one volume after another, which hardly matches 
reader’s expectation.208 Third, and maybe the most important, the image of the peasant 
rebels is portrayed in such a way that they are idealized, perfected, so much so that it 
is not clear why they finally failed. “Lady Gao (Li Zicheng’s wife) is too high (Gao), 
and Madam Red (Hong Niangzi) is too red,” so the critics say, which makes the novel 
not as realistic as the author claimed.209 Fourth, and not the least, the political 
atmosphere in the 1990s was much different from that in the 70s and the 80s. The 
revolutionary discourse had gradually faded from the public horizon. In a word, Yao 
Xueyin and his Li Zicheng, although successful in the beginning, appeared outdated 
and untimely in the post-revolutionary society. This, however, has less to do with the 
specific historical period than with the intrinsic value of literature itself. In this section, 
we will focus on the first two volumes as they are the very product of the 
revolutionary discourse in the Maoist era. 
Seen by Yan Jiayan as a “social encyclopedia of the transition from the Ming 
to the Qing dynasties,”210 this novel provides a detailed portrait of social life in 
different social groups. Adopting a panoramic perspective, the novel not only depicts 
the heroic image of the peasant rebels centered on Li Zicheng, who forced the Ming 
Emperor Chongzhen to commit suicide and established his own regime before the 
                                                             
208 Liu Zaifu and Liu Xuyuan, “Liu Zaifu tan wenxue yanjiu yu wenxue lunzheng,” in Wenhui yuekan 
(Literature monthly), 1988, vol2. See Wang Aisong, Zhengzhi shuxie yu lishi xushi, 238. 
209 Tang Zhesheng, Zhongguo dangdai tongsu xiaoshuo shilun, 277. 
210 Yan Jiayan, “Li Zicheng chu tan” (A preliminary discussion of Li Zicheng), in Guanyu changpian 
lishi xiaoshuo Li Zicheng, 170. 
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Manchus conquered Beijing, but also portrays the complicated political struggles 
within the Ming court.  
The first two volumes illustrate the period of the rise of Li Zicheng’s rebellion 
before he overthrew the Ming court. Surviving the extreme difficulty in which his 
troops were almost exterminated, Li’s army develops so rapidly that his success 
attracts people of all kinds of backgrounds to join the rebellion, including literati 
counselors such as Niu Jinxing, Song Xiance, Li Yan, and Li Mou.   
Unlike A Ying’s play Li Chuangwang written in 1945, which mainly focuses 
on the failure of Li Zicheng’s regime after he occupied Beijing,211 the first two 
volumes of this novel describe the widely-supported, increasingly mature, and 
deterministically promising rise of Li’s rebellion in contrast to the deeply corrupted 
Ming Court. In A Ying’s play, Li Zicheng appears to be a capable yet narrow-minded 
and suspicious peasant leader who fails to listen to the appropriate suggestion of Li 
Yan to deal with the complex situation after they have overthrown the Ming. Based on 
Guo Moruo’s study of Li Zicheng,212 A Ying in his play described Liu Zongmin, the 
important peasant general in Li’s army, as no more than a short-sighted, greedy, and 
impertinent rebel whose rough behavior arouses revulsion from both the former Ming 
officials and the common people. Moreover, he keeps the famous beauty Chen 
Yuanyuan, favorite concubine of the important Ming general Wu Sangui, which 
infuriates Wu into surrendering to the Qing and directly leads to the peasant regime’s 
final defeat. Should Li Zicheng have listened to Li Yan’s advice to discipline his 
subordinates and tactfully cope with the former Ming officials, the destiny of this great 
peasant rebellion might have been different.  
                                                             
211 A Ying, Li Chuangwang. In A Ying quanji (the complete anthology of A Ying) (Hefei: Anhui jiaoyu 
chubanshe), Vol 10. 
212 A Ying acknowledges that this play was written according to Guo Moruo’s essay “Jiashen sanbai 
nian ji” (A memorial essay on year Jiashen/1644 three hundred years later). A Ying, “Li Chuangwang 
bianyan jishi” (About the play Li Chuangwang). See A Ying quanji, Vol 10, 557. 
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A Ying’s play, written at a time when the CCP (the Communist Party) and the 
Communist New Fourth Army developed tremendously during the War of Resistance 
to Japan and prepared to enter the civil war with the Nationalist Party, aimed to 
educate the CCP party cadres to keep alert of the complicated situation they would 
face when advancing from the countryside into the cities.213 Dramatizing the limitation 
of the peasant class, the play in effect calls to mind the crucial importance of 
intellectuals in guiding the correct path of revolution. 
Contrary to Guo Moruo’s research and A Ying’s literary adaptation, Yao 
Xueyin reversed Liu Zongmin’s image and confirmed Li Zicheng’s ability to make 
correct judgment independently based on democratic discussion among the peasant 
rebels. To Yao, Guo Moruo’s research was at any rate biased, for Guo merely relied 
on insufficient historical records. His lack of rigor and overly subjective attitude 
blemished the peasant rebel’s image to mislead readers.214 Moreover, Guo Moruo and 
A Ying both accentuated the positive function of Li Yan, a literati intellectual raised in 
a feudal official’s family, as a crucial element in determining the destiny of the 
revolution. However for Yao, to overly emphasize Li Yan’s function was to 
undermine the peasants’ intrinsic revolutionary consciousness. The truth should be the 
opposite: Li Yan never completely betrayed his own class, so that he unavoidably had 
some negative influence on the rebel group, though he was sympathetic with the 
people and voluntarily joined the peasant rebellion to contribute his insight.215   
Indeed, the novel Li Zicheng implicitly applies class analysis as the narrative 
guideline to create typical characters determined by their class background in typical 
                                                             
213 Ibid. 558-9. 
214 Yao Xueyin, Preface of Li Zicheng. In Guanyu changpian lishi xiaoshuo Li Zicheng, 283. Note that 
this comment on Guo’s research was deleted in the preface published together with the novel. 
215 Ibid. 284. 
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contradictions.216 This typicality, though different from the extreme stereotype of the 
typical figures promoted by the “Gang of Four” during the Cultural Revolution, is 
itself structured by Marxist-Maoist class struggle discourse defined by formulas for 
socialist realism. 
Taking class analysis as the theoretical paradigm, in which class struggle is 
seen as the dominant contradiction in a hierarchical society and the people the ultimate 
force pushing history forward, the novel attributes the fall of the Ming to class 
contradiction rather than to the Manchu invasion. In fact, the Marxist class analysis is 
so prevalent that it claims to be the universal perspective transcendent of any historical 
period and national boundary. For instance, in dealing with the tension between the 
class contradiction and the ethnic contradiction, Yao created a compound narrative 
structure by taking the ethnic conflict as the background foil to give prominence to the 
class conflict. 217 For Yao, the primary cause that prompted Wu Sangui to surrender to 
the Qing was not that Liu Zongmin kept Wu’s favorite concubine Chen Yuanyuan, 
which according to the unofficial historical tales infuriated Wu so greatly that he 
surrendered to the Qing in order to retaliate against Liu, but that Wu’s class 
background determined that he could only cooperate with the oppressive class to 
suppress the peasant regime.218 The class structure over-determines the discursive 
event in the process of important decision making. This structure, according to Yao, 
not only manifests itself in the late Ming in Emperor Chongzhen’s court, but also in 
the late Northern Song, late Qing, and Jiang Jieshi’s regime in the modern period. 
Since these corrupt regimes share the common class interest with the external 
                                                             
216 Jiang Xiaotian, “Ping Li Zicheng” (On Li Zicheng), in Guanyu changpian lishi xiaoshuo Li Zicheng, 
214. 
217 Yan Jiayan, “Li Zicheng chu tan” (The immature discussion of Li Zicheng), in Guanyu changpian 
lishi xiaoshuo Li Zicheng, 199. 
218 Yao Xueyin, Preface to Li Zicheng, vol1. In Li Zicheng (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 
1977), 22. 
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aggressor, they would rather sacrifice the national interest to them in order to first 
suppress the internal peasant revolution. To formulate it in Jiang Jieshi’s famous 
words: “To counter the foreign one must first pacify the domestic” (rang wai bi xian 
an nei 攘外必先安内).219 
This class analysis, on the one hand suggests that the aforementioned regimes 
are determined to fail since they have lost the foundation to legitimize their rule; on 
the other hand, nonetheless, it implies a universal tendency beyond the state/ethnic 
boundary. Class transcends ethnicities and nations. In a manner that is the other side of 
“internationalism,” the ruling class cooperates with each other across national/ethnic 
borders to suppress the people, and as such, class analysis overlaps with the traditional 
imperial moral regime to confirm the cyclical pattern of Chinese history. As long as 
the new regime rectifies its name by alleviating class contradiction, developing social 
economy, and reclaiming the moral high ground, it could insert itself successfully into 
the Chinese empire. The so called “traitors,” then, might have betrayed their own 
ethnicity and former authority, but never really betrayed the Chinese Empire. In this 
sense, the Marxist theory rationalizes the betrayal, rationalizes the entire historical 
development, even though it condemns as immoral the whole feudal regime since it 
represented the oppressor’s interest.  
Indeed, moral judgment never ceases to accompany the rationalization of 
historical events during the discursive representations of empire. The question is not 
whether moral judgment is necessary, but who has the morality. Such is the juncture of 
the traditional imperial-time regime and the modern Marxist theory. As discussed in 
the prior chapter, with the enlightened renmin (the People) replacing the passive min 
(mass, people) as the ultimate holder of morality and unity, Li Zicheng not only 
                                                             
219 Ibid. 33. 
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justifies the peasant rebellion, but also reinforces the conception of the unified Chinese 
Empire.  
For instance, in the first volume, Yang Tinglin, the upright official in Emperor 
Chongzhen’s court, articulates his understanding of the Manchus as part of the 
Chinese Empire: 
 
In the capital city Beijing even three-foot high children know that the area east 
of the Liaohe River (the northeast), and north to Nuergan, eastward to the sea, 
belongs to the Chinese territory. It has been that way since the Jin and Yuan 
dynasties. Whenever it is a time of prosperity, our China is unified and both 
the Han Chinese and the minorities (Hu) support the same emperor. Since the 
ancient times, the territory east of the Liaohe River has been a place inhabited 
by different tribes, who have been the subordinates of the Chinese during Qin, 
Han, Sui, and Tang dynasties, remaining the same till our Ming dynasty. How 
can there be a country other than China? (57) 
 
Hearing his words, Lu Xiangsheng, the loyal general who has been advocating 
fighting against the Manchus and finally dies in battle, extends this argument, 
demonstrating that the Manchus have always been part of the Chinese Empire since 
the Zhou dynasty. The invasion of the Manchus is in effect the rebellion of a 
subordinate tribe rather than the foreign invasion. Hence, it is a shame that the Ming 
court allows the Manchus to attempt to segregate Chinese territory rather than unify 
the empire handed down from the ancestors.220 
Perhaps, it was this latent assumption of unity that allowed Yao Xueyin to 
dramatize class contradiction within the empire, and perhaps, it was the resemblance 
between Li Zicheng’s peasant rebellion and Mao’s revolution that induced Mao to 
support the novel. Mao Zedong used to compare and contrast himself with the former 
successful emperors in ancient China in his poem “Snow.” For Mao, what he was 
going to accomplish would not only inherit, but also outshine and negate what the 
                                                             
220 Yao Xueyin, Li Zicheng, Vol.1, 56-7. 
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former emperors had established.221 What emerges from the lines of the poem is the 
consciousness of time and space, the consciousness that endows the new generation 
with will and confidence to build a new country on the foundation of the past empires. 
The beautiful China, embodied on the eternal images of the Great Wall and the 
Huanghe River, challenges Heaven for its height. Such a splendid landscape of “river 
and mountain” (jiangshan 江山), a metaphor for the empire, continually calls for the 
heroes—past emperors like Qin Shihuang, Han Wudi, Tang Taizong, Song Taizu, 
Genghis Khan, and the contemporary new generation—to protect and improve her 
beauty.  However, past emperors are just “heroes” who belong to the past, while the 
real “successful figure” (fengliu renwu风流人物) resides in the present. Mao’s 
comparing and contrasting his era with the past emperors, applauded by many Chinese 
intellectuals as the unsurmountable verve ever manifested in a modern individual, not 
only created the historical continuity of a unified empire, but also implied the 
fundamental difference initiated by a socialist regime. Between the lines of the poem, 
there emerges the ambiguous figure that refused to be put in the categories of both the 
“empire” and the “nation state.”   
However, besides Mao Zedong’s confirmation of those great emperors’ 
accomplishments in his poem, there was no direct, positive portrayal of the past 
successful emperors in the modern literary representation.222 It seems that national 
crisis and class consciousness worked together to force those successful emperors off 
stage. Not until 1981 did the figure of a great emperor, Tang Taizong, appear on the 
                                                             
221 The poem Snow was written in 1936. In the poem, Mao listed the great emperors such as Qin 
Shihuang, Han Wudi, Tang Taizong, Song Taizu, and Genghis Khan. He implied that the present hero 
would outshine all these people in history.   
222 Guo Moruo wrote a historical play Zhu in 1941, in which he portrayed the first emperor Qin 
Shihuang as an ugly, cruel, and lascivious figure to mirror Jiang Jieshi. In 1956, he revised this play and 
changed its title to Gao Jianli, in which Qin Shihuang’s image was greatly improved, yet he still 
remained as a morally questionable figure. In 1960, Guo published the historical play Wu Zetian, 
depicting the only female emperor in Chinese history. Yet Guo’s intention was to “reverse the verdict” 
for Wu Zetian and took her mainly as a female ruler who was standing with the people.     
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public horizon, marking the transition to the post-Mao period in historical 
representations.  
  
The Recovery of “min” in Yan Haiping’s Qin wang Li Shimin (Li Shimin Prince of 
Qin) 
In 1981, Yan Haiping published the ten-act play Qinwang Li Shimin (Li 
Shimin Prince of Qin), paving the way for representing the great emperors of Chinese 
history.223 Nevertheless, rather than a direct depiction of the emperor, this play focuses 
on his life as an uncrowned prince before he stepped onto the throne. Published at a 
time when the country needed social stability after the Cultural Revolution, the play 
stresses the double theme of both the unification of the empire and the support from 
the people.  Repeatedly articulating the emperor’s famous saying that “water can float 
the ship yet can also overturn the ship,” the play positions itself in the post-Mao 
transitional period. On the one hand, it continues the Maoist discourse on “the People”; 
on the other hand, however, the play frees itself from the shadow of the “suggestive 
literature/history” and openly praises the great (future) emperor in history.224 Bearing 
deep concern about the people and the empire, Prince Li Shimin surpasses the emperor 
and the crown prince in morality, wisdom, and performance, so much so that he wins 
the support of the righteous officials in the court and the common people outside the 
court, which gives him the ultimate legitimacy to take the throne. 
                                                             
223 Yan Haiping, Qin Wang Li Shimin (The Prince of Qin Li Shimin). The play was first published in 
the literary journal Zhongshan in 1981. See Zhongshan, (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 1981), 
Vol. 1, 6-60. 
224 Dong Jian, “Lishi zhenshi, yishu zhenshi he xianshi qingxiangxing de tongyi—ping lishiju Qinwang 
Li Shimin” (The unity of historical truth, artistic truth, and contemporary realistic tendency—on the 
historical play The Prince of Qin Li Shimin), in Dong Jian, Wenxue yu lishi (Literature and history) 
(Nanjing: Jiangsu wenyi chubanshe, 1992), 256. Also see Gu Ertan, “Rencai nande—du huaju Qinwang 
Li Shimin you gan” (The talent of one in a thousand—some thoughts on play The Prince of Qin Li 
Shimin), in Zhongshan,1981, Vol. 1, 63.  
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Besides the tense, convoluted plot and the vivid use of theatrical language, 
which caught the attention of the critics,225 the historical consciousness about the 
empire and the people woven in dialogues and poems throughout the play endows the 
play with a transcendent flavor spilling over the specific historical circumstances. 
More than just portraying Li Shimin and the court struggle, the play conveys the 
imperial-time regime that enfolds Li Shimin and his imperial family to be evaluated 
according to the historical trend. For instance, the theme song, which introduces the 
protagonist Li Shimin and sets the tone for the entire play, articulates the historical 
consciousness concerning the relationship between the people and the empire. It reads 
as such: 
 
The Yellow River flows east,  
For centuries its waves have washed the sands; 
Floating and capsizing the ship of the state, 
How many are aware of this in the rise and fall of empires? (7) 
 
Borrowing the metaphor of river and ship, the image of the Yellow River 
signifies the history of the Chinese empire. The individuals, the dynasties, are like 
sands washed out in the current of history, while the secret of the rise and fall was 
both concealed and revealed in these sands. The relationship between the river and the 
ship and between history and the present is most clearly articulated in Li Shimin’s 
remonstrance to his father:  
 
Your Majesty! King Wu of Zhou has said, “What Heaven sees is what 
the people see; what Heaven hears is what the people hear!” Duke Mu of Qin 
has said, “The people (min) are the foundation of the state; only when the 
foundation is stable does the state remain peaceful.” There has been the saying 
“to pursue the Way for the people (min)” since the ancient times! Father! The 
common people are like the Yangtze and Huanghe rivers, and the emperors are 
                                                             
225 Gu Ertan, “Rencai nande—du huaju Qinwang Li Shimin you gan” (The talent of one in a thousand—
some thoughts on play The Prince of Qin Li Shimin), in Zhongshan,1981, Vol. 1, 61.  
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like the giant ships on the water.  The river can float the ship; it can also 
overturn the ship! (43) 
 
Quoting King Wu of Zhou and Duke Mu of Qin, the successful rulers in 
ancient times, Li Shimin not only compresses the temporal gap between the present 
and the past, but also elicits the transcendent rule—to pursue the Way for the people—
for a prosperous state. Needless to say, such a statement delivered a significant 
message in the post-Mao era for the legitimacy of the Party-state, with a self-reflexive, 
all-encompassing historical consciousness. As Dong Jian suggested, this play digs out 
“the not-yet-past content of history” for the present.226 
 
Conclusion: the Staging of the Empire 
Thus far, it ought to be clear that throughout modern Chinese history, 
representations of imperial history have always been inextricably intertwined and 
interlocked with the project of nation building toward modernization. Symptomatic of 
specific social circumstances, historical representations embody the creative agency 
that the writers adopted to manipulate history in order to mirror and define reality; 
however over time, the ambivalence and the discrepancies among the representations 
not only exhibit the self-negation of the human agency, but also give rise to the all-
encompassing temporal paradigm in which the imperial-time regime manifests its 
transcendent, penetrating power.  
In this regard, borrowing Guo Moruo’s understanding that each historical play 
is a “totality,” there are different “totalities” due to different historical contexts. The 
common theme of unity and morality, hence, makes itself implicit as the transcendent 
                                                             
226 Dong Jian, “Lishi zhenshi, yishu zhenshi he xianshi qingxiangxing de tongyi—ping lishiju Qinwang 
Li Shimin” (The unity of historical truth, artistic truth, and contemporary realistic tendency—on the 
historical play The Prince of Qin Li Shimin), in Dong Jian, Wenxue yu lishi (Literature and history) 
(Nanjing: Jiangsu wenyi chubanshe, 1992), 256. 
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totality in all these discursively constructed totalities, through time. The Chinese 
empire under represented, therefore, manifests itself as both One and Multiple.  
The relationship between One and Multiple evolves from Deleuze’s reading of 
Leibniz. Deleuze suggests that Leibniz’s One-Multiple philosophy can be perceived as 
the allegory of the world.227 For Deleuze, there is always “a unity of the multiple, in 
the objective sense, the one must also have a multiplicity ‘of’ one and a unity ‘of’ the 
multiple, but now in a subjective sense.”228 This relationship between the One and the 
Multiple, non-dialectical and non-oppositional as such, nevertheless displays the 
characteristic of the imperial-time regime: the dispersing character of the One and the 
collective character of the Multiple. In the objective sense, there is this Chinese 
Empire which is the unity of the multiple; on the other hand, in a subjective sense, this 
empire is the “multiplicity of one and a unity of the multiple.” The latter “unity,” 
instead of being petrified in the space of the past, nonetheless registers in time. 
Traveling across time and space through metamorphosis, it continually articulates an 
infiltrating persistence to be instrumental for its self-perpetuation.   
The Chinese Empire, in this sense, far from being a stage of history, is still 
staging in the modern cultural landscape, constantly unfolding its surplus value in the 
cultural production.   
                                                             
227 According to Leibniz, there is always a process of transforming the perceptible object into an 
individual point of view. The object itself contains a series of figures and aspects which are assigned 
with definitions and propositions, and finally reaches a single point of view—“a principle of 
indiscernibles assuring the interiority of the concept and the individual.” See Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: 
Leibniz and the Baroque (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 126. 
228 Ibid. 126 
138 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART III 
139 
 
PART III—PREFACE 
 
From “the People” to “Tianxia”: 
The resurgence of the empire in post-revolutionary representation 
 
The history of empire is far too important to be face-value. The rise and fall of empires to 
a great extent determines which values and ideologies will dominate an era. The study of 
empire says much about the contemporary global order, its origins, its moral and political 
bases, and the manner in which it may evolve. 
                                                                                                  ---- Dominic Lieven Empire 
“Toward the Republic” and toward the empire 
In 2003, Channel One of CCTV (China Central Television) during primetime 
broadcast the TV series Zouxiang gonghe (Marching towards the Republic), 229 
grabbing people’s attention with its controversial and subversive portrayal of late 
imperial history. The series restages the turbulent transition from the late Qing to the 
Republican period, immerses the conservatives, the reformists, and the revolutionaries 
into the same hot water of this shameful period, and poses a provocative challenge to 
the officially established view on modern Chinese history.230  
Unlike the mainstream opinion that has been taught in history textbooks that 
the feudal regime, the decadent imperial family and officials, are the primary reason 
that China was held back, the series almost completely inverts the images of the 
“corrupt” Empress Dowager Cixi, the “quisling” official Li Hongzhang, and the 
“national robber” Yuan Shikai. It suggests that these people have been the scapegoats 
for the national stigma in history and that in reality they were no less patriotic than 
those reformists and revolutionaries. Indeed, Cixi appears to be wise, sober, intelligent, 
                                                             
229 Zouxiang gonghe (Marching towards the Republic). Directed by Zhang Li, written by Sheng Heyi 
and Zhang Jianwei. (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2003). 
230 Ibid. See the interview with the director Zhang Li and the scriptwriter Sheng Heyi.  
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and strategic, no less open-minded than the situation allows her to be; Li Hongzhang is 
extremely loyal, diligent, and self-sacrificing, yet has no alternative options to choose 
from. Similarly, Yuan Shikai becomes a man who is talented, capable, realistic, and 
far-sighted, only to be trapped by the dream of being an emperor fueled by the 
conservatives. In a word, these commonly-regarded “historical criminals” seem to be 
understandable and reasonable due to the situations they were in, and they appear as 
no less than forerunners in seeking the way to save China during its crisis. On the 
other hand, Sun Zhongshan (Dr. Sun Yat-sen) is portrayed as an idealistic, enthusiastic, 
easily-tempted revolutionary, who is no more rational than the reformists, no more 
realistic than the conservatives. Sun, as a representative of the people, does not seem 
more heroic than any of the other characters. On the contrary, Cixi, Li Hongzhang, 
and Yuan Shikai are all charming and capable figures. Their endeavor to save the Qing 
Empire (and Yuan’s attempt to establish a new dynasty) fails not because of their 
character flaws, but because they lack the vision to recognize the historical trend. 
Similarly, the steadfast believer in constitutional monarchy, reformist Kang Youwei, 
could not accomplish his blueprint also owing to his lack of vision of the people’s 
power and their demand for democracy. As a result, the success of revolution 
overthrowing the Qing is presented as more of an outcome of historical inevitability 
discursively shouldered by Sun than a real break from centuries of the imperial system. 
The process of moving toward the Republic, hence, appears not so much as social 
progress led by national heroes than it does a grassroots movement determined by the 
larger historical trend. 231 The end of the Qing dynasty, then, seems to be no more than 
a discursive change in Chinese history, and the boundary between the late imperial 
regime and the modern republican state is blurred.  
                                                             
231 Ying Zhu, Television in Post-Reform China: Serial Dramas, Confucian Leadership and the Global 
Television Market (London & New York: Routledge, 2008), 50. 
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Such an attempt to rewrite history, no doubt, not only attracted a well-educated 
audience, but also invited intensive debate among the cultural elite. A survey 
conducted by CCTV at the time reveals its popularity among well-educated males 
between the ages of 30 and 49.232 Critics who were skeptical about the show accused 
this series of confusing class boundaries and misleading historical perspective, 
suggesting that it would misinform the audience with deceptive historical 
knowledge.233 On the other hand, critics who were in favor of the show believed that it 
would provide a fresh perspective to look at history as well as contemporary Chinese 
policy.234  
In her study of this TV series, Ying Zhu pointed out that the show followed the 
trend of revisionist representation of imperial history, defined as endorsing both a neo-
authoritarian view on a stronger central government and a more egalitarian society. 
Zhu argued that even though on the surface Republic is at odds with the neo-
authoritarian vision on a stronger central government, it promotes the grassroots 
pursuit for democracy, which is consistent with the neo-authoritarian vision.235   
                                                             
232 An online report. “Zouxiang gongge guanzhong san gao: xueli gao, shouru gao, nianling gao” (Three 
characteristics of the audiences for Marching towards the Republic: higher education, high income, and 
older in age). Published in Hong wang, Xiaoxiang chenbao ( Xiaoxiang Morning Post), online on www. 
Sina.com.cn on May 19, 2003. See http://ent.sina.com.cn/v/2003-05-19/1026150077.html.  
233 Zhang Haipeng, “Dianshiju Zouxiang gonghe yinqi guanzhong lishi zhishi de cuoluan” (TV series 
Marching towards the Republic engenders confusion over historical knowledge) in Zhongguo jingjishi 
luntan (China Economic History Forum), June 17, 2003. See 
http://economy.guoxue.com/article.php/1059 Accessed October 24, 2004. Also see Xie Junmei, Li 
Miaogen, Hua Qiang, Ma Honglin, and Shen Weibin, “Haishang shixuejia dianping Zouxiang gonghe 
lishi renwu” (Shanghai historians comment on historical characters in Marching towards the Republic.) 
in Zhongguo jingjishi luntan (China Economic History Forum), May 22, 2003. See 
http://economy.guoxue.com/article.php/866 Accessed October. 24, 2004. 
234 See the interview with director Zhang Li, “Zouxiang gonghe shi bu guandian xi” (TV drama 
Marching towards the Republic is a show of new point of view) In Renmin wang, www.people.com.cn. 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/wenyu/223/8821/8822/20030429/981941.html. See also the historians’ 
discussion in “Xinmin Zhoukan zhuanfang: shijia pingshuo Zouxiang gonghe” (A special interview 
conducted by Xinmin Weekly: historians talk about Marching towards the Republic), first published in 
Xinmin Weekly, May 16, 2003. See http://ent.sina.com.cn/v/2003-05-19/1026150077.html. For a more 
comprehensive collection of web pages on discussions about Marching towards the Republic, see 
Zhongguo jingcai wangzhi (Chinese excellent web pages) at www.5566.net, see 
http://www.5566.net/tvj/892.htm.  
235 Ying Zhu, Television in Post-Reform China, 50. 
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However, Zhu did not comment on the mysterious ban of the show after its 
speedy screening. First being promoted on CCTV, the most politically and 
ideologically supervised TV station, the series was scheduled to air on CCTV-1 in 
early April, with two episodes being screened at primetime every night. In the 
meantime, CCTV also programmed daily reruns on its drama channel CCTV-8. 
Shortly after it began, without any announcement, CCTV increased its pace to three 
episodes per evening. Anticipating a ban from the central government due to the 
unexpected debate on historical controversies, CCTV finished the first run within a 
month, just before the ban finally came down. After its appearance on CCTV, the 
show was never shown again in any other TV channel in China, even though video 
copies were openly available in video stores.236 The exact reason for the ban remains 
unknown, yet one thing is self-evident: the government is ambivalent about rewriting 
modern Chinese history. On the one hand, rewriting is tolerated, even promoted; yet 
on the other hand, toleration is not without limits.  To what extent, and in what area 
history could be rewritten is still a sensitive space where different social forces 
contend.  
By the time Republic was broadcast, historical representations had experienced 
tremendous change, as will be demonstrated below, from “revolutionary narrative” to 
“empire representation.” As much as the “empire representation” is tolerated and 
encouraged, Republic might have incongruously reached a threshold for toleration. In 
other words, while some characteristics of this series won applause in contemporary 
society, which led to its public appearance in the first place, some aspects of it touched 
upon a controversial area that pushed a warning button in the government. What, to be 
speculative, is this button or threshold, then?  
                                                             
236 Ibid. 43.  
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The series is fundamentally about legitimation. It portrays a gray zone where 
every party finds its legitimacy in a complicated empirical situation. On the one hand, 
it restores the continuity of Chinese history, visualizing that troublesome period in 
which it is virtually impossible to distinguish clearly republican history from imperial 
history. On the other hand, every party has legitimacy in searching for a way to save 
China, which might potentially challenge the sole legitimacy of the Communist Party 
that claimed to have inherited the revolutionary tradition from Sun Zhongshan. As 
much as the Party likes to obscure revolutionary ideology and recover historical 
continuity, any potential threat to its legitimacy, from whatever direction,237 is still 
unbearable. Moreover, inasmuch as Republic manifests the contradiction between an 
authoritarian government and mass democracy, and the tension between political and 
economic reform (the Qing court finally endorsed the reform in economic, social 
levels, yet it is commonly believed that its political regime blocked China’s path 
toward modernity and democracy), the government cannot afford to allow the 
audience to identify the late Qing court with the contemporary government.238 
Setting aside the threshold of political censorship, the initial promotion of the 
TV series nonetheless perfectly completed a change in the field of historical 
representation that had been in place since the mid-1980s. The subversive portrayal of 
different characters signifies the shift of attention from the idealistic blueprint to the 
empirical situation, from revolutionary discourse to “empire representation,” and from 
modernization to globalization. Republic offers a major example to show these shifts 
                                                             
237 Some people speculate that the Party is afraid of being compared with the late Qing government. 
Since the late Qing court finally decided to carry out economic reform, rather than political reform, just 
as the contemporary government is doing, the image of this reality might seem to be a criticism to the 
contemporary policy. 
238 For instance, Xing Haonian linked the late Qing self-strengthening movement led by Li Hongzhang 
and Zhang Zhidong and the breakdown of the “Hundred-Day Reform” in 1898 with Deng Xiaoping’s 
economic policy and the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. See Ying Zhu, Television in Post-Reform China, 
55-6.  
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and tensions. Insofar as the empirical situation becomes the primary concern in 
carrying out the national strategy, Sun Zhongshan’s idealistic enthusiasm seems not 
much nobler than the realistic calculation of Li Hongzhang for the sake of the falling 
empire. Following Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic “black cat, white cat” theory, the post-
revolutionary discourse tends to desublimate idealism and endorse practicality. While 
revolutionary history has faded, imperial history is brought to the fore; while the 
black-and-white world is blurred, the gray area is legitimized, presented, and brought 
to the surface on both the national and global horizons.  
 
The transition: the shift from the people’s culture to the mass culture 
Witnessing the tremendous social change in the last two decades of the 
twentieth century, the post-revolutionary cultural landscape exhibits diversified 
literary products corresponding with multifaceted social phenomena. In the field of 
imperial historical representation, critics observed the shift from “revolutionary 
narrative” to “empire representation,” implying that the representations of peasant 
rebellions gave way to the representations of the prosperous dynasties in the past, and 
event-centered history gave way to character-centered history.239 
Following Yao Xueyin’s Li Zicheng, till the mid 1980s, a large number of 
historical novels on peasant rebellions were published. Among them were Feng Jicai’s 
Yi he quan on the Boxer Rebellion, Ling Li’s Xing xing cao on the Nian minority 
revolt in the Qing Dynasty, Liu Yazhou’s Chen Sheng on Chen Sheng’s uprising at the 
end of the Qin Dynasty, Guo Candong’s Huang Chao on the peasant insurrection by 
the end of the Tang Dynasty, Li Yuewu’s Fang La qiyi on Fang La’s rise in the Song 
Dynasty, and Jiang Weiming’s Bailian nüjie on the White Lotus unrest, and so on.   
                                                             
239 Wang Aisong, Zhengzhi shuxie yu lishi xushi (Political writing and historical narrative) (Beijing: 
Zhongguo guangbo dianshi chubanshe, 2007), 277. 
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Though these novels appeared publicly in the 1980s, they were mostly 
conceived and written during the Cultural Revolution.240 Whereas the writers were 
seeking a psychological refuge in historical writing to avoid the intense political 
environment around them, they were also influenced by the revolutionary master 
narrative at that time. In the Maoist historical view, peasant rebellions were considered 
as the irreversible force to push history forward.241 Progress was tied with class 
struggle in which “the People” are the ultimate carrier of morality and historical force. 
Therefore, the peasant leaders in those uprisings were seen as righteous heroes 
fighting against oppressors who blocked the historical wheel of progress. In the desire 
to construct historical epics portraying peasant rebellions, these novels mostly take the 
perspective of social class to depict a black and white world, at the cost of overly 
glorifying the peasant heroes and demeaning the imperial ruling class. In a sincere 
self-reflection, Ling Li later commented that Xing xing cao was a product of her 
subjective limitation and the longstanding leftist tendency in literary creation. “The 
reason [for the flaw of Xing xing cao] is,” she wrote, “subjectively, because I idealized 
the peasant heroes, trying to endow the protagonists with all kinds of great virtues and 
sing praise of their mountain-shaking heroic spirit, I could not afford to write about 
their mistakes and flaws. Objectively, the longstanding extreme-leftist thoughts, and 
the mentalist view and method in creating the ‘lofty, great, and perfect’ [gao da quan 
高大全] model characters also impacted me, so much so that I could not break out of 
the fetters and the frame (of the model), manifesting my own historical limitations.”242  
                                                             
240 Ibid.232. 
241 Mao Zedong articulated the importance of peasant rebellions in Chinese history in his article 
“Zhongguo geming he Zhongguo Gongchandang” (The Chinese revolution and the Chinese Communist 
Party). He said, “The scale of the peasant rebellions and peasant wars in Chinese history finds no match 
in world history. In the Chinese feudal society, only this kind of class struggle [between peasants and 
landowners], peasant rebellions and peasant wars were the real force of historical development.”  In 
Mao Zedong xuanji (Selected works of Mao Zedong), vol 2. 
242 Ling Li, “Cong Xing xing cao dao Shaonian tianzi de chuangzuo fansi” (Reflecting on the writing 
from Xing xing cao to Shaonian tianzi) in Duo qing wu (Beijing, Jingji ribao chubanshe, 1998), 5. 
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Such an idealistic portrait of revolutionary history was soon replaced by the 
resurgence of “empire representations.” Peasant rebellions faded, yet emperors, 
empresses, ministers, powerful officials, and successful merchants appeared; the grand 
narratives of collective heroes were silenced, yet the individual imperial heroes were 
seen and heard; the discourses of “the people” and Communism were latent, yet the 
discourse of “Tianxia” (all under Heaven) was rearticulated. Indeed, since the late 
1980s till the turn of the twentieth first century, historical narratives and historical 
images about past Chinese empires nearly dominated cultural production, making a 
primary contribution to the social visibility. A lot of literature, including novels, 
biographies, films, and television series devoted themselves to the lives of emperors, 
empresses, powerful officials, legendary scholars, controversial beauties, and the time 
periods when the Chinese empire proudly assumed the role of “Central Kingdom” in 
the world. Almost all the mighty dynasties in imperial China—the Qin, Han, Tang, 
Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties and their associated influential emperors—were 
covered to shower the audience with convoluted stories and splendid images. The term 
“Empire,” after nearly a century’s exile, also returned to the public horizon to capture 
the national imagination of its past glory.  
Needless to say, the representations of the Chinese empire and imperial history 
go far beyond the portrayals in the historical records. Some were openly promoted as 
fantasy representations, ones that are explicitly entitled with “xi shuo” (dramatic 
narration) or primarily developed from the unofficial anecdotes, such as the TV series 
Xi shuo Qianlong (Dramatic representation of Emperor Qianlong) or Huanzhu gege 
(Princess Pearl). Others, on the other hand, have assumed a position of legitimacy in 
representing history, declaring themselves to be the products of comprehensive 
research and a serious attempt to recover history. For instance, Ling Li and Eryuehe’s 
historical novels and the associated TV series have been regarded as “serious” ones. In 
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fact, no matter how serious and how faithful to history the producers claimed their 
works to be, contemporary imagination inevitably played a crucial role in constructing 
and visualizing history. Especially in the visual productions, cinematic devices, high-
tech visual effects, and the dramatic plots turned the imperial images into highly 
embellished and reception-oriented cultural shows. Hence, the boundary between 
seriousness and non-seriousness is not that clear-cut. Rather, all these representations 
together make up the totality of the “empire representation,” and what emerges from 
the self-assigned categories goes beyond the producers’ intention and manifests the 
performativity of representation itself. 
The cross-fertilization of “empire narrative” and mass media delivers a sense 
of glory, unity, beauty, and abundance, which significantly diverges from the 
revolutionary cultural tapestry a decade before. Tang Zhesheng characterizes this shift 
from revolutionary narrative to “empire representation” as the shift from “People’s 
culture” (qun zhong wenhua 群众文化) to “mass culture,” (da zhong wenhua 大众文
化), for the elite-led, idealistic pursuit in “People’s culture” gave way to the popular 
interests of “mass culture,” and the market played a crucial role in propagating the 
imperial stories and images.243 While “the People” indexes a class-conscious, clearly 
demarcated, black-and-white world, “the mass” signifies the gray zone in which class 
struggle is disguised and blurred.  According to critic Wang Aisong, the resurgence of 
the imperial narrative indicates that the ordinary people were moved off stage and the 
historical celebrities reappeared on the stage. Moreover, event-centered history gave 
way to character-centered history.244 In the latter, there is a tendency to glorify the 
emperors, officials, and successful merchants, dramatizing the romantic encounters 
                                                             
243 Tang Zhesheng, Zhongguo dangdai tongsu xiaoshuo shilu (The history of contemporary Chinese 
popular fiction) (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2007), 300-309. 
244 Wang Aisong, Zhengzhi shuxie yu lishi xushi,285. 
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and power intrigues, which points to the commercialized, vulgar direction of both 
production and consumption.245 
 
The interplay between modernization and globalization 
The subtle shift from “the people’s culture” to “mass culture” goes hand in 
hand with the swing of public language and national imagination. Coinciding with the 
intensification of the market economy within China and worldwide globalization, this 
literary phenomenon signifies the discursive address of “Empire” situated between 
two overlapping yet different discourses: China’s continued modernization and its 
ambivalent incorporation into globalization under the rubric of “socialism with 
Chinese characteristics.” To be sure, modernization and globalization are not 
contradictory discourses. The post-revolutionary slogans “reform and openness,” or 
“harmony and development,” contain both elements. To some extent modernization is 
the end, while globalization is the means. Considering the Maoist ideological heritage 
of the past and contemporary discourse, the former signifies a closed policy, the latter 
advocates open-door strategy; the former denotes competition, the latter connotes 
cooperation; the former stresses the worldview of scarcity, implying the win-lose 
battle against the West in national development, the latter emphasizes the worldview 
of abundance suggesting the win-win result in the global arena.  
The negotiation and the shifting emphases between these two discourses, 
manifesting the central government’s political and rhetorical strategies in dealing with 
the post-revolutionary era, find their best cultural artifact in the narratives of the 
historical empire.  In one sense, empire narrative implies the shifting of gears, the 
invisible negation of the revolutionary discourse; in another sense, nevertheless, it 
                                                             
245 Ma Zhenfang, Zai lishi yu xugou zhijian (Between history and fiction) (Beijing: Beijing daxue 
chubanshe, 2006). 
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crosses the national boundary, responsive to the worldwide attention to redefining 
empire in the new world order under globalization246 and the Chinese anxiety to 
resituate its position in the contemporary world. 
In this context, the reemergence of the Chinese Empire in popular culture 
serves to dramatize the confrontation between the present and the past, between China 
and the West, between the symbolic and political, economic power, and between the 
national morality (as repeatedly manifested in the rhetoric “Tianxia”) and being a 
global superpower.  
 
The characteristics of the empire narrative 
Inasmuch as the “empire narrative” corresponds to a globalized mass culture, it 
first of all manifests the at once centralizing and de-centering tendencies that reveal 
the centripetal and centrifugal forces that “the imperial-time regime” unfolds 
throughout history. 
Characteristic 1: The dialectic between “the People are missing” and 
Emperors as heroes 
On the surface, the commercialization of imperial history desublimates a lofty, 
idealistic revolutionary history which aims to construct a unified class memory. “The 
People are missing.” 247  Yet paradoxically, “the People” constructed in the 
revolutionary textual world in effect are always in opposition with the enemy—the 
ruling class, and to read it contextually, “the nation” in this discourse is always in 
competition with other nations in the world. The unity achieved in the revolutionary 
                                                             
246 For instance, Empire by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (Cambridge & London: Harvard 
University Press, 2000); and A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium  by Peter 
J. Katzenstein (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 2005) For a Chinese American scholar’s 
attention on this topic, see Clash of Empires by Lydia H. Liu (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2004) 
247 Gilles Deleuze, “One Less Manifesto” in Mimesis, Masochism, & Mime: The Politics of 
Theatricality in Contemporary French Thought, ed. Timothy Murray, (Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press, 1997). 
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master narrative therefore implies intrinsic disunity from both within and without. By 
contrast, the commercialized mass culture reconstructs the stories from the remote 
collective memory embodied in famous historical figures to glorify the unified, 
wealthy empire, which ironically arouses the national imagination to centralization. 
For instance, Ling Li’s series of novels on the early Qing dynasty was named as “One 
hundred years of resplendence” (bai nian hui huang百年辉煌) to depict the rising 
Qing Empire, and Eeryuehe’s similar series was titled “The trilogy of the evening 
glow” (luo xia san bu qu 落霞三部曲) to portray the splendid greatness of the Qing 
Empire at its height. The concentrated portrayal of imperial glory comes across as 
natural and harmonious, perceivable in both the past and the present, engendering a 
positive feeling of common root and collective belonging. 
Moreover, the dilemma between the absence of the People and the presence of 
the emperors is resolved in the rhetoric of “Tianxia” (all under Heaven) or “Minxin-
Tianxia”(Whoever gains the heart of people will rule all under Heaven). Put another 
way, even though on the surface “the People are missing,” the discourse of “Tianxia” 
has blended the spirit of the people with the very image of the heroes. It is noteworthy 
that this “People” is different from the ancient notion “min.” Far from being ignorant 
and passive as “min” connotes, “the People” has inherited the intensive revolutionary 
legacy in modern China which is deeply rooted in the national consciousness. Just as 
the aforementioned criticism shows, the cautious voice of the critics signifies the 
engrained revolutionary consciousness that is still awake in the contemporary period. 
The displacement of “the People” with “Tianxia,” hence, primarily serves to bridge 
the continuity between the pre-modern empire and the modern nation state, mend the 
class opposition between the despot and the people, and bring to the surface a vision 
of harmony and abundance. 
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Indeed, in terms of the image of the ruling heroes, emperors and officials alike, 
there is a primary concern that the heroes are not fundamentally different from the 
common people. By contrast, there is a strong tendency to deny the longstanding 
assumption in modern history, that the emperor has unlimited imperial power and 
stands in opposition to the people. In the historical representations, far from being free 
and authoritative with absolute power, the emperors are usually situated in a critical 
situation facing multiple threats. As the late Qing court portrayed in Republic, the 
empirical situation determines that the ruling class has no more alternatives than other 
people to save the empire. Instead of being a totalitarian, transcendent ruler, the 
emperor has to deal carefully with the crucial situation he is in while bearing Tianxia 
in his mind. Whereas the failed emperors could not shoulder the mission for lack of 
ability or vision, like the late Qing rulers, the successful ones become the heroes with 
superb talent, wisdom, vision, and ability. The emphasis on the empirical situation not 
only erases the distance between the emperor and the common people, but also lifts 
the notion of “Tianxia” to a transcendent, lofty level. “Tianxia” is absent, yet also 
omnipresent. As such, “empire representation” manifests itself as the centralizing 
force organized by the “imperial-time regime.”  
Characteristic 2: The dialectic between the centralizing and de-centering 
effects  
Besides the centralizing portrayal of the emperors, on the other hand, the 
imagination of the empire was reified in the images of wealth, beauty, romance, and 
success that are also attractive to the individual viewer. The symbiosis between 
historical representation and mass media, hence, not only contributes to the collective 
national imagination, but also caters to the popular desire to achieve the ideal success 
in both spiritual and material senses. The material abundance, including simultaneous 
possession of wealth, beauty, and fame, is built upon the culturally rich “mellowness” 
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that suggests the possibilities of maximal gain and cultivates materialist motivation in 
a commercialized, post-revolutionary social context. For instance, the representations 
of the famous merchants Fan Li and Lü Buwei in the Warring States period 
deliberately lead the readers to the “open sesame of their grand success.” 248 In that 
sense, historical narrative incites multiple desires and identifications that are not 
always lofty and noble, promoting an egocentric, acquisitive response toward an 
otherwise unitary cultural text.  
However, in most cases, the characteristics that contribute to a character’s 
success are not just tactics and chance, but mostly the traditional virtues and values 
those characters possess. As discursive and contingent as the social encounters altering 
personal fate are, the underlying factor that determines the growth of a hero is 
traditional morality. As Tang Zhesheng pointed out, though these historical 
representations adopt a non-elitist, less spiritual perspective, the glorified protagonists 
usually manifest superhuman-like charisma in a highly praised Confucian culture. 
Thus, the Emperor Yongzheng becomes the advocate of traditional values and the real 
practitioner of the view of “Minxin-Tianxia”; the official Zeng Guofan is portrayed as 
first and foremost a prominent Confucian scholar; and the successful merchant Hu 
Xueyan also possesses qualities comparable to those of a Confucian shi-scholar.249 
Whereas material success is what attracts popular attention, the larger-than-life 
spiritual pursuit and the Confucian social conscience is the cultural core that defines 
their personality. The construct of an ideal character is thus centered on the traditional 
                                                             
248 Han Yaoqi, Juedai zhengshang Lü Buwei (The unprecedented politician- merchant Lü Buwei) 
(Beijing: Guoji wenhua chuban gongsi, 1996); Xie Shijun, Shangsheng—Fan Li quanzhuan (The 
Merchant saint—the grand biography of Fan Li) (Beijing: Beifang wenyi chubanshe, 1997). See Tang 
Zhesheng, Zhongguo dangdai tongsu xiaoshuo shilun, 332. 
249 Tang Zhesheng, Zhongguo dangdai tongsu xiaoshuo shilun. 314-339. Zeng Guofan in Tang 
Haoming, Zeng Guofan (Changsha: Hunan wenyi chubanshe, 1990); Hu Xueyan in Gao Yang, Hu 
Xueyan quanzhuan (The grand biography of  Hu Xueyan) (Beijing: Zhongguo youyi chuban gongsi, 
1992); Emperor Yongzheng in Eryuehe, Yongzheng huangdi (Wuhan: Changjiang wenyi chubanshe, 
1998). 
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values by which the protagonists shine through history and on which the empire was 
founded and stabilized itself.  
The centrality of traditional culture as well as imperial thinking and 
commercialized images constitute both the centralizing and de-centering effects of the 
representations of empire. In the meanwhile, besides the more conventional historical 
representations based on historical record, the representations of empire are also 
accompanied by the “alternative history” that is from an individual or minority 
perspective. Su Tong’s Wu Zetian and Wo de diwang shengya (My Lifetime as 
Emperor), and Wang Anyi’s Jishi yu xugou (Fact and Fiction) belong to the latter 
category.250 Following the literary trend of the new historical fiction, a loosely defined 
category that often refers to the alternative representation of the Republican era from a 
non-official perspective,251 these novels offer an individual, minority angle to present 
imperial history that is fictive or outside the official historical record. Chen Sihe 
defined this non-official perspective as a minjian perspective, which exhibits a more 
diversified, fragmentary, plural memory as against the official, unified history.252 
However, what is behind this individuated, de-centering shard of memory is 
the unity against which the fragments of history become meaningful. Without the 
underlying, unified image of the Empire the private, individual narrative of history 
will lose fundamental reference. For instance, Su Tong’s Wo de di wang shengya 
presents an ahistorical, timeless story of a nameless emperor’s life, one that attempts 
to epitomize the totality of the power struggle in the imperial families in Chinese 
history. In his own words, “I hope I am immersed in the thousands of years of Chinese 
history. I wish I were an old tea drinker in a tea house on an ancient street, the 
                                                             
250 I will examine these two works in the next chapter. 
251 Lin Qingxin, Brushing History against the Grain. (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), 
3. 
252 Ibid. 32.  
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boundless universe, all living things, and flowing time beneath my eyes.”253 Here the 
personal, subjective understanding of Chinese history is intertwined with the collective 
memory; the real and the fictional both constitute the creation of a timeless history. 
Similarly, Wang Anyi’s family lineage in Jishi yu xugou situates history between 
reality and fiction, positions the narrator in the flow of time within a solid imperial and 
contemporary history.  
Characteristic 3: multiple and differential temporality 
The dialectic between centralization and de-centering effects points to another 
characteristic intrinsic of the “empire narrative”—the multiple and differential 
temporality. As will be shown below, more often than not the same history is 
represented heterogeneously rather than homogeneously. The interweaving of the past, 
present, and future exhibits a sense of crystalline time, which is neither linear nor 
cyclical, but the composite of both. For instance, Ling Li’s novels inherit more of the 
revolutionary legacy, assuming a linear, progressive history and projecting a better 
future in the historical writings. By contrast, Eryuehe’s “emperor series” manifests 
neither a sentiment of nostalgia nor a vision of projection onto the future, but rather 
radiates a double-layered, universal, all-encompassing temporality: the transcendent 
moral time and the empirical amoral time.  
The coexistence of different temporalities signifies the overlapping of 
differential historical consciousness, the consciousness that desires to resituate 
contemporary China in history and in the world. An enduring desire in the entire 
history of modern China, the “placing” of China manifests itself in multiple media, is 
agreeable to geographically and intellectually diverse audiences. It is a desire that 
                                                             
253 Su Tong, Hou gong (The imperial palace), in Su Tong wenji (Nanjing: Jiangsu wenyi chubanshe, 
1994). Citation on cover. 
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enfolds the so-called nativist, liberalist, even new-leftist,254 or just the plain ordinary 
audience, into an all-encompassing staging of the ancient Chinese empire.  
In this part, I am not going to downplay commercialization and the pleasure-
seeking endeavors of these productions, but focus more on the subject matter and the 
desire for unity it conveyed. In other words, the aim is to answer the question why 
historical empires were so intensively represented in such a specific historical context 
without denying the function of the market. Moreover, without challenging the view 
that history is always contemporary history, I intend to complicate the temporality a 
little bit more, to show that contemporary history could be multiple rather than 
homogeneous due to different perspectives. In other words, from the point of view of 
social context, both modernization and globalization, as practical processes, imply the 
coexistence of different times yet at the same time assume the convergence of a single 
world time. The historical narratives cannot but further complicate the already 
multiplied temporalities, playing out the anxiety of the vision of the future. Further, 
without overlooking the revival of traditional values, the homology between family 
and empire, which by any measure manifests a historical continuity in social ethics, I 
attempt to formulate the strategic shift, and sometimes the subtle twist, between the 
language of scarcity and the language of abundance, between identification with the 
people who were portrayed as the ultimate force for the historical development under 
the socialist regime and conditional identification with the emperors who were the 
legitimate heroes of the Chinese Empire. Lastly, following the analysis of divergence 
and convergence in the multifaceted representations, I direct attention to the rhetoric 
of “Tianxia,” or “Minxin-Tianxia” (whoever gains the heart of the people will govern 
all under Heaven), which echoes the totality of the imperial moral principle from the 
                                                             
254 Xudong Zhang, ed. Whither China: intellectual politics in contemporary China (Durham & London: 
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remote past. I suggest that the “imperial-time regime” never ceased to exist. Rather, its 
pervasive power partially explains the way modern China developed and unfolded 
itself. As such, it renders the textuality of empire a virtual force in redefining a new 
global order in the contemporary world.    
The narrative of empire, perceived as such, thus exhibits itself as a double-
enunciation: it not only speaks to the contemporary glocal—global plus local, as some 
theorists put it—context, but also reflects on its own textual capacity. In other words, 
the textual complexities spill over the contextual constraint and allow one to see new 
relations and new possibilities beyond past and present experience. In this respect, 
empire is not so much a stage of history but rather its staging, and its representation 
could only be characterized with the following ambiguous language: it is more 
national than nationalistic; more history-conscious than historical; more hero-centered 
than heroical; more unity-prone than fragmentary; more egalitarian-oriented than 
hierarchical; more realistically-minded than idealistic; and more transcendently 
spiritual than immanently practical. In a word, the representation of the past empires is 
not so much imagining a timeless history to reinforce the national identity as it is 
evoking multiple tensions and perspectives to reconfigure a relation between past and 
present, for the sake of the future, in the age of globalization.  
The following sections examine the historical films, dramas, and novels about 
successful emperors and empresses, starting from three films on the first emperor Qin 
Shihuang to discuss the local-global interactions, followed by historical novels by 
Eryuehe and Ling Li, and the TV series about the emperors. These sections address 
the tension between history and present, the importance of genre in shaping literary 
production and reader’s expectations, and the impact of media on narrative structure 
and collective reception, in a word, the “empire fever” across the media at the turn of 
the new century.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Love or Hate: The First Emperor on Screen 
----Three movies on the attempted assassination of the first Emperor Qin Shihuang 
 
Empire is materializing before our very eyes.     
                                                                                          ---- Hardt & Negri Empire 
 
The ultimate realm (jingjie) of the art of swordsmanship is no sword in hand, and 
none in mind either. It is to embrace the Whole with the most open mind. It is non-
killing. It is peace.   
                                                                                              ---- Zhang Yimou Hero 
 
The First Emperor in the Metropolitan Opera Theater 
The world premiere of Tan Dun’s opera The First Emperor in December 2006 
marked a decade of sustained film, television, and stage productions on this historical 
figure by the most renowned directors and actors in China, as well as its celebrated 
composer. Tan Dun’s opera introduced the notorious first Emperor Qin Shihuang to 
worldwide opera lovers at the Metropolitan Opera Theater in New York City, just as 
Chinese films had repeatedly introduced him to global film audiences since 1996. 
As a renowned composer trained in both China and the United States, Tan Dun 
brought to life an epic opera that breaks free from cultural boundaries and blends 
multiple cultural elements. Not only is it a hybrid product of both the East and the 
West, or both a tradition and the modern, but it is also impossible to draw the line 
between the cultural sources. Tan borrowed the coloristic elements from the Shaanxi 
Qinqiang opera and was inspired by the Chinese opera’s attention to attack, duration, 
and decay in the sound. His unusual approach to vocal color and dramatic timing 
posed a challenge to both the English-speaking singers and to Western ears.255 The 
result of this tricky compositional and performance balancing act is that the opera 
                                                             
255 Matt Dobkin and Ken Smith, “Tan Dun’s Operatic Odyssey,” in the Playbill of The First Emperor, 
(New York: Playbill Incorporated, 2006). 22. 
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became a new product that “expands tradition.”256 “It is not about being Chinese or 
Western, about being old or new,” Tan Dun explained, “my favorite formula is 
1+1=1.”257 
The legendary tenor Plácido Domingo played the title role of the first emperor, 
and all the performers, except the Yin-Yang master, sang in English.  Zhang Yimou 
served as the director. Together with a highly creative team from different national, 
cultural backgrounds, Zhang contributed his cinematic spectacle to the Met stage. 
Portraying the history of the first emperor unifying China and employing the musician 
Gao Jianli to compose an anthem for the newly founded empire, the story, however, 
was based on a film script for the 1996 film The Emperor’s Shadow, which I will 
analyze more in detail below. “The work,” as the opera playbill convincingly 
concluded, “therefore, is built both around the epic (in choruses and spectacle) and the 
intimate (in vocal solos and subtle orchestrations). As the score represents a synthesis 
of diverse styles, so the story represents a synthesis of sources. Film, history, and 
tradition unite to create this musical tale of the powerful emperor who successfully—if 
controversially—forges a nation.”258 
It is hard to tell how many layers we need to approach this operatic odyssey. 
Music, language, image, the significance of the Met stage, and the first 
emperor…hybrid yet synthetic, together they construct the “fabula” of this cultural 
event, to borrow a term from narratology.259 From the Chinese perspective, this opera 
is an extension of the Chinese fever to present the first emperor to the global audience. 
In addition to three movies on this controversial figure that were produced in China 
yet aimed at global recognition, the opera took a further step to elevate the 
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257 Ibid. 18. 
258 Ibid. 47. 
259 Mieke Bal, Narratology (Toronto, Buffalo, and London: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 5 
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representation from mass culture to high culture, and to transform the Chinese 
emperor into a world one. 
For the purpose of examining the Chinese-based cultural product, the 
following section is devoted to the three films on the first emperor, in the hope of 
turning the perspective from global to local, and then back to global again.  
 
Three films on the first emperor 
By the turn of the twenty first century, three films on the first Emperor Qin 
Shihuang had appeared in the global film awards competition: The Emperor’s Shadow 
(hereafter Shadow) by Zhou Xiaowen in 1996, which was the primary source of Tan 
Dun’s opera, The Emperor and the Assassin (hereafter Assassin) by Chen Kaige in 
1998, and Hero by Zhang Yimou in 2002. All three films capture the moment of 
attempting to assassinate the King of Qin, Ying Zheng, before he founded the Qin 
Empire in 221BCE. By any measure, such intensive attention to such a historical topic 
reveals the strategic significance of the founding of the empire in the contemporary 
period. On the other hand, the difference among three representations nevertheless 
displays the divergent views toward the same event and as such, invites multiple 
perspectives on Empire as a concept in the world.  
Critics have paid attention to the issues of transnational visuality, nationalism, 
and even Sinocentrism exhibited in Hero, yet they stop short of addressing all three 
films from a comparative perspective to dig out the complexity manifested in the 
textual worlds.260 In fact, as will be shown below, the textual commonality manifests 
the enduring as well as fashionable consciousness about Empire and the unity it 
                                                             
260 Refer to Tzu-hsiu Chiu, “Public Secrets: Geopolitical Aesthetics in Zhang Yimou’s Hero,” See 
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160 
 
embodies, while the textual difference nonetheless opens up a performative space to 
play out tensions, ambiguities, and possibilities.  
One of the attractions of these films is that they all capture people’s 
imagination about that critical moment. A “what if” question is unavoidably prompted: 
what if the assassination succeeded? Would history have been changed? How should 
we perceive the function of individual heroes in relation to the larger historical trend?  
Who (or what) would assume the moral agency in pushing history forward? Is the 
unification fully justifiable?  
Historically perceived as being in tune with the grand cosmic-imperial order, 
the unification has been fully justified as the proud moment in Chinese civilization and 
solid foundation for its national identity, yet the Emperor Qin Shihuang has always 
been seen as a notoriously controversial figure in Chinese history. How to comprehend 
his accomplishment of unification and the accompanying tyrannical rule is an 
enduring task in various representations throughout history. Accordingly, the story of 
assassination, owing to its dramatically playing out the tension between the violent 
unification and moral justification, has been a long lasting focus across media. As a 
result, the choice of hero alternating between assassins and the emperor manifests the 
characteristic of the respective time period. Regardless of the different view of 
assassination in imperial China,261 in the modern period, the vision has also been 
changed along time in different socio-political situations. In 1936, the historian Ma 
Yuancai wrote a biography of the first Qin Emperor, aiming to praise Ying Zheng’s 
accomplishment of unification and alluding to Jiang Jieshi as Ying Zheng’s equal in 
                                                             
261 For instance, in Shiji, Sima Qian portrays Jing Ke and Gao Jianli as heroes who are loyal to friends 
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modern China.262 Conversely, in 1942, Guo Moruo, who situated himself in the 
Communist camp, wrote a stage play Zhu, in which the heroic Gao Jianli tragically 
fails to assassinate the first emperor, who is portrayed as an ugly, cruel, lascivious, and 
superstitious figure universally hated.263 The initial intention of this play was to 
criticize Jiang Jieshi, who was the orthodox leader during the period,264 and possibly 
to mirror himself and other Communists during the Chongqing reign as the tolerant, 
disguised assassin Gao Jianli. Interestingly enough, the same play was revised by Guo 
himself in 1956, in which the image of Qin emperor Ying Zheng was noticeably 
improved.265 However, despite the improvement of his image in the revised version of 
the play, Qin Shihuang still remains as a negative figure who bears a lot of personal 
flaws, whereas Gao Jianli is a hero who finally becomes an enlightened representative 
of the people. Gao in the end realizes the inadequacy of assassinating an individual 
and advocates a people’s war against the tyranny.266 During the Maoist era, especially 
during the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong praised Qin Shihuang for his 
achievement of unification, which later led to exaggerated embellishment of Qin 
Shihuang’s image.267 
Obviously, every version of the Qin Emperor Ying Zheng bears the imprint of 
the period, echoing the old saying “all history is but contemporary history.” The fact 
that Qin Shihuang always becomes the focus at every critical moment of history 
manifests his intrinsic complexity as the source of open-ended value judgment and 
multi-layered interpretations. In fact, his images perfectly demonstrate the “complex 
                                                             
262 Ma Yuancai, Qinshihuangdi zhuan (The Biography of the First Emperor of Qin), 1936. 
263 Guo Moruo, Zhu (Shanghai: Qunyi chubanshe, 1946). 
264 Guo Moruo, Gao Jianli. (Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 1970), 125. 
265 Ibid. Guo says in the epilogue: “When I was writing this play (1942), I intended to allude to Qin 
Shihuang as Jiang Jieshi, so my treatment was unfair to Qin Shihuang. Qin Shihuang is an important 
figure who contributed to China’s historical development a great deal. How could Jiang Jieshi compare 
to him!” 
266 Ibid. 90. 
267 An Zuozhang and Meng Xiangcai, Qinshihuang da zhuan (The grand biography of Qin Shihuang) 
(Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2005), 458-459. 
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strategies of cultural identification and discursive address that function in the name of 
‘the people’ or ‘the nation’ and make them the immanent subjects and objects of a 
range of social and literary narratives,” as Homi Bhabha puts it.268 In other words, the 
image of Qin Shihuang displays the inherent paradox between “the nation” and “the 
people” in modern times. 269  Whenever unity and national identity become the 
predominant concern, he is the identifiable hero; whenever people’s interests become 
the primary concern, he is reduced to the despotic enemy of the people. To be sure, in 
the socialist discourse, both “the nation” and “the people” have symbolic and 
rhetorical function. The difference merely resides in the level of unity they signify. 
While “the nation” designates a more universal, transcendent unity, “the people” 
implies a more collective, compromising unity among the multitude, which is 
ideologically consistent with the interests of “the nation.” 
  Hardt and Negri mentioned in their book Empire that the fundamental crisis 
within a modern nation state lies in the built-in contradiction between the immanent 
forces of the multitude and the transcendent state power to restore order. The concept 
of Empire, as a transcendent global form of sovereignty manifested in globalization, 
might provide a utopian solution for this crisis in modernity. 270  Setting aside the 
definition for nation state or modernity, which bespeaks another problem, the image of 
Qin Shihuang embodies in modern China the antagonism between the people with 
immanent desires and the nation as transcendent sovereignty. However, on the other 
hand, the antagonism thus manifested is not so much exposing a national crisis as 
reinforcing a lasting imperial vision of China. Indeed, it constitutes a continued myth-
                                                             
268 Homi Bhabha, “DissemiNation: Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Modern Nation,” in Nation 
and Narration (London & New York: Routledge, 1990), 292. 
269 In the socialist discourse, however, “the people” and “the nation” have a similar unitary and 
rhetorical function. The nation is the symbolic form for the people. Whoever is against the nation is 
against the people, but not vice versa. Whoever is against the people isn’t necessarily against the nation. 
It may be just regarded as the contradiction within the nation.  
270 Hardt and Negri, Empire, 76. 
163 
 
making process, one in which unification as a norm of Chinese history has been 
deemed ultimately moral and ethical. The persistent cry for unity at  times of disunity, 
the forces pushing for unification in history, have structured an empire mentality 
which contributes to the myth of Chinese civilization. This imperial vision of China, 
as an essentialized, predominant way of thinking, has fertilized a multi-ethnic country 
that otherwise would be perceived as contradictory to a modern nation state. As a 
result, the diversified representation of the Qin Emperor never aims to undermine the 
power of unification, yet to convey some underlying ambivalent humanistic messages 
to appeal to public sentiment and call for social consciousness. To this end, no matter 
whether it is historical recovery or literary representation, the elaborated aspect of the 
Emperor’s image reveals but the interweaving vision of history, of humanism, of the 
position of hero, and ultimately, the ambiguous relation between the traditional 
Empire and the modern nation state. 
In this light, it does not matter whether the emperor is portrayed as a hero or 
not, what matters is the vision of history conveyed from the representations. He could 
be an immoral tyrant and deserve to be overthrown, yet the unification he achieved set 
the norm for Chinese history, and the notion of “Tianxia” manifests the transcendent 
moral order for the people.  On the other hand, as demonstrated above, specific 
historical situations do determine the different strategies to manipulate the discursive 
identification either with the emperor or with the assassin. The image of the emperor 
thus exhibits the specific historicity or temporality of the time period when it is 
produced. Besides Guo Moruo’s stage plays, one interesting story about the shifting 
historicity is the evolution of the film Shadow. The film was first conceived in the mid 
1980s. Director Zhou Xiaowen at that time had in mind the title “Xue Zhu” (Bloody 
Zhu), referring to the musical instrument used by Gao Jianli to attack the emperor. 
Resonating with Guo Moruo’s stage play Zhu in the 1940s, it reminds us of the scene 
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in which the revolutionary hero Gao Jianli attacks the brutal tyrant. Yet by 1995 when 
the film was finally shot, the title became “Qin Song” (The Anthem of Qin; English 
title The Emperor’s Shadow).271 With the enduring influence of music replacing the 
weapon of assassination—the musical instrument--the film places more stress on the 
transcendent power of music and the rhetoric “Tianxia” it represents.  
The thematic shift in Shadow parallels the diachronic transition from 
“revolutionary narrative” to “empire narrative.” Needless to say, Assassin and Hero 
also participate in the contemporary “empire narrative.” Although the images of Ying 
Zheng are not unamibiguously heroic in all three films, they are not negative as in Guo 
Moruo’s plays. Whether or not portrayed as a hero, the (future) emperor is the 
protagonist in all three films, which signifies the intensive attention to Empire. On the 
other hand, synchronically, the three films produced in the same time period on the 
same event manifest differentiating temporalities in contemporary China. They 
converge in justifying unification as a promise of ultimate peace in the rhetoric of 
“Tianxia,” yet they diverge in portraying the image of the emperor.  
Moreover, all three films were aimed at global film awards, trying to win 
international recognition. As Dai Jinhua pointed out, Shadow and Assassin are in the 
category of art film, aiming at European film awards, yet Hero is characterized as a 
commercial film, targeting a Hollywood Oscar film prize. 272  The different 
categorization of the films also influenced the filmmakers’ thematic and stylistic 
choices. Therefore, the imagination of a Chinese temporality is intertwined with the 
imagination of global expectation, both thematically and stylistically. The 
convergence and divergence of the three films, hence, exhibit the multifaceted 
                                                             
271 See Dai Jinhua “Ci Qin xingdong.” (The action of assassinating the Qin emperor). A Talk at China 
Central Television Station (CCTV) on April 5, 2005. See 
http://www.cctv.com/program/bjjt/topic/education/C13808/20050405/101615.shtml.     
272 Ibid.  
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manifestations of a dialectic relation between “the imagination of what the 
international audience want to see” and “what the directors want to show” about 
Chinese history and culture. Falling within the spectrum between national imagination 
and global imagination, the three films not only participate in the “empire narrative” 
prevalent in contemporary China, but also contribute to the global imagination of a 
newly emergent world order at large.  
All three films justify unification as a promise of ultimate peace in the rhetoric 
of “Tianxia” (all under Heaven), even though they employ different strategies to 
influence the conditional identification with the emperor. On the other hand, no matter 
whether the emperor is portrayed as a hero or not, his behavior is understood to follow 
the historical trend of unification, which, if not accomplished by Ying Zheng, might 
have been accomplished by somebody else. The normalization of unification, 
justification of the historical trend, and moralization of the emperor’s behavior all 
prove the lasting influence of the “Imperial-time regime”—its centripetal and 
centrifugal forces are played out in the contemporary national-global context.  
In Shadow, the emperor appears to be a hero, yet he has to suffer personal loss 
that results from his violence. The audience is led to identify with him sympathetically. 
In Assassin, the emperor is portrayed as a physically unappealing, psychologically 
unstable, usurping, illegitimate ruler. He suffers not only loss of love but also a 
psychological split and constant self-questioning. It is hard for people to identify with 
him except to identify with his ideal blueprint of unification. In Hero, no doubt, the 
cinematic language creates the emperor as a hero of superhuman wisdom. Yet, rather 
than a flesh-and-blood human being, he is portrayed as no more than an abstract 
concept, which more or less disrupts the rule of cinematic identification and 
superimposes the heroic image onto the audience. If the omnipotent, sage-like Ying 
Zheng in Shadow and Hero implies the vision of history as predetermined, non-
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reversible progression in which a charismatic hero plays a crucial role in pushing the 
historical trend forward, the psychologically unstable Ying Zheng in Assassin 
nevertheless conveys more of a view of a discursive development of history in which 
an historical event happens just by chance. If Shadow and Assassin celebrate both the 
unified empire and humanistic message of benevolence, Hero, on the other hand, takes 
unification as automatically justifiable and articulates the abstract concept of Tianxia 
that promises the ultimate peace.  
To be sure, all three films convey the term “Tianxia” as the displacement of 
“empire.” Literally meaning “all under Heaven,” “Tianxia” contains two layers of 
implications signifying unification: one is the integration of geographical spaces, the 
other is the unity of human subjects; one is objective, the other is subjective; one is 
material, the other is spiritual, one is political, the other is moral. These two layers, 
interrelated yet sometimes contradictory, construct the double-structure of empire and 
compose the basic contradiction in the films: military conquest and moral justification. 
To resolve the contradiction is to eliminate the middle realm within the three-level 
hierarchy: individual-state-empire, to transform individuals into qualified subjects of 
the empire, to persuade them to accept the present killing for the sake of future non-
killing, to convey the Grand Unification (Da yi tong) message of “Tianxia” which 
could transcend the boundaries of states.  
For instance, in Shadow, Ying Zheng constantly emphasizes the comparable 
importance of conquering other states with military force and conquering human 
minds with music: “The mission of conquering ‘Tianxia’ will end with the fall of Qi, 
the mission of conquering human minds will start with Gao Jianli [the musician].” 
“Music can make me sing and cry. It accordingly can make the people of ‘Tianxia’ 
sing and cry along with my will. We should not only inscribe the character qiu 
(prisoner) onto their foreheads, but also inscribe it onto their minds.” Regardless of the 
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condescendingly confident tone, these statements nonetheless express the urgent need 
to transform the loser state’s subjects into the empire’s subjects, to fuse the two layers 
of “Tianxia” into one unity. 
Similarly, in Assassin, Ying Zheng says to the crying Han cartographers: “You 
are crying for your own state. You are good subjects of Han….Han will cease to exist, 
but a great empire (Chinese ‘Guojia’) will emerge. Qin and the other six states, as far 
as eyes can see, will be unified. All the people of ‘Tianxia’ will be the subjects of this 
empire.273 There will be only one ruler, a good Emperor, who will rescue all the 
people under Heaven when the six states disappear…” This statement, again uttered 
by Ying Zheng himself, explicitly suggests the moral justification of the future 
emperor.  
In Hero, however, unlike the other films, the justification is nonetheless 
articulated by the sword master Broken Sword from Nameless’s narrative: “An 
individual’s suffering, when compared to ‘Tianxia’ people’s suffering, is not suffering 
anymore. The hatred between the states of Zhao and Qin, when placed into ‘Tianxia,’ 
is not hatred anymore.”  
“Tianxia,” as an all-encompassing symbolic figure, transcends time and space, 
and signifies an overpowering morality to legitimize violence. To articulate this 
ultimate moral order associated with “Tianxia,” the three films each surprisingly 
employ a similar narrative strategy. They all invent fictive figures involving romantic 
relationships to intensify, and meanwhile compromise, the confrontations within 
“Tianxia.” 
 
                                                             
273 It is worth noting that in this scene the Chinese word translated as “empire” in the English subtitles 
is “guojia,” used for “nation” or “state” in modern usage. Perhaps, in Chinese understanding, “Empire,” 
as a loan word from the West, is connected to imperialism, which is different from the way they think 
about the traditional Chinese empire. 
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Romance sublimated —love or hate 
Inasmuch as romance dramatically intensifies love-hate relationships, pushing 
the contradictions into climax, it plays a significant role in all three films. Being 
involved in the inter-personal, inter-state struggles, and finally being sublimated in 
such a way that sacrifice is necessary in one way or another, romance sensationalizes, 
or controversially, mythologizes the bloody political event and helps to articulate the 
rhetoric of “Tianxia.”  
 
1. The Shadow of the Emperor: winner’s tears 
In order to bring to the surface the tension between the double conquests of 
states and human minds, Shadow presents a triangular relationship complicating the 
dynamics between conquering and being conquered. However, this triangular 
relationship is not in the usual romantic sense per se, but registered in a more 
metaphorical, symbolic realm. In the end, as will be demonstrated, the triangular 
relationship turns out to dramatize Ying Zheng himself. 
To carry out his plan of conquering people’s minds after unification, the King 
of Qin Ying Zheng has first to conquer his childhood friend, the famous musician Gao 
Jianli. He tries to persuade Gao to compose the anthem for the empire, which he 
believes will erase the traces of killing, eradicate hatred, and bring peace into people’s 
minds. After his effort fails, the beautiful but crippled Princess Yueyang fulfills this 
mission by nurturing Gao back from a suicidal fasting attempt. “You go to conquer 
‘Tianxia,’ I am going to conquer this madman,” says Yueyang to her father. Once 
Yueyang has made love with Gao she is cured of her disability, which also partly 
originated from Gao’s suicidal attempt. Yueyang falls in love with Gao, implying that 
they are both conquering and being conquered simultaneously.  
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The twist involved in the romance, in a sense, manifests the ambivalent yet 
interdependent relationship between the conquest of states and the conquest of human 
minds. Indeed, as a physically weak, mentally pedantic, and virtually symbolic 
assassin, Gao represents non-killing, benevolence, and love. His conquest of Yueyang, 
or more precisely, rehabilitation of Yueyang, is a metaphor for the power of 
benevolence, of love. Even his powerful counterpart, Ying Zheng, has to admit: “if 
you can make Yueyang cry, then you can make me cry, then you can make all the 
‘Tianxia’ people cry.” To this end, to keep Gao alive is to keep the power of moral 
justification, is to keep the potential of conquering people’s minds. Therefore, the 
romance not only involves Gao Jianli and Yueyang, but also involves Ying Zheng, 
who in effect plays a devastatingly crucial role in this relationship. 
In fact, everybody in the balanced triangle has double identities, implying the 
intersubjective relationship among them. Yueyang nurtures Gao back to life, serving 
the role of mother; on the other hand, Gao gives her a second life by curing her 
disabled legs, symbolically serving the role of father. Similarly, as the father of 
Yueyang, Ying Zheng in childhood shares the same mother with Gao, and the image 
of this mother in turn prompts Gao to molest Yueyang. In this regard, both men have a 
mutually reversible relationship—father/daughter and mother/son relations—with 
Yueyang. This seemingly entangled and preposterous relationship, contradictory as it 
were, nonetheless brings to the fore the internal split/contradiction of Ying Zheng 
himself. 
To push it further, it is rather safe to state that Yueyang actually embodies the 
Empire itself. As the product of the future emperor, powerful and beautiful as such, 
she is nevertheless disabled. Only with Gao’s love can she recover as a more complete 
figure. Without love, she would either remain incomplete, as suggested at the 
beginning of the film, or die away and remain fragmentary, as implied in the end when 
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Li Si reports to the new emperor that Wang Ben has dismembered her body in their 
wedding room. Such is the metaphor of the newly founded empire that falls apart 
without benevolence and love. 
The metaphor that Yueyang embodies the vulnerable empire is best portrayed 
in the scenes of parallel action when Gao and Yueyang first make love. With a joyful 
scream, the Qin army breaks the gate of Chu with a log —a phallic symbol—while at 
the same time Yueyang’s body melts in Gao’s arms. The alternate and overlapping 
images of the victory banners and Yueyang’s body manifest the parallel processes of 
two conquests: conquest with military aggression and conquest with love (Figures 4-1 
and 4-2). Unlike the commonly used parallel action in cinematic practice that stresses 
condensation of time and continuum of consecutive film segments,274 this parallel 
action is purely metaphorical. Yueyang’s female body, insofar as it nurtures as well as 
suffers, signifies the empire awaiting rescue. Meanwhile, insofar as Gao heals 
Yueyang’s enduring physical drawback, the obtainment of Yueyang’s love in effect 
metaphorically parallels the conquest of the empire, not by military invasion, but by 
love. In the succeeding shot Gao waves in front of people the silk stained with 
Yueyang’s virgin blood, a gesture deliberately juxtaposed with a shot of the Qin army 
banners, suggesting the triumphant occupation of both territories.  
 
                                                             
274 Stefan Sharff. The Elements of Cinema: Toward a Theory of Cinesthetic Impact (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1982), 87. 
171 
 
 
Figure 4-1: Yueyang and Gao Jianli make love for the first time  
 
Figure 4-2: the Qin Army conquers Chu 
In another situation this metaphor resides in Ying Zheng’s comment on Gao’s 
song, which articulates the defect of the empire: “How fascinating! ... This interprets 
the importance of the human mind and the importance of musicians. Wherever there is 
a mountain, there is a notch. There is no reason to deny it.” This comment, brought up 
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to oppose Li Si’s legalist view and his smear of Gao Jianli, follows the scene in which 
the newly recovered Yueyang is walking falteringly along the bank and stumbling in 
both Ying Zheng and Gao’s sight. Against the imposing music, the awe-inspiring 
current of the river separates the emperor and the singing prisoners led by Gao. The 
music mixed with the sound of the river, and the fusion of water mist with the image 
of prisoners, together imply the power of the people. The scene echoes the Tang 
Emperor Taizong’s famous motto: “water can float the ship, yet it can also capsize the 
ship.” Indeed, in the prior long shot, the small, isolated figure of the emperor facing 
the magnificent river exposes this worrying concern (Figure 4-3). Only with the 
appearance of the staggering Yueyang, the symbol of the vulnerable Empire, is the 
tension between the two contrasting parties softened. The caring eyes of Gao looking 
toward Yueyang suggest that only Gao and the benevolence he embodies can make up 
the defect of the Empire, and stabilize the emperor’s rule. 
 
 
        Figure 4-3: Ying Zheng faces the river and the singing prisoners 
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It is noteworthy that in this sequence, the camera adopts an omniscient view, 
belittling both Ying Zheng and Gao Jianli. The shot is framed over Ying Zheng’s 
shoulder towards the splendid river from a high angle, contrasting his small image 
with the breathtaking current of the river. Yet Ying Zheng always occupies a more 
privileged subjective position than Gao Jianli. It is first from his gaze, followed by 
Gao’s, that Yueyang’s vulnerability is exposed. The multi-angularity of the camera, 
the visual manipulation—modulating emphasis and emotional tone through variations 
in camera positioning vis-à-vis the scene’s action—ambivalently leads to the intended 
identification with the emperor yet meanwhile undermines this identification.   
Moreover, if we leave aside the romance for a moment and pick Yueyang out 
of the triangle, the relationship between Ying Zheng and Gao Jianli turns out to be 
unbalanced. The encounter between the strong and the weak, between military power 
and humanistic sentiment, between conquering states by force and conquering 
people’s hearts by love, more explicitly manifests its over-determined favor toward 
the former. In response to Gao’s criticism, contrasting Ying Zheng’s cruel slaughter 
with the Way of Heaven (“Tiandao”) which is non-killing, Ying Zheng finally replies 
to him before the ritual to Heaven: the Way of Heaven is nothing but the face of the 
winner. To be sure, given the cinematic portrayal of Ying Zheng, as powerful, 
intelligent, and omniscient, he is the pre-determined winner from the very beginning; 
Gao Jianli is just a foil, a shadow, another part of Ying Zheng himself.  
Indeed, Gao, as the complementary figure, nothing more than a tool, is 
intended to be employed to help carry out Ying Zheng’s ideal cause of unification, to 
make up the defect of the empire accomplished by military unification. In this sense, 
the twist of the double conquests revealed in the Gao-Yueyang romance is nothing but 
the disclosure of Ying Zheng’s internal contradiction, his dynamic perception of the 
unified empire. In other words, even though the ultimate winner is registered with 
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power in his mind, he sometimes is dominated by the counter force of love. As Ying 
Zheng utters to Gao Jianli explicitly: “…for how many times I was trying to conquer 
death, yet I was always blocked by a shadow. It is the Way of Heaven that brings you 
to me. You have become part of me. You must endure all of this and prepare for the 
severe punishment with me.” In this light, the contradiction between Ying Zheng and 
Gao Jianli gives way to the internal split of Ying Zheng himself. Along the same logic 
is the children’s song presenting two dogs fighting. The song is later used to compose 
the melody for the Anthem of the Empire, but also resonates with Ying Zheng’s 
enduring psychological split, his attempt of self-othering, self-mirroring, and self-
correcting. Indeed, this fighting against oneself, insofar as it is lasting and continuous, 
more often than not manifests its power violently. In the sequence depicting Jing Ke’s 
assassination attempt, after all the attempts fail, Jing Ke lies to Ying Zheng that Gao 
Jianli, in order to remonstrate with the king, has put his severed finger into the map. 
However, this finger later proves actually to be a knife to be used to kill Ying Zheng. 
This easily overlooked detail reveals such a message: the contradictory part of oneself 
may sometimes become the sharp weapon against oneself. Ying Zheng is certainly the 
bearer of this contradiction.  
This continuous internal contradiction finally reaches a resolution when both 
Yueyang and Gao Jianli die before the emperor performs the ritual to the Heaven. 
Love is suppressed, and military victory displays its power to all under Heaven. As 
suggested above, the dismembered body of Yueyang foretells the fragmenting of 
empire due to the failure of love. In this respect, does introducing the image of Huhai, 
the even crueler future Emperor in the short-lived Qin Dynasty, herald the fall of the 
empire owing to its greater failure of benevolence?  
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The imbalanced power encounter between military victory and moral 
justification is dramatically performed in the final sequence. 275  Against the 
background of strong music that sets the tone, Ying Zheng is delivering his victor’s 
speech; the poisoned, blind Gao Jianli suddenly throws his musical instrument, the zhu, 
at Ying Zheng. Unfortunately, unlike the historical record of Gao’s assassination 
attempt, the attack is too weak to engender any real effect. It is at most a symbolic 
assassination, a warning gesture. After Gao dies, he is taken away downward from the 
steps while Ying Zheng is walking upward to the huge cauldron to light the fire. The 
sharp contrast between the upward and downward directions, between the upright, 
strong figure and the prone, frail body, between the confident, lonely emperor and the 
dead, weak shadow, intensifies the victory of the military unification visually. This 
sequence, with the rhetorical juxtaposition of camera angles, with the imposing music 
the Anthem of Qin, and finally with the panning camera following Ying Zheng’s steps, 
worshiped by the Terra-Cotta army-like troops, is maintained for almost two minutes. 
In all respects, this scene celebrates unification and power, whereas the voice of love 
remains weak. As Ying Zheng says to the dying Gao: “You are wrong. History is 
going to be written by me [the victor],” implying the assassination attempt would not 
exist in history, so that even the shadow himself may be erased forever.  
However, despite the overpowering statement, the identification process 
remains ambiguous. Insofar as the Anthem was composed by Gao and sung by the 
prisoners, this scene also suggests the undying legacy Gao left behind and its 
subversive force to the empire. In the end, after lighting the fire in the huge cauldron, 
facing Heaven alone when he kneels down, the emperor uncontrollably weeps (Figure 
4-4). This scene echoes yet contradicts Yueyang’s statement that her father is unable 
to cry in any circumstance, suggesting the virtual force of love that is still working and 
                                                             
275 This reading is also in agreement with that in Dai Jinhua, “Ci Qin xingdong.” 
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fighting inside him. Isn’t benevolence the eternal task to accomplish? The huge 
cauldron, the symbol of unified empire from the ancient myth,276 calmly witnesses his 
tears, rendering the problem unresolved till the end of the film. 
 
 
Figure4-4: the new emperor weeps in front of the cauldron. 
2. The Emperor and the Assassin: loss of love 
It is notable that the film Assassin also presents a triangle relationship, and the 
only difference is that it is a genuinely triangular romance.  Moreover, this triangular 
relationship also presents the theme of the woman being transformed from the 
emperor’s collaborator to his enemy, even though at a different level. While Princess 
Yueyang in Shadow is more of a rebellious victim without any choice, Lady Zhao in 
Assassin is very much a strong-willed, free woman. While Yueyang’s love is devoted 
only to one man, Lady Zhao’s love is extended to all the “Tianxia” people. In a sense, 
                                                             
276 In Chinese myth, Yu the Great divided a unified empire with nine caldrons. 
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Lady Zhao embodies the idea of unification with love, and she is consistent in this 
throughout the film.277  
At the beginning, Lady Zhao is convinced that Ying Zheng’s project to unify 
the warring states will stop killing and rescue all the people under Heaven. Deeply 
moved, she is determined to help him out. Holding the dagger Ying Zheng gives her, 
initially a symbol of love which later turns out to be the weapon to attack him, she 
goes off with Prince Dan of Yan like an agent with a secret mission. At this point, 
Lady Zhao is promoted as a godlike figure, transcending both the narrowly defined 
human love and the boundary of individual states. She embodies the ideal fusion of 
unification with power and with love. “You are different from them (other kings), you 
said you will rescue all the people of ‘Tianxia.’ … Finally, I have found things to do 
for you,” says she to Ying Zheng before setting out. 
In opposition to Lady Zhao’s calmness, confidence, and self-determination, 
Ying Zheng’s mental state appears to be unstable, displayed through his gestures, his 
speech, his facial expressions, and his exaggerated, paranoiac performance. The 
repeated reminder from a courtier—“King of Qin, have you forgotten the great 
mission of unifying ‘Tianxia?’”—uttered in an off-pitched voice, signifies the 
vulnerability of his psyche. He is constantly torn apart by internal weakness and an 
externally imposed mission. The internalization of the exteriority contradicts his initial 
human nature, which continually tortures him and finally leads to his alienation. It is 
as if the idea of unification is not from his own ambition, but from his ancestors, 
including his newly-discovered real father, Lü Buwei. As he says to Prince Dan, “even 
if you kill me, this cause [unification] will still be carried out by somebody else; if not 
me, maybe you.” This articulation of both discursive turn and predetermined teleology 
of history distances him from a superior hero. It reduces him to an ordinary person 
                                                             
277 A feminist reading of this film may assert that the treatment manifests gender consciousness.  
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who is lucky enough to be placed onto the throne. The tremendous pressure imposed 
upon him from both inside and outside the court has gradually alienated him from his 
good nature. The most telling examples are his cold-blooded executions of his real 
father Lü Buwei and the illicit children that his mother has had with Lao Ai. With 
these inhumane killings within the court, he is shown gradually transformed into a 
cruel, lonely tyrant. The will of benevolent rule, the love for the people of “Tianxia,” 
in the end gives way to the desire for power and self-protection.  
In this sense, the initially heroic figure in Lady Zhao’s eyes, Ying Zheng, is not 
much different from other narrow-minded kings. The chauvinistic King of Zhao, at the 
moment he loses his kingdom to Ying Zheng’s army, calls on innocent children to 
sacrifice their lives rather than survive the fall of Zhao. No better than he, Ying Zheng, 
the incoming conqueror, out of fear of revenge, commands his soldiers to bury the 
children alive. These two painfully violent actions, though carried out for different 
reasons, converge in the same result—killing, which finally destroys Lady Zhao’s love 
and faith toward Ying Zheng.  
Along with the deepening discovery of a dynamic psyche, the gradual 
transformation of Ying Zheng engenders a transferring, intersubjective effect among 
the characters. In fact, Jing Ke’s transformation proves to be Ying Zheng’s reversal. 
Jing Ke, initially a reclusive swordsman who regrets his previous misdeeds and 
refuses to kill any more, later becomes a chess piece controlled by both Prince Dan 
and Lady Zhao for their plan to assassinate Ying Zheng. From a tool in a secret plot by 
Ying Zheng and Lady Zhao to create an excuse to invade the State of Yan, Jing Ke 
finally turns out to be a real dagger pointing at Ying Zheng.278 Jing Ke’s change of 
                                                             
278 There are two versions of this film, in which Jing Ke is presented differently. In the longer version, 
presumably popular in the West, Jing Ke is portrayed as more of a strong-willed hero, and Lady Zhao’s 
love for him is a just and natural response to his charming character and humanistic concern. Yet in the 
shorter version, presumably popular within China, Jing Ke’s image turns out to be a flatterer, seemingly 
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attitude, from empathetic to cooperative with Lady Zhao to repay her rescue, and 
ultimately to being willing to kill Ying Zheng for the sake of all the children under 
Heaven, in effect parallels Lady Zhao’s change of attitude toward Ying Zheng. The 
relations could be described like this:  
• Lady Zhao, empathetic toward Ying Zheng, leaves Ying Zheng alone, 
cooperates with him on behalf of his benevolent, ideal unification, then desires 
to kill him for the sake of saving all children under Heaven. 
• Jing Ke, empathetic toward Prince Dan and Lady Zhao, cooperates with them 
out of  gratitude to Lady Zhao, then desires to kill Ying Zheng for the sake of 
saving all children under Heaven. 
In this light, Lady Zhao’s turning to Jing Ke manifests her punishment of Ying Zheng 
for his betrayal of benevolence. The dagger hidden in the map, originally a gift to 
Lady Zhao from Ying Zheng, now becomes the weapon held by Jing Ke to attack him. 
From this perspective, the appearance of Jing Ke is no more than a shadow of Lady 
Zhao to reveal her hatred toward Ying Zheng, articulating her broadest love for the 
people of “Tianxia.” 
In this regard, a similar structure can be perceived in both Shadow and 
Assassin. The triangular relationship in both films functions to play out the tension 
between rule by power and rule by benevolence. The woman figure, Princess Yueyang 
in Shadow and Lady Zhao in Assassin, embodying the ideal empire fused power with 
love, dramatizes the original contrasting relationship between the emperor and the 
assassin:                    
                
               
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                               
being controlled by Lady Zhao. This analysis is mainly based on the shorter version in which Lady 
Zhao occupies a more important position than Jing Ke. 
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            (rule by power)      (rule by benevolence)                 (rule by power)       (rule by benevolence) 
                       Ying Zheng                 Gao Jianli                             Ying Zheng                  Jing Ke 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
                                                                                                                                        
                                              Yueyang                                                                   Lady Zhao 
                           (Empire as object)                                                (Empire as subject) 
 
         conquering by force                                                conquering by the ideal of benevolence 
          conquering by love                                                    conquering by love 
 
          love-hate                                                                    killing 
 
 
It deserves attention that Lady Zhao plays a more active and loftier role than 
Yueyang. While Yueyang functions to manifest the internal split within Ying Zheng 
himself, Lady Zhao’s existence uncovers the gradual alienation of Ying Zheng. The 
two assassins, Gao Jianli in Shadow and Jing Ke in Assassin, intended by Ying Zheng 
to conquer human minds in the former, and to justify military invasion in the latter, 
display the different emphases of the two films. While in Shadow, Ying Zheng is 
partially aware of the importance of benevolence from beginning to end, in Assassin, 
he betrays this ideal further and further, which results in his loss of love from his 
acquaintance and Lady Zhao. 
The loss of love finds its visual evidence in the ending sequence. After Jing 
Ke’s assassination attempt has failed, driving away all his subordinates due to their 
helplessness, the desperate Ying Zheng meets Lady Zhao again in the empty 
Unification Hall. This is the visual repetition of a prior scene in which Ying Zheng 
sends Lady Zhao off to carry out her secret mission. However, it is a repetition with 
significant difference. Rather than coming back to celebrate her fulfilled mission and 
prove her love toward him, she comes back to take Jing Ke’s body with her. Separated 
by the water of a pool, Ying Zheng and Lady Zhao are presented in a series of shot-
reverse shots moving progressively closer, from extreme long shots, to medium shots, 
and finally facial close-ups of them (Figures 4-5—4-8). These shots manifest the 
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physical as well as emotional distance, rather than intimacy, of these two former 
lovers. Moreover, in this sequence of separation, Lady Zhao’s image carries a longer 
“apparent time” than Ying Zheng’s image. “Apparent time,”  a cinematic term related 
to the lingering “after image” which holds over from one image to the next in 
separation, is defined as the time created by the “aura” of the extra “after image” of 
each picture in separation. It refers to the strength and intensity of an image. “The 
more significant an image is (in form), the stronger the apparent time.”279  Insofar as 
Lady Zhao’s calmness belittles Ying Zheng’s fluster, her image generates a stronger 
impact on Ying Zheng, thus a longer “apparent time.” It visually demonstrates Ying 
Zheng’s diminished stature as a character. After seeing Lady Zhao off, standing alone 
on the bridge in the Hall, Ying Zheng hollowly whispers to himself: Ying Zheng, King 
of Qin, have you forgotten the commandment of unifying “Tianxia”? (Figures 4-9 and 
4-10) With an ambiguously bitter smile on his face shown in the close-up, this murmur 
suggests his unchangeable dominant goal of unification without mercy. This 
psychological pain, caused by the loss of love from his mother, father, siblings, and 
lover, complicates and dramatizes the issues of power struggle within the court and the 
greater mission of unifying “Tianxia.”  
It is ironic that in this scene, the celebration of power and the manifestation of 
alienation contradict each other, yet reinforce each other. The squared artificial pool, 
symbolically the “four seas” (si hai) of the world, together with the grand hall, implies 
the power of unification. On the other hand, the vacant, lonely figure standing on the 
                                                             
279 “Apparent time” is a term drawn from the nautical vocabulary. In nautical terminology, “apparent 
wind” refers to the wind created by forward movement of a boat. Through proper sail arrangement, this 
“extra” wind is used, in addition to the “real” wind from the atmosphere, to propel the craft forward. In 
separation, time is compounded in the sequence of images by the aura of that extra after-image. While 
watching image A, the viewer is strongly and predictably aware of the presence of image B in recurrent 
cycles. In short, image A receives a “shadow” of apparent time from the previous shot and, in turn, 
projects an apparent time on the next image B, and so on. See Stefan Sharff, The Elements of Cinema: 
Toward a Theory of Cinesthetic Impact, 63.  
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bridge in the emptiness of the huge hall suggests the internal emptiness. This sequence 
is composed of virtually still images. It visualizes the stratification of different 
discourses, intensifying the dramatic contradictions in layers from outside to inside. 
Resonating with both the lovely memory in his childhood when Lady Zhao held his 
hand crossing the bridge, and with the episode in which he forced Lao Ai to walk on a 
high single-log bridge, this scene reveals the double-edged nature of power. In other 
words, acquiring power needs legitimation, and abusing power loses that legitimation. 
Without a legitimate bloodline, Ying Zheng now resembles Lao Ai walking across a 
risky bridge;280 without love from Lady Zhao, Ying Zheng now loses the support from 
the people of “Tianxia,” which will prove the vulnerability of his rule. This symbolic 
image of a bridge, comparable to the image of the water current in Shadow, echoes the 
Chinese proverb “the higher the climb, the heavier the fall” (pa de yue gao, die de yue 
zhong) and “having more help once you have the Way, having little help once you 
don’t have the Way” (de dao duo zhu, shi dao gua zhu). It foreshadows the pre-
destined failure of Qin rule. 
 
 
                                                             
280 This scene only exists in the longer version of the film. 
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Figure 4-5: Ying Zheng meets Lady Zhao 
 
Figure 4-6: Lady Zhao comes back to see Ying Zheng 
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Figure 4-7: Ying Zheng talks to Lady Zhao 
 
Figure 4-8: Lady Zhao: “I’ve come back to take Jing Ke’s body back to Yan.”  
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Figure 4-9: Lady Zhao is leaving 
 
Figure 4-10: The lonely (future) emperor murmurs to himself 
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It is noteworthy that in both Shadow and Assassin, the female characters both 
willingly have themselves branded with a Chinese character qiu (prisoner) on their 
faces. A symbol of military triumph of the Qin state, this character initially signifies 
eternal inferiority and humiliation for people who have it. However, in the films, the 
character bears double implications for Yueyang and Lady Zhao. On the one hand, it 
symbolizes the prisoner of love. For Yueyang, the consistent love for Gao Jianli; for 
Lady Zhao, the love for Ying Zheng and the people of “Tianxia.” On the other hand, it 
manifests the rebellious potential for betrayal. For Yueyang, it gestures toward the 
rebellious attempt against the oppressive father who betrays his own and her will; for 
Lady Zhao, it finally turns out to be the evidence of disillusionment and hatred.  
Nevertheless, these irreconcilable double meanings still imply the imbalanced 
encounter: after all, they are “prisoners.” 
Indeed, the disproportionate confrontation between emperor and assassin in 
Assassin, similar to Shadow, still conveys the absolute advantage of power. Shadow 
reveals a built-in split within the self, justifying unification as a pre-determined 
historical trend which requires necessary sacrifice. Assassin puts more emphasis on 
the discursive aspect of history, conveying both the power of unification by force and 
its vulnerability. Put another way, although both films celebrate unification, and 
meanwhile manifest the transcendent message of “Tianxia,” Assassin is more 
humanistic in the sense that it explores the complexity of Ying Zheng’s psyche and 
reduces him to an ordinary man being placed into a significant position, rather than 
making him a sage-like hero. Director Chen Kaige once said that he intended to 
portray Ying Zheng as an ordinary person with a complicated personality. He wanted 
to show how an individual’s fate is determined by uncontrollable historical situations 
which result in dramatic change in one’s life.281 Against the backdrop of the Empire, 
                                                             
281 An interview with Chen Kaige by Li Erwei. See Beijing qingnianbao (Beijing youth), Oct 23, 1998. 
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he put more emphasis on an individual’s, rather than an emperor’s, story, which 
significantly differentiates his film from other portrayals of Ying Zheng as a born hero.    
 
3. Hero: an abstract concept of “Tianxia” dancing with romance and tradition 
If we assert that Shadow and Assassin both devote great effort to digging out 
the psychological complexity of the emperor Ying Zheng as a human being to 
articulate the discourse of “Tianxia,” in one way or another, Zhang Yimou’s Hero 
rather depicts Ying Zheng as a depthless figure dressed in stylized armor, placed in a 
huge palace and animated through illustrative dialogues. Moreover, the assassin he 
encounters is named Nameless, symbolically non-existent, which more explicitly 
manifests the fictiveness of the whole confrontation. Therefore, the question for 
Nameless whether or not to assassinate Ying Zheng, and the question for Ying Zheng 
whether or not to kill Nameless are non-existent questions. Their presence is just    to 
articulate the even more abstract concept “Tianxia.” For “Tianxia,” Nameless finally 
gives up assassination; for “Tianxia,” Ying Zheng has to kill Nameless to maintain the 
efficacy of law.  
Toward the end of the film when Ying Zheng finally reluctantly orders the 
killing of Nameless, thousands of arrows fly at Nameless, suggesting he is killed by 
the arrow storm. However, the supposed dead body exhibits itself as an empty space 
surrounded by a mass of arrows sticking on the gate. From the following birds-eye 
view, the machine-like Qin army is shown performing a funeral parade, implying 
Nameless’s body is on the board. Yet, still, the red cover renders the body invisible. 
(Figures 4-11 and 4-12)282 Against the army’s shout “Hail! Hail!” and the melancholy 
thematic music, the camera cuts to the image of the dead Broken Sword and Flying 
Snow in the desert, followed by the shot of the empty space on the gate again, finally 
                                                             
282 This observation is also emphasized by Dai Jinhua. 
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back to Ying Zheng standing alone in the Hall. (Figures 4-13 and 4-14) These 
juxtaposed images, ambiguous and lyrical, reassure the virtual existence of Nameless. 
Meanwhile, it is indicated that the actual encounter and final reconciliation is between 
the two lovers and Ying Zheng. Like the vaguely depicted, homogeneously clothed 
statesmen in court who push Ying Zheng to kill Nameless, Nameless, rather than a 
flesh-and-blood human being, merely functions to bring together two contrasting 
groups of people, assassin and emperor, living in disorder and order, to play out the 
tensions between individual and state, between state and the unified empire. 
 
 
Figure 4-11: The arrow storm that shoots Nameless [The empty position of Nameless 
in the storm of arrows] 
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Figure 4-12: The funeral parade for Nameless 
 
Figure 4-13: Flying Snow and Broken Sword die together 
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Figure 4-14: The lonely emperor stands in the court  
These tensions, uttered in the conversation between the emperor and the 
assassin, also manifest themselves through the relationship of two lovers in different 
scenarios. Thus, the romance between Broken Sword and Flying Snow revealed in 
different narratives conveys different phases of love, parallels the inquiry into the 
value of life, and ultimately articulates the necessary sacrifice for the sake of 
“Tianxia.”  
Indeed, the articulation of “Tianxia” in Hero, unlike those in the other two 
films, bypasses the tension between rule by power and rule by benevolence. It 
supports more explicitly unification as the dominant goal with ultimate moral 
justification, which is gradually developed through three romantic scenarios.  
In the first scenario narrated by Nameless, Broken Sword and Flying Snow are 
depicted as two ordinary, jealous lovers. Out of jealousy for each other, they fight, 
seek revenge, and hurt each other, which later results in the easy defeat by Nameless. 
Their lives, due to their superior swordsmanship, are measured as no more than the 
reward offered by the King of Qin, Ying Zheng. According to this narrative, the two 
191 
 
lovers both place their individual emotion ahead of the mission of assassination, or the 
mission of their state, which leads to their worthless deaths only to benefit Nameless’s 
material pursuit of reward. Displaying its disorder by disarrayed passion, beautiful 
swordplay, and soaring cinmatic choreography in the tone of red color, this narrative 
divorces the two lovers from their state identity and their initial mission. It is seen 
through by Ying Zheng for its cheapness, as he refuses to believe that the heroic 
assassins would be so ignoble. 
The second scenario, narrated by Ying Zheng, however, glosses the two lovers 
with their consistent belief in their assassination mission. They love each other so 
much as to sacrifice one to protect the other; they love their state so much as to 
sacrifice themselves in exchange for Ying Zheng’s life to save their state. In this light, 
the value of one life, Flying Snow in this case, plus Sky’s life, is worth the value of 
Ying Zheng, of other individual states. Framed in the tone of blue color, 
conventionally signifying the rational, the idealistic, and the lofty, this narrative 
suggests the phase of love which is to endure the life-and-death parting for the higher 
mission of assassination.  
In the third scenario, a correction by Nameless, both the phase of love and the 
value of life witness a dramatic turn. While Flying Snow sticks to her identity as a 
subject of Zhao and insists on carrying out the assassination mission, Broken Sword 
identifies himself with the people of “Tianxia” through a farsighted vision. Therefore, 
the contradiction between two lovers parallels the contradiction between individual 
states and the unified empire. According to Broken Sword, to achieve ultimate peace, 
one has to transcend his/her own state identity to become a subject of the unified 
empire, and to some extent, to sacrifice one’s life is necessary. “One individual’s 
suffering, compared to the sufferings of the people of “Tianxia,” is no longer suffering; 
the hatred between states of Zhao and Qin, placed under “Tianxia,” is no longer 
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hatred,” says Broken Sword to Nameless. Moved by this statement, Nameless finally 
gives up the assassination attempt, bringing about the deaths of the three would-be 
assassins in the end. These lives, sacrificed for the foreseeable peace of “Tianxia,” 
gain their highest value as history. On the other hand, in terms of love, Broken Sword 
offers his life to Flying Snow, in this way compromises his love for her and for 
“Tianxia,” and equates his romantic love with the concern for the future empire. 
Similarly, Flying Snow kills herself to be together with Broken Sword, which echoes 
Moon’s words: “Broken Sword and Flying Snow, their lives never part, their swords 
never part either.”  This tragic climax manifests the highest realm of love in traditional 
Chinese romance—loyalty to each other forever, be it in life or death. Displayed in the 
tone of white color, which conventionally signifies purity and death, the violent 
sacrifice of the two lovers most powerfully justifies unification and the discourse of 
“Tianxia,” yet in a superimposed, intangible manner.  
In fact, the statement about three realms (“jingjie”) of swordsmanship, 
regardless of its providing an unrealistically fetishizing showcase of Chinese martial 
arts, nonetheless frames the three romance scenarios. In the first realm body and sword 
are fused into one so that sword is body and body is sword, and even grass held in 
one’s hand can become a sharp weapon. This realm corresponds to the first scenario in 
which jealousy (body is sword) plus sword leads to worthless conflict and easy defeat. 
The second realm celebrates the vital energy (“qi”) described as sword in one’s mind. 
One can make the enemy withdraw one hundred steps with the sword in mind instead 
of the sword in hand. This realm corresponds to the second scenario in which steadfast 
belief in revenge (sword in mind), manifested in violent sacrifice of lives, makes it 
possible for Nameless to draw closer to Ying Zheng in order to carry out the 
assassination. The third realm is without sword in either hand or mind. It embraces the 
Whole with the most open mind, to achieve the realm of non-killing, of peace. By the 
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same token, it is associated with the third scenario in which all people willingly give 
up assassination and justify the sacrifice. This seemingly mystical depiction of 
swordsmanship most effectively justifies violent unification, with the embellished 
hope for the ultimate realm, the non-killing, the peace.  
To be sure, the film makes every effort to celebrate the power and order of the 
Qin state. The geometric-shaped, machine-like military force, the highly exaggerated 
arrow hail, and the awe-inspiring imperial court, by all means signify the might of the 
winner and the violence it generates. However, unlike the exaggerated and compelling 
violent portrayals in Shadow and Assassin, the unavoidable violence in Hero, 
beautifully exhibited as it were, is nevertheless always softened by the tone of color, 
by the settings of natural splendor, by the lyrical and agonistic music, and by the 
highly stylized performance. Setting aside the commercial appeal of the performance, 
the visual decoration of violence erases all historical verisimilitude, whereas it 
facilitates conveying the abstract discourse of “Tianxia.” 
 
Fictive figures: imagined history 
It merits attention that in all three films, fictive figures play a crucial role in 
constructing the whole narrative. Needless to say, all the characters appearing in the 
films are to some extent reconstructed, fabricated, and imagined. For the purpose of 
separating historicity from fictionality, it is necessary to distinguish two categories of 
the characters: the imagined and the fictive. In the category of the imagined are the 
characters who historically existed, yet are reinvented in the films. For instance, Ying 
Zheng, Gao Jianli, and Jing Ke, all can be found in Shiji and other historical records, 
which essentially form the basis for all kinds of narratives and representations in later 
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periods.283 They are basically the bearers of the double temporality consisting of past 
and present. The category of fictive characters means the invented figures who have 
no trace in history yet are created for the sake of cinematic narrative. For example, 
Yueyang, Lady Zhao, and all the assassins in Hero, are by any measure fictive 
characters invented to convey the ideas of the filmmakers. They bear the double 
temporality of present and future. 
If the imagined assassins Jing Ke and Gao Jianli are representatives of the 
revolutionary force within the multitude, as Hardt and Negri would put it, the fictive 
characters are a rhetorical device to mediate the antagonism and to deliver the 
discourse of “Tianxia.” If the imagined characters bring to the present what has 
happened in the past, the fictive figures nonetheless suggest what would be the 
potential, the virtual, and the subversive problems in the future. In one sense, the 
narratives promote the empire logic for the promise of the future peace and abundance; 
in another sense, however, they at once criticize and justify the violent sacrifice in the 
present.  
Needless to say, the history thus conveyed, diversified as such, has lost its 
historical context and been registered in multiple temporalities, manifesting itself in a 
displaced, compressed, and secondary-revisionary manner. On the one hand, due to 
the fictive figures and imagined portrayal, historical authenticity has ceased to be the 
focus of representation; on the other hand, the fusion of history and cinema gives more 
power to the image to display its historicity. To put it in another way, it is not the 
visualization of history, but rather, the historicization of visuality, to divert from the 
contemporary superficiality, to give the image a vertical structure, to manifest its 
historical depth. In this regard, the multiple representations of historical Empire not 
                                                             
283 The stories about Jing Ke and Gao Jianli can be found in Shiji and Zhanguo ce, which are constantly 
referred to by later writers and biographers.  
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only provide a unified, grandiose past for people to consume, but also constitute the 
reality for people to experience. The audience is not only led to perceive the historical 
Empire, but also experience it on the screen. The textual difference, revealed in these 
contemporaneous artifacts, thus, opens up a performative space, interacts with a much 
more complicated social context, and invites new possibilities to reconfigure 
relationships between past and present, China and the West. 
 
National or global empire: timeless, universal history and nationalism? 
In his book Overcome by Modernity, Harry Harootunian philosophizes on the 
rationality of Japan’s “alternative modernity” during World War II. He argues that the 
Western influence and ever-changing modern life have generated an anxiety toward 
the fragmentation and superficiality of the modern, and brought to the fore the desire 
to create a concrete wholeness, a culture in contrast to commodity, and an aesthetics in 
opposition with politics. As a result, the ambiguous attitude of enjoying the fantasy of 
the modern and the desire to overcome the ephemeral modern leads to the projection 
onto the past, to create a concrete, universal, and timeless history conquering the 
modern. However, he continues, the collaboration of this timeless history with a 
market that ultimately turns history into commodity nevertheless manifests the final 
triumph of modernity. The attempt at overcoming proves to be nothing but being 
overcome in the end.284 
This eye-opening argument, inspiring as it were, at first glance perfectly fits 
with the post/modern representation of history. As discussed above, the re-imagined, 
forged history has lost its historical context and been transformed into a visual 
commodity subject to consumption. The extreme example might be Hero. The highly 
                                                             
284 Harry Haroontunian, Overcome by Modernity (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 
2000). 
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beautified visual appeal, the over-embellished imagination of traditional culture, the 
fictive figures, and the commercial operations from production to circulation, all 
contribute to constructing a timeless history without historical depth, and at the same 
time, satisfy the audience’s exotic imagination of China, in both China and the West. 
Indeed, as a globalized martial arts film, Hero can be compared with Ang Lee’s 
blockbuster Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon in many ways. On the surface, it also 
fits well with Lee’s interpretation of his creation of Crouching Tiger. For Lee, the film 
is his invention of ancient China, a world that does not exist anymore but remains in 
his imagination.  Therefore, “[c]ulture, tradition, ethnicity, and ‘Chineseness’ for that 
matter,” as Sheldon Lu and Emilie Yueh-yu Yeh put it, “are de-historicized, 
decontextualized, and disembedded from deep national roots. Chinese culture, in the 
form of martial arts or ethnic cuisine, becomes a portable package that travels, is 
carried over, and is ultimately consumed effortlessly from region to region across the 
globe—such is the state of cultural consumption and entertainment in the age of 
globalization.”285 Yet, does it fully characterize Hero in the same manner? Or, does it 
mean the final triumph of the market? Can we apply the same commercial model to 
Shadow and Assassin?286 
A close reading of the three films reveals that there is more than one version of 
history in the filmic representations. In fact, the textual difference in the three films, 
far from showing a homogeneous, universal, timeless history, rather manifests a 
complex reality with multiple perspectives. The extreme vision of these films either as 
                                                             
285 Sheldon H. Lu and Emilie Yueh-yu Yeh, “Introduction: Mapping the Field of Chinese-Language 
Cinema,” in Chinese Language Film: Historiography, Poetics, Politics (Honolulu: University of 
Hawai’I Press, 2005), 16. 
286 Dai Jinhua, “Ci Qin xingdong,” observes that even though three films all aim at the global market, 
Shadow and Assassin belong to the art film series, aiming at the European international film festival to 
show their artistic value and critical function; whereas Hero was aimed at the Oscar in Hollywood to 
expand its market channel for global distribution, which means that commercial production and 
circulation become the ultimate goal.  
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a subversive political act or as a constitutive player in the market is far from accurate 
and comprehensive. To overemphasize the power of the market risks undermining the 
trace of history, which articulates its depth disguised in historical symbols in 
contemporary visuality. On the other hand, to overemphasize the nationalistic 
sentiment manifest in historical representations overlooks the deconstructing power of 
the market, which has the potential to dissolve the subversive elements. 
In this regard, the history thus represented, rather than being timeless or 
universal, is time-sensitive and historical-conscious. Instead of portraying a static 
history, the three films offer three different perspectives to look at the same historical 
event. They not only represent diachronic history, but themselves construct the 
synchronicity of history in the contemporary period. Displaying the dynamic 
interaction and reconciliation between the timely representation of history and its 
timelessness, the synchronicity suggests a middle ground bearing the historicity in the 
contemporary moment. 
This middle ground, however, does echo Harootunian’s assertion in the sense 
that it is symptomatic of the present social reality. The origin of the empire 
represented at the turn of the new century, showing the transition from chaos to order, 
from division to unification, from destitution to abundance, appears to mirror the 
contemporary social situation in a metaphorical way. With the intensification of 
market economy, the socialist social order is collapsing, while a fragmentary, 
uncertain social life and an ever-deepening anxiety arise. After the socialist work units 
underwent extensive privatization, the old sense of community has faced a tremendous 
challenge of destruction and reconstruction. Urbanization, migration, and 
commercialization have been breaking the old geopolitical boundaries and 
transforming the Chinese society into an unprecedented biopolitical place. Everyday 
life becomes even more transient and the only graspable reality is the hope for the 
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future. “Stability” and “harmony” have become the new government slogans 
accompanying the primary one, “development.” In this regard, unity and order, 
embodied in the historical Empire, seems to provide a symbolic, rhetorical, and 
optimistic cure in a transcendent way. If the assassination attempt signifies the 
immanent desire from the multitude to find security in the present, then the unification 
depicted at the conclusion offers an optimistic, powerful, and transcendent sovereignty 
promising the ultimate peace and order. If the tension played out in the romantic 
stories displays the anxiety over competition for scarce resources in reality, the 
discourse of “Tianxia” suggests cooperation for the assurance of unity and abundance 
in the future.  
However, the unity desired is not as hierarchical as in the historical Empire, 
but rather leveled, manifesting a more egalitarian, transcendent flavor. The fact that all 
three films pay more attention to the rhetoric of “Tianxia” as moral justification and 
painstakingly dramatize sacrifice for unification exhibits the ambivalent encounter 
between the immanent desire and the transcendent order. This encounter, not only 
reveals itself within China, but projects outwardly and globally. 
The turn of the new century has witnessed China’s rapid economic 
development and the newly emerged desire to recover the long lost national pride and 
past glory.287 On the other hand, the ever-changing global order refreshes people’s 
consciousness and conception of Empire. How to redefine Empire and re-envision its 
function in the world has caught world-wide scholars’ eyes and emerged as a hot topic 
of intellectual scrutiny.288 In this context, the reemergence of the Chinese Empire on 
                                                             
287 Dai Jinhua, “Ci Qin xingdong” (The action of assassinating the Qin emperor). A Talk at China 
Central Television Station (CCTV) on April 5, 2005. See 
http://www.cctv.com/program/bjjt/topic/education/C13808/20050405/101615.shtml. 
288 For instance, Empire by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (Cambridge & London: Harvard 
University Press, 2000); and A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium  by Peter 
J. Katzenstein (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 2005) For a Chinese American scholar’s 
attention to this topic, see Clash of Empires by Lydia H. Liu (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2004). 
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the cinematic screen serves to dramatize the confrontation between China and the 
West, the asymmetrical encounter between the symbolic and the political, economic 
power, and the ambivalent juxtaposition of national morality with global 
superpower.289  
In his recent study on Zhang Yimou’s Hero, Feng Lan situates the film into 
China’s intellectual trend to revive the perspective of “Tianxia.” He argues that the 
concept of “Tianxia” informs the ideological orientation and aesthetic features of 
Zhang Yimou's Hero. Taking “Tianxia” as the alternative to the modern order of 
nation states, and following the trend of asserting the legitimate role of Chinese 
culture in constructing a new global vision on the basis of a Chinese transnationalism, 
Zhang reinvents the martial arts film as a way to invigorate Chinese cinema in the 
international film market.290 
In fact, in terms of commercial success, Hero could not compete with 
Couching Tiger in the international market. It did not capture the Oscar that Zhang 
Yimou originally sought. Nevertheless, it overwhelmingly broke box-office records in 
mainland China. At a time when Hollywood films, instead of Chinese films, 
dominated the attention of Chinese audiences, Hero not only invigorated Chinese 
cinema in the international film market, but revived China’s national cinema vis-à-vis 
the ascending hegemony of Hollywood films in China’s domestic film market.291 
The Chinese audience’s enthusiastic response to Hero was in sharp contrast to 
their initial reaction to Shadow and Assassin. In Spain, Shadow won the San Sebastian 
                                                             
289 Sensitive scholars might go so far as to assert that the benevolence conveyed in Shadow and 
Assassin is the demonstration of Confucian morality, which is the foundation of the stable Chinese 
Empire, and which is the unique cultural capital contrasting China to the West.   
290 Feng Lan, “Zhang Yimou's Hero: Reclaiming the Martial Arts Film for ‘All under Heaven’" in 
Modern Chinese Language and Culture, vol. 20, no. 1 (Spring 2008), 1-43. 
291 Sheldon Lu and Emilie Yueh-yu Yeh, “Introduction: Mapping the Field of Chinese-Language 
Cinema” in Chinese Language Film: Historiography, Poetics, Politics, ed. Sheldon Lu and Emilie 
Yueh-yu Yeh, ( Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2005), 20. 
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Film Festival Jury Prize. Assassin was nominated for the Palme d’Or Award and 
finally did win the Technology Award in the Cannes International Film Festival. 
However, neither film received much attention in the domestic market. Only after the 
success of Hero did the audience start looking for videos of Shadow and Assassin and 
reevaluate the two films.292 It is not news any more that the directors in China 
consciously let their films travel from China to the world and back to China again in 
order to get domestic attention. Yet generally Chinese audiences are used to giving a 
cold shoulder to the films which have won international film awards, films like Yellow 
Earth (by Chen Kaige), or Not One Less (by Zhang Yimou) that portray the Orientalist 
backwardness of China. The reactions the Chinese audience gave to Chinese films that 
have won international rewards reveal that there is a discrepancy between China’s 
national imagination and global expectation. While most internationally awarded films 
cater to what global audiences want to see about China, these films cannot match the 
domestic audience’s national imagination. The success of Hero, both domestically and 
globally, manifests the fusion of national imagination with global expectation about 
Chinese film at the turn of 21st century, even though from different perspectives.  
Indeed, what Hero conveys is more than just transnational entertainment and 
pleasure. The diversified reactions it engenders from the critics—Orientalist 
Eurocentrism, Nationalist Sinocentrism, or authoritarianism, (not) guilty as 
charged293—place the film in the political areas of national identity, transnationality, 
                                                             
292 See an online article, “Yang Jinsong: Chen Kaige Jingke ci Qinwang de beiju” (Yang Jinsong: The 
tragedy of Chen Kaige’s Emperor and Assassin), in which the author reveals that because of Hero, the 
film Assassin got more attention after its initial failure several years before. Published on 
www.sina.com.cn, April 11, 2005, see http://ent.sina.com.cn/r/m/2005-04-11/1642700094.html.  
293 Refer to Tzu-hsiu Chiu, “Public Secrets: Geopolitical Aesthetics in Zhang Yimou’s Hero,” published 
on E-ASPAC: An Electronic Journal of Asian Studies on the Pacific Coast , May, 2004. See 
http://mcel.pacificu.edu/easpac/2005/tzuchiu.php3 .The article addresses the dialectics of “Orientalist 
Eurocentrism” and “Chinese Nationalist Sinocentrism.” Also refer to Robert Y. Eng “Is Hero a Paean to 
Authoritarianism?”, which challenges those who argue that the hit martial arts film celebrates 
authoritarianism. Published online in Asian Media—Media News Daily. September 7, 2004. See 
http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=14371.  
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globalization, national imagination and the understanding of the emerging global order. 
Meanwhile, Shadow and Assassin add differential temporalities to what Hero conveys, 
complicating the asymmetrical encounter between China and the West in a globalized 
culture. The painstakingly portrayed complex of power and moral justification in three 
films, ambivalently lingering within and beyond a national boundary, manifests the 
contemporary consciousness and anxiety to resituate and re-imagine China in global 
topography. As Dai Jinhua pointed out:  
 
Since the 1990s, during the process of rapid economic reform and 
participation in globalization, China’s self imagination has ceased to dwell on 
self-criticism or reminders of national crisis, but on attention to strengthening 
the country so as to participate in globalization or the global village as a strong 
nation state. … Artists and filmmakers, their self imagination, their self 
identification, have gone beyond identifying with the symbolic assassin, but 
rather with the Emperor who founded the powerful and unified empire. This is 
the change in the imagination of China [compared to the 1980s].294 
 
It is questionable that the Emperor is the only person to identify with. As 
discussed above, Gao Jianli and Lady Zhao are both heroes in Shadow and Assassin. 
However, as far as the imagination of China is concerned, the discourse of “Tianxia” 
deserves more attention. And Tan Dun’s opera comes to the fore. In the Met-
commissioned, internationally-made epic opera The First Emperor, as in the film 
Shadow, “Tianxia” is articulated in the anthem sung by the prisoners who are captured 
to build the Great Wall. The grandiose music is synthetic, the language is English plus 
Chinese, and the performers are nationally diverse. “Tianxia” resides in the heart of 
the people. It transcends the national, cultural boundaries, and reveals its centuries-
long, historically-tested moral power. 
                                                             
294 Dai Jinhua, “Ci Qin xingdong.” She compared the representations of history in the 1980s with that in 
the 1990s, suggesting that in the 1980s the vision of history was more self-critical, whereas in the 1990s, 
it became more self-reassuring. For instance, the original plan during the 1980s for the film Shadow 
was to portray Gao as the heroic protagonist, and the title of the film was supposed to be Bloody Zhu, 
yet the emphasis was shifted in the final version of Shadow in 1996. 
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In both Empire by Hardt and Negri, and A World of Regions by Peter 
Katzenstein, the authors discuss the emergence of global empire (American imperium 
as Katzenstein defines it) and its function in the contemporary world.295 The emphasis 
on non-territorial power as manifested in its moral justification shaping the new world 
order poses the major challenge in redefining empire. In this light, is the rhetoric of 
“Tianxia” a responsive counterpart to American ideological power or a submissive 
collaboration with the new world order, or both?  
 
 
                                                             
295 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press, 2000); 
and Peter J. Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Ithaca & 
London: Cornell University Press, 2005). 
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CHPATER 5 
 
“Minxin—Tianxia”: Emperors in Contemporary Novels 
 
The history of empire cannot be merely political, military and diplomatic. Economy is crucial 
and so too is culture. In the long run the strength and attractiveness of an empire’s culture will 
contribute greatly to its longevity and its influence. Imperial ideologies are both fascinating in 
themselves and vital to empire’s survival.  
                                                                                                         ---- Dominic Lieven: Empire 
 
In comparison with cinema, novels and TV series have more capacity to 
describe the entire history of an emperor and his associated empire. On the other hand, 
while the films could be shown to both the global and domestic audience—for 
instance, all three films on Emperor Qin Shihuang were aimed at obtaining 
international film awards—voluminous historical novels and lengthy TV series mainly 
targeted the Chinese-reading audience on account of the requirement of familiarity 
with the historical contexts and the unavailability of translation. In other words, film 
could project an empire image outwardly, while novels and TV series produced the 
imperial images inwardly and meanwhile, catered to and shaped popular taste and 
expectations.  
At a time when economic development as well as globalized culture gradually 
fragments the established social structure and de-sublimates the revolutionary 
narrative, the emergence of historical novels nonetheless provides a counter-
revolutionary yet more historically-rooted discourse, one that presents unity and 
abundance in both material and spiritual senses. That means, the material scarcity due 
to keen competition in the market, the spiritual emptiness owing to the lack of a 
sublimated ideal, the uncontrollable confusion resulting from the intensive social 
transition, all find a solution, or refuge, in the historical novels. Not that the “empire 
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narrative” projects an idealistic fantasy image which leads people to turning away 
from reality, but that it mirrors reality in the sense of providing reassuring precedents 
in history that “we have been there before, everything will be fine as long as we….” 
Such a corrective portrayal of history functions not so much to criticize reality as to 
articulate the transcendent notion of “Minxin-Tianxia.” In other words, even though 
historical novels manifest the temporality of the present, they are not so much 
pragmatic solutions to the current crisis as they are reassurances of a sense of 
universal truth transcending any time and space. Meanwhile, the detailed portrayal of 
powerful struggles and social contexts epitomizes the empirical situation and the 
richness of Chinese culture. Hence, the “empire narrative” overall bears a double 
structure as both transcendental and empirical, with the transcendental organizing the 
empirical and the empirical containing the transcendental. 
Indeed, historical novels on imperial China, especially the so-called “serious” 
ones, in this period are mostly based on official historical records, emanating a sense 
of the “harmonious, continuous, taken-for-granted” gloss conducive to a popular grasp 
of history and social stability. As Wu Jianren articulated almost a century ago, 
historical novels ought to “imply education in idle conversations so that the reader 
could have the benefit (of historical knowledge) from entertainment and pleasure,”296 
contemporary historical novels divulge more than ever the intimate life of the 
emperors, providing readers with detailed portrayal of historical knowledge, including 
diversified social customs, complicated rituals, exquisite lifestyles, and politico-
economic interactions among court, family, and  market spaces, on top of the well-
known historical events.  Moreover, most novels adopt a traditional episodic narrative 
structure. With or without the couplet separating the chapters, the relationship between 
                                                             
296 Wu Jianren, “Liang Jin yanyi xu” (Preface to the yanyi of Western and Eastern Jin dynasties). In Wu 
Jianren quanji (The complete collection of Wu Jianren’s works), Vol 4, 257. 
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the chapters is more spatial than temporal. It means that the novels present a large 
number of characters in a variety of settings and plots, and the shift of chapters as 
often as not indicates a change of setting and plot rather than the temporal 
development of one single plot. As discussed in the previous chapter, such a narrative 
form—what Lin Qinxin characterizes as “spatial narrative”—manifests the dialectic 
between time and space, which is the intrinsic and long lasting tradition of Chinese 
empire narrative. 
 
The images of the emperors  
Two types of emperors were portrayed in this period: the successful ones and 
the failed ones. In the popular representation, the successful ones are usually those 
who possess insurmountable wisdom and virtue associated with political achievement 
and glory; the failed ones are usually associated with love stories and troublesome 
romances that affect the emperor’s political accomplishment. 297  Of course, the 
boundary between them is not that clear-cut—the successful emperors also have 
romantic encounters and devoted lovers, yet they never surrender their political 
mission to their private desire. They would either sacrifice their own love if the 
political atmosphere does not allow it or direct it to the positive function for the 
empire. For successful rulers, besides Eryuehe and Ling Li’s novels on the Qing 
emperors, as well the representations of Qin Shihuang, Han Wudi, Tang Taizong, 
Yuan Shizu Genghis Khan, Ming Taizu, etc., on television, there are also Yang 
Shuan’s Qin E yi (Memoirs of Qin E) on Qin Shihuang, and Wu Yinyi’s series on 
Tang Xuanzong (Li Longji). For the failed rulers, there are Huo Ran’s Fengliu tianzi 
Li houzhu (The romantic emperor Li Yu), Yang Shuan’s Ban jiang se se ban jiang 
                                                             
297 Wang Aisong, Zhengzhi shuxie yu lishi xushi (Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo dianshi chubanshe, 2007), 
256. 
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hong on Sui Yangdi, Wang Hongru’s Sheng tang yi hen (The eternal regret of the 
Great Tang Empire) on Tang Xuanzong, and Yan Tingrui’s Bianjing fengsao (The 
story of Bianjing) on Song Shenzong, et cetera. Generally speaking, literature about 
the former type of emperor gained more attention and was regarded as “serious” 
representation of the emperors.  
One common characteristic about the so-called “serious” historical 
representations is that they all focus on the most successful emperors and their 
intimate associates, by and large family-centered, which undoubtedly reflects the 
traditional Chinese value promoting the homology of state with family, and which also 
makes explicit the built-in disadvantage of such a family-centered political structure. 
For instance, Emperors Qin Shihuang, Han Wudi, Tang Taizong, Yuan Shizu, Qing 
Shunzhi, Qing Kangxi, Qing Yongzheng, and Qing Qianlong all start their lives as 
successful rulers through their active roles within imperial families, and the most 
urgent task they have to accomplish in the beginning is to build up their legitimacy 
and authority within the family.  Moreover, the emperors all seize power at crucial 
moments of the dynasties, either at the start of the dynasty or the ascending period of 
the dynasty.  They all experience a time of transition from chaos to order, at the least 
having to appease a power struggle within the imperial family in order to stabilize 
their authority. In some sense, these are the bildung or coming of age narratives of the 
emperors. The emperors are for the most part portrayed as ordinary people with 
common traits and shortcomings, but with extraordinary strength or wisdom. After 
enduring and overcoming remarkable pressure and anxiety, they usually grow up, 
mentally and psychologically, to become powerful, wise, and great heroes for people 
to consume and identify with.  
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Foundational fiction: Ling Li’s novels on Qing emperors 
Ling Li’s series of “One hundred years of resplendence” comprises three 
novels. Qing cheng qing guo (Topple the city and overthrow the kingdom) is on the 
transition from the Ming to the Qing dynasties associated with the last Ming Emperor 
Chongzhen and the first Qing Emperor Taizong Hong Taiji. Shaonian tianzi (Youthful 
son of heaven) presents the Shunzhi Emperor. Mu gu chen zhong (Evening drum and 
morning bell) is an account of the Kangxi Emperor in his youth. As a scholar of the 
imperial history of Qing dynasty, Ling Li, pen name of Zeng Lili, considered the 
ascending period of the Qing Empire as one of the most glorious time periods in 
Chinese history, and it is through the aforementioned three Qing emperors that the 
empire achieved unity and stability after the fall of Ming.   
Besides the encyclopedic scope of these novels, the series accentuates the 
theme of unification and consolidation in both military and civil senses. The 
contradictions between the corrupt Ming and the promising Qing, between the military 
Manchu and the civil Han, and between the nobles and the ordinary people are played 
out, dramatized, and finally resolved.  
Qing cheng qing guo places the scholarly general of the Ming Dynasty Sun 
Yuanhua and his subordinates in the midst of the political intrigue in the Ming Court 
and the military encounter between the Ming and the Qing to imply the causation of 
the fall of the Ming and triumph of the Qing.298 Almost a perfect figure in the novel, 
loyal, virtuous, capable, far-sighted and wholeheartedly admired by his subordinates, 
Sun Yuanhua is victimized by the complicated political struggle in the Ming court and 
finally executed by the seemingly wise yet in effect confused Emperor Chongzhen. 
His subordinate officer Kong Youde is forced to surrender to the Qing after his dream 
of becoming a great general in the Ming is smashed. The novel portrays the paranoid, 
                                                             
298 Ling Li, Qing cheng qing guo (Beijing: Beijing shiyue wenyi chubanshe, 1996). 
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suspicious Emperor Chongzhen, the corrupt officials and eunuchs of the Ming, in 
contrast to the rising power of the Qing under the ambitious, clear-sighted, embracing 
Emperor Hong Taiji. Unlike the historical plays in the 1930s and 1940s dramatizing 
ethnic encounters and emphasizing unity from within the Chinese, this novel takes a 
more detached stance, from a panoramic perspective retelling the assertion that the 
Ming fell because it lost the hearts of the people and the Qing continued its mission to 
consolidate all under Heaven. Hong Taiji is a hero since he understands that “in order 
to gain ‘Tianxia’ (all under Heaven), (the ruler) has to gain the people’s hearts.”299 
Similar understanding is proved true later from the bottom-up perspective in a final 
statement of an ordinary young soldier, Lu Qiyi, before his premature death:  
 
“We ordinary people, common soldiers, don’t know [the obligations 
between] the despot, officials, and the like. Whoever treats us well, we pay him 
back with the same; whoever treats us badly, we are not going to have any 
concern for him either!” (494)  
 
Here the abstract notion of loyalty or narrowly-defined nationalism begs the reciprocal 
responsibility, and first of all, the obligation of the emperor to his subjects.  
The same theme of “Minxin-Tianxia” (people’s heart-all under Heaven) is 
continually rearticulated in the novels Shaonian tianzi and Mu gu chen zhong to show 
how the Qing emperors Shunzhi and Kangxi solve the contradictions between the 
Manchu and the Han and win the hearts of all under Heaven to stabilize their rule.  
Both novels move the focus from political periphery (as in Qing cheng qing guo) to 
the political center—the imperial family and court. Shaonian tianzi represents the 
difficulty and obstacles the young emperor Shunzhi faces when he tries to incorporate 
the Han culture into his Manchu rule. The Manchu nobles attempt to maintain their 
privilege, relentlessly expropriating the land and executing their Han slaves, while the 
                                                             
299 Ling Li, Qing cheng qing guo (Beijing: Beijing shiyue wenyi chubanshe, 1996), 476. 
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teenaged emperor admires the Han civilization and desires to be a benevolent 
emperor.300  
The Han-Manchu contradiction not only manifests itself in court debate 
between officials, among the late Ming literati scholars, in the village, but also in the 
imperial palace. The half-Manchu-half-Han Lady Dong’e (Dongeh) captures the 
whole heart of the emperor for her delicate, refined southern manner and high literary 
talent, which inevitably puts her in the hot water of jealousy and intrigues among the 
Mongol- or Manchu-born imperial concubines. Her little son dies of such kind of 
hatred and she herself finally pines away. Losing his love and frustrated by the 
Manchu nobles, the initially reform-minded emperor appears impatient and 
disillusioned. He at first shaves his head, announcing his intention to be a Buddhist 
monk, but is later persuaded by the imperial teacher Yulin to resume taking up the 
affairs of state. Yet the fatal disease smallpox soon after defeats the emperor and he 
dies prematurely at age twenty-four.  
Mu gu chen zhong continues the story to the next emperor, Kangxi. Ascending 
to the throne at age seven, the young emperor’s life unfolds against a background of 
social upheaval as Ming resistance still exists and the Qing is struggling to strengthen 
its foundation.301 Young, ambitious, and obviously brilliant, Kangxi finds himself 
hemmed in by four Manchu regents, who deny emperor Shunzhi’s reform proposals 
and rekindle the Manchu-Han conflicts. In order to become a great emperor 
comparable to the past sage-rulers, he forces himself to grow up quickly so as to 
reduce the power of these Manchu nobles. At age sixteen he cleverly imprisons the 
overpowering regent Aobai and wipes away all the obstacles for his independent rule, 
thus beginning to establish a great epoch of the Chinese empire. 
                                                             
300 Ling Li, Son of Heaven, trans. David Kwan, (Beijing: Chinese Literature Press, 1995). 
301 Ling Li, Shaonian Kangxi (the title of Mu gu chen zhong when the novel was published in Taiwan) 
(Taipei: Guojicun wenku shudian, 1993). 
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One characteristic in all three novels is that they develop the stories around the 
Han-Manchu contradiction and, without exception, intertwine romances with political 
struggles. In fact, romance as an imagined element parallels politics, annotating the 
unspeakable cruelty of politics. Representations of pure, beautiful, ideal matches 
strangled or destroyed by political turmoil, the romantic stories demonstrate the 
brutality of the counter-productive force manifested in the dynastic transition. Only by 
overcoming this force can the protagonists become heroes. Unlike the conventional 
accounts of imperial romances in the past dynasties that alienate the emperor’s passion 
from the affairs of the state, for instance, romance between the Tang Emperor 
Xuanzong and his favorite concubine Lady Yang, romance in Ling Li’s novels appears 
to be a positive, productive force for the unity and stability of the empire. Romance is 
more projection than retrospection, more imaginary than realistic.  
In her Foundational Fictions, Doris Sommer analyses the romantic novels in 
Latin America in the nineteenth century. Unlike the romances in the European 
tradition in which the triangulated desire among lovers usually leads to the tragic 
ending in the personal love affairs, the romances in Latin America appear to be the 
unbridled passion between lovers, and the success or the failure of their love mirrors 
the political situation of the nation. The marriage between eros and polis hence 
implies the ideal picture of the nation.302 
In this light, the union between the lovers in Ling Li’s novels projects the 
ultimate blueprint of the empire, in which productive romance functions as the 
imaginary force that grounds the (ideal) imperial family. However, unlike the Latin 
American romances, the Chinese “empire narrative” usually places romance as the 
temporary foil of the growth of the hero, an essential, physical, and psychological 
                                                             
302 Doris Sommer, Foundational Fictions: The National Romances of Latin America (Berkeley, Los 
Angles, and Oxford: University of California Press, 1991). 
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stage that the hero has to pass through. Therefore, the forces that sabotage the 
romantic union turn out to be the obstacles that the heroes have to conquer for the sake 
of the future empire. Romantic passion is not the end of the hero’s life; rather, it 
ignites, incites, and matures the hero’s vision of how to develop, to improve, and to 
consolidate the empire.  
For instance, in Qing cheng qing guo, the love story between the literati officer 
Lü Lie (later Lü Zhiyue) and General Sun Yuanhua’s daughter Youfan epitomizes the 
political turmoil during the transition of Ming-Qing dynasties. The couple fall in love 
at first sight yet can only be reunited almost twenty years later. The Ming separates 
them yet the Qing joins them. Their detachment from the Ming and reattachment to 
the Qing therefore manifest the emotional propensity toward two regimes, indirectly 
legitimizing the rule of the Qing. 
In Shaonian tianzi, the unrestrained passion between the young Emperor 
Shunzhi and Lady Dong’e (Black Pearl) pictures a perfect union of Manchu and Han, 
martial and civil, rigidity and gentleness, enthusiasm and rationality, which projects an 
ideal image of the future empire the young emperor dreams of establishing. Yet the 
ethnic discrimination, jealousy, and scheming, together with illness, take away Lady 
Dong’e’s life, which simultaneously foretells the collapse of the emperor’s radical 
reform attempt.  
Similarly, in Mu gu chen zhong, the pitiful love between the adolescent 
Emperor Kangxi and Icy Moon suggests the necessity and importance of balance 
among different power groups in order to maximally consolidate the newly founded 
empire. Like Baoyu and Daiyu in the Dream of the Red Chamber, Kangxi and Icy 
Moon grow up together with genuine care for and telepathic understanding of each 
other. Ideal soul mate for the young emperor, Icy Moon unfortunately appears to be 
Kangxi’s cousin from the same imperial clan. Even though she is actually the product 
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of an unidentifiable prince of the Ming Dynasty and a Han woman of lowly origin, 
both her official and her real identity make it impossible to tie the marriage knot 
between them. Far from being an independent emperor who can choose his love by 
free will at the time, young Kangxi learns to submit his personal desire to the 
responsibility for the empire when the two are in temporary contradiction. In a sense, 
romantic passion is the necessary obstacle he has to overcome in order to grow up, to 
surpass his father Emperor Shunzhi, and to become a greater emperor to continually 
glorify the empire. When his request to marry Icy Moon is refused by the Empress 
Dowager he sinks into ambivalent musings:  
 
What he wanted was both to be an emperor and have Icy Moon. Icy 
Moon could help him become a good emperor. 
Yet, given it was impossible to get both, what should he choose? 
To lose Icy Moon would leave him heartbroken, no way to make up the 
loss and pain, and no way to have so real a love for the rest of his life; 
Yet if he gave up the throne, could he be content with living his life as 
a commonplace man without any great accomplishment? …He should 
remember what the imperial grandma told him: what he shoulders is the cause 
handed down from his ancestors, the great empire with boundless territories, 
and millions of people!303 
 
Sacrifice is indispensable and unavoidable, which makes him at once a human 
of flesh and blood and a super-human who can transcend personal love or hate for the 
future of the empire. Like the union of Emperor Shunzhi and Lady Dong’e, the love 
between Kangxi and Icy Moon is as much productive and positive for the empire, yet 
the practical situation makes it an ideal unity for the future rather than for the present.  
Thus romance takes on the quality is the projection in Ling Li’s novels, so that 
it mirrors the social condition in the early Qing dynasty when the Manchu-Han 
consolidation is on the horizon yet the ultimate unity is yet to be accomplished. It is 
also noteworthy that in all three novels the female characters are idealized in such a 
                                                             
303Ling Li, Shaonian Kangxi (Taipei: Guojicun wenku shudian, 1993), Vol 2, 746. 
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way that they embody not only the future unified empire but also the melting-pot of 
Chinese civilization. Youfan, Black Pearl, and Icy Moon were all born into influential 
families significant enough to impact the fate of the empire, and they are all 
uncontaminatedly innocent, learned, talented, and virtuous, not only being sincere 
about personal love, but also deeply concerned about the people and the empire. 
Youfan, daughter of the Confucian-Christian literati general, practices Chinese 
medicine for the people in need and, at a time when his father’s troop is deprived of 
subsidy and the soldiers are at the edge of revolt, she would rather trade herself to 
collect the stipend for the troop. Her love transcends ethnic, cultural boundaries and to 
the people appears to be an all-embracing benevolence. As a baptized Christian, she 
loves even more broadly than the Christian missionary Tang Ruowang (Tang Jo-
Wang)—the learned German Jesuit Adam Schall von Bell who never forgets his 
mission and disapproves other religious doctrines and practices. As Lü Lie comments 
on his wife, only Youfan’s medicine proves the genuine love and benevolence to the 
people that transcends any political, ethnic, and cultural limits to save lives.304 By the 
same token, Black Pearl and Icy Moon are as much the epitome of the ethnic and 
cultural unity as Youfan. They have both the Manchu and Han origins, are talented, 
well read, versed in Confucian teaching, yet also embrace the Buddhist and Christian 
principles. They represent the all encompassing ideal of the future empire that is yet to 
come. 
Meanwhile, the ambivalent reception of Tang Ruowang (the Jesuit Adam 
Schall von Bell) represents China’s early encounter with the West. The presence of 
Tang and his foreign friends not only foretells the later Western imperialist ambition, 
but also reminds one of China’s increasing technological backwardness by the late 
Ming dynasty. A devoted Christian missionary and a dispenser of Western sciences, 
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Tang at once attracts and repulses Chinese with his knowledge and belief. 
Successfully befriended by some influential members of the Chinese elite and even by 
emperors, he is nonetheless frustrated by the Chinese’s all-embracing attitude toward 
religion. It is hard to ask the Chinese to follow the rule of monogamy, even harder to 
persuade them to believe in only one God. The frustrating experience of Tang, on the 
one hand, manifests the assimilative, inclusive, and centripetal quality of Chinese 
civilization; on the other hand, however, as a court official in charge of astronomy and 
calendric affairs, Tang’s tragic death during Kangxi’s reign suggests the brutal 
suppression of the development of science by conservative forces, which foreshadows 
the decline of the empire in the global arena by the late Qing period.  
Although the three novels present independent stories about different heroes, 
they could be seen as a serial narrative on one hundred years of early Qing history. 
They share some common characters. Among them there are influential ones who are 
crucial for the imperial family and the development of the empire, functioning as 
witness and the participants in the growing empire. There are also some imagined 
characters who link the court with commoner families, transgressing the social spaces 
and creating suspense to generate dramatic effect.  For the former, Empress Dowager 
Xiaozhuang, Lü Zhiyue, and Tang Ruowang, all from different perspectives view the 
temporal trajectory of the empire. For the latter, imagined people such as Menggu and 
Tongchun, Menggu’s lost twin daughters Icy Moon and Shiny River (Yingchuan), and 
the half-Manchu-half-Han boy Feiyaose, all travel across different social spaces, from 
the village to the noble household, even to the imperial palace. They encounter people 
from different social backgrounds, and thus interweave the diversified spaces into one 
single imperial space. In other words, the influential historical figures provide the 
vertical, temporal structure for the novels, yet the imagined characters construct the 
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horizontal, spatial structure, introducing the multifaceted social image of  late imperial 
China.   
Moreover, the concealed identity among the relevant characters creates 
tensions, suspense, and secrets to intensify the dramatic effect to attract the readers. 
For instance, in Shaonian tianzi, Menggu and Tongchun are deeply in love. In order to 
marry Menggu, Tongchun leaves his profession as an opera performer playing young 
females, only to find out that Menggu has been married off by her mother to the self-
appointed Prince of Ming. Both Menggu and Tongchun suffer tremendously in their 
separate tragic lives, yet still bear the unfulfilled desire to see each other. Following 
that, in Mu gu chen zhong, both Menggu and Tongchun are by chance employed in the 
same household of the Manchu Prince An, yet they don’t recognize each other until a 
later time. Similarly, Icy Moon is one of Menggu’s lost daughters, adopted by Prince 
An. While Menggu is hired as the nanny of the little girl, who is particularly attached 
to her, neither of them knows their real relationship. On the other hand, Icy Moon’s 
twin sister Shiny River is adopted by Lü Zhiyue. The lost trace of Shiny River after 
adoption unavoidably generates curiosity, especially against the backdrop of Icy 
Moon’s prominent existence.  
Stories like these extend across the volumes of the novels. The omniscient 
narrator constantly creates suspense and secrets. Sometimes the information is 
concealed from the readers yet revealed to the characters, and sometimes the secret is 
revealed to the readers yet concealed from the characters. Such manipulation 
undoubtedly draws the reader’s attention, not only dramatizes these otherwise 
irrelevant and insignificant affairs, but also consolidates the separate novels into an 
organic whole, awaiting the unfolding of more secrets in the unknown future. 
In sum, Ling Li adopts a developmentalistic perspective, inserts the early Qing 
dynasty in the current of Chinese history accompanied with a global vision, and 
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parallels the political struggle with productive romances to project a unified, 
prosperous, powerful, all-encompassing image of the Chinese empire, an image that is 
both retrospection and projection, both historical and timeless, both individual and 
collective, and both hero-centered and self-effacing.  
 
Assemblage of Chinese traditional culture: Eryuehe’s “Emperor Series” 
Following Ling Li’s early Qing emperors, Eryuehe’s “trilogy of the evening 
glow” portrays the most flourishing era during the reigns of emperors Kangxi (Aisin 
Gioro Xuanye 1654-1722), Yongzheng (Aisin Gioro Yinzhen 1678-1735), and 
Qianlong (Aisin Gioro Hongli 1711-1799) of the Qing dynasty. Titled eponymously 
“Kangxi da di” (Great emperor Kangxi), “Yongzheng huangdi” (Emperor Yongzheng) 
and “Qianlong huangdi” (Emperor Qianlong), the novels are apparently focused on 
the three emperors’ lives and the great accomplishments associated with them.  
From the mid-1980s when Eryuehe, pen name of Ling Jiefang, started 
publishing historical novels, his “emperor series” gradually attracted broad attention 
and, thanks to the television dramas adapted from his novels, his name became widely 
known among the Chinese audience in East Asia. Eryuehe adopted traditional episodic 
narrative structure with couplets that introduce the chapters and divide them into two 
stories, and skillfully interlaced different types of life experience, including power 
intrigues, romantic affairs, erotic encounters, and unexpected successes and failures in 
political careers, that successfully create a microcosmic social picture of the Qing 
dynasty that meets both the elitist and popular tastes of the readers.   
Obviously influenced by the traditional narrative techniques, especially that of 
the Dream of the Red Chamber, 305  Eryuehe consciously makes use of witty 
                                                             
305 Eryuehe used to devote himself to studying the Dream of the Red Chamber, and he admitted that he 
was deeply influenced by it. See Feng Xingge et al, eds. Jujiao “huangdi zuojia”Eryuehe (Focus on the 
“emperor writer” Eryuehe), (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2003). 
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conversations, insinuated jokes, meaningful poetry, and suggestive riddles associated 
with different characters and situations to intensify the contradictions, dramatize the 
seemingly plain circumstances, and make explicit the relationships among the 
characters. Furthermore, the wide employment of literary devices such as 
foreshadowing, backshadowing, sideshadowing, suspense, irony, and secrets, weaves 
together the historical and the fictional, the comic and the tragic, and the mysterious 
and the fated. Such a narrative strategy incorporates the multifaceted elements into a 
well-structured, centralized theme—the emperor and the empire, and draws out the 
reader’s emotional identification to prevent boredom reading these voluminous novels.  
As Eryuehe confessed about his own writing, he treated his work as a “four-
knurl lotus root.” That means, he invested his energy evenly into different aspects of 
the novel, such as the patterning of narrative structure, design of legendary plots, 
descriptive portrayal of anecdotes, construct of poems, medical prescriptions, and 
riddles, et cetera, and made all the aspects interconnected yet relatively independent. 
One failed aspect would not affect the entire quality of the novel, in the sense that one 
rotten part of the lotus root would not keep other parts from being edible.306 Such an 
encyclopedic yet non-elitist approach makes his novels appealing to people of 
diversified tastes, at once centralizing and decentering the readership in his “emperor 
narrative.” 
Indeed, the lengthy series could be seen as a well-structured assemblage of 
traditional Chinese culture, in which elements from the Confucian literati-elitist 
culture, Buddhist and Daoist philosophical influences, pragmatic power-money 
exchange, entertainment and pleasure seeking activities, male and female knight-errant 
legends, and so on and so forth, are intertwined and blended together, rendering the 
novel an exciting display of imperial culture. The selection and combination of the 
                                                             
306Feng Xingge et al, eds. Jujiao“huangdi zuojia” Eryuehe, 262. 
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traditional cultural elements on the one hand mirror contemporary diversified culture 
of the late twentieth century, insinuating that the world has not fundamentally changed 
in terms of social relations; on the other hand, however, the temporal distance endows 
the past culture with a gloss of unity, concentrated on the emperor under the 
omnipresent rubric of “da yi tong” (grand Unity or great Harmony). 
As in Ling Li’s novels, the transcendent notion of “Tianxia” functions as an 
“invisible hand,” organizing and consolidating the empirical situation and the 
otherwise fragmented elements, showcasing the complexity and richness of Chinese 
culture enshrined in the unifying imperial thinking. For instance, in Great Emperor 
Kangxi, the scene in which Kangxi runs into Wu Ciyou at the Daoist Baiyun Temple 
is dramatic and metaphorical. It employs poems, jokes, allusions, and puns to reveal 
their concealed identity and respective character as well as intersubjective relations, 
transforming a tense meeting into a leisurely encounter.   
Accompanied by Wei Dongting, officer of the imperial guards, and 
Banbuershan, the Manchu noble who is planning a coup with Aobai to overthrow 
Kangxi’s throne, the fifteen-year-old emperor is visiting Baiyun Temple in order to 
sound out Banbuershan’s attitude and persuade him to leave Aobai’s network. Since 
the moment they approach the temple, Kangxi has grasped every opportunity to use 
allusions to investigate Banbuershan’s mentality. The rich history of the temple 
provides him with plenty of seemingly aimless topics: from the Dao (Way) of the 
emperor to the Dao (Way) of the robber, from the Ming Emperor Zhengde’s couplet 
expressing the theme of “respecting Heaven and loving the people” to the heavy 
cauldron as the symbol of the imperial power, Kangxi constantly initiates the 
discussion to probe into Banbuershan’s mind. However, pretending being unaware of 
the emperor’s real intention, Banbuershan only responds at a superficial level.  
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At this moment, the emperor and his subordinates bump into Wu Ciyou and 
Kangxi’s imperial maid Sumalagu. Having been the emperor’s private tutor arranged 
by another official, Wu Ciyou nonetheless does not know the real identity of the 
emperor. He was told that this pupil is just a well sheltered young master from a 
wealthy family. Except for Banbuershan, the emperor and his guard and maid all know 
the secret. Intending to continue concealing the emperor’s identity, Wei Dongting first 
introduces the emperor and Banbuershan to Wu Ciyou as Mr. Zhen Longming （甄龙
鸣）and Mr. Jia Zicai (贾子才), the phonetic puns of “real dragon howling” and “fake 
talented scholar” respectively, and introduces Wu Ciyou as his own cousin. Wu Ciyou 
immediately understands the situation that he needs to hide his own and his pupil’s 
identity, the one that he knows. However, as the puns suggest, the concealing of the 
concealing is in effect revealing, even though Wu Ciyou is still masked from reality.  
After the introduction, five people continue their trip and discussion in the 
temple. At one point, they decide to compose rhymes extemporaneously to add to the 
fun. In one jueju poem portraying a carp jumping out of the water, they each 
contribute one line to complete the poem. It reads like this:  
 
Kangxi:   Shiny scales in the narrow pool spring out of the shadow of the cloud 
                            剑池锦鳞跃云影 
Wu Ciyou:         Breaking the autumn sky in order to demonstrate their shape 
                            击破秋空欲出形 
Wei Dongting:    To ask Heaven about destiny 
                            为问天阙造化数 
Banbuershan:      Slicing through a clear wave to salute the golden dragon 
                            划乱清波朝金龙!307 
 
Here the underlying image is of the carp springing over the dragon gate, an image that 
conventionally alludes to the ultimate success of a person from ordinary origin, 
                                                             
307 Eryuehe, Kangxi da di—duo gong (The great Emperor Kangxi—struggle for the throne), Vol 1. 
(Zhengzhou: Huanghe wenyi chubanshe, 1985), 199-200. 
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especially that of a scholar who succeeds the civil exam or gets the emperor’s 
recognition for his talent. The carp represents the person with exceptional ability, and 
the dragon symbolizes the emperor. Although the poem is far from an excellent one, 
each line nonetheless indirectly describes the respective character according to their 
relative status. The emperor is observing, simply telling what he sees; Wu Ciyou 
expresses the ambition of an unemployed, talented scholar; Wei Dongting cares about 
his own future as a loyal guard from a lowly origin; and Banbuershan exhibits the 
flattering attitude toward the emperor, suggesting that it is only the emperor, rather 
than Heaven, that determines one’s fate.  
Not knowing the emperor’s identity, Wu Ciyou satirizes Banbuershan’s line 
and delivers his critical opinion of the flattering conceit. Stating that poetry should be 
expressing one’s real spirit and genuine emotions, he then recites a poem to convey his 
desire and anxiety in the hope of a wise emperor’s recognition. The poem is full of 
past allusions to the ideal relationship between emperors and their advisors, a 
relationship that goes beyond the normal lord-servant association, and is rather more 
interdependent, mutually admiring, more of the egalitarian relationship of a confidant. 
Such a poem implies the double constraints for both the emperor and the advisor, for 
that ideal relationship depends on mutual recognition, which means, the talented 
scholar would only serve the capable emperor who is worth serving, and who is 
destined to achieve the great accomplishment. In this sense, the poem reveals Wu 
Ciyou’s confidence, ambition, and expectation, yet also his ambivalent feeling about 
serving the emperor.  
Afraid of exposing the secret of the emperor’s identity, Wei Dongting cleverly 
changes the topic, suggesting that they tell jokes instead of composing poems to relax 
the atmosphere. Still remembering Wu Ciyou’s criticism, Banbuershan first tells a 
joke about a skilful writer: 
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A skilful writer died. He went to see the King of Hell, and at that moment the 
King of Hell farted. This scholar then wrote an essay titled “On Farting.” It 
reads like this: “Your highness lifts your noble hips releasing a kind of 
precious gas, which sounds like the lyrical music from silk and bamboo, and 
smells like the fragrant scent of orchid and muskiness. I, your servant, standing 
at your leeward, cannot be honored more than with this incredible aroma!” The 
King of Hell was so happy that he granted him another dozen years of life. 
Twelve years later when his life expectation expired, the scholar came to salute 
the King again. He held his head high entering into the palace, yet the King 
had forgotten him. Upon being questioned who he was, the writer said: “I am 
the one who wrote the (worthless) essay ‘On Farting.’” (pi wen zhang 屁文章) 
(201) 
 
According to the context, this joke is designed to mock scholars like Wu Ciyou, 
who is versed in writing. Rather than being offended, Wu nevertheless responds 
cheerfully: “Mr. Jia Zicai [fake scholar] is unexpectedly a real scholar. He uses only 
one joke to scold all the flatterers in the world.” The joke turns into a barb aimed back 
at the praising attitude Banbuershan expressed in his poem a moment before. Relaxing 
as the atmosphere seems, the tension between Wu Ciyou and Banbuershan is in effect 
escalated through the laughter.  
Following this joke, Wei Dongting also contributes one on farting: 
There was a person called Chen Quan in the Ming Dynasty, who was a famous 
Casanova with knowledge. One day he mistakenly walked into the imperial 
hunting field and was captured by a eunuch. The eunuch said to him: “You are 
Chen Quan, who is said to be good at telling jokes. If you say only one 
character that can make me laugh, I will release you.” Chen Quan promptly 
responded: “fart!” Confused by the answer, the eunuch asked for an 
explanation. Chen then replied: “It is up to you whether you want to release 
[me] or not.” (201) 
 
Vulgar as it sounds, this joke nevertheless matches Wei’s status and philosophy of life. 
As Kangxi’s nanny’s son, Wei is both the subordinate and the intimate friend of the 
emperor. His prestigious yet dependent situation determines that he has to be 
extremely careful and absolutely subservient.   
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On the other side, Wu Ciyou’s joke is about the psychological burden of status 
and fame, which reveals his conflicting view on whether he should be pursuing a 
political career to gain reputation, foreshadowing his later decision to become a 
recluse after learning the emperor’s real identity. The joke, however, only insinuates 
this in a ridiculously funny way: 
 
There was a rich family that originated from the lowly status of entertainers. 
After the mother died, the son decided to solicit a composition for the 
memorial tablet of the mother for people to worship. The description was to be 
grandiose, including two characters “qin feng” (entitled by the emperor 钦奉), 
yet truthful enough. So the son offered one thousand liang of silver, only to 
find out that no one could write such a memorial tablet. Luckily there was a 
skilful writer—must be the one Mr. Jia just talked about—who did not know 
how to kill his time and took the job. Without thinking hard, he nevertheless 
wrote effortlessly on the tablet: “This is the memorial tablet of Granny Liu, 
neighbor of the servant of Prime Minister Wang, whom the Emperor has titled 
‘Great Scholar in the Council of Ministers,’ ‘General in charge of Guangdong 
and Guangxi,’ ‘Concurrent Shangshu in the Department of Officials,’ ‘Imperial 
Supervisor of the Palace Guards,’ and ‘Mentor of the Crown Prince.’” (202)  
 
Such a lengthy title not only ridicules the vanity of the son in the joke, but also 
painstakingly reveals the cruelty and emptiness of political status, status as symbolic 
capital that has drawn many people to pursue an empty name for their entire life. Wu 
Ciyou’s joke hence manifests his cynicism toward the vanity of political reputation, in 
contrast to his ambition expressed a moment before, hinting his later withdrawal from 
the political stage, in a disguised, leisurely way. 
Similarly, Kangxi’s joke manifests his status and concern as an emperor: 
 
One family wanted to live in a better house, so they sold their land and all the 
stored grain. With borrowed money, they finally built a better house, only to 
find themselves starving without food. One friend came to visit them. He lifted 
his head and took a look at the house, commenting, “This is a good house, but 
short of two beams (liang梁).”  Upon being asked for explanation, he said: 
“one is without thinking (si liang思量), the other is without pondering (zhuo 
liang 酌量).” (202) 
223 
 
 
Hardly a joke to make people laugh, it nonetheless reveals the emperor’s identity-
matching interest. The phonetic puns bring to light what is in the emperor’s mind. On 
the one hand, it could mean the emperor’s consciousness of the responsibility for 
managing a family (empire), to make a realistic plan, to balance resources, and to 
make ends meet; on the other hand, however, it could serve to warn Banbuershan and 
Aobai, who should be aware of their own ability and potential enough not to risk 
shaking the throne. Or mostly likely, it could mean both. The house, or the throne, 
should match the person’s destined status and identity. Not everybody is qualified to 
live with/in it. Without careful calculation and self-evaluation, even if one finally 
succeeds in building it, one cannot survive having it. 
The poems, jokes, allusions, and puns, adeptly interlaced into one short chapter, 
at once conceal and reveal the characters’ status and their interpersonal relationship. 
The indirection of these exchanges functions to dramatize the encounter so that Wu 
Ciyou and Banbuershan can express distaste toward each other, and expose their 
personality to the emperor. The underlying revelation nonetheless manifests the 
narrator’s omniscient perspective, to put the refined, the vulgar, the powerful, the 
powerless, the ambitious, and the disillusioned into one melting pot, to promote the 
character of the young emperor, and to foreshadow the storyline in the later chapters. 
Just as Wei Dongting’s last joke suggests, the deaf person sees the blind person 
lighting the firecracker, which means both are blocked from the complete truth. In this 
episode, Wu Ciyou and Banbuershan are like the deaf and the blind, while the emperor 
oversees the entire truth. Through the concise and ostensibly directionless portrayal of 
these people’s performance, not only is the multifaceted traditional culture showcased 
in a broad scale, but the young emperor stands out as a superior hero with great talent, 
insight, and wisdom. It is around the emperor, who is the representative of the great 
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empire, that the diversified elements of the imperial culture are unified, fused, and 
consolidated in this textual space, exhibiting the centralizing force for this four-knurl-
lotus root-like novel. 
Among the three novels, Emperor Yongzheng was regarded as the most 
successful one for its design of plots, various literary devices, and the keen 
observation of political struggles. Literary critic Ding Linyi commented: “with its rare 
thoughtful insights and artistic creativity, it is the historical novel most worth reading 
since the Dream of the Red Chamber. It wouldn’t be exaggerating to say it is a superb 
work one can only expect every fifty or even one hundred years.”308 
True or not, the comment in effect implies that the novel satisfies, even 
surpasses, the reader’s expectation for a literary reconstruction of history. It challenges 
the reader’s imagination of a controversial emperor, and most of all, reifies the popular 
imagination of a prosperous empire, the empire that is glossed with a glorified image 
from outside after Kangxi’s reign yet full of corruption, potential crisis, and political 
turmoil inside.  
Unlike the conventional image of Emperor Yongzheng as severe, cruel, 
insecure, intolerant of the existence of competitive siblings, and the promoter of the 
“word prison” to trap intelligent scholars, Yongzheng in Eryuehe’s novel appears first 
of all as a reformer and the guarantor of the people’s interests. It not only legitimizes 
his rule but also puts him among the great emperors in history. As the theme song of 
the adapted TV series suggests, “it is said that whoever gains the heart of the people 
will govern all under Heaven, let’s see who will rule the empire,” Yongzheng’s heroic 
image is first of all gained from the notion of “Minxin-Tianxia.” Not only is his throne 
justified by his devotion to the well being of the common people and the empire, but 
                                                             
308 Ding Linyi, Beijing qingnian bao (Beijing youth), March 19, 1996. Reprinted in Feng Xingge et al, 
eds. Jujiao “huangdi zuojia” Eryuehe (Focus on the “emperor writer” Eryuehe) (Guangzhou: 
Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2003), 221. 
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his mercilessness toward the privileged officials and nobles becomes necessary and 
essential. Presented as the “cold-faced emperor,” Yongzheng dares to challenge the 
age-old and deeply-ingrained bureaucratic corruption, working diligently to make sure 
that the people suffering from natural disasters are well cared for, the funds loaned to 
the officials returned to the state treasury, and the foundation of the empire further 
strengthened. This ironfisted image undoubtedly encounters discontent from his 
officials, yet ironically helps to underpin the prosperous reign for the next emperor 
Qianlong, and most positively, answers to the popular desire to eliminate corruption in 
contemporary society.309 
The novel comprises three volumes, in all of which the theme “Minxin-
Tianxia” (people’s heart—All under Heaven) is implicit. It is conveyed not only from 
the emperor’s words, but also through the construction of different spaces. As the 
aforementioned temple scenario suggests, the space of the temple provides multiple 
cultural cues, elements, and aspects to intertwine different characters together, to make 
explicit their relative relationship. Yet time—the different temporalities inscribed in 
the objects within the temple, such as the Ming Emperor’s writing, the age-old 
cauldron, the imagery of carp springing out of the pool, is rendered timeless, 
ahistorical, universal. The assemblage of the cultural elements, layer by layer 
accumulated through time, only serves to construct an empirical space in which the 
tensions among the characters are played out. Indeed, Eryuehe is good at creating 
different social spaces, unfolding the relationship among characters, while time is 
differentiated into the transcendent, imperial moral time and the empirical, spatialized 
time.  
                                                             
309 Zhu Ying, “Yongzheng wangchao he meiguo huangjin shiduan de dianshiju” (Chinese translation of 
the article in English: The Yongzheng Dynasty and the Revisionist Qing Drama: Chinese Primetime 
Television’s Historical Turn) in Zhongmei dianshiju bijiao yanjiu (Comparative Research on Television 
Drama between China and America), 47. 
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In the first volume Jiu wang duo di (Nine princes struggle for the throne), the 
first ten chapters already lay out the most important characters for the whole novel and 
describe all the spaces that annotate the relationship among the characters: the 
beautiful natural and historical sites that usually arouse historical consciousness 
associated with unemployed scholars; the commercial market places that circulate 
rumors, gossip among elites and common people; the local governmental space 
associated with corrupt local officials; the disastrous countryside space associated with 
starving peasants and heartless villains; the imperial palace associated with the 
anxious emperor; and the wealthy residential neighborhoods in Beijing associated with 
powerful officials in the capital city.310 The novel allows the protagonist, prince 
Yinzhen (the future emperor Yongzheng) to transgress all these spaces, placing him 
among all kinds of people to discover the social network built by different levels of 
officials. The brief introduction of the talented yet unfortunate scholar Wu Sidao, and 
the shrewd boys Gou Er and Kan Er from the labor market, foreshadows the crucial 
role they are going to play in helping the prince to gain the throne, and meanwhile 
implies the prince’s identification with the people.  
Indeed, space is privileged over time so much so that the entire life of the 
emperor is consumed by the narrative of spaces and the contradictions among them. 
Time nonetheless manifests itself as a double structure: empirical time, or timing, 
associated with practical situations; and transcendent time, which is the universal 
moral time ingrained in the imperial thinking, and which determines the transfer of the 
throne and the fate of the individuals. However, unlike Ling Li’s novels that are 
endowed with a presaging quality pointing to the developmental future, also unlike the 
modern “empty, homogeneous time” in Walter Benjamin’s characterization, the two 
                                                             
310 Eryuehe, Yongzheng huangdi—jiu wang duo di (Emperor Yongzheng—Nine princes struggle for the 
throne) (Taipei: Babilun chubanshe, 1999), Vol 1.  
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features of time in Eryuehe’s novels exhibit a tense relationship with each other. 
While empirical time requires chance and strategy to manipulate timing to deal with 
uncertainty, transcendent time has a streak of timeless, all-encompassing flavor with a 
fated characteristic, as if everything is foreordained, and there is no alternative 
possibility.  
Eryuehe believes that every dynasty has its own fatalistic destiny, and no one 
single emperor could change the fate of the empire, which explains the cyclical 
development of Chinese history.311 The shi-trend of the empire could be molded by 
human beings, yet collectively rather than individually. A heroic individual might 
discursively change his empirical situation in a microcosmic way to follow the 
historical trend, but he could not change the macrocosmic trend itself. Such an 
understanding reflects the deep-rooted “imperial-time regime.” In light of this 
understanding, Prince Yinzhen is destined to be the next emperor among Kangxi’s 
numerous promising sons from the logic of the empire—“Minxin-Tianxia,” while Wu 
Sidao and other subordinates are just helping to cope with his empirical situation (形
势).  By the same token, the talented scholarly advisors cannot escape their fate as an 
imperial instrument destined to be alienated in the future. Their special positioning 
determines the double-edged relationship with the emperor: the emperor needs them in 
some circumstances, yet not always. Once they accomplish their mission for the 
emperor, either they will become too close to be trustworthy or so powerful as to be 
threatening.  In that sense, the scholarly advisors Wu Ciyou (for Kangxi) and Wu 
Sidao (For Yongzheng) have to refuse the favorable positions the emperors offer them 
at the peak of their careers, not only because they desire to live a reclusive life, but 
also because that is the best destiny for them. Ambitious and insightful as they are in 
helping the unfledged emperor and prince, they undoubtedly crave to accomplish more 
                                                             
311 Feng Xingge, et al, eds. Jujiao “huangdi zuojia” Eryuehe. 265. 
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in their lifetime, yet they are also far-sighted enough to tell that withdrawal early is 
better than staying, for they are very much aware that their talent, knowledge, and 
close relationship with the emperors will sooner or later get them into trouble, just as 
past examples in history demonstrate and as the old saying “the moon starts to wane 
once it is full” describes.  
In this regard, there are two conflicting views that simultaneously face the 
characters in the novel—uncertainty and fatalism. Insofar as the empirical situation is 
complicated and the future is not perceptible, the characters have to work in every way 
to actualize their best potential. On the other hand, their innate characters or behavior 
will decisively lead to their pre-determined destiny that may or may not be what they 
have dreamed of. In other words, uncertainty is the engine for the individuals to strive 
for their fate, to enhance the empirical force to achieve the inevitable destiny, and 
meanwhile, for the novel to intensify the contradictions and push the storyline forward.  
In fact, indeterminacy to some extent organizes the entire novel to suggest all 
kinds of possibilities, and makes enough room for the characters to discover their 
potential and change their situation. For instance, in the first volume Jiu wang duo di, 
more than ten adult princes are involved in the struggle for the throne. Among them 
the most influential ones, including the existing crown prince, the first prince, and the 
eighth prince, all consciously devote themselves to activities like expanding their 
power group, pleasing the emperor, and circumscribing each other’s power, in order to 
strengthen their individual position to become the imperial heir. The protagonist, the 
seemingly hard-working, unambitious fourth prince Yinzhen, the future emperor 
Yongzheng, also unfailingly manifests his own aspiration, which is articulated by his 
advisor Wu Sidao. With Wu’s insightful analysis of the situation, effective speculation 
regarding the emperor’s intentions, and efficient manipulation of timing, Yinzhen’s 
innate nature of diligence, justness, benevolence toward the people, and cold-faced 
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competence is brought to the full attention of the emperor. However, after the crown 
prince is deposed, the next candidate turns out to be a mystery. Instead of naming a 
crown prince while all the princes still underhandedly struggle for the crown, the 
emperor for many years decides to keep his decision a secret. He composes a rescript 
in which the next emperor’s name is stated and hides it in the palace. That means, 
even though their fate has been pre-determined, for the princes, the situation is still 
indeterminate, and they more than ever expose their “inappropriate” ambition, which 
further intensifies the contradiction among them and renders the textual struggle a 
tense and exciting one.  However, the surface indeterminacy merely serves to 
distinguish Yinzhen from other, unqualified princes, boost the force for his legitimacy, 
and finally lead to his unavoidable destiny—to be the next emperor. 
Fate plays a crucial role in Emperor Yongzheng. Although fate determines that 
the empire be unified, no individual could really control their own fate, since 
everybody is actively or passively engulfed in the huge wheel of time, of empire. 
Setting aside the unfair fate falling upon the common people, like the undeserved 
death of innocent Kan Er, the tragicomic romance between emperor Yongzheng and 
his unknown daughter Qiao Yindi best demonstrates this fatalistic view, which casts 
an ironic and poignant shadow on the heroic image of the emperor. Known for his 
simple and abstinent lifestyle among the luxurious nobles, Prince Yinzhen could be 
seen as one of the few who do not indulge in fulfilling physical desire. However, 
fatefully he falls in love with a Han girl of lowly origin during one of his trips to 
inspect the flood of the Huanghe River. Rescued by the girl Xiao Fu (Happiness), he 
has an affair with her during his stay in her home. Unable (or unwilling) to marry her 
on account of her lowly status, he secretly witnesses Xiao Fu’s clan punish her 
severely for her adultery. Convinced that the pregnant Xiao Fu has been burned to 
death, he is overwhelmed by guilt and passion. So later when the emperor, the former 
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prince, meets Qiao Yindi, the favorite consort of his younger brother prince Yunti, he 
cannot help but notice that Yindi looks exactly like the dead Xiao Fu. With his 
reputation and the brother’s hatred at stake, he nonetheless makes Yindi come to the 
imperial palace to accompany him. While Yindi’s attitude toward him gradually 
changes from hostility to admiration, they finally become a loving couple and Yindi is 
promoted as the imperial concubine. However the reality is so cruel that Yindi turns 
out to be his daughter by Xiao Fu, which ultimately leads to Yindi’s suicide and his 
own death from an overdose of drugs.  
This agonizing story implies less criticism toward the feudal constraint on 
individuals than demonstration of the voluntary notion of “retribution.”  If the 
romance of Kangxi and Icy Moon in Ling Li’s novel manifests an individual’s 
incapacity to fight against a much more powerful social convention in need of 
elimination, as in the literature of May Fourth period which aims to criticize feudalism 
and seek freedom, Yongzheng’s romance with Xiao Fu and Yindi rather exhibits the 
unavoidable shortcomings of the individual facing a paradoxical choice. It is not clear 
why Xiao Fu has to die (it suggests that the girl who was burned to death is her twin 
sister Xiao Lu), nor is it convincing that Prince Yinzhen cannot take Xiao Fu away 
with him since he can freely buy any servants and maids in the market. Perhaps, it is to 
save his image as a virtuous prince that Xiao Fu becomes his sacrifice. It is guilt, 
rather than desire, that ignites his passion for Yindi to make up for his mistake in his 
youth, which unfortunately develops into an even tighter loop strangling both of them. 
A cool, capable, and justifiably benevolent emperor is therefore belittled by his own 
character and personal choice.  
Indeed, unlike the emperors in Ling Li’s novels who are idealized, perfected, 
and are relatively lacking any depth of personality, the emperors in Eryuehe’s novels 
appear to be more complex,  sophisticated, and a composite of a force for both good 
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and ill. They not only have the legitimacy to rule by birthright (the imperial bloodline), 
but also possess charisma, wisdom, and strategy to secure their image and their rule, 
even at the cost of love and friendship.  
In fact, the insecurity of the throne plays a critical role in the growth of the 
emperors. The threat either comes from equally legitimate brothers, or from powerful 
officials/generals who have military ability, or from the common people who can 
initiate peasant rebellions to overthrow the throne. Insecurity is the built-in crisis that 
reminds the emperor to calculate, to balance, even to sacrifice, in order to fit in his 
position and secure his identity. As Yongzheng utters his concern in front of his 
inconvincible, competing brothers upon Kangxi’s death, insecurity in effect haunts 
every emperor in history: 
 
Zhu Yuanzhang once said, the barbarian’s rule in China has never 
lasted for a hundred years since ancient times. Thinking back to the time from 
the Five Hu’s [ethnic minorities] disturbing China till the Yuan dynasty, this 
has proved true. We Manchu have only less than one million people. To rule 
China, if we are not alert, careful, and concerned day and night as if walking 
on thin ice, will be like tossing a handful of spices into Lake Taihu—there is 
no way to make a spicy soup! How difficult our task is! Even though we are 
trying to be vigilant enough, diligently working from early morning to late 
night, there are still many mistakes that are hard to correct! In my view, 
Shengzu [Kangxi] really worked his heart out for all under Heaven, for ruling 
the Chinese empire so much so that he succumbed to exhaustion!  
So it is a tough job to be an emperor, and it is even tougher for one of 
our Manchu to be an emperor! 312 
 
He then lists all the virtues his brothers have and insincerely offers to abdicate the 
throne to whoever desires it. Of course, such a speech is designed to disguise his 
ambition and seek recognition of his authority from his competitive brothers, yet it 
                                                             
312 Eryuehe, Yongzheng huangdi—jiu wang duo di (vol.2) (Emperor Yongzheng—Nine princes struggle 
for throne), Vol 2, 333. 
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also articulates the real anxiety of the emperor originating from both outside and 
inside the court.  
The motivation to surpass the past great emperors and the delicate practical 
situation force the emperor both to enlarge and belittle himself in front of his blueprint 
of the great empire. In Eryuehe’s novels, what distinguishes the great emperor 
(Kangxi) from other people is his unprecedented ambition to build an unparalleled 
empire and the supreme ability to deal with the unbearable pressure, which requires 
that the emperor must have superhuman strength and wisdom, and at the same time, be 
aware of his insecure situation within the empire and in history. 
Among the three emperors, Kangxi is regarded as the greatest one. The Great 
Emperor Kangxi is designed to accentuate the “greatness” of Kangxi. “Yao Xueyin 
criticized me for using the word ‘great,’” Eryuehe wrote in his correspondence, “yet 
my central gist is to describe his ‘greatness.’”313In his Preface to the novel, Eryuehe 
lists various great accomplishment of Kangxi, concluding that the emperor’s enormous 
martial and civil achievements could be compared with those of  Tang Taizong and 
Song Taizu, which makes him one of the greatest emperors in one thousand years.314  
Two layers of meanings could be elicited from Eryuehe’s writing: one, the emperor is 
great; two, Kangxi’s “greatness” is determined and conditioned by the great empire 
only through which his legitimacy is secured and his authority acknowledged.   
 
The dialectical relationship between the great emperor as a hero and the empire 
that defines him and his greatness manifests the thematic significance in both Eryuehe 
and Ling Li’s novels. They both create the images of the successful emperors in the 
early Qing Dynasty, rearticulating the theme of “minxin-Tianxia.” Yet they diverge in 
                                                             
313 Ibid. 240. 
314 Eryuehe, Eryuehe zuopin zixuanji (The self collection of Eryuehe’s works) (Zhengzhou: Henan 
wenyi chubanshe, 1999), 220. 
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the representation of time. While Ling Li inherits more of the modern revolutionary 
legacy and projects an ideal image of future empire in her novels, Eryuehe takes the 
traditional values for granted and presents an all-encompassing, timeless image of the 
empire. Time for Ling Li is spiral and developmental; for Eryuehe it is differential—
both transcendent and empirical.  
The converged image of the empire and differentiated presentation of time is at 
once symptomatic of, and paradigmatic of, the post-revolutionary cultural arena. The 
multi-layered representation of the same historical image could also be seen in the 
three movies about the first emperor Qin Shihuang, which leaves the tension among 
different discourses open awaiting a future resolution.  
Meanwhile, the voluminous TV series expand the empire narrative to a broader 
scale. Most of Ling Li’s and Eryuehe’s novels have been adapted into television 
dramas, participating in a larger trend of visualizing empire. Yet in the television 
dramas, the heroic image of the emperors appears to be more unified and harmonious, 
while the tensions among the characters and discourses are secretly resolved not only 
in language, but also in image. Insofar as the TV series has greater representational 
capacity than the films, and is more visually appealing than the novels, it possesses a 
comparative advantage in representing the idea of empire and projecting the image of 
harmony and abundance.  
In the next section, I will direct attention to the TV series on the imperial 
history. Besides the thematic significance, the specificity of the media will be brought 
to the fore, to bring to light the centralizing and consolidating function of the empire 
representation in contemporary China.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Empire plus Family: the Performative Space on the Television Screen 
 
Europeans suffered from a schizophrenia of the soul, oscillating forever unhappily 
between the heavenly host on the one side and the ‘atoms and the void’ on the other; 
while the Chinese, wise before their time, worked out an organic theory of the 
universe which included nature and man, church and state, and all things past, present, 
and to come. 
                                ----Joseph Needham Science and China’s Influence on the world 
 
Television dramas: state propaganda?  
In her thought-provoking work on contemporary Chinese television,315 Ying 
Zhu made an extensive analysis of the interplay between state and society. She pointed 
out that, although China’s media industry has been undergoing the processes of 
decentralization, marketization, and commercialization since the 1980s, the change of 
economic structure has not reduced the state’s regulatory power in television 
production. On the contrary, decentralization and deregulation have always been 
accompanied with consolidation in content control and integration in administration, 
production, and delivery. A combination of legal and administrative means has mostly 
functioned to “maximize state control over television drama production from 
conception to broadcast.”316 In this sense, the booming historical dramas, specifically 
the “emperor series,” at the turn of the twenty first century reflect the ideological 
shift—in Zhu’s characterization, the demonstration of Neo-authoritarianism—in the 
central government advocated by the New Left intellectuals, who support a strong 
centralized state. Moreover, in the global context, the propagation of the serial dramas 
                                                             
315 Ying Zhu, Television in Post-Reform China: Serial Dramas, Confucian Leadership and the Global 
Television Market (London & New York: Routledge, 2008). 
316 Ibid. 11. 
235 
 
throughout the pan-Chinese area and the diaspora creates a cultural-linguistic market 
comparable to those of the English- and Spanish-speaking worlds.317  
Zhu’s analysis, inspiring as it is, invites critical investigation. The first query 
arises from the linguistic-comparative approach. Even though the framework of 
“cultural-linguistic market” evokes a fresh perspective to look at Chinese television 
production and distribution, the television dramas, especially the historical ones, 
attract the Chinese-speaking audience in a centripetal rather than a centrifugal way. In 
other words, while the multi-centered or non-centered English or Spanish television 
programs blur the national boundaries when they circulate among the audience, the 
Chinese television dramas, on the contrary, reassert the Chinese center yet expand the 
national boundary by promoting and consolidating traditional values. Moreover, the 
distribution of television dramas on TV mostly relies on the advertisers whose interest 
resides only in their domestic market share. In both senses, television in China is still 
more of a domestic than a global phenomenon, which is perhaps where the difference 
between television and film lies. 
There has been much discussion of the differences between film and television. 
Generally, whereas film embraces the broader social space, especially in recent years, 
the global space, television series are mainly devoted to portraying a familial space for 
the domestic market. Film is regarded as the “factory of dreams” which could be 
experimental and surreal, whereas the television series is dedicated to portraying daily 
empirical experience. Film mainly aims to construct visual and psychological 
stimulation, whereas the television series focuses on creating characters and dialogues 
in a more detailed way. Where film could be full of ideological contradictions and 
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cultural differences, the television series is primarily concerned with the consolidation 
of mainstream morals and ethics.318 
In light of these media-specific comparisons, especially of ideological 
orientations, television offers a more convergent political view than film. This leads to 
the second query about Zhu’s observation. While Zhu is convincing in situating the 
TV dramas in the intellectual debate concerning the course of China’s modernization, 
319 the direct connection she makes between state policy and the seemingly marginal 
New Left intellectuals appears to be confusing and too simplistic. Setting aside the 
elusive label of the “New Left,” since it is as unclear who really belongs to this group 
as it is how much they really agree with each other on certain political views within 
the group, her observation fails to single out the integrating effect of the historical 
dramas and the convergence of the intellectual vision of a national imagination. 
According to Zhu, it seems that the regimes of Jiang Zemin and then Hu Jintao have 
been deeply influenced by the New Left intellectuals, presumably the alleged 
(Neo)Marxists who represent the interests of “the People,” and ironically promote  
Confucian values through historical TV serial dramas. On the surface, the direct 
connection between the New Left intellectuals and the Confucian leadership Zhu 
makes is confusing at best, misleading at worst. However, contrary to the seemingly 
contradictory linkage, Zhu’s analysis nevertheless indicates the underlying 
convergence among the intellectuals, be they New Leftists, Nativists, as some 
characterize those who promote traditional values, or liberals. In other words, unlike 
film, which could demonstrate multiple, controversial, even extremely oppositional 
perspectives, television drama nonetheless blurs the boundaries of intellectual visions 
and provides a performative platform for a convergence of national imaginations.  It is 
                                                             
318 Ibid. 
319 Ying Zhu, Television in Post-Reform China: Serial Dramas, Confucian Leadership and the Global 
Television Market, 3-4. 
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not that the state adopted the New Leftist view and superimposed it on the production 
and distribution of television dramas; rather, television dramas manifest the active 
negotiations between political and economic powers, and the confluence of intellectual 
visions of China’s future, which is projected onto China’s imperial past. In fact, I 
would suggest that the success of historical dramas demonstrates the age-old historical 
way of thinking, rather than the merely “Confucian” one, that is still working through 
the Chinese elites and ordinary audience to shape their view of China’s past as well as 
its future.  It is the imperial-time regime—normalization of unification and 
moralization of time—that helps harmonize and consolidate the social discrepancies in 
a transitory historical moment.  
In this chapter, instead of concentrating attention on the intellectual debate 
reflected in the television productions, I would rather take these historical TV series as 
texts mirroring social relations. Focusing on the “emperor series” in general, and the 
TV series Hanwu da di (the great Emperor Wu of the Han) in particular, I intend to 
show that such family-centered historical TV series appear as a stabilizing and 
consolidating force resulting from negotiations among multiple social powers in 
contemporary China. At the same time, their prominence manifests the persistent 
imperial-time regime becoming more and more visible in a global context. Textual 
analysis reveals a dialectic between eternal contradiction and ultimate harmony that 
spills over the textual frame, and calls for a harmonious society embracing 
discrepancies and welcoming difference. 
 
Historical television series: the “field” of negotiation 
The favorable portrayal of the past emperors, especially the Qing emperors, 
started from the late 1990s, yet it gained popularity immediately so as to dominate the 
television screen at the turn of the new century. Many historical novels, including 
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those by the popular authors Ling Li and Eryuehe, have been adapted into TV series to 
shower the audience with overwhelmingly splendid images and convoluted stories. 
However, compared to the novels, not only does the TV series appeal to a broader 
audience regardless of their educational background, but the visual language also more 
directly reifies the power and wealth of the empire, and thus more efficiently shapes 
the national imagination in terms of abundance and harmony.   
Indeed, as the leading family-centered narrative art form,320 the television 
series targets the widest possible audience regardless of their age or social background, 
inevitably proving to be the most powerful medium to shape the public mentality. 
According to China TV Drama Report 2003-2004, among all the TV programs, the 
biggest shortage (5.8%) was in the supply of TV series in 2002, suggesting that there 
was more demand for TV series than for other programs, even though TV series 
already occupied 27% of all broadcasting, more than any other single category among 
the programs.321 The same source also reported that in 2002, historical dramas, or 
costume dramas, consisted of 30.3% of the entire TV series supply, and demonstrated 
a greater gap in demand than other types of series.322 In other words, even though the 
modern dramas, including romances, urban life, crime investigations, sitcoms, et 
cetera, dominated the screen in quantity, they as a whole appeared to exceed audience 
demand, whereas the supply of historical series could not meet the demand. Moreover, 
the TV series broadcast by CCTV (China Central Television) proved to be more 
welcomed and competitive among the educated audience. That means, people with 
higher education tended to watch those TV series produced by CCTV, the most 
                                                             
320 Yin Hong and Yang Daihui, “Zhongguo dianshiju yishu chuantong” (The artistic tradition of 
Chinese television series), in Zhu Ying and Qu Chunjing, eds. Zhongmei dianshiju bijiao yanjiu 
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321 Zhongguo dianshiju shichang baogao 2003-2004(China TV drama report 2003-2004) (Beijing: 
Huaxia chubanshe, 2004), 44. 
322 I believe that historical dramas occupied a larger proportion of TV series broadcasting in the late 
1990s and 2000 or 2001. However, the statistical source is not available. 
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politically guarded and ideologically centralizing TV station in China. In light of this 
information, the structure of television production and consumption, as well as 
audience preference and their relationship with the CCTV, manifested a somewhat 
different picture of Chinese television from the global image of this media. To put it in 
another way, inasmuch as the TV series—the dramatic representational art that 
requires extended devotion and patience from the audience—demonstrates the un-
diminished attraction of television, and CCTV plays a predominantly leading role in 
consolidating an audience, Chinese television appears to be more of a totalizing force 
in favor of social stability and ethical affirmation. 
In the field of television criticism, western scholars usually focus on the ethical 
or ideological effect of television on society, specifically, timely news production 
rather than dramatic representation. As the dominant mass medium in post-industrial 
society, television has manifested itself as a “subversive medium,” as asserted by 
Alvin Toffler, in that it offers an unprecedented channel to propagate information that 
challenges political authority. Everywhere in the contemporary world, Toffler suggests, 
people are exploiting this medium to question, and sometimes to overthrow, the 
political power of the state. 323 Such a statement finds agreement in Habermas’s 
observation on the political havoc in Eastern Europe, that television not only recorded 
the historical events in the former socialist Germany, Romania, and Czechoslovakia, 
but the havoc itself was also promoted and completed by means of television 
broadcasting. Television made omnipresent the political demonstrations and protests 
that were otherwise absent outside of streets and political centers, and thus exhibited 
revolutionary force toward authoritarian political machines.324 
                                                             
323Alvin Toffler, Powershift: Knowledge, Wealth, and Violence at the Edge of the 21st Century (New 
York: Bantam Books, 1990), 348. 
324 Jurgen Habermas, Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: an inquiry into a category of 
bourgeois society, trans. Thomas Burger with the assistance of Frederich Lawrence, (Cambridge, Mass. : 
MIT Press, 1991).  
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Besides its subversive potential in the political arena, television is also seen as 
the seditious force in destroying traditional morals and values, as it tends to exaggerate 
sex, violence, chaos, and disaster, seek visual stimulation that is far from social reality, 
and normalize, even promote, material satisfaction rather than spiritual pursuit that 
leads to decadence and hedonism. As James Twitchell observes, American TV has 
become “a medium whose input is so profound and so resolutely banal that it has 
almost single-handedly removed vulgarity from modern culture by making it the 
norm.” 325 “The result is a mass culture, driven by profiteers who exploit the hunger of 
vulgarity, pornography, and even barbarism. Such supremacy of decadence and 
hedonism in a culture cannot help but have a demoralizing effect on the values of 
society, undermining and eroding once more deeply felt beliefs.”326 
In a word, from the ethical or ideological perspective, critical social thinkers 
have realized the powerful force intrinsic in television, that it has a “subversive” 
tendency which could be used in both positive or negative ways, that it could produce 
a “public sphere” to propagate the democratic message, or that it could be manipulated 
by one single power to become the voice of control. The term “public sphere” comes 
from Jürgen Habermas, indicating the public space between state power and the 
society. In an ideal sense, public sphere is an autonomous area in which citizens could 
freely express their opinions that are independent of both state power and market 
control. Mass media, to be sure, operate in the public sphere. However, Habermas also 
observes that the democratic character of the public sphere, which has been conducive 
to the growth of the bourgeois class following feudal society, has lost its strength in 
the capitalist world as capital has deprived this sphere of freedom. In other words, the 
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structural shift of the public sphere has submitted this formerly revolutionary space to 
the hegemony of capital.327 Such an argument rationalizes the function of the public 
sphere, and hence the mass media, in the contemporary world. It shifts the attention 
from the after effect of the media, the consumption of the images, to the structure of 
the media and the production of the images. The causative relation between capital 
and the change of public sphere suggests that it is the pursuit of profit, or the 
regulation of the market, that determines the commercialization, vulgarization, and 
homogenization of the television programs.  
Yet, on the other hand, Habermas’s emphasis on capital as the foremost reason 
controlling mass media seems to be exaggerated or only partially valid. Since political 
power, age-old cultural heritage, and majority public taste still play a role in the 
production of television images, capital could not be the sole factor to determine 
television. In this sense, Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of “the field” seems to be beneficial 
to serve our purpose. “The field” is a core concept in Bourdieu’s sociological theory. 
For Bourdieu, society could be divided into multiple yet interrelated fields, among 
which different forces interact, compete, and negotiate with each other to gain 
legitimacy or power. Individuals, or a group of individuals, are “agents” with various 
forms of capital, including cultural, symbolic capital, to operate within or between the 
fields.328 Therefore, any field could be a space where multiple forms of capital are 
involved in following different game rules. For instance, television as a medium 
constitutes a field where news production, which is most likely controlled by political 
or economic capital, science and art exchange, which is relatively independent of 
politics and economy, and commercial advertisement, which strictly follows the rule 
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of the market, all could find a place in it.329 Even though the success of the media 
itself is by and large determined by the audience ratings, and art work cannot avoid the 
fate of being commercialized, economic capital is far from the only “actor” in this 
“field.” 
In this light, television in China is not only not solely the product of capital, 
but is still on the way to achieving the balance and harmony among different forms of 
capital. As Li Haibo points out, television in China today is experiencing an on-going 
negotiation between political and economic powers. Although the reform of television 
is relatively successful in the process of privatization and marketization, legal, 
political regulations still weigh heavily on it. 330 On the other hand, the competition 
among different levels of TV stations determines that the audience is the ultimate 
judge of the programs. “The invisible hand” of the market has involved different 
“agents” in “the field” of television. The audience, especially the educated audience, 
participates in both producing and consuming high quality TV series that satisfy social, 
educational, and entertainment functions. The encounter and compromise between 
different forms of “capital,” especially between monetary capital and politics, suggests 
that TV productions have to be politically mainstream, market-oriented, and 
conducive to the security and stability of society.  
In this sense, the propagation of historical dramas not only projects an image 
of abundance to fulfill the popular desire for prosperity and stability, but also helps 
mold the national imagination into a vision of China as a glorious empire promoted by 
the government in a collective, communal way.  The plentiful supply and the 
insatiable demand demonstrate this mutual nourishment for the flourishing of 
historical dramas from both top-down and bottom-up directions. It seems that the 
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production and consumption of historical TV series are altogether molding a new shi-
trend for China’s self-imaging and self-identification, a shi-trend with a direction that 
neither state politics nor private capital can totally determine. On the contrary, each 
party is a distinguished “agent,” its role defined by this trend and required to adjust its 
position in this trend. 
Meanwhile, the lengthy series with its dramatic suspense was able to draw the 
audience out together, to identify, to discuss, to predict, and to express the emotional 
excess for what should or should not have happened in history, as well as what should 
be watched for in the present. The discussion of the TV series, in a sense, helped 
create a communal space, in the family, even in the working place, to fuse a 
community with a shared history. The sizeable production and promotion of historical 
dramas, hence, exhibited the most centralizing and consolidating effect in the 
contemporary cultural landscape. For instance, many of the “emperor series,” 
including the serious representations of Qin Shihuang (Qin Shihuang), Han Wudi 
(Hanwu da di and Da Han tianzi), Tang Taizong (Zhenguan changge), Ming Taizu 
(Zhu Yuanzhang), Qing Kangxi (Kangxi wangchao), Qing Yongzheng (Yongzheng 
wangchao), et cetera, were initiated and first broadcast in primetime on Channel One 
of CCTV, attracting first of all the educated audience and cultural elite. Not only did 
the bombarding of “empire representation” engender intense reaction, manifested by 
means of critical reviews, scholarly discussion, and anonymous debate in newspapers, 
journals, and internet blogs, but also the sales of DVD and VCD copies greatly 
extended the discussion in both temporal and spatial senses. Traditional values such as 
“Minxin-Tianxia,” loyalty, filial piety, and the imperial legacy articulated in these 
dramas therefore appeared at the peak of national visibility. The audience varied, from 
Party leaders, government officials, and university professors, to company employees 
and ordinary, retired people, but they were all exposed to the same imperial space, 
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enfolded in the conventional values and social ideals, both passively and actively 
trying to position China and oneself in the contemporary world.  
One major characteristic of the TV series, in comparison to the novels, is that 
the visual language tends to idealize the imperial image, hence even further glorify the 
Chinese empire. As critics pointed out, the image of the emperors on the television 
screen appeared to be more heroic and loftier than the already glorified one in the 
novels.331 For instance, the TV series Yongzheng wangchao (The reign of Yongzheng) 
creates an almost flawless, perfect image of Emperor Yongzheng, which diverges 
from that in Eryuehe’s original novel, one that has been criticized for its elevation of 
the emperor’s image.332 Director Hu Mei defended this adaptation in terms of the 
specificity of the medium, admitting that the TV series deliberately aimed to construct 
a heroic icon of the emperor, since the television screen needed heroes.333  
Moreover, the television representation also tends to idealize the relationship 
between the emperor and his subordinates, perpetuating a hierarchical relationship in a 
more harmonious, egalitarian, and sentimentalized way. For instance, in the TV series 
Kangxi wangchao (The reign of Kangxi), the last meeting between the emperor and 
the Han official Zhou Peigong turns out to be an exaggerated, moving, and 
emotionally charged scene to eliminate all the discontent between them. Not only does 
Zhou, on his deathbed, present the emperor the most comprehensive map of China, 
one that he has spent ten years in the deserted northeast to draw, reminding the 
emperor of unification and the future strategy, but the emperor is also so moved by 
Zhou’s loyalty and far-sightedness that he stays up all night to accompany Zhou’s 
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Peking University Press, 2006), 276. Tang Zhesheng, Zhongguo dangdai tongsu xiaoshuo shilun (The 
history of the contemporary popular fiction) (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2007), 317. 
332 Ibid. Also refer to Feng Xingge et al, eds. Jujiao “huangdi zuojia” Eryuehe (Focus on the “emperor 
writer” Eryuehe) (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2003), 153. 
333 Shan Wenhe, “Liangge Yongzheng na ge geng zhenshi?” (Which Yongzheng is more realistic?) in 
Feng Xingge et al, eds. Jujiao “huangdi zuojia” Eryuehe (Focus on the emperor writer” Eryuehe) 
(Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2003), 154. 
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spirit after his death. The touching display of both people’s emotions wipes away all 
the previous discord between them, as if the emperor has never treated Zhou unfairly 
and Zhou has never complained about his own fate. The scene, hence, transcends the 
ethnic, political contradictions, so much so that both the emperor and Zhou’s images 
become more heroic. The map signifies unification, the blueprint for the future empire, 
which renders Zhou’s image larger than life; on the other side, the unusual emotional 
display by the emperor manifests the interdependent relationship between them, 
reducing the emperor to a functionary position in building a great empire. This 
idealized portrayal diverges both from the original novel and the historical account,334 
generating great dramatic effect in presenting a harmonious relationship under the 
glory of the empire. 
In this regard, instead of faithfully recovering a historical empire centered on 
the emperor with absolute power, the television series displays qualities that are both 
centralizing and hierarchical, yet also egalitarian to project the image of empire. It is 
hard to tell what the real history would look like; only an imagined one seems to be 
possible and reasonable due to an imperial ideal—an ideal that has inspired 
generations of Chinese intellectuals for the realization of the real “grand unity,” one 
that not only enfolds the present, but also envelops the past, and embraces the future. 
 
Family plus Empire: the energy flow scheme  
In terms of narrative strategy, one major feature of the historical television 
dramas is that they are all centered on familial space, partly because of the specificity 
of the media as an art targeted at home audiences, partly due to the traditional 
                                                             
334 Meng Zhuo, Liu da lishiju pipan (The Critique of Six Historical Dramas) (Beijing: Zhongguo 
gongren chubanshe, 2005), 191-4. Historically, this most comprehensive and accurate map was not 
drawn by Zhou Peigong, but was a project assigned by the emperor Kangxi himself and conducted by a 
French missionary Bai Jin—Joachim Bouvet. 
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homology between the family and the empire. The imperial family is presented as the 
microcosm of the empire on the television screen, showing the most powerful people 
being troubled about family affairs comparable to those of the ordinary family yet 
more complicated in scope and larger in scale. Meanwhile, the image of the empire in 
terms of wealth and power is consumed in an intimate, egalitarian, familial setting. 
“Power fetish,” a term used by the cautious critics to criticize the mesmerizing 
ideological effect of the historical dramas,335manifests the negative function of such a 
glorifying portrayal. Yet on the other hand, the splendid image of the imperial family 
nevertheless projects a sense of all-encompassing unity, abundance, and the ultimate 
harmony achieved after balancing different interests among the family members and 
the empire.  
In the “emperor series,” in most cases, the emperor is situated in the 
complicated network of imperial family members, court officials related to the 
emperor with nepotism, powerful generals who can both protect and threaten the 
throne, and the other subordinates associated with different power groups. Rather than 
being an independent, absolute despot on top of the social strata, the emperor is the 
loneliest man, who has to be sober, wise, capable of balancing the power groups, and 
good at making use of the different forces to the advantage of his own rule and the 
growth of the empire. Social values, rituals, and family ethics are all double-edged 
swords to be both the constraints on and the forces for the emperor. To secure his 
position, the emperor has to subject himself to the larger imperial rhetoric “Tianxia”; 
to be successful and great, he is forced to manipulate different forces and consolidate 
them into positive energy for the prosperity of the empire.  
                                                             
335 Zhang Dexiang, “Lishi ticai dianshiju siti” (Four topics on historical television series), in Zhongmei 
dianshiju bijiao yanjiu, 486-502. Also see Tang Zhesheng, Zhongguo dangdai tongsu xiaosho shilu, 
331. 
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Indeed, what the emperor has to do is to position himself within the network of 
family plus empire, empirically in the family and transcendently in the empire. The so-
called “tactic of the emperor” (diwang zhishu 帝王之术 ) or the “strategy of 
contingency” (quanbian zhishu权变之术), as the critics characterize it, is no more 
than the manipulation of the different energies to construct the positive shi-force, and 
most of all, the reconciliation of the competing powers to strengthen the centrality of 
the emperor’s authority. The familial space, in this sense, becomes the foundational 
node for the interaction of forces, in which the emperor is both surrounded and 
elevated, both being inside and outside—within the family as a member of it, outside 
it as a transcendent emperor. The tension between the family and the empire, hence, 
resides in the emperor’s double identity, which could either fail him as an emperor if 
he cannot balance the doubleness or fulfill him if he could master the flow of different 
political forces around him.  The great emperors, such as Emperor Wu of the Han or 
Emperor Kangxi of the Qing, are such masters of artistically dealing with this double 
identity and bringing the contradictory forces into the fullest harmony.  
However, the compromise and reconciliation of forces is not so much the 
Confucian “middle way” as the continuous transformation of energies through the 
emperor’s manipulation. In other words, the forces are far from fixed in terms of their 
function of being constructive or destructive to the emperor’s rule or the strength of 
the empire; rather, they are relative and exchangeable. They are in the constant flux of 
change between imbalance and equilibrium. Just as the Book of Changes describes, yin 
and yang, or the positive and the negative energies, are interchangeable while the 
optimal state is their being in changing equilibrium. Whereas at one point one force is 
positive for the empire, it may become negative later; whereas in one circumstance the 
forces are balanced under the emperor’s control, in another circumstance they may 
turn out to be imbalanced to threaten the emperor’s rule. To bring about the optimal 
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function of the state, the emperor is forced to realize this dialectic and adjust his own 
strategy to maneuver so that he can balance the power groups and try to reach the 
maximal equilibrium.   
In his discussion on the ultrastable structure of the Chinese empire, Jin 
Guantao provides a vision of Chinese history that parallels that of the TV dramas. He 
argues a theory of internal forces that determine cyclical shifts between order and 
disorder throughout the entire imperial history. 336  Inspired by the theory of 
homoeostatic systems, Jin observes the Chinese empire as a mature, ultrastable living 
organism that has a powerful internal modulating scheme to maintain long-term 
stability. Specifically, the imperial ideology legitimizes the “the grand unity” and the 
literati-official social estate enforces the internal compromising power of the organism. 
Inasmuch as the literati officials are those who are detached from their native land and 
social background, they construct a mobile network to consolidate the otherwise 
divided society. With advanced transportation and communication systems, the 
emperor is able to transform aristocracy to meritocracy, and build a centralized 
bureaucratic system. However, along with the positive, or the organic force conducive 
to the unification, there is a built-in negative, or inorganic, force within the system to 
cause the gradual decay from within. Since it is almost impossible to prevent 
corruption in this huge bureaucratic system, or to prevent land annexation due to the 
territorial scale of the empire, the unification and internal equilibrium face constant 
challenge. Although the emperors in the earlier period of each dynasty have all tried to 
improve the situation, the marginal effect of reform is diminishing, and the empire is 
unavoidably declining. Such a structure exhibits rigidity instead of elasticity. That 
means, although the organic force is beneficial to gradually overcoming the inorganic 
                                                             
336 Jin Guantao, Zai lishi de biaoxiang beihou—dui Zhongguo fengjian shehui chao wending jiegou de 
tansuo (Behind the phenomena of history—an exploration of the ultrastable structure of the Chinese 
feudalist society) (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1983). 
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force, its modulating effect is diminishing, so much so that at a certain point the 
organism will collapse entirely. Only after the organic force recovers its consolidating 
power, will the system return to its original equilibrium, which usually resulted from 
the shift of dynasties.    
The inorganic, negative force harmful to the grand unification often comes 
from the imperial palace. According to Jin, it usually originates from the eunuchs and 
from imperial relatives through marriage. Generally, in order to secure his 
transcendent position, the emperor has to maximize the modulating power through 
balancing different power groups. To prevent the imperial princes and powerful 
generals from becoming dominant, he has to make use of relatives through marriage to 
balance them. To ensure his absolute authority, he usually trusts eunuchs working 
around him. Whenever the imperial relatives or the eunuchs are out of the emperor’s 
control, the balance of the system is shaken. In that sense, the contradiction between 
the emperor’s unlimited power and limited compromising ability constitutes the 
fundamental dilemma within the empire. In other words, the tension between the 
(extended) family and the empire provides the basic paradoxical energy which could 
lead to either positive or negative consequences. Whenever the emperor has overly 
indulged in his intimate life, enamored of one single woman or too trustful of the 
intimate eunuch, the power groups associated with the woman or the eunuch will 
overpower him, resulting in disorder and disunity in the empire. On the other hand, 
after the disorder, the wise emperor learns from the past lesson and balances the power 
groups to the advantage of the reunified empire, which will restore order and bring 
about prosperity.  
Such an analysis offers a fresh perspective to look at the cyclical structure of 
imperial history as it appears on TV, and most importantly, it is possible to epitomize 
the gigantic organism at the core of its power—the imperial family--to describe the  
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flow of energy within the empire. In this light, if Jin’s model manifests the dialectical 
shi-trend in a macrocosmic way in shaping Chinese history into a cyclical yet 
progressive structure, the empire representation in the novels and TV series displays a 
similar structure in a microcosmic way in dramatizing the tensions. 
Indeed, the television series is the best form to visualize this dialectical 
movement of energy manifested in the empire representation. While suspense is 
necessary for holding the attention of the audience, the ever-changing, unpredictable 
tension among different power groups provides the ultimate source of energy flow 
within the representation. The multi-directional energies flow within the imperial 
family, operated and twisted to take turns, and finally converge in the emperor to 
achieve balance and harmony. Meanwhile, this at once centralized and egalitarian 
family setting puts the audience in the same flow of energies, for they could identify 
with any character in the drama and achieve emotional catharsis in the glory of the 
great emperor and the empire.  
However, unlike the theory in which the basic tension is between the 
emperor’s unlimited power and limited balancing ability, which ultimately leads to 
internal decay of the empire, in the TV series on the heroic emperors, the basic tension 
manifests itself as being between the emperor’s limited power and unlimited 
modulating ability. Since the emperor is so aware of the negative consequence of his 
abuse of power, the pressure stimulates and brings out his talent and wisdom to 
imaginatively reconcile the powerful groups and congregate the energies to his 
advantage. Moreover, the empirical familial situation is more complicated than theory. 
Far from being independent with absolute authority, the young emperor in many cases 
is fettered by influential people around him. Besides the powerful officials who have 
potential to overthrow his throne, usually there is a mother, or grandmother, who has 
been helpful in his attaining the throne, yet continues trying to maintain her authority 
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over him.  To balance the tension between filial piety and loyalty, the emperor is also 
forced to employ inventively rhetoric, strategy, and tactics, to strive for his autonomy. 
In a word, the successful emperors all stand outside this ultrastable, self-decaying 
imperial organism, and it is the TV series that visualizes their lives and accentuates 
their individual greatness.  
 
The TV series The Great Emperor Wu of the Han 
The best example to describe this “energy flow scheme” conducive to the 
image of the emperor is the TV series Han Wu da di (The Great Emperor Wu of the 
Han).337 Adapted directly from official history texts such as Shiji (Records of the 
Grand Historian) and the Hanshu, this serial drama successfully represents a heroic 
image of Emperor Wu (156-87BCE) of the Han dynasty, normally regarded as the 
greatest emperor since Qinshihuang unified China. It is under his reign that China 
achieved unprecedented glory in terms of both territorial expansion and civilization. 
The Huns (Xiongnu), the most powerful nomadic enemy who had constantly raided 
the border prior this period were decisively defeated and forced to succumb to the Han, 
and the famous “silk road” was pioneered to foster cultural and commercial exchange 
with the other civilizations. Most of all, the Chinese empire realized the unparalleled 
centralization of state power under the doctrine of Confucianism.  
Broadcast during primetime on Channel One of CCTV, the series is seen as the 
serious representation of the Han dynasty and the emperor’s life. In the video edition, 
the series is advertised as follows:  
 
He bequeathed a people confidence to proudly live through thousands of years; 
his dynastic title became the eternal name of a great people; the greatest empire 
                                                             
337 TV series Han Wu da di. Scriptwriter Jiang Qitao, director Yang Jun. 
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in Chinese history; the contemporary screen presents the cruelest battle in the 
warring history of thousands of years…338 
Obviously, pride, glory, greatness, and martial achievement are the intrinsic qualities 
the series is dedicated to present in both the emperor and the Han Empire. However, 
not surprisingly, these grand qualities are also mainly exhibited in family settings, 
among the imperial family members and their associates.  
The series comprises fifty-eight episodes, the first seventeen of which depict 
the Emperor Wu’s childhood centered on his father, the Emperor Jing, who is troubled 
by trying to balance the power struggles among his mother, younger brother, other Liu 
family princes, and the imperial concubines, in order to build a peaceful foundation for 
his successor. An unfledged child without the title of the crown prince, the 
unprivileged young prince is already situated in the middle of the complicated swirl 
within the imperial family. The relationship between the father and son, hence, not 
only is crucial for the relative status within the family, but also determines the future 
of the empire. In this sense, the detailed portrayal of the Emperor Jing is far from 
being irrelevant or un-necessary, but vital for the growth of the young emperor. It is 
the father (under the influence of other family members) who determines his status as 
the new crown prince, and introduces him into the power machine of the empire. As 
Dou Ying comments on the emperor’s intention to imprison the former crown prince, 
the father is removing the thorns for the next emperor, since every emperor in effect 
stays in a cluster of thorns. [Episode 14] It is the father who painstakingly tries to 
secure the centralized and transcendent status of the future emperor so as to pave the 
way for the son’s future success. Generally, as emperors, the father and the son share 
the same position in the family and the empire. The position could be described in the 
following diagram:  
 
                                                             
338 VCD cover. Hongen wenhua shiye youxian gongsi. n.d. 
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  (The network facing the emperor, with the relationship of relatives to Emperor Wu in parentheses) 
Generally, both emperors (and all the emperors in imperial China) have to deal with 
three groups of people who have potential to pose the threat for the throne: the princes 
from the same imperial lineage with appointed fiefdoms, the families close to the 
emperor through marriage, and the powerful generals who have authority in the army. 
Of course, the three groups are not separate, but sometimes interacting and 
overlapping, and in most cases, they are in competition for wealth and power. For 
instance, in this drama, Prince Liang is also the favorite son of Empress Dowager Dou, 
and thus he has both the imperial blood and the Dou family’s support. Similarly, 
generals Wei Qing and Huo Qubing are the relatives of Empress Wei, and their 
promotion cannot be totally separated from nepotism. The emperor is at once 
dependent upon them and scrupulous in employing them. In order to secure his rule, 
the emperor needs to negotiate with different groups to let them balance each other so 
that the contradictory energies among them could be transformed into positive 
energies to carry out his policies.  
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In addition to letting the different power groups balance each other, the 
emperor also needs to employ harsh officials who dare to challenge these powerful 
people to supervise all of them, to investigate crimes and enforce the law. On the one 
hand, this ensures that the emperor does not have to directly face the family members 
(especially those of his older generation); on the other hand, this is effective in 
preventing any single group from growing overly dominant.  
The double structure of family and empire determines that the emperor’s life is 
full of tensions and contradictions. Inasmuch as any family situation is also an affair of 
state, it forces the emperor to decide strategically when to obey a family rule (e.g. 
filial piety) and when to follow the law of the empire. The tension between the family 
and the empire, between different power groups, thus, constitutes the primary flow of 
energy to unfold the emperor’s life, and to develop the plot of the TV series. Each 
episode presents one or several aspects of the tensions, generating suspense in leaving 
the tensions unresolved. Once the former tension is solved or power imbalance 
achieves equilibrium, new tensions appear, and a new imbalance awaits leverage. 
Moreover, the relative power position is in constant evolution, so much so that the 
positive and the negative energies are interchangeable, which renders the storyline 
unpredictable. For instance, Empress Dowager Wang (Lady Wang before she becomes 
the empress) and her brother Tian Fen represent the constructive force in the 
beginning in helping the young prince win the crown, yet they turn out to be relatively 
destructive after the young emperor takes the throne. The dramatic unpredictability not 
only facilitates creating the emperor as a hero with superb wisdom who can always 
sufficiently transform diverse energies into productive achievement, but also transfers 
the flow of energy to the audience, enfolding them in the field of family/empire to 
yearn for the final reconciliation among the powers.   
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Han Wu da di presents Emperor Jing as a far-sighted strategist and Emperor 
Wu as surpassing him in both civil and martial achievements. In the beginning, it 
shows that the greatest threat to the throne is “the rebellion of the seven princes.” 
Emperor Jing appoints the capable prince Liang, his own younger brother and favorite 
son of his mother, and the famous general Zhou Yafu together to appease the rebels. 
After the mission is accomplished, he promotes Zhou as a prime minister to deprive 
him of his authority in the army, and employs the harsh official Zhi Du to investigate 
Prince Liang to prevent him from being dominant. Later, when Prince Liang dies and 
the power structure becomes uneven, he finds an excuse to imprison General Zhou to 
eliminate his influence in the army. To secure the status of the new crown prince, he 
compels the divested former crown prince to commit suicide for a minor misdemeanor. 
To be sure, what Emperor Jing does is to identify different forces and balance them to 
make sure that the emperor is the only authority in court. Yet his way to achieve this is 
strategic: he knows exactly how to compromise between his obligation to the family 
(mother) and to the empire. In order to resolve a hot debate between a Confucian and a 
Daoist scholar, he takes contradiction as the source of productive energy and directs it 
to a harmonious track. When the two scholars insist on their doctrine and refuse to be 
reconciled, the emperor articulates his opinion in the presence of the crown prince: 
 
You cannot say that a person does not know how to eat fish if he refuses to eat 
fish bone; you cannot say that a person does not know how to eat horsemeat if 
he refuses to eat the poisonous liver of the horse. [Episode 14] 
 
Without commenting on either Confucianism or Daoism, he cleverly manifests his all-
encompassing and pragmatic philosophical propensity, which also indirectly echoes 
his strategic manipulation of the powerful forces.   
It is obvious that Emperor Wu inherits his father’s philosophy. Though he 
openly favors Confucianism over Daoism, he himself is far from a dedicated 
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Confucian. His military ambitions do not follow Confucian principle, and his political 
ambition proves a composite of traditional intellectual thinking. Princess Pingyang 
sees him as a Legalist, yet in his later age, he is shown advising his son to read more 
of Laozi.  
Indeed, what we see is an all-embracing emperor with unprecedented ambition, 
wisdom, and tactical skill. In the beginning of his reign, he allows his grandmother’s 
family to balance his mother’s family so that none is overpowering; meanwhile, he 
secretly collects his own men to train cavalry preparing to launch the battle against the 
Xiongnu. When both grandmother and mother are dead, he has matured into an 
independent, decisive, and authoritative emperor with his own core of power to 
accomplish his desire to establish a great empire. No significant force could block his 
blueprint since he has learned to balance the power structure and elicited absolute 
admiration and loyalty from subordinates. However, the tension within the court and 
family never ceases, so that this not only pushes the narrative forward, but also 
accumulates the energy for the harmonious climax.  
The image of the emperor is more heroic than perfect, and not all his treatment 
of situations is fair. In fact, more often than not, the audience is left to feel sympathetic 
toward some characters, thinking the emperor is merciless or overly suspicious. Such 
an emotional identification casts a shadow on the positive portrayal of the emperor’s 
character, which, however, is balanced later in the presentation of the emperor’s 
emotional release and the lyrical display of the harmonious relationship between the 
emperor and his subordinates, and between the emperor and the common people. Such 
emotional display, however, begs for embellishment in visual representations, in 
addition to the verbal exchange.  
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Between language and image: the performative space on television screen 
The relationship between language and image can be best understood in the 
encounter between the emperor and the great general Wei Qing. The general crucial to 
carrying out the emperor’s military plan, Wei Qing wins the decisive battle against the 
Xiongnu Hun. Yet the emperor becomes increasingly suspicious and prudent towards 
Wei’s military influence. He divides Wei’s military authority with another general, 
Huo Qubing, and deliberately ignores Wei. A loyal servant of the emperor since his 
youth, Wei undoubtedly feels sad yet remains silent, while his complaint is articulated 
by his wife Princess Pingyang. However, as his death approaches, Wei determines to 
go to the palace to see the emperor to talk about the crown prince, who is his nephew. 
Lying on a couch carried by servants, the sick general is enthusiastically greeted by 
the soldiers, who show their admiration and volunteer to shoulder his sedan couch, 
implying that Wei is widely revered by his soldiers. (Figure 6-1) On the other side, the 
emperor orders his eunuchs to dress him formally and rushes out to see Wei Qing 
when he is told that the general is coming. At the sight of Wei outside the palace, the 
emperor stops, anxiously watching Wei staggering up the steps. (Figure 6-2) The 
camera dwells on the eyes of the two men, sentimental music plays, and the camera 
begins cutting back and forth from the emperor to Wei struggling up the steps and then 
to flashbacks of the growth of the young general in the emperor’s eyes, indicating their 
lifelong interdependent relationship. (Figures 6-3 and 6-4) Uttering “Your Majesty,” 
Wei Qing eagerly approaches the emperor, who steps forward to embrace Wei Qing as 
he kneels. (Figure 6-5) Both are shown tearful to see each other. [Episode 55] Such an 
idealized portrayal of the relationship between the emperor and his subordinates not 
only shows the general’s absolute loyalty toward the emperor as a foil to the latter’s 
greatness, but also softens the emperor’s image as a cold-faced strategist and renders 
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him accessible and forgivable, dispelling the past discord between them, and the 
necessary disharmony in the past now gives way to harmony. 
 
 
Figure 6-1: The soldiers worship General Wei Qing and voluntarily gather to 
carry him 
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Figure 6-2: The emperor watches Wei Qing coming to the palace 
 
Figure 6-3: The emperor steps down to welcome Wei Qing 
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Figure 6-4: Flashback of Wei Qing when he was young and conquered the 
Xiongnu Hun 
 
Figure 6-5: Wei Qing kneels down in front of the emperor 
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 The dialectical relationship between harmony and disharmony can be 
compared to the mutually dependent relationship between narrative and visual 
representation, between diegesis and mimesis. While the serial narrative requires 
disharmony to develop the plot, the visual representation transforms the disharmony to 
harmony that leads to dramatic climax and psychological catharsis.  
Such a dramatic climax bears both historical and contemporary ideological 
significance. In fact, the meeting scene manifests a sense of architectural quality to put 
stratified discourses in harmony, which I will term as “stratification of image.” In 
other words, the scene visualizes the ideal hierarchical relationship between people, in 
a disguised, lyrical, and visually appealing way. The palace, the steps, upward and 
downward directions all signify the vertical structure of the social strata, while the 
lyrical song (which is strangely manifested as a popular love song),339 the public 
display of the reciprocal emotions exhibits the seemingly egalitarian relationship that 
softens, mitigates, and harmonizes the hierarchy. Symbolically, Wei Qing represents a 
hero from a lowly origin supported on the shoulders of the common people, and the 
emperor represents the lonely ruler standing against the backdrop of the empire. The 
lofty union of the ruler and the general, hence (in a way), idealizes the relationship 
between the lord and his subject, between the hero and the common people, and 
between the emperor and the empire. The reunion at once grants the hierarchy and 
masks it, suggesting the relationship as being both vertical and horizontal, naturalizing 
the harmonious social structure within the empire.  
                                                             
339 This might indicate the homoerotic (or homosexual) relationship between the emperor and the 
general, as some historical anecdotes suggest. Yet in the TV series, there is no indication that the 
emperor is bisexual. On the contrary, he is portrayed as a heterosexual, decisive hero. The love song 
mainly serves to idealize the relationship between the emperor and the general, given the contextual 
situation.  
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The visual harmony compensates for the narrative discordance, temporally 
balancing the endless contradictions. Whereas the narrative constantly creates tensions 
to attract attention, the image stratifies the discourses and reconciles them. In this 
sense, the television screen turns out to be a performative space to transfer the multi-
directional forces, between the family and the empire, between language and image, 
and between the textual world and contextual world. It at once dramatizes and 
reconciles the multi-dimensional contradictions, and also in some way perpetuates the 
contradictions by problematizing the representation on screen.  
The word “performative” is indebted to J. L. Austin’s speech act theory. For 
Austin, language is performative in the sense that it does not merely transmit 
information or describe things, but perform acts which produce significance beyond 
the boundary of that language. The language here refers to the constative statement, 
which is opposed to the performative: “the constative is language claiming to 
represent things as they are, to name things that are already there, and the performative 
is the rhetorical operations, the acts of language, that undermine this claim by 
imposing linguistic categories, bringing things into being, organizing the world rather 
than simply representing what is.”340 Similarly, in performance theory, performativity 
appears to be the dynamic competition between performance and its original text as 
authority.341 In this sense, the model of the performative suggests the blurring of 
boundaries between the performance and its original representation, thereby leaving 
more possibilities open for interpretation.  
From this perspective, my use of the term emphasizes the uncertainty and 
plurality manifested in the televisual representation, to uncover the possibly multiple 
                                                             
340 Jonathan Culler, Literary Theory: a Very Short Iintroduction (New York: Oxford University Press 
Inc, 1997), 100.  
341 William.B.Worthen, “Drama, Performativity, and Performance,” PMLA, Vol. 113, No. 5 (Oct., 
1998), 1093-1107.  
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understandings hidden in the closed structure of the TV series. On the one hand, the 
harmony among different discourses synthesized in images is not stable, but rather 
points to new contradictions; on the other hand, the tension between language and 
image problematizes the linguistic statement and intensifies the dramatic effects.  
For instance, following the aforementioned unity achieved in the reunion of the 
emperor and the general, Wei Qing starts to persuade the emperor to keep the crown 
prince. Since he is both an important official in court and the uncle of the crown prince, 
Wei Qing’s suggestion immediately provokes the emperor’s suspicion. The emperor 
turns cold-faced and looks penetratingly into Wei’s eyes, asking why he suddenly 
cares about the crown prince and whether he is sent by the empress and the prince. 
(Figure 6-6) The suspicious eyes and the sharp tone completely overturn the harmony 
manifested in the moving reunion scene a moment before, implying that another round 
of tension is set in motion. The harmony just achieved through the stratification of 
image thus leaves the temporary resolution open, giving way to new contradictions.  
 
 
Figure 6-6: The emperor becomes suspicious of Wei Qing’s intention 
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On the other hand, the emperor’s facial expression and tone also destabilize his 
speech. Whereas he does reassure Wei Qing that he would not change the candidate 
for his successor, his face suggests that he is discontented with the crown prince. 
(Figure 6-7) The later episodes prove that he never really liked or trusted the crown 
prince, which leads finally to deposing him.  
 
 
Figure 6-7: The emperor reassures Wei Qing that he trusts the crown prince to 
be a good emperor, but his facial expression shows otherwise.  
The double suspicion towards both language and image manifests the great 
performative capacity of the television series. That means, in a medium like this, the 
language and image often betray each other, which keeps the narrative alive to evoke 
psychological attachment. The tension between language and image is far from a new 
concern for critics. As is commonly recognized, language is in nature analytic, 
articulating meaning explicitly, whereas image is in nature descriptive, provoking the 
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use of language to make a statement about the meaning.342 While language can pin 
down meanings from an image, an image can tell more than language.  In his cinema 
books, Gilles Deleuze distinguishes the silent film and talking cinema, suggesting that 
once film incorporates language into image so that the language could be immediately 
and transparently received by the audience, the language then becomes part of the 
image while at the same time engendering something new from the image beyond the 
frame of the language. In his words:  
 
The silent cinema carried out a division of the visible image and the readable 
speech. But when speech makes itself heard, it is as if it makes something new 
visible, and the visible image, denaturalized, begins to become readable in turn, 
as something visible or visual. The latter, from this point, acquires problematic 
values or a certain equivocal quality which it did not have in the silent cinema. 
What the speech-act makes visible, interaction, may always be badly 
deciphered, read, seen: hence a whole rise in the lie, in deception, which takes 
place in the visual image.343 
 
This is indeed the performativity of image. Language is performative in the sense that 
the speech act manifests something other than the speech itself; similarly, image is 
performative in the sense that it makes the acts visible, therefore renders linguistic 
statement problematic.  
The television dramatic series, recognized as a genre with narrative dominating 
image, may have the most potential capacity for this performativity. To put it in 
another way, insofar as the dramatic contradictions are pushed forward by talking, the 
image can always subvert the words to problematize the narrative, to question the 
character’s verbal expressions, and to intensify the dramatic effect.  
In a word, image and language interdependently betray, compensate, and 
balance each other to render the television screen a performative space, to construct an 
                                                             
342 Paul Messaris, Visual Literacy, Image, Mind, and Reality (Boulder, San Francisco, & Oxford: 
Westview Press, 1994), 22. 
343 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: the Time Image, 229. 
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energy-flow scheme to balance the family and the empire, the emperor and “Tianxia,” 
and spill the energies over into the audience.  
The most obvious scene to portray the relationship between Emperor Wu and 
“Tianxia” is the one in which the aged emperor with his little son (the future emperor) 
visits the martyr’s village. [Episode 58] Since the majority of the village men have 
been enlisted to fight against the Xiongnu Hun, the village now is full of disabled 
veterans and starved women and children. While the emperor is at first enthusiastic 
about the glory of the heroic village, he is shocked by what he sees: aged veterans 
deformed, haggard women in rags, and skinny children naked. Although the veterans 
show great zest in seeing the emperor, in a loving, admiring rather than distant or 
fearful way, he cannot help feeling guilty about the cost of his military aggression. 
(Figure 6-8) Standing in front of the monument of the martyrs against the ordinary 
people kowtowing at his back, the emperor silently sheds tears, murmuring to himself: 
“no war anymore.” Upon the inquiry of the little prince, he holds the boy up in his 
arms, symbolically placing the future emperor among the common people, between 
the dead and the living, and between foreign and domestic affairs. (Figure 6-9 and 6-
10) Indeed, the image puts the emperor among, rather than above, the common people, 
figuratively suggesting the logic of the empire—“Minxin-Tianxia.”   
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Figure 6-8: The emperor is dismayed by what he sees in the veteran’s village 
 
Figure 6-9: The emperor stands in front of the monument of the martyrs 
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Figure 6-10: The emperor holds up the little prince standing between the 
monument and the people behind him 
In the succeeding sequence, we are told that an attempted assassination has 
been prevented in the palace. It is the former prince of the Xiongnu Hun, now the 
bodyguard of the emperor, who saves the emperor’s life. The conversation between 
the emperor and the Xiongnu prince suggests that the Xiongnu Huns are absolutely 
subdued by the Chinese, both militarily and psychologically, implying great 
accomplishment and harmony in foreign affairs. On the other hand, the assassination, 
together with the experience in the martyr’s village, reminds the emperor of the 
domestic disharmony. He later delivers a rescript of self-accusation to all under 
Heaven to criticize himself for being so militarily ambitious and ignorant of the 
people’s living condition, promising that the future policy would be focused on the 
rehabilitation of the people’s wellbeing. Thus far, it completes the loop of the 
emperor’s life. While he reconciles forces and accumulates the domestic resources to 
achieve the glory in territorial expansion, it is also the domestic people’s welfare that 
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constrains and holds back his personal ambition. While he learns to manipulate, 
balance different forces to transform them to his advantage, he is far from being a free 
man who can carry out his plan at will. In fact, what he does can only be justified in 
the framework of the empire.  It is the empire, or all under Heaven, that legitimizes his 
behavior, and organizes the diversified forces into the highest level of harmony.  
Indeed, without the discourse of the empire, the emperor’s life would be full of 
inexplicable mistakes and unspeakable cruelty. For instance, after he decides to pass 
the throne to the under-aged prince, he forces the prince’s mother, the young, beautiful, 
mystically renowned Lady Gouyi, to die immediately so that the mother’s family 
cannot dominate the future young emperor. Such a decision manifests the emperor’s 
far-sighted vision and determination, yet also perpetuates the tension between the 
empire and the family, which makes the Chinese empire a continuous flow of both 
positive and negative energies, and which puts the emperor in both a transcendent and 
empirical situation.  
The emperor’s double identity makes it hard to evaluate his life 
accomplishment. This is what the otherwise closed-structured TV series leaves open 
for the audience. The series is framed by the conversation between the aged emperor 
and the great historian Sima Qian. In the first episode and the last episode, Emperor 
Wu is shown talking with the historian about his historical writing, especially Sima’s 
evaluation of him. It is as if the entire drama is folded within the historian’s book, out 
of the historian’s writing, which is in fact the producer’s claim. However, the 
appearance of Sima Qian in the drama ironically destabilizes the historian’s writing, 
rendering the established perspective problematic.  
After reading the historian’s book on himself, the emperor is infuriated to the 
extent that he first orders the book burned, then changes his mind, yet spits a mouthful 
of blood and faints on the huge pile of bamboo slips. Later during the meeting with 
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Sima Qian, he expresses his respect for the historian’s righteousness and courage, yet 
continues to defend himself for what he did, suggesting that nobody could really 
understand his ambition, accomplishment, and sacrifice in order to build a great 
empire. Apparently moved by the emperor’s sincere speech, Sima Qian admits that the 
emperor is the greatest ruler for a thousand years, his achievement beyond the reach of 
others. Still insisting on keeping the objectivity of historical recording, he nevertheless 
implies that he might lack the perspective to write about the emperor, which to some 
degree denies his own writing. [Episode 58] 
There are, perhaps, two functions of this conversation scene. One is to show 
the emperor’s dramatic reaction toward the book, further accentuate his character as an 
overbearing yet open minded hero, and provide an opportunity for the emperor to 
defend himself; the other is to exhibit Sima Qian’s response to the emperor, to 
question the historian’s ability to write about such a great hero, and thus cast doubt on 
the objectivity of the historical account.  
Needless to say, such a scene serves to glorify the emperor’s image, liberate 
the emperor from the historical writing, and reinsert him in the emperor’s own 
narrative, the narrative that justifies his goal to establish a great empire. It is the 
discourse of empire, rather than the historian’s writing, that enfolds the emperor, the 
discourse that elevates the emperor’s cacophonous life into the highest harmony yet at 
the same time leaves the evaluation of the emperor open. At the end of the series, the 
voiceover states that shortly after Emperor Wu’s death, the Xiongnu Hun divided into 
two groups due to the multiple attacks from the Han. One group went to China to live 
with the Chinese people, and the Xiongnu Hun as a people gradually disappeared 
owing to assimilation among the Chinese. The Chinese empire hence also consists of 
the blood of the Xiongnu.  
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Thus ends the TV series of Great Emperor Wu of Han. The scheme of energy 
flow finally leads to the great harmony of the Chinese empire—the inclusion of the 
Xiongnu Hun, symbolic of the all-encompassing, assimilative, and centripetal power 
of China. The emperor’s image is thus overlapped with the empire’s image manifested 
in the Great Wall, with the latter replacing the former, implying that while the emperor 
is deceased, the empire stays, in the images of the eternal landscape.  
 
Conclusion 
It is significant that the “emperor series”—spanning two thousand years of 
history from the first emperor Qinshihuang to the Qing emperors—all adopted a 
similar representational strategy. The imagination of the empire is opened up through 
the representation of the imperial family, and the theme of balance and harmony is the 
common trait among the representations. Even in the most prosperous, ascendant 
periods of history, as in the reigns of emperors Han Wudi, Tang Taizong, Qing Kangxi, 
et cetera, the representations seek to dramatize empirical contradictions and leave 
harmony and abundance as the goal to be achieved or the background to be 
remembered. Each representation could be regarded as the epitome of the imperial 
history, one that favors practicality over idealism, while the notion of “Tianxia” is 
omnipresent. In other words, even though the TV series idealize the image of the 
emperors and their relationship with the people, the dramatic portrayal of the empirical 
situation accentuates the difficulty of achieving that kind of ideal. It delivers the 
message that, even in the most glorious historical period, it is hard for an emperor to 
succeed in managing affairs of state and carrying out an imperial blueprint. This is 
proved true in other TV series as much as in Han Wu da di. As director Hu Mei 
defended the glorification of Emperor Yongzheng’s image in the TV series Yongzheng 
wangchao (The reign of Yongzheng), she took Yongzheng as a reformist and the TV 
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series was aimed at dramatizing the hardship he faced during his reform to accentuate 
his heroic image: 
 
There is a latent theme in Yongzheng wangchao. That is, it is the difficulty of 
managing state affairs (zhi guo nan治国难 ), and also the difficulty of 
benefiting the people（li min nan 利民难）. For Kangxi to treat everyone 
generously and with tolerance is difficult; for Yongzheng to be strict and 
severe with subordinates is also difficult. In a word, it is hard to manage the 
“family.”(dang jia nan 当家难)344  
 
Setting aside the analogy between state affairs and family affairs, which has 
been discussed at length, the sympathetic attitude toward the emperor in Hu Mei’s 
speech as well as in the TV series implies the understanding and sympathy toward 
contemporary reform. Insofar as “it is difficult,” it requires patience and faith in the 
leadership from the people to support the reform. The “empire representation,” hence, 
provides a justification for the side effect caused by contemporary economic reform 
on the one hand, and reassuring precedents in the prior periods on the other.  
Contemporary society has witnessed enough social discord: the growing 
income gap between the rich and the poor, the disadvantaged working class expressing 
discontent in the competitive market, the corrupt government officials trying to seek 
“rent” from the economic reform, and the disoriented people struggling in the spiritual 
void… All these problems challenge the legitimacy of the reform and the market 
economy. Coincidentally, the historical TV series, especially the emperor series, all in 
one way or another address these kinds of problems, and provide a reassuring “cure” 
centered on the heroic emperors. Nevertheless, the “cure” is not so concrete or 
pragmatic as to suggest an effective way to resolve the problems, but rather symbolic 
                                                             
344 Interview with Hu Mei. See Fang Jinyu, “ ‘Gaige huangdi’ zouhong yingping, Yongzheng wangchao 
huobao jingcheng” (The reformist emperor is hot on screen, Yongzheng Dynasty explodes in Beijing) in 
Feng Xingge et al, eds., Jujiao “huangdi zuojia” Eryuehe (Focus on the “emperor writer” Eryuehe) 
(Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2003),160. 
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and transcendent as manifested in the discourse of “Tianxia” and in the images of 
harmony and abundance.  
In this sense, the support of the “empire representation” from the central 
government is not so much an endorsement of traditional values, nor an attempt to 
directly identify with the past ruling houses, but rather the effort to elicit faith (in the 
government), confidence, and national pride from the people.  On the other hand, the 
semi-autonomous “field” of television suggests that there has been this bottom-up 
demand for the “empire representation,” especially from the educated audience. The 
production and consumption of the historical TV series, therefore, manifested itself as 
the convergence of the public appeal. Besides the psychologically reassuring function 
of this genre symptomatic of contemporary social reality, it seems, there is the 
paradigmatic, enduring imperial thinking—the “imperial-time regime”—that is 
deeply-rooted in the Chinese public and constantly conveys its transcendent value 
throughout history.  
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PART IV—PREFACE 
 
Minority Historical Fiction: Alternative History of the Chinese Empire 
 
To conclude, minority has two meanings that are related, no doubt, but very 
distinct. First of all, minority denotes a state of rule, that is to say, the situation of 
a group that, whatever its size, is excluded from the majority, or even included, 
but as a subordinate fraction in relation to the standard measure of that regulates 
the law and establishes the majority. …There follows a second meaning: minority 
no longer denotes a state of rule, but a becoming in which one enlists. To become-
minority. 
                                                                 ----Gilles Deleuze One Less Manifesto345 
In summer 2004, when I was traveling in Beijing, I noticed that the taxi drivers 
were all consumed by a serial radio broadcast entitled Wolf Totem, which tells a story 
of a Beijing educated youth (zhiqing) raising a wolf cub in the inner Mongolian 
grassland during the Cultural Revolution. What attracted the audience is not just a 
nostalgic portrayal of one’s youth, however, or an emotionally-charged story of “man 
and his pet,”346 but what is hidden in the image of the wolf—the lupine spirit. I later 
realized that the radio broadcast was adapted from a bestseller literary piece—a 
combination of fiction, history, and sociopolitical lecture by Jiang Rong, 347 
pseudonym of a social science professor.  
Wolf Totem engendered a phenomenal sensation in contemporary China, not 
only because it portrays a heartbreaking story between man and wolf, or the 
breathtaking landscape and exotic lifestyle on the Mongolian grassland, but also 
because it articulates a bold argument about Chinese civilization and national 
                                                             
345 Gilles Deleuze, “One Less Manifesto: Theater and Its Critique” in Mimesis, Masochism, and Mime, 
ed. Timothy Murray, (Ann Arbor: The university of Michigan Press, 1997), 255.  
346 Haiyan Lee, “The Lord of the Wolves” in the online source: The China Beat: Blogging How the East 
is Read, June 19th, 2008. Electronic access:  
http://thechinabeat.blogspot.com/2008/06/lord-of-wolves.html 
347 The English translation of the novel by Howard Goldblatt does not include the excerpts from the 
historical documents at the beginning of each chapter and the appendix—the lengthy lecture on Chinese 
civilization.  
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characteristics from a minority perspective. It adds another layer to the contemporary 
“empire fever,” leading people to re-pondering the past Chinese Empire, not from the 
centripetal, Han-centered, moralistic historical perspective, but from a centrifugal 
direction, proposing a vital, rather than supplemental, function of the ethnic minorities 
for the prosperity of Chinese civilization. Moreover, it suggests that minorities 
contribute to Chinese history, not only through territorial expansion, but also through 
spiritual rejuvenation. In other words, rather than being culturally deprived barbarians 
assimilated by Chinese civilization, minorities help perpetuate the civilization by 
infusing the much-needed competitive spirit and energy to the degenerate, static 
Chinese society. 
To some extent, Wolf Totem brought to a climax the discussion of Chinese 
empire and Chinese history, which I will come back to later in this chapter. What 
struck me as significant is that it concludes more than a decade’s writing on Chinese 
history from a minority perspective. These writings, which I will term “minority 
historical fiction,” are the focus of this section. 
 
What is minority historical fiction? 
 When the seemingly objective, following-the-history-books, media-friendly 
historical representations occupy the center stage of mass culture, the so called 
“serious” literary field has also turned its attention to imperial history. The once 
experimentalist, vanguardist writers such as Su Tong, Zhang Chengzhi, and Wang 
Anyi also projected their imagination onto the cultural screen of the past Chinese 
Empire. However, they often situate themselves in a marginal position to write about 
imperial history, from either an individual or a minority perspective, to create an 
imagined, alternative account that de-centers and deconstructs the totality of the well-
established, dominant, official history. Since their works are often connected with 
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minority ethnic groups, I characterize them as “minority historical fiction.”  These 
works usually depict a lifestyle or spiritual pursuit specific to a certain minority group, 
yet they all attempt to elicit universal or transcendent values or characteristics that 
could be critical and constitutive of the perpetuation of Chinese civilization. They are 
also inclined to make general comments on Chinese history, in terms of Han-minority 
interactions, the recognition of which plays a critical part in the ever-expanding 
representation of the Chinese Empire from the minority perspective.  
To some extent, minority historical fiction shares some territory with both 
root-searching literature and new historical fiction. Emerging from the mid-1980s and 
exemplified by works by writers like Han Shaogong and A Cheng, root-searching 
literature characterizes the literary landscape in contrast to that of the Mao’s era. As 
Huang Ziping pointed out, rather than portraying an ethical, utilitarian world in which 
a “great man” has “morality, responsibility, and a sense of vocation” to strive for his 
ideal and self-realization in Mao’s era, root-searching literature emphasizes the 
“aesthetic situation, the atmosphere, the cultural sedimentation, the celebration of the 
power of nature, the unrefined, wild and basic beauty in the crude, primitive mode of 
life.”348 Minority writers such as Zhang Chengzhi, A Lai, Zhaxi Dawa, and Han 
writers like Wang Anyi, Gao Jianqun could be loosely put into this group.349  
On the other hand, new historical fiction is brewed by writers who “are 
engrossed in re-creating an aura of history, or in an aesthetic of historical imagination. 
They are concerned with the peripheral rather than the dominant, the legendary rather 
than the logical, and the individual rather than the integral, breaking corporate wholes 
                                                             
348 Huang Ziping, Xingcunzhe de wenxue (Literature of the survivors) (Taipei, 1992) 192. See Xudong 
Zhang, Chinese Modernism in the Era of Reforms (Durham & London, Duke University Press, 1997), 
138. 
349 Xudong Zhang, Chinese Modernism in the Era of Reforms (Durham & London: Duke University 
Press, 1997) 137; Howard Yuen Fung Choy, Remapping the Past: Fictions of History in Deng’s China 
1979-1997 (Ph.D dissertation, University of Colorado at Boulder, 2004), 85. 
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into fragmentary cases.” 350 Put otherwise, “New historical fiction” comprises those 
works that are free from the paradigm of traditional historical writing, those that 
replace historical research with fiction, and those that attempt to convey a discourse 
rather than represent historical reality. In other words, writers “cease to think with 
historical materials, but rather, take history itself as the material of thinking.”351 
Writers like Mo Yan, Su Tong, Yu Hua, and other aforementioned writers have 
practiced such writings.  
Needless to say, both concepts are loosely defined, and writers themselves 
usually don’t agree on such categorizations. What is significant here is the attention 
given to the paradigmatic shift in the literary world. Inasmuch as writers consciously 
choose the aesthetic over the didactic, the poetic over the political, the periphery over 
the central, they automatically take a marginal stance against the official, dominant 
account of history. What is at stake here is both the individual identity and the national 
identity. “History” in both categories of literature remains an amorphous figure that 
explicitly or implicitly deconstructs and subverts the totality of the linear, 
homogeneous, official history.  Consequently, these types of literature engage in an 
ongoing project of creating an alternative history, problematize and de-center the 
existent definition of national indentity, and negotiate a new national identity from a 
marginal, minority perspective.  
In this regard, minority historical fiction could be placed either in “root-
searching literature” or in “new historical fiction,” filtered through the lens of imperial 
history. Specifically, for our purpose of analysis, there are three categories of minority 
historical fiction. The first category consists of those portrayals of Chinese history 
from a marginal, individual perspective, for example, Su Tong’s fictional depiction of 
                                                             
350 Howard Yuen Fung Choy. Remapping the Past: Fictions of History in Deng’s China, 1979-1997, 
(Ph.D dissertation, University of Colorado at Boulder, 2004), 22. 
351 Ibid.  
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the imperial history. The second category compromises those that manifest the 
continuity of premodern and modern history regarding family lineage and ethnic 
interactions, for instance, Wang Anyi’s Fact and Fiction (Jishi yu xugou纪实与虚构), 
Gao Jianqun’s The Last Xiongnu Hun (Zuihou yige Xiongnu 最后一个匈奴). The 
third one includes those that identify with the ethnic minority groups, romanticize the 
minority cultures, criticize yet also complement the Han cultural center, for instance, 
Zhang Chengzhi’s Spiritual History (Xinling shi心灵史) and Jiang Rong’s Wolf 
Totem (Lang Tuteng, 狼图腾).352 Needless to say, these categories are interrelated and 
overlap. The individual, familial, and national identifications all have to do with the 
search for both individual identity and national identity. 
Gilles Deleuze used to take minority as a critical term in power relations. He 
defines minority as either concrete or abstract, either in terms of a state of rule, or in 
terms of a cultural stance that is still becoming. In his words:  
 
To conclude, minority has two meanings that are related, no doubt, but 
very distinct. First of all, minority denotes a state of rule, that is to say, the 
situation of a group that, whatever its size, is excluded from the majority, or 
even included, but as a subordinate fraction in relation to the standard measure 
of that which regulates the law and establishes the majority. …There follows a 
second meaning: minority no longer denotes a state of rule, but a becoming in 
which one enlists. To become-minority….Minority here denotes the strength of 
a becoming while majority designates the power or weakness of a state, of a 
situation.353 
 
For Deleuze, minority signifies both the actual being and the potential 
becoming. In the first sense, minority represents the fewer in number, the subaltern, 
and the powerless, for instance, women. In the second sense, minority nevertheless 
implies a self-reflexive attitude, self-critical consciousness, and the power of false 
                                                             
352 Strictly speaking, Wolf Totem is not a novel about imperial history. But because it provides a lengthy 
lecture as the appendix in the end discussing Chinese history and civilization, I include this novel as the 
concluding part of the chapter.  
353 Gilles Deleuze, “One Less Manifesto: Theater and Its Critique,” in Mimesis, Masochism, and Mime, 
ed. Timothy Murray, (Ann Arbor: The university of Michigan Press, 1997), 255.  
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identification. In his words, “everyone is a becoming-woman, a becoming-woman 
who acts as everyone’s potentiality.”354  
In light of this definition, contemporary minority historical fiction thus 
contains both layers of minority: both as a material existence of ethnic minority groups 
and as a consciousness of becoming-minority. On one level, these literary works make 
visible the lifestyles and values of the minority groups that used to be overlooked in 
the majority cultural landscape; on another level, they represent the tendency to 
deconstruct the unitary portrayal of Chinese culture and history. Critically and self-
reflexively, they participate in the ongoing discussion of redefining China’s self 
identity in terms of minority-majority, periphery-center, and individual-society 
interactions.  
However, considered further, no matter how much intertwined, the two layers 
of minority nonetheless require two different approaches in order to act like minority. 
Whereas the first one—the actual being minority—starts from the margin, having to 
assimilate itself with the majority in order to be recognized and listened to, the second 
one departs from the center so that “becoming minority” is a self-critical gesture or 
tendency. In other words, they work in centripetal and centrifugal directions, 
respectively.  
If for Deleuze, minority is most and foremost about “subversion” of majority, 
the centrifugal and centripetal directions nevertheless render the “subversion” 
indiscernible. In the Chinese case, minority historical fiction manifests a much more 
complex relationship with the majority historical representation, with regard to the 
double meanings of minority.  On the one hand, minority writers, for instance, the Hui 
ethnic minority writer Zhang Chengzhi and female writer Wang Anyi, still adopt the 
patriarchal, Han-centered discourse to convey their minority status; on the other hand, 
                                                             
354 Ibid. 
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however, even though they represent a divergent, centrifugal force from the official 
history or discourse, all these writers are promoted by, or even reside in, the literary 
center. They either have won major literary prizes, or have attracted considerable 
attention from the literary society and the intellectual world. To some extent, they 
represent the literary trend of the 1990s.  
If margin and center, being-minority and becoming-minority are 
indistinguishable from each other, minority then must have ceased to be 
unidirectionally subversive. If becoming-minority signifies a major literary trend 
coexistent with the mainstream mass culture, not only in the sense of the avant-garde 
literature manifested in form, but in the sense of historical representation manifested in 
content, then minority literature has lost its purpose as minority. Its function must be 
two-fold: both centrifugal and centripetal.  
Homi Bhabha once discussed the strategy of minority. By adopting the 
language of the dominant discourse, minority makes itself a supplementary force to 
interrogate the solidity of mainstream social power. In his words: 
 
The minority does not simply confront the pedagogical, or powerful 
master-discourse with a contradictory or negating referent. It does not turn 
contradiction into a dialectical process. It interrogates its object by initially 
withholding its objective. Insinuating itself into the terms of reference of the 
dominant discourse, the supplementary antagonizes the implicit power to 
generalize, to produce the sociological solidity. 355        
                                                            
Whereas it is persuasive that the minority has to be strategic in order to be 
recognized, Homi Bhabha failed to stress enough the flipside of the strategy: inasmuch 
as the minority accommodates itself to play the game with the dominant discourse, it 
at once questions and constitutes the unity of the dominant discourse by expanding the 
                                                             
355 Homi Bhabha, “DissemiNation,” in Nation and Narration (London& New York: Routledge, 1990), 
306. 
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scope of it. In the Chinese context, instead of simply being subversive of mainstream 
Chinese culture or history, minority historical fiction creates a parallel narrative that 
contributes to the diversity and unity of the multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic Chinese 
culture. 
It is noteworthy that being subversive and being constitutive are not 
contradictory in this sense, as they target different objects. While the object of 
“subversion” is the mainstream historical discourse within China, the object of 
“constitution” is the China related to the imagined West. Indeed, the complex 
relationships reflected in the minority historical fiction manifest the double-layered 
relationships between the minority and the majority within China, and between China 
and the West. 
For centuries, the minority ethnic groups have been regarded as culturally 
inferior barbarians. Only after they were sinicized or civilized could they be included 
in the Chinese Empire, no matter whether they were ethnic subalterns or imperial 
rulers. In modern China, as historians have observed, the Chinese government has 
continued the civilizing project toward their minority brothers.356 In assuming to have 
cultural superiority, the central government was able to incorporate the minorities into 
its unified history following a linear and rigidly structured historical narrative of 
progress.357 
 Needless to say, this linear historical narrative has put China in an awkward 
situation in modern world history. The ambivalent sentiment of acknowledging 
technological inferiority yet at once insisting on moral superiority compared to the 
West, as we discussed in previous chapters, has led to the substitution of a re-
                                                             
356 Stevan Harrell, Cultural Encounters on China’s Ethnic Frontiers (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 1995),79. 
357 Jonathan N. Lipman, Introduction to Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), xxi. 
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conceived Marxism for the deeply ingrained imperial thinking. On the other hand, 
within China, the Han-centered Chinese government presumes a complete package of 
superiority over the minorities, both morally and technologically. The double standard 
towards the outside and inside, inevitably, allows room for the stratification of 
identification in minority literature. Inasmuch as the writers could identify with either 
the minority group or Chinese, their works could be subversive of the official narrative 
on account of ethnic interactions, or could be constitutive of the unity of Chinese 
history by inventing the minority to re-imagine Chinese characteristics in the world 
arena, or both. In general, the minority historical fiction under examination here 
consists of both layers of identification: with minority and with China. As a result, 
they at once rebel against the totality of official historical narrative, bring about the 
crucial contribution of minority to the Chinese Empire, and express the nationalistic 
concern by trying to re-imagine, or reconfigure Han-minority relations to improve 
China’s status in the world.    
 
The common characteristics of minority historical fiction 
Simply stated, minority historical fiction includes those works that delineate 
Chinese imperial history from a marginal, minority perspective. At the current stage, 
there are not many in quantity, and they are quite diverse. Despite their diversity, they 
nonetheless share some common characteristics. 
Characteristic 1: the dialectic between the centripetal and the centrifugal  
As discussed above, what distinguishes minority historical fiction from the 
conventionally written historical novels represented by Ling Li or Eryuehe’s works is 
that, though both about the Chinese Empire, they portray the imperial history from 
different perspectives. If history writing is to convey historical knowledge, and the 
historical novel is to make use of the available historical knowledge to create stories, 
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then Ling Li and Eryuehe’s “emperor series” belong to the centripetal historical novel 
that renders commonly known history to make it “re-appear” centered on the 
emperors and the Empire, whereas minority historical fiction belongs to the 
centrifugal type of historical novel that makes the local, suppressed, or unknown 
history “appear” from a minority perspective.358 
However, on the other hand, minority historical fiction does not negate the 
mainstream history by simply dismissing the function of the imperial center or 
Chinese civilization; rather, it incorporates the minority into the foundation of the 
Chinese Empire, creating an alternative history that parallels and complements the 
official history. Celebrating the crucial function of minorities in the past, they serve to 
re-imagine and re-construct unified, more balanced, and better-conceived national 
characteristics in the present and future. In other words, “what they write” is marginal 
in the official history, yet “why they write this way” manifests the nationalistic 
concern and reinforces the image of a unified empire from a minority perspective. 
Characteristic 2: The dialectic between the temporalization of the space and 
spatialization of history 
Critics have characterized contemporary historical fiction, especially the so 
called “new historical fiction”, as “spatialization of history.”359 Since the narrative is 
engaged in the rewriting of histories that focus on the local places, the teleological, 
unilinear, official history has been turned into fragmentary, space-specific histories. 
“By changing the tradition of ‘once upon a time’ to the fiction of ‘once upon a place,’” 
                                                             
358 In a recent talk, “The Historical Novel in Postmodernity,” Frederic Jameson mentioned that the post-
modern historical novel is to “make history appear,” suggesting the subversive and deconstructive 
effect of the postmodern historical novel.  I am borrowing his notion of “making history appear,” 
though I am not quite sure about the definition for “postmodern.”  See Jameson’s talk in the 
Colloquium “Between History and Narrative: Colloquium in Honor of Hayden White,” University of 
Rochester, April 24-25, 2009.  
359 Howard Yuen Fung Choy, Remapping the Past: Fictions of History in Deng’s China 1979-1997 (Ph. 
D dissertation, University of Colorado at Boulder, 2004); also Lin Qingxin, Brushing History Against 
the Grain (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), 17. Lin suggests that the new historical 
fiction shares a mode of “spatial narration.”                         
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as Howard Yuen Fung Choy noted, “the spatialization of history flattens the past into a 
plane surface or, more precisely, a  map, on which the shadows of the past are 
projected without the depth and weight of ‘the whole truth’ of history. None of these 
shadows can be seen as history itself; rather, they are the other of history, a fabulous 
analogy of it.”360 
As much as I agree with Choy that “the spatialization of history” cannot be 
seen as history itself, I believe that alternative histories are more than just depthless 
shadows. In the case of minority historical fiction, even though the minority places, 
the Mongol grassland or the Shanbei Plateau, for example, are the focus to construct 
an alternative history, these places nonetheless embody the transcendent values that 
are crucial to Chinese history. By discovering and rearticulating these values, writers 
turned these minority places into everlasting cultural spaces that bear the same weight 
of history. Instead of reducing these places to an uncivilized world that is left behind 
according to the linear, progressive historical time frame, minority historical fiction 
celebrates the nomadic spirit and universal values prevalent in minority places and 
promotes them to a national level. In other words, those values have transcended the 
local spaces and become national characteristics. As a result, the backward minority 
space shares the same time with the Han majority space. Therefore, along with the 
“spatialization of history,” there is also “temporalization of space.” 
Characteristic 3: The dialectic between diversity and unity 
Needless to say, minority historical fiction displays miscellaneous cultural 
scenes as the writers devoted themselves to the portrayal of various times and spaces 
and to the experimentation with different writing skills. Nevertheless, insofar as there 
is “stratification of identification” and China is an overpowering entity to identify with, 
the alternative histories indicated in the minority historical fiction nevertheless 
                                                             
360 Howard Yuen Fung Choy, Remapping the Past: Fictions of History in Deng’s China 1979-1997, 11. 
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manifest a deeply-ingrained historical understanding: unification is the key to the 
blossoming of the Chinese Empire. For instance, they all incorporate the ethnic 
minority cultures into the Han-centered culture, all take the unification of the Chinese 
Empire as normal yet celebrate the functions of minorities. They either justify the 
historical shi-trend by means of strength, or criticize the Chinese center in terms of its 
lack of morality or competitive drive. The normalization of unification, justification of 
the historical trend, and de-legitimatizing of the winner’s behavior all prove the other 
side of the imperial-time regime: its centripetal and centrifugal effects are also played 
out in the contemporary minority literature.  
As we can see in the following analysis, specifically, Su Tong’s fictive history 
de-legitimates and de-sublimates Chinese history.  A fictive, illegitimate emperor’s 
dramatic life suggests an ahistorical, metaphorical account of history: an individual is 
the victim of imperial structure, and only by escaping from that structuring could one 
gain freedom and enlightenment. Chinese history is one that is corrupt, decadent, and 
full of internal struggle, one that consumes the energy that should have been used on 
more lofty, productive causes. On the other hand, Wang Anyi and Gao Jianqun’s 
family histories link the minority groups with national characteristics, attribute the 
rebellious, the revolutionary, and the productive spirits to the nomadic peoples, and 
reveal the positive function of minority cultures in Chinese history. Further, Zhang 
Chengzhi and Jiang Rong’s works discover the spiritual values that the Han cultural 
center lacks. They not only comment on the Chinese national characteristics in 
contrast to the minority spirit, but also attempt to seek the national cure from the 
minority cultures. Especially Jiang Rong, echoes Lu Xun’s discussion of Chinese 
characteristics early last century, but instead of trying to find the national cure from 
the West, advocates a “Chinese nomadic spirit” inspired by the wolf totem in 
Mongolian culture. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
Becoming-Minority: Chinese Characteristics in Minority Historical Fiction 
 
Walter Benjamin once described an automaton chess game as a metaphor for 
historical materialism. This automaton is designed to win all the games of chess, 
answering each move of an opponent with a countermove. A puppet sits before a 
chessboard placed on a large table. A system of mirrors creates the illusion that the 
table is transparent. However, in fact, an expert chess player sits inside the table and 
guides the puppet’s hands by means of strings. Benjamin mockingly suggests that the 
puppet is called “historical materialism” as it will win in all circumstances.361   
Following the discussions in previous chapters, I would like to borrow this 
metaphor and suggest that, philosophically and symbolically, the puppet is called the 
“Chinese Empire” and the expert is the “imperial-time regime.” Moreover, in addition 
to making the table look transparent, the mirrors reflect all the moves between the 
puppet and the opponents. Minority historical fiction, in this regard, represents part of 
the fragmentary reflections in the mirrors. 
This chapter will examine these fragmentary reflections of Chinese imperial 
history, from a marginal, individual, minority perspective. The works range from Su 
Tong’s fictive account about imperial history to Jiang Rong’s wolf epic on the Mongol 
grassland. They manifest the multi-layered, diverse interactions between the minority 
and the majority, yet in the meantime, they converge in constructing positive national 
characteristics to re-imagine Chinese history and redefine national identity.    
 
                                                             
361 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn, 
(New York: Schocken Books, 1968) 253. 
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Su Tong’s Wu Zetian and My Life as Emperor: individual against history 
Among Su Tong’s historical fictional works, which are normally considered as 
“new historical fiction,”362 only two are set in imperial times: My Life as Emperor and 
Wu Zetian. Even though Su Tong refuses to take these novels as “new historical 
fiction,”363 and believes that these two novels portray two different kinds of history,364 
the two novels nonetheless fit into the category of “new historical fiction” in the sense 
of “taking history itself as the material of thinking.”  
Indeed, in both novels, imperial history appears to be the star-crossed 
background of the individual’s life. Through poetic language, metaphor, and imagery, 
history, as an abstract concept, is conveyed as a culture, an atmosphere, a spell, a 
bottomless abyss that would eventually swallow the rationality, beauty, and humanity 
of the characters. The court struggle, or the imperial culture, creates an inescapable 
web of signification that determines the position, the role of its players. The identity of 
the characters is pre-determined, loaded with foretold warnings. Any attempt to 
change one’s fate will result in irrational choices and catastrophic consequences. In a 
word, imperial history is a life-destroying power regime. Rather than an ideal 
Confucian society characterized by order and morality, it is full of self-destructive 
power struggles that eventually lead to loss of humanity and self-alienation.   
In light of the model of structure-agency to examine the imperial culture, the 
two protagonists, Emperor Duanbai and Empress Wu, then become two agents whose 
                                                             
362 Jin Han, Zhongguo dangdai xiaoshuo yishu yanbian shi (The Evolution of the art of contemporary 
Chinese fiction) (Hangzhou: Zhejiang daxue chubanshe, 2000), 260.  
363 Wang Zheng, “Su Tong fangtan” (Interview with Su Tong) in Wang Zheng and He Ping, Su Tong 
yanjiu ziliao (Research materials for the study of Su Tong), (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 2007), 
5.  
364 Su Tong, Preface to Hou Gong (Imperial palace) (Nanjing: Jiangsu wenyi chubanshe, 1994), 1. 
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positions are pre-determined, although they both try to change their fate in the 
imperial structure. In both stories, history is portrayed as a stifling power machine 
such that no one can avoid its structuring, even though the story of Empress Wu is 
supposedly real, yet the one of Duanbai is completely imagined.  The difference lies in 
that, whereas Empress Wu Zetian triumphs over the life-suffocating structure defined 
by her gender at the cost of self estrangement, the fictive emperor Duanbai fails his 
assigned role as an emperor. Yet, there is another twist. Empress Wu’s success 
eventually appears to be nothing but a failure, for she has never been free from history, 
from historical judgment. She is still defined by her gender role, as a woman, a wife, a 
mother, and a sister, rather than as a capable political ruler. Though the third-person 
narrative attempts to provide an objective account to celebrate her victories, the first-
person narrative from her sons nevertheless portrays her as an inhumane mother. 
When she utilizes her husband, her friends, her sister, and her children as the stepping 
stones to the height of power, she is seen to have alienated herself and lost humanity. 
Therefore, her success as an extraordinary woman is accompanied by her failure as a 
woman. As Su Tong claims, “I don’t have the desire to invent a Saint Empress Zetian, 
so this novel as well as this famous woman will unavoidably fall into the historical 
stereotypes.”365  On the other hand, in My Life as Emperor, the immature, willful, and 
ignorant Emperor Duanbai nonetheless gains freedom and salvation after he becomes 
an ordinary tightrope walker. Political failure leads to individual enlightenment and 
freedom. 
 Su Tong once noted that he has always been interested in the unpredictable 
and uncontrollable turns of individual’s fate within history: “I sigh over the turbulence, 
the ups and downs of life, and have come to feel that the perfect life is nothing more 
                                                             
365 Su Tong, Preface to Hou Gong. 1. 
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than the organic unity of fire and water, of venom and honey.”366 The specificity of 
history has ceased to be significant, as an individual’s agency against a well 
established power structure becomes the focus. What is implied in this understanding 
is that, for Su Tong, history could be a myth designating the imagined imperial order, 
whereas an individual could be a fictive character freely travelling in and out of that 
order. In other words, the character could transgress the boundaries between the past 
and the present, sharing the consciousness with the narrator.  
Therefore, in Su Tong’s mythic historical world, history is timeless, amoral, “a 
kaleidoscopic world” full of color, desire, passion, palace intrigues, suffering, and 
slaughter. Only stepping out of this world could one gain a clearer perspective and 
find enlightenment. Su Tong has dreamed of obtaining that calm, aloof, disengaged 
perspective from a distance, “to transform myself into an old customer at some 
teahouse on an ancient street in the midst of a kaleidoscopic world with its teeming 
masses, and soak up the passage of time with my eyes.”367 Yet, he is also aware that it 
is difficult to have that distance, since everyone lives in history and is defined by 
history. “The distance between the individual and history is both far and near. I see 
history as some music playing outside my wall or a scary dream on a rainy night; 
history might see me as an ignorant frog sitting at the bottom of a well.”368 The desire 
to create a distance and the awareness of the impossibility bring about the ambiguity 
and ambivalence toward history in Su Tong’s fiction. Instead of playing an 
enlightened intellectual who is openly critical or simply enthusiastic about history, Su 
Tong seems to dwell on the history as it is portrayed, conscious of self-limitation for 
                                                             
366 Su Tong, Preface to the English translation of My Life as Emperor, trans. Howard Goldblatt, (New 
York: Hyperion East, 2005), v-vi.  
367 Ibid. Preface to the English translation of My Life as Emperor, v.  
368 Su Tong, Preface to Hou Gong,1. 
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not being outside it. This ambiguity of being both inside and outside history is most 
vividly manifested in My Life as Emperor. 
In this novel, an illegitimate adolescent becomes an emperor due to the 
empress dowager’s secret manipulation; his throne is later overthrown by the 
legitimate brother and the deposed emperor turns to being a tightrope walker; his 
favorite concubine Lady Hui is forced out of the palace owing to other women’s 
jealousy and intrigues, yet she later is discovered as a prostitute; his loyal servant, the 
young eunuch Swallow follows him to be a log-balancing performer and finally dies 
under the Peng army’s knives. The Xie Empire falls, and the former emperor Duanbai, 
later the tightrope walker, spends the rest of his life in a monastery walking the 
tightrope during the day and reading Confucius’s Analects at night. 
The story is fictive and dramatic, yet it best reflects Su Tong’s purpose to 
portray life as full of contradictions and dramatic turns against history.369 Stylistically, 
this novel is developed around phonetic puns, metaphorical images, parallel storylines, 
and symmetrical structure, all of which are skillfully woven together to construct a 
degenerate imperial culture determining and consuming an individual’s life. It starts 
from an individual’s attempt to break away from the imperial structure and search for 
a new identity, yet ends at his return to the imperial culture to look for the cure for 
humanity through Confucius.     
Among other tropes, the most obvious phonetic pun is “Wang,” which could 
refer to two distinctive Chinese characters in the novel: “wang”王 (ruler) and “wang”
亡 (death). The double meaning of the term “wang” (ruler-death) foreshadows the 
doomed fate of the imperial culture. Literally, it documents two emperors’ 
unavoidable deaths: the former emperor’s passing in the beginning; the last emperor 
Duanwen’s violent end at the conclusion of the novel. Symbolically, it suggests 
                                                             
369 Su Tong, Preface to the English translation My Life as Emperor, vi.  
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Duanbai’s death as an emperor when he is deposed, and therefore links the entire 
imperial culture with inevitable decline and fall.  
Most tellingly, the connection between “wang” as ruler and “wang” as death is 
articulated through the calls of birds. As an embodiment of freedom, the bird 
announces the death of the emperor and the beginning of a free individual. The image 
of a birdcall about death first appears to accompany Duanbai’s departure from the 
imperial palace as a dethroned, ordinary man:  
 
I saw a gray bird fly by overhead, its strange cry slicing through the sky.  
Wang-Wang-Wang. (207)370 
 
Later the image repeats itself several times, gradually reinforcing the curse on 
the emperor and the empire. During Duanbai’s pennilessly floating around, he 
accidentally runs into Lady Hui, now a prostitute, and rekindles their passion for 
several days. Yet, after he realizes how Lady Hui has completely changed, he decides 
to leave. Then he sees the birds again:  
 
[B]ut in my adolescence and early adulthood, it was these free-flying 
creatures that captured my fancy….When I felt especially lonely, I struck up a 
conversation with the birds. 
Wang-Wang. I shouted to birds flying overhead. 
Wang-Wang-Wang. Their echoing response quickly covered mine. 
(242) 
 
The connection to “wang” as death now serves to indicate the death of Lady 
Hui as an imperial concubine, the end of their romance, the last memory of himself as 
an emperor, and the beginning of his search for a new identity. In addition to 
announcing the death of the emperor and his lover, when the bird appears for the third 
                                                             
370 The quotation is from the English translation. In the original Chinese version, “wang” here is the 
Chinese character 亡 (death). Note that page numbers for all subsequent citations are given in 
parentheses in the text. 
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time, it also cries for the people who are blindly ruled by the life-destroying Confucian 
values. On his way to Pinzhou, Duanbai passes a village struck by devastating plague. 
However, a young man refuses to leave the village, for he needs to obey his mother 
and tend his late father’s grave in the village. 
 
An indescribable shiver ran through my body as I took one last look at 
the filial young man before hurrying back onto the road….What could I say to 
him? In the end, I framed my parting comments in the cries of a bird: 
Wang-Wang-Wang. (245) 
 
The bird’s cry now turns into foreshadowing of the death of the empire 
dominated by inhumane virtues and values. These values, for the narrator Duanbai, are 
more ruinous than the pandemic plague. Echoing Lu Xun’s assertion that the 
Confucian values “eat people,” the bird’s cry manifests the humanistic awakening of 
the narrator. He realizes that one individual’s enlightenment cannot save the empire 
from falling. Even without an external attack, the empire could inevitably decay from 
within. This pessimistic, worrying concern has ever since haunted Duanbai even after 
he has become a successful tightrope walker cheered by audiences numbering in the 
thousands: 
I knew that I had gained approval as a tightrope walker. It was magical, 
it was incredibly moving. 
Something else echoed faintly in my ear: It came from the throat of a 
bullfinch that did not know what it meant to be tired; it flew to me from an 
eave on the roof of the Charming Phoenix, and left in its wake a familiar cry 
that drowned out human noises: 
Wang-Wang-Wang. (267) 
 
This time, the bird presents itself to herald the impending fall of the Xie 
Empire, which takes place shortly after:  
 
But for some reason, my thoughts froze, and the scene before me was 
the Great Xie Palace going up in flames, fire and more fire. And the sound 
filling my ears was the plaintive cry of the bullfinch: 
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Wang-Wang-Wang. (278)    
 
Thus far, the bird accomplishes its mission as a messenger of fate in the second 
half of the novel. Witnessing the fall of the Xie Empire, the bird verifies the ominous 
message from the madman Sun Xin. In fact, the repetition of the bird’s crying replaces 
and echoes the repetition of Sun Xin’s message in the first half of the novel. Sun Xin, 
an old, mad imperial attendant, nevertheless turns out to be the only enlightened figure 
who has foreseen the fall of the Xie Empire. 
 
“Autumn is deepening, and calamity will soon befall the Xie Empire.” 
(5) 
“The fire is out, and calamity will soon befall the Xie Empire.” (18) 
“An assassin’s arrow has been shot, and calamity will soon befall the 
Xie Empire.” (24) 
“Now that eunuchs have gained favor, calamity will soon befall the Xie 
Empire.” (43) 
The Emperor is young, and very cruel, he muttered, and calamity will 
soon befall the Xie Empire….His [Duke Zhaoyang’s] mournful comment was 
the same as the one that had so often come from the mouth of the madman Sun 
Xin. (77) 
His [Sun Xin’s] deep red lips were parted, and it almost seemed as if I 
could hear his raspy voice say to me, Sun Xin is dead, and calamity will soon 
befall the Xie Empire. (100) 
 
Sun Xin is dead, yet his reiterated, spell-like prognostic message foreshadows 
the fate of the emperor and the empire, as if the fate has been written and determined 
in advance, as if he is reincarnated into the bird continuing to cry for the end of the 
empire, and history. 
It is noteworthy that the image of the bird emerges together with the 
appearance of Lady Hui. Originally a free-spirited, quick-witted, charming girl, Lady 
Hui captivates the young emperor for her innocent motion of imitating birds flying.  
The emperor falls in love with the girl as well as the birds. Yet the palace intrigue 
among women gradually destroys Lady Hui, transforms her into an overly sensitive, 
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insecure, hateful woman, and finally ends her life as an imperial concubine. On the 
other hand, the power struggle within and outside the court also turns the young 
emperor into a cruel, immature, irrational ruler, and eventually leads to the end of his 
identity as an emperor. The image of bird therefore signifies the two lovers’ pursuit of 
freedom, their desire to escape from the imperial culture, and their future adoption of 
new identities. 
There is a parallel storyline about the young emperor Duanbai and Lady Hui, 
also repeatedly associated with the image of birds and birdcalls. When Duanbai finally 
fulfills his dream of becoming a free bird as a tightrope walker, Lady Hui becomes a 
prostitute as an ordinary woman. The shift of identities, especially the change of Lady 
Hui’s identity, is seen by some critics as a pitiful transformation. For instance, Wu 
Yiqin takes Lady Hui’s turning into a prostitute as the loss of Lady Hui and the last 
obstacle that Duanbai has to overcome in order to become enlightened.371 Yet in the 
novel, the narrator takes Lady Hui’s unfortunate experience as the depravity of the 
body and the enlightenment of the soul:  
 
I assumed that so many coarse, low-class whoremongers had 
fundamentally changed this genteel girl from Pinzhou, a once lovely girl who 
had run beside the Imperial Stream flapping her arms like a bird. Now she truly 
did seem like a bird, one that had flown off, never to return, leaving behind 
only a degraded body that was beginning to smell. (241) 
My beautiful, unlucky Lady Hui had already been transformed into a 
free-flying white bird, and from now on we would soar in the same skies, our 
meetings limited to brief encounters and a wave of the hand; this would 
legitimize our worshiping of birds and our dreams of becoming one. 
We had reached the same goal by different routes. (264-265) 
 
Lady Hui also gains freedom. It seems that being a prostitute is the only way 
for her to become a free bird. Discarding the Confucian moral code, Lady Hui now 
                                                             
371 Wu Yiqin, “Lunluo yu jiushu” (Depravity and salvation), in Dangdai zuojia pinglun (Review of 
contemporary writers), v 6, 1992; in Wang Zheng and He Ping, Su Tong yanjiu ziliao, 311. 
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liberates her body and soul to break away from the imperial structuring. Yet at the 
same time, her lowly status manifests what Lu Xun called the “iron house” of the 
imperial culture. Insofar as her social status stays low, she is not completely outside of 
the Confucian moral hierarchy. In this regard, Lady Hui’s change serves to awaken 
Duanbai to ponder the entire Confucian culture.  
The imagery of the flying bird signifying reincarnation is not only enhanced by 
the parallel storylines, but also reinforced by the symmetrical structure of the novel. 
Besides the balance of the ominous messages articulated by Sun Xin and the bird, 
Duanbai’s two identities also mirror each other. To some extent, being an emperor is 
also being a tightrope walker. The second identity—the emperor of tightrope walking 
(走索王)—is simply a literal manifestation of the emperor's first identity. Both are 
risky, and the secret for both resides in the art of handling the rope or of ruling. On the 
other hand, the two identities also negate each other. Being an emperor is being a 
manipulated chesspiece in the imperial palace; being a tightrope walker nonetheless 
results from free choice. Being an emperor means that his fate is predetermined by his 
role in history; being a tightrope walker makes him live again as a free-spirited 
individual. Duanbai succeeds as a tightrope walker by skillfully balancing on the rope, 
yet he fails as an emperor in court.  
Here exists the most ambiguous and ambivalent message of the novel: it is not 
clear why Duanbai fails as an emperor: whether because he has never learned to 
handle the art of imperial rule—Confucius’ Analects, or because the imperial culture 
itself is doomed to destroy humanity and alienate people. In other words, is Duanbai’s 
failure a manifestation of the importance of Confucianism for the Empire or the 
criticism of its strangulation of freedom and humanity, or both? 
In the last part of the novel, Duanbai packs two things in his backpack: a dog-
eared copy of The Analects and a coiled tightrope, which he regards as two unrelated 
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objects that have perfectly summarized his life (286). The symbolic meaning is 
transparent. While he has never been interested in reading The Analects as an emperor, 
he spends the rest of his life walking the tightrope and reading The Analects. Yet, 
about this bible of imperial rule, Duanbai notes, “Sometimes I feel that this sagely 
book holds all the wisdom of the world; sometimes I don’t get anything at all out of 
it.” (290) 
Duanbai is contradictory, and the message is ambiguous. On the one hand, it 
could mean that this sagely book holds the key to the success of the Empire; on the 
other hand, however, it could mean that the book betrays its sagely reputation and has 
tricked all the people in the world. The tightrope walker, the free flying bird, does not 
seem to be fully enlightened after all. 
In various places of the novel, there are remarks on history as false narrative: 
how later historians mistakenly portray Duanbai’s romantic life, how Duanwen is 
judged as an emperor who lost the empire, etc. It seems that Duanbai attempts to 
recover the real history with his own narrative, and feels that “we had both been 
tricked and made fools of by the forces of history.”(279) 
There are several levels to approach this comment: one, written history, official 
or unofficial, is not trustworthy; two, Confucianism maintains an undeterminable 
status in the imperial culture; three, if Confucianism determines the writing of history 
and therefore the writing of him, Duanbai is not sure whether he still lives in history or 
is out of it.  
From an emperor whose fate is historically determined, to a free individual, to 
the individual facing history, the novel compresses a mythic, allegorical account of 
imperial culture. Moreover, the ambivalent attitude toward history manifests Su 
Tong’s agnosticism toward history: “what is real, and what is unreal?”372 Without 
                                                             
372 Su Tong, Preface to Hou Gong, 1. 
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obvious moral judgment, Su Tong manages to make his novel an organic whole of 
contradictions and ambiguities. Just as the name of the empire Xie (燮) “harmony” 
ironically signifies the disharmony that fills the novel.  
However, as agnostic, sarcastic, and ambiguous as it is, the novel nonetheless 
is partial toward a sense of death, doom, and the end of the imperial culture, 
manifested in the ominous messages, the non-productive palace intrigues, the cold 
blooded killing, and natural catastrophe resulting from human behavior. History serves 
as a backdrop for an individual’s spiritual journey. Yet, rather than finding the lofty, 
the sublime, the enlightened, he finds himself involved in the writing of history, and 
also being written by history. History is an overwhelming existence. There is no 
escape. 
In contrast to other contemporary historical novels that celebrate the collective 
consciousness centered on the imperial discourse, My Life as Emperor rearticulates the 
freedom of the individual against the imperial structuring. Echoing from afar Lu Xun’s 
observation that “the feudal society eats people” (吃人), Su Tong nonetheless delivers 
a more ambiguous account to characterize the relationship between individual, empire, 
and history.   
 
Wang Anyi’s Fact and Fiction: family history reconstructed 
If Su Tong’s individualistic journey to the past brings about an “iron-house” 
history which is decadent, suffocating, and unproductive, Wang Anyi and Gao 
Jianqun’s family histories seem to accentuate the revolutionary, productive aspects of 
history borrowed from minority groups.  
In Wang Anyi’s autobiographical novel Fact and Fiction, the narrator, a 
female writer based in Shanghai, explicitly suggests that this novel is a result of her 
root-searching effort in creating a matrilineal family history. The entire novel is 
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structured around the questions: “who am I?” and “where did I come from?” As 
Huangzhi Wang appropriately pointed out, Fact and Fiction directly responds to the 
contemporary identity crisis, and serves as an attempt to reconstruct the self and the 
national identity.373 
As a child of Communist “comrades” （同志）  who take power after 
Shanghai’s liberation, the narrator grows up in an awkward situation in which she 
finds herself at a loss over her own identity. On the one hand, she belongs to the 
authoritative revolutionaries who speak official Mandarin and look down upon the 
local Shanghainese as “urban petty bourgeois（小市民）”; on the other hand, she is 
one of the outsiders often considered as bumpkins（乡巴佬）  by modern 
Shanghainese. She is attracted to the colorful, mysterious, and capitalistic Shanghai 
past and desires to fit in; yet her mother, as an orphan who has grown up in Shanghai 
and later abandoned Shanghai to become a revolutionary, deliberately conceals her 
own Shanghai identity and discourages the child’s interest in the old Shanghai. To the 
child, Shanghai’s past is more appealing; to her mother, Shanghai does not have a past. 
As an authority figure, the mother embodies the revolutionary discourse that 
consciously renounces the old world and is enthusiastically determined to transform 
the world anew. In the revolutionary discourse during Mao’s era, Shanghai, as well as 
the other parts of the country, has been cut off from tradition and become an “orphan” 
city without history. As Huazhi Wang observed, “Shaped by class consciousness in 
modern times, Communism did not only reject urban bourgeois modernity, but also 
attempted to cut off historical connections to Chinese tradition with an ardent ideal of 
constructing a brand new world. It produced an ‘orphan culture,’ within which 
‘history’ is designed to be an ideological apparatus to prescribe identities for offspring 
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of the voluntary orphans.”374 The ideological denial and the material existence of 
Shanghai’s past create a double image for Shanghai, which reinforces the child’s 
feeling of displacement and being an outsider to Shanghai. To make it worse, the 
father is from a remote place where it is impossible to have a family reunion. As a 
result, the entire family becomes orphans of Shanghai. When other people enjoy 
family reunions during the Spring Festival, the only place they can visit is another 
comrade’s home.  
Loneliness characterizes the narrator’s life. She has no extended family to 
associate with, no family history to hold onto, and she finds it difficult to form any 
meaningful relationship with people in her own life. Shanghai, as a modern 
cosmopolitan city, signifies both a concrete and symbolic place where people can only 
have transient, superficial relationships. This is proved true in both capitalist and 
socialist modernities. During the first half of the 20th century, capitalist modernity in 
Shanghai has transformed the kinship-based relationship into a class-based, monetary 
relationship. This is manifested in the mother’s encounter with her wealthy aunt when 
the mother is little, which partly explains the mother’s resolutely abandoning Shanghai 
to become an eternal orphan. After the revolutionary comrades take over Shanghai, the 
relationships between the comrades and the local Shanghainese are still in tension. 
Rather than forging an equal, socialist, universal “comrade-like” relationship among 
people, the comrades take pride in their position as saviors that transcends the 
Shanghai local identity, whereas the Shanghai people take pride in their old local 
identity. Comrades are still outsiders, Shanghai is still Shanghai, and the relationship 
between them remains superficial and arbitrary. In Shanghai, the narrator observes, 
“becoming strangers seems to be the only result of our encounters with other people. 
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[The relationship] between the unknown pedestrians jostling each other in a crowd on 
the street signifies the eternal relationship between us.” 375 To conquer loneliness, the 
narrator starts her root-searching project to define her own position in history, 
temporally and spatially, which she believes would give her a sense of determinacy 
and convey a fateful relationship. “I have always been trying to find and construct a 
fateful relationship, to locate my position in the crowd and clarify my situation, so as 
to avoid losing myself and falling into confusion.” (203) 
The root-searching project is structured around temporal-spatial coordinates, 
with the vertical axis representing the historical timeline, the family lineage, and the 
horizontal axis signifying her personal relationship with the social environment. In her 
words, she attempts to answer two questions: “how did she come to this world?” and 
“what kind of relationship does she have with the surrounding world?” (5)  
Following the mental mapping of the two axes, the narrator launches her 
journey in two distinct directions, leaping back and forth between two coordinates.  
The novel consists of ten chapters. Five chapters document the narrator’s personal 
experience, whereas the other five chapters present the family history the narrator 
creates. Personal experience and family history alternate with each other, forming a 
parallel narrative roughly following a chronological order. Starting respectively from 
the origin of the mother’s family and the narrator’s childhood, the two storylines 
eventually intersect at the narrator’s current position, where the mature writer 
consciously and self-reflexively conducts a root-searching project. In other words, the 
narrator is both the starting point and the ending point of the narrative. She remains a 
powerful existence as a character, a narrator, and an analyst. The search for self 
identity is so powerful that she is the omniscient presence even in the exploration of 
the ancient family myth.  
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Needless to say, the parallel narrative creates suspense, which constantly 
directs the reader to navigate between ancient history and contemporary events, 
creating enormous temporal gaps. However, the narrator remains a first-person 
narrator, easily bridging the temporal gap by continuing to use phrases like “my 
ancestors,” “my great grandfather,” and so forth. Such narrative strategies keep the 
reader alert to the narrator’s conscious choice of temporal-spatial configuration, and at 
the same time make the novel a coherent whole.  The effect resembles the parallel 
action in the cinematic narrative. It forms a continuum of consecutive narrative 
segments, each representing a temporal progression. It involves the reader in a 
constant awareness that in the end the temporal and the spatial will intersect, yet the 
intersection is continually delayed. The recurring juxtapositions of the past and present 
thus at once sharpen the contrast and bridge the gap between the past and the present 
during the process of reiteration.   
Indeed, the portrayal of the narrator’s personal experience differs dramatically 
from the construction of her family history. The personal experience is trivial, 
ordinary, manifested in children’s play, neighbor’s small talk, gossip, and everyday 
quotidian relationships. For the narrator, her personal experience as a child living in 
Shanghai and later an educated youth sent down to the countryside seems to be 
organized around a series of arbitrary events which she has no control over. These 
arbitrary events, including the Cultural Revolution, the “up to the mountain and down 
to the countryside movement,” were commonly perceived as the heroic, grand 
historical projects conducted during the narrator’s adolescence and young adulthood. 
However, against the distinctive historical background, her story unfolds quietly, 
unremarkably, and self-reflexively in the trivial, everyday life. The revolutionary 
discourse that used to mobilize several generations and boil the young people’s blood 
at that time is submerged and subverted in the people’s socializing activities. With no 
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epic stories, no revolutionary sublime, no serious trauma, no regret, only a sigh is left, 
and endless loneliness. She does not feel enthusiastic about the revolution, nor does 
she feel sorry about her life. She just quietly accepts what history has thrown to her 
and attempts to find “profound” relationships with people. History to her is a series of 
contingent events that bring people together, and the meaning of history is produced 
through people’s intimate relationship with each other rather than from official 
ideology or discourse. For instance, she observes that the students’ parades during the 
Cultural Revolution resembled today’s “parties.” They liked parading because they 
could gain freedom from school, present themselves on the street, and develop 
premature romantic relationships. For the narrator, parades provide a temporary 
community, one that has little to do with the nominal meaning of the event—
revolution, but that creates an atmosphere of collectivity and sociality. Yet such 
collectivity is transient and artificial, unable to form a fateful relationship. “Just like 
the modern ‘party,’ the parade in effect creates an illusion that people are mingled 
together and getting along well. It is a smoke ball.”(128) A seemingly grand historical 
event is thus reduced to the children’s performative socializing activity and the 
narrator’s musing on personal relations.  
Similarly, the experience of being a zhiqing (educated youth) in an Anhui 
village must have played an important role in the narrator’s life. Yet she treats the 
experience just as another contingent event, enriching her life when growing up. With 
no apparent scar, no unforgivable regret, she deems this period of personal history an 
important stage of life toward maturation, which lends her an opportunity to reflect on 
“fateful relationships.” History is represented in such a way that the insignificant 
things such as her partying with other zhiqing, staying with the resentful Director 
Zhang’s family, having dinner with mother’s comrade—her “Uncle”, and her 
negotiation with the gongshe (the Commune) to get a room, and so forth, become the 
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fateful events of her life. Otherwise put, for the narrator, it is not the big historical 
event—the Cultural Revolution—that has determined her fate, but her relationship 
with the local people that has altered her life. Through her experience in the village, 
she realizes what a fateful relationship is: “Survival binds us together. For survival we 
must depend on others, and be depended on. This kind of codependent-otherwise-
both-fall relationship is a fateful relationship. Yet this codependence tires us out. Since 
we know that it is very important, we feel it is even more unbearable. We yearn for 
freedom and lightheartedness one day when we can get rid of this relationship like 
taking off our clothes.” (226) “Yet after I come back to Shanghai, walking on the 
crowded street where freedom is everywhere and everyone is independent, I 
nevertheless feel confused. I find that freedom is tied together with loneliness. They 
are together.” (227)  
Her desire to find a fateful relationship yet maintain individual freedom ends in 
a paradox. A fateful relationship can cure one’s loneliness, yet its heaviness constrains 
freedom; on the other hand, absolute freedom is always accompanied with loneliness. 
The important historical event, the Cultural Revolution, thus becomes a site for the 
narrator to do intellectual, philosophical speculation. Her emotional detachment 
offsets the heaviness of history imposed on her, making the otherwise unbearable 
memory into material for thinking, not about history, but about human relations. “To 
some extent, the Cultural Revolution resembles a big game (大游戏) or a big gossip 
（大闲话）  among adults,” the narrator writes, “it gave us an opportunity to 
experience all kinds of human relations and broaden our life experience….When it 
ended, the world went back to its normal track. We feel it was like a dream.” (227)  
This assertion opens two avenues for understanding. First, a significant 
historical event is relativized as such lighthearted socializing activities as “game” or 
“gossip,” rather than the more commonly accepted notions as drama, comedy, tragedy, 
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or farce. It not only counteracts the grand revolutionary discourse during the Cultural 
Revolution, but also dissolves the heavy traumatic sentiment prevalent after the 
Cultural Revolution. The narrator’s personal experience, therefore, lays bare a peculiar 
account against the sublime, the dramatic, and the traumatic portrayals of the Cultural 
Revolution, and forms a singular temporality against official and mainstream histories.   
Such an individualistic perspective to formulate the everyday as the basis of 
experiencing history, needless to say, deconstructs the grand narrative of history in 
every sense. History has been hollowed out, de-centered, manifesting multiple 
temporalities instead of just one single historical time. Harry Harootunian once 
discussed the disjuncture between the empty, homogeneous, modern time and the 
individual, lived, observed, human time. He argues that Japan’s modernity is 
characterized by the contemporaneity of multiple temporalities and the coexistence of 
the lived individual time and a totalizing national time.376 In this light, Wang Anyi’s 
Fact and Fiction gives a particular version of Cultural Revolution that reminds one of 
the “doubleness” of history—official, mainstream history and lived, individual history.  
Second, the narrator claims that she discovers the fateful relationship during 
the Cultural Revolution when people have to rely on each other for survival, yet she 
later counterbalances this statement by stressing that the Cultural Revolution is an 
irrational, abnormal event and thus the relationship developed during that time is 
temporary, therefore not profound or fateful enough. “The Cultural Revolution in our 
lives seems to lack a logical connection,” she says, “it appeared abrupt. It neither came 
inheriting our previous connections, nor did it leave us some connections to pass on. 
Of all the relationships we developed during this time almost all disappeared 
afterwards. We just attended a game of destroying the old procession and forming a 
                                                             
376 Harry Harootunain, History’s Disquiet: Modernity, Cultural Practice, and the Question of Everyday 
Life (New York: Colombia University Press, 2000).  
306 
 
new one. Now that the game is over, we have returned to our old position and old 
track, never to meet again.” (227)  
The narrator’s frustrated desire to find a fateful relationship to conquer 
loneliness in reality is intertwined with the desire to find her origin to position the self 
in history. However, contrary to the trifling, almost loquacious portrayal of personal 
experience, the family history is full of grandiose glory and heroic adventure. 
Enthusiastically and stubbornly, she makes sure that her family history is one that 
combines legendary heroes, mystical beauties, breathtaking landscapes, bloody battles, 
and fateful events. As mentioned above, the parallel narrative between the “trivial” in 
the present and the “grand” in history not only intensifies the “triviality” and the 
“grandness” simultaneously, but also subverts the myth of history writing. On the one 
hand, the lived history opens up a temporal gap with the official or mainstream 
histories (as in the “scar literature” of the late 1970s) and thus undermines the official 
history; on the other hand, by creating a history of her family, the narrator 
demonstrates how history could be constructed in a self-serving way. In other words, 
both the official history and her own history—experienced or imagined—could be 
myths. This self-deconstructive approach renders fact and fiction indistinguishable in 
both her personal and family histories and as such, reveals the paradox of her both 
wanting to deconstruct the contemporary history and desiring to create a grand ancient 
history. In other words, for the narrator, the allegedly heroic, or for some chaotic, 
revolutionary age only inscribes itself as insignificant and nonsensical, which has left 
nothing but a feeling of loneliness, unfulfillment, and displacement. The revolutionary 
ideal only appears empty, and what people experienced has always been the ordinary 
everydayness—growing up, making friends, falling in love, starting a career, and still 
feeling lonely. She does not show enthusiasm for participating in the grand historical 
moment, and does not show the post-revolutionary disillusionment, either. What else 
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is more powerful to deconstruct a notorious historical event than basically saying that 
nothing eventful has happened? In the meantime, however, for her, a grand narrative 
of history is much needed to define one’s identity, and if it is not in the present, then it 
should be in the past.  
There are several possibilities to approach this paradox. First, the narrator may 
intend, consciously or unconsciously, to demonstrate that no matter what a 
“revolutionary” time period it is, people still live their ordinary daily lives, and the 
grand narrative or sublime discourse only proves to be a big lie, a delusion. Second, 
contradictorily, there is this eternal unfulfilled desire for meaning and determinacy, so 
much so that the illusion of ideology is a necessity rather than an option. The attempt 
to unmask official discourse and deconstruct official history is thereby undercut. This 
paradox resembles the narrator’s uncompromising pursuit for the fateful, 
interdependent relationship and simultaneous personal freedom, exemplified in her 
romantic encounters with several men. Third, to play the gender or minority card, 
maybe it suggests that as a woman in the patriarchal society, her history has largely 
been ignored, for she lacks the authorial voice to write history; given the right to be a 
participant or an architect of history, she could write her own version of history. But 
again, paradoxically, her construction of the family history does not fundamentally 
differ from a patriarchal family myth. She chooses the mother, instead of the father, as 
the starting point to forge her family lineage. Yet from the mother on, back to 
medieval times, her family tree is still following a patrilineal track. Huazhi Wang 
observantly suggests that maybe it is precisely the writer’s gender consciousness, to 
show that in a patriarchal society, it is impossible to create a matrilineal history since 
all the links have been missing. 377  
                                                             
377 Huazhi Wang, Problematizing the Nation, 367. 
308 
 
Perhaps, as a self-reflexive melting pot, the novel contains all of the above. But 
one thing is for sure, that is, her fictional family history is hero-centered, sweeping 
through time and space, very much like an epitome of Chinese history condensed in a 
family. In this sense, the past seems to serve as the wish-fulfillment of the present, and 
the search for self identity is extended to the search for national identity. The question 
then becomes: in what position is the contemporary time period in history? Or, how 
could we position contemporary China in history? If an “orphan” is lost in the modern 
city Shanghai without a family history, a nation is also lost without referring to its past. 
The narrator’s root-searching adventure starts from her mother’s family name: 
“Ru,” which is such a rare name in China that the narrator believes that all “Ru” 
people are connected in terms of kinship. According to the historical materials she has 
referred to, people with the surname “Ru” are descendents of a nomadic people, the 
Rouran in the Northern Wei period. Yet her mother’s hometown, Shaoxing in 
Zhejiang province, is in the South. How did the uncultured, nomadic people living in 
the northern steppe end up being mingled with the rice-growing southern folks? Her 
hunting for the missing links therefore is characterized by the “travel” back and forth 
from the nomadic, minority culture in the north to the agricultural, Han-centered 
culture in the south. In a broader sense, it is the quintessence of Chinese civilization, 
featuring ethnic interactions and the combination of martial and civil achievements.   
It is a process of “choosing one’s ancestors.” For the reason that the historical 
materials are so fragmentary, the narrator has to make arbitrary choices to select the 
materials. She confesses that during her research historical heroes always reside in the 
center of her choice, for “only heroes have the active strength and energy [to create 
history], ordinary people can only follow the trend.” (137) For instance, among several 
possibilities, she chooses to believe that after the Rouran kingdom fell and disappeared 
from history, the rest of the Rouran people were subdued by another nomadic people, 
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the Tujue, and later conquered by Mongols.  The rationale behind this choice is that 
she needs Genghis Khan to be her ancestor: 
 
Sometimes I feel my creation of history has the tendency of the subject 
matter dictating the research. Long before I found any materials, I had already 
decided to find a hero to be my ancestor. I always want to associate myself 
with a strong bloodline, consciously or unconsciously. This feeling originates 
from a wish, that is, I wish that the life that has been passed on to me has been 
a necessity instead of a contingency of chance. I wanted this life to have swept 
away all obstacles and for nothing to have prevented it from being passed on. I 
wanted it to have thrived wherever it went, blossomed whenever it was seeded 
and born fruit whenever it blossomed. I wanted it to have marched on with 
songs and joys, and, with the confidence of decisive triumph, to have been 
passed on from generation to generation, eventually to me. It is only a hero 
who can realize this wish. (139)   
I must have a great hero as my ancestor. I don’t believe there has been 
no hero at all in my several-thousand-year history. Even if there isn’t, I want to 
create one by myself. I want him so distinctively brave and successful that all 
people are willing to follow him. His glory will shine all through the tunnel of 
time and illuminate our ordinary lives. (137) 
 
“Our ordinary lives” motivates the wish to find a great hero as her ancestor. 
The other reason she picks up Genghis Khan is because: “The Mongols were brave 
and adept in battle. They united the steppe and dominated the world for a time. The 
great name of Genghis Khan was known in all central Asia.” (137) Note here that in 
Chinese history, Genghis Khan was unquestionably celebrated as a great Chinese hero. 
The Yuan Dynasty established by his grandson was considered part of the unified 
Chinese Empire which had the largest territory in Chinese history. Therefore, the 
selecting of Genghis Khan is evoked by a sense of nationalistic sentiment and an 
Orientalist consciousness in today’s world. The narrator nostalgically imagines the 
glory of Genghis Khan’s triumph and self-mockingly confesses: 
 
The glorious name of “invader” has tempted my vanity. In modern 
times, which I know about well, there have been all sorts of records of how 
other people have bullied us. Such traces were left everywhere in the streets of 
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the city where I live. It was out of the question for us to even think about 
bullying others. The world after I was born was already settled into a stable 
picture of assignment, and territories have been defined by international 
treaties. “Invading” is again out of question. We missed the glorious times of 
seeking hegemony and our life is very dull and ordinary. I can only project my 
fantasy to root-searching. (172) 
 
This is an “Ah-Q” style self ridicule. Rather than advocating imperialist 
invasion, it suggests an imaginary “vengeance” against the foreign (Japanese as well 
as Western) powers who have exercised their hegemonic power over China,378 
overcompensating for the uneasy feeling of national inferiority in today’s world order. 
As a result, Genghis Khan is not only a family hero for the narrator, but first and 
foremost a national hero, who embodies the great qualities that the narrator aspires to 
in order to define self- and national identity.  
If a hero symbolizes the lost unity for a community, a family or a nation, where 
everybody could identify with the hero to define one’s identity, the narrator 
nevertheless does not always stick to heroes to construct her family history. Instead, 
she intentionally moves her attention to the “losers”—the “untouchables” (堕民).  
This was a group of Mongol nobles who were downgraded as lowly people and 
transported to the south without any official records of them. This is how the narrator 
links her nomadic origin with the southern hometown. For the narrator, the 
“untouchables” are in effect also heroes because, during a dark age of unfair treatment, 
they survived and passed on a strong bloodline. They not only survived, they 
triumphed. They were not tamed, but civilized. One of them, Ru Fen, even passed the 
imperial civil examination and became a Zhuangyuan (the highest ranked candidate in 
the exam, top candidate for the civil service). Even though there are several 
possibilities to create a lineage, she insists on having all the ups and downs, triumphs 
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and failures, in her family. For instance, when she discovers that Ru Fen might not 
belong to her immediate family, she ponders:  
 
 It is not a big problem to go back looking for new materials and 
imagine something different. But it is a big problem to experience a new 
psychological and emotional identification. My imagination has come through 
such a turbulent, long way and established such a cherished bloodline. I love 
Mugulü.  I love Cheluhui. I love Genghis Khan. From my whole heart I 
sympathize with and love the “untouchables.” I have also had feelings for Ru 
Fen. My musing has traveled through a dark, long tunnel of time. Mountains 
and rivers have experienced many ups and downs, and changed their lords 
many times. This several-thousand-year history has been flowing through my 
heart….I don’t want give up any of them. I want every possibility. I cannot 
give up the Rouran. I cannot give up the Mongol Empire. I cannot give up the 
Naiyan. I cannot give up the Zhuangyuan, either. The Zhuangyuan embellishes 
our family history. He makes us close to the central authority. My ancestors 
have always been warriors with long blades battling on galloping horses; the 
Zhuangyuan adds a sense of grace and poetry to our family history. (359-60) 
 
This combination of ups and downs, martial and civil, characterizes the 
narrator’s family history. Isn’t it the allegory of Chinese history? For the narrator, 
what she inherits from her ancestors is not just the blood, but also the vitality and 
vivacity (生命力). Even though her own grandfather was bankrupt and eventually 
abandoned his family, she considers him as a lost child with abundant energy. “A 
bankrupt family must be an energetic family,” she writes, “destructive force and 
constructive force are two similarly strong forces, both originating from the billowy 
current of life.” (51) Destructive and constructive forces have both been made explicit 
in the narrator’s family history, and the real subject of her root-searching project turns 
out to be “life.” “I think, this is the reason why I like the latter type of literature 
[family history fiction],” the narrator claims when self-consciously pondering upon 
family history fiction. “It makes such concepts as ‘life,’ ‘kinship’ more tangible and 
approachable. How wonderful it is to experience that!” (408) 
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However, for the narrator, “life force” or “spirit” has always been tied up with 
“traveling” or “floating.” In addition to her ancestors’ journey from the steppe to the 
southern land, her imagination also “travels” wildly through time and space. She likes 
to use metaphors such as “river” as life, and “tunnel” as time, manifesting her 
consciousness of the fluid relationship between past, present, and future. While she is 
determined to define her position in life and history, she finds it unstable and 
undeterminable, for life is forever flowing forward, just as the whole of humanity is 
floating on the ocean, and destiny is just an unknown realm. “Earthquakes make our 
continent a drifting island.” When she describes her experience of an earthquake in 
Shanghai, she discovers that “according to this observation [that our continent is a 
drifting island], there is no shore or destination any more. Everything is floating.” (314) 
Ironically, such absolute insecurity and disorientation nevertheless lead to another 
discovery: this is the moment when she finds the fateful, “profound” relationship with 
her husband while the shadow of death unexpectedly befalls them. It seems to suggest 
that, when our common destiny is death, to love is the only “profound” relationship 
between us. 
In another novella by Wang Anyi, The Heartbreaking Pacific, the narrator 
makes a similar observation: “In the end I want to repeat what I have said before: ‘if 
we look at maps, continents appear to be floating islands as well.’ All land on earth is 
rocks in the sea, on which humanity resides. Humanity is actually a drifting species, 
and drifting is our eternal destiny.”379  
Perhaps, it is both the consciousness of, and the fear of, the eternal “floating” 
and “drifting” that motivate her to search her historical origin. To search the origin is 
to return, return to the past, and also return to home. “On the surface, family history 
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fiction has a sense of returning home,” the narrator explains, “it seems that after it 
[family history fiction] is tired of traveling, it eventually goes home.” (408) Where is 
the home for the narrator? It is the intersection of the past and the present, after 
discovering the fate and the force of “life,” with the life force determining one’s fate. 
Yet this “life” is still traveling, floating, with its forces, still passing on, to the future. 
Herein resides the novel’s last paradox: being aware of destiny as an unknown 
yet desiring to define a recognizable home to return to. This home, as discussed above, 
points to the unknown future that inherits the “life force” from the past. This life force, 
which has manifested itself as characteristics of bravery, creativity, resilience, and 
persistence that have been passed on from her ancestors to the narrator, determines her 
ancestors’ fate, as well as hers.  The contingent historical events, such as the Cultural 
Revolution, could not alter the narrator’s fundamental fate as a writer, since she 
believes that she inherits the talent from her ancestor, the Zhuangyuan Ru Fen. 
Without the Cultural Revolution, she might have experienced something else to 
become a mature writer, since she also inherits an unrelenting spirit from her nomadic 
ancestors. It is the life force that designates a sense of determinacy and fatefulness, 
rather than any discursive historical events. This life force, should we say, resembles 
the “national spirit” or “national characteristic,” which combines the characteristics of 
the nomadic hero and the characteristics of the Chinese intellectual. It is the life force 
that has created the glory of the Chinese civilization. It transcends the specificity of 
the narrator’s time and space, and during a period that lacks a sense of direction, 
provides reassurance of the continuity of Chinese civilization.  
In this light, it is noteworthy to ponder the significance of minorities in this 
novel. Minority here embodies double meanings: both as the ethnic minority in the 
narrator’s blood and as a woman who creates history. For the narrator, nomadic people 
have contributed their productive, diligent, and competitive spirit and energy to 
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Chinese civilization, just as women and men have constructed history together. It is 
through the interdependence, cross-fertilization between minority and majority, and 
the fateful, profound relationship between men and women that history has been made. 
Rather than regarding the ethnic minority people as culturally inferior to the Han 
majority, or taking women as marginal beings without authorial voice, the novel 
pronounces the fateful significance of minority in the construction of self- and national 
identities.   
 
Gao Jianqun’s The Last Xiongnu Hun: foundational myth of Chinese culture 
If Wang Anyi’s Fact and Fiction suggests the interdependent, mutually-
reinforcing relationship between the Han Chinese and the ethnic minority in 
constructing the Chinese history, Gao Jianqun’s The Last Xiongnu Hun (Zuihou yige 
Xiongnu 最后一个匈奴) makes it even more explicit that it the synthesis of the 
nomadic and the sedentary spirits that has characterized the regional Shanbei culture 
and even the Chinese civilization as a whole.  
Published in 1993, the same time when Fact and Fiction was published, The 
Last Xiongnu Hun follows the trend of family history fiction. It tells a story 
interweaving love and hate among several families for three generations. Like Mo 
Yan’s Red Sorghum (红高粱) or Cheng Zhongshi’s Bai Lu Yuan (白鹿原), The Last 
Xiongnu Hun centers its narrative on the interaction of several families during the 
modern revolutionary and post-revolutionary eras. To some extent, this novel could be 
put into the vaguely defined category of the “new historical fiction” for its emphasis 
on local history during the modern revolutionary period. Yet, rather than constructing 
“an oppositional discourse that challenges both the outdated discourse of revolution 
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and the now dominant discourse of ‘Chinese modernity,’” 380  this novel 
enthusiastically celebrates the triumph of the Communist Revolution and its 
determinant relationship with the region under question—the Shanbei Plateau. The 
subject of the novel, therefore, is not “revolution,” but rather, the region, or more 
accurately, the regional characteristics. As the narrator unequivocally claims, the real 
subject of the novel is the “the phenomenon of the grand culture of Shaanbei” (the 
north of Shaanxi province) (陕北大文化现象).381  
The novel vividly portrays several interrelated characters with complicated 
relationships: student-turned-Communist revolutionary Yang Zuoxin; bandit-like local 
warrior Hei Datou; Hei Datou’s widowed wife and Yang Zuoxin’s lover Hei Baishi; 
Yang Zuoxin’s son—writer Yang Anxiang; Hei Datou and Hei Baishi’s son—
Communist Party official Hei Shoushan; and Dan Hua, who is the granddaughter of 
Miss Zhao, Yang Zuoxin’s former fiancée, and who turns out to be Hei Shoushan’s 
illicit daughter, and so on and so for forth. Kinship, romance, local custom, and 
political belief are intertwined, rendering the relationships among people complex and 
unpredictable against the revolutionary background.  
Nevertheless, in addition to merely dramatizing the relationship among people, 
the writer consciously ties the characters to their regional, historical backgrounds, 
suggesting that there is a determinative relation between people and their origin. As 
the narrator explicitly explains, the primary characters of the novel “belong to four 
clans with distinctive background: the Yang clan, descended from an illicit 
relationship between a Xiongnu Hun and a Han girl in Wuerbao; the Hei clan, who are 
the descendents of the Hui ethnic minority that have immigrated to the Shaanbei 
                                                             
380 Lin Qingxin, Brushing History Against the Grain (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), 
3.  
381 Gao Jianqun, Postscript to Zuihou yige xiongnu (The Last Xiongnu Hun) (Beijing: Zuojia chubanshe, 
1993), 580. 
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plateau from Ningxia and Sichuan; the centuries-old Bai Clan, who have been living 
here since the ancient, legendary Xuanyuan period; and the Zhao Clan, who came to 
Fushi city by crossing the Huanghe River from a point beneath a Chinese scholartree 
in Shaanxi, yet later left Fushi city hurriedly.” (293)  
Diversity characterizes this region, the Shaanbei Plateau, and the ethnic 
complexity distinguishes this area from other places in China. For the narrator, one’s 
origin—ethnic and cultural alike—seems to mold one’s character, and there is a fateful 
reason why the Shaanbei Plateau became the center of the modern Chinese Revolution. 
It is this region that embodies the characteristics that nourish revolution, one that 
nevertheless appears as the cultural margin of the Chinese civilization. “The ambitious 
author wanted to write a chronicle for the 20th century, so he chose the Shaanbei 
Plateau, the desolate village, the listless small town, the dusty spiral road, and the 
splendid Fushi city, as the stage on which his characters could perform. He chose the 
phenomenon of the grand Shaanbei culture, which is deeply ingrained in every granule 
of the yellow earth and still prevalent in the modern time-flow like a ‘living fossil,’ to 
provide the poetic atmosphere and the aesthetic background of the characters’ 
activity.” (293) 
The nature of this “stage” or “background,” of course, cannot be reduced to a 
“granule of the yellow earth” or the “living fossil” such as the folk songs or the paper-
cuts that the narrator fervently describes, but is carried in the characters—their 
inherited family traits distinguish the culture of this locality. 
Specifically, the narrator makes the story revolve around the Yang family 
living in Wuerbao village, and at various places, deduces the family characteristic as 
the combination of the nomadic and sedentary spirits. This combination, manifested in 
several characters in the Yang family, comes from a foundational myth that traces 
their origin and accounts for their behavior. The novel opens with a colorfully 
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portrayed ancient legend that took place in Wuerbao village: By the end of the Han 
dynasty (202 BCE-220AD) when the Xiongnu Hun were finally driven out of the Han 
Empire and withdrew to central Asia, a young Xiongnu soldier fell in love with a Han 
girl as he retreated to the Wuerbao village. Love made him stay with the girl yet he 
had to face the punishment from the local clan. The girl determined to die with him 
even though she was pregnant. In the end it is the girl’s pregnancy that rescued both of 
them as the local clan would not kill an unborn baby. The couple survived and thus 
became the foundational parents of the Wuerbao village.  
From the beginning, the myth already sets the tone that the people living in 
Wuerbao inherit similar qualities from their ancestors: brave, rebellious, freedom-
loving, perseverant, and not necessarily obedient to the rules of authority. They are the 
descendents of, and therefore bear the traits of, both the Xiongnu Hun and the Han. 
These traits not only manifest themselves in physical features, as in their distinctive 
physique and distinctive toenails, but also in their character and behavior. Some of 
them are forever nomads, longing for roaming and freedom; some of them are 
sedentary residents, insisting on living a peaceful life. “Half of the soul in this family 
belongs to the roamers on the horseback, the other half of the soul belongs to the 
peasants who are intensely attached to the yellow earth until death.” The narrator 
writes, “[t]he roaming soul forever pursues places faraway, whereas the agricultural 
culture nurtures the perseverant protector of home. The magical combination of the 
two constructs the clan in Wuerbao. Two types of soul govern this clan alternately, 
and it is hard to achieve balance between them. Sometimes one type dominates and 
sometimes the other type dominates. Therefore there are realists and romanticists, and 
timid peasants and restless rebels.” (467) 
Thus far, we know that “Xiongnu Hun” in the title signifies something that has 
detached from the ethnic background, something that is abstract, intangible, and 
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transcendent, that is, the nomadic, rebellious spirit that was not celebrated, or even 
approved, by the official Confucian discourse in history. The narrator makes it explicit 
that the Shaanbei Plateau had been on the margin of the Confucian culture, not 
completely assimilated or “civilized” by Confucianism, which had dominated the 
agrarian culture in the imperial China. Here is a place “that was ignored by the Sage’s 
doctrines.” Yet ironically, here is also a place that has nourished the revolutionary 
spirit that rescued the dying Chinese civilization from falling.  
In several places, the narrator enthusiastically celebrates the marginal status of 
the Shaanbei plateau and its constructive function in Chinese history. This vulgar 
place, the late Qing official Wang Peifen used to state, is one that lacks traces of 
civilization, one that is excluded from the Confucian world. In his mockingly written 
report to the Guangxu Emperor, Qi bi gou (Culturally bankrupt: seven accounts), 
Wang condescendingly described the Shaanbei Plateau as a place where no beautiful 
landscape, no habitable architecture, no decent clothing, no refined food, no 
knowledge and scholarship, no graceful woman, and no rituals and morality are to be 
found. (491) In a word, this is a place where the orthodox Confucianism has had 
limited impact. However, for the narrator, it is just this place, marginal to Confucian 
culture, that is the origin of the Chinese civilization and has nourished the centrifugal, 
revolutionary forces to continue Chinese civilization. It is this place that has produced 
the peasant rebels such as Li Zicheng, Gao Yingxiang, and Zhang Xianzhong, and it is 
determined that it later became the cradle of the modern Chinese Communist 
revolution. From the origin of civilization to the margin of Confucian culture, then to 
the revolutionary center, the narrator believes that the Shaanbei Plateau has constantly 
energized and rejuvenated the static Chinese culture. In his words: 
 
The Shaanbei Plateau is, of course, the origin of the Xuanyuanshi. The 
tomb of the Huangdi Emperor [the legendary first emperor in Chinese 
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civilization] on the south of the plateau is the evidence….But because of the 
chronic wars among different ethnic groups, because for a long time, this land 
had been ruled by nomadic peoples, also because of the ethnic interactions and 
inter-marriages among different ethnicities, the Confucian doctrine could only 
symbolically stay here for a while like water, only moistening the surface of 
the ground. The great contribution of Confucianism lies in that, during the long, 
two-thousand-year grand feudal unification, it produced the centripetal and 
cohesive forces that saved our old oriental empire, preventing it from falling 
apart like the other three old empires in the world, which have disappeared 
from the long current of history; yet its [Confucianism] failing resides in that it 
constrained the energetic national spirit, limiting the creativity of this people 
known for their intelligence and diligence….Therefore, the desolate Shaanbei 
Plateau, …the Sage-forsaken wasteland…announced to the world, here, there 
was another fantastic group among the descendents of Emperors Yan and 
Huang. These born rebels, these uncivilized people, this untamed group, 
provided cardiac resuscitation for the dying national spirit. (275) 
 
The narrator then goes to suggest that, like Heaven’s intention, Mao Zedong 
chose Shaanbei as the cradle of modern Chinese revolution. The rebellious Mao 
entered Shaanbei, “like a dragon returning to his old ocean” or “a tiger submerging in 
the forest,” receiving great nurture from this land and maturing quickly as a national 
leader. American journalist Edgar Snow used to say that, the narrator recalls, it is 
probably a coincidence that the origin of the Chinese civilization became the bedrock 
of Mao’s revolution for him and his fellow men to save the nation and reform the 
national spirit. (275) 
Regardless of the narrator’s grand analysis of Confucianism and Chinese 
civilization, his observation of the Shaanbei Plateau and its relationship with modern 
Chinese history nevertheless poses several questions about Chinese history in general: 
First, he deconstructs the homogeneous Confucian culture in the imperial period. 
Rather than a commonly believed agrarian, Confucian society, imperial China is more 
heterogeneous in terms of ethnicity and cultural activity. Second, he constructs 
continuity between the imperial history and modern Chinese history. By linking the 
modern revolutionaries with the peasant rebels in the past, the narrator suggests that 
320 
 
the modern revolutionaries in effect inherited the rebellious spirit from their ancestors. 
Moreover, by turning the Confucian margin into the revolutionary center, the narrator 
creates a centrifugal spiral between the past Chinese empire and the modern nation 
state. Just as modern China has marginalized, or even tried to extinguish 
Confucianism, from the imperial historical perspective, the past Chinese Empire might 
have marginalized the modern nation state. In other words, modern China continues 
the imperial history by completing another centrifugal and then centripetal cycle. 
Third, again, after being transformed from the Confucian margin to the revolutionary 
center, the “grand culture of the Shaanbei Plateau” has transcended the boundary of 
Shaanbei, and in effect embodies the Chinese national characteristic.   
In sum, like the minority heroes in Wang Anyi’s Fact and Fiction, the 
“Xiongnu Hun” in this novel serves as the constitutive, productive, and creative force 
in Chinese history. Traveling between the marginal and the central, between the 
unofficial and the official, between the unorthodox and the mainstream, The Last 
Xiongnu Hun provides a peculiar account in the discussion of Chinese characteristics 
from a marginal perspective.  
 
Zhang Chengzhi’s Spiritual History: from contradiction to incorporation 
If Wang Anyi and Gao Jianqun’s minority historical fiction incorporates the 
nomadic spirit in Chinese national characteristics primarily from a mainstream Han 
writer’s perspective, Zhang Chengzhi’s Spiritual History nonetheless manifests a 
paradoxical position of the narrator/writer as both a marginal Jahriyya and an elitist 
intellectual residing in the cultural center. In the contemporary literary landscape, 
Zhang Chengzhi presents an unusual case in finding one’s self identity. As a Beijing-
based ethnic Hui Chinese, Zhang first viewed himself as the adopted son of the 
indigenous Mongolian people in his early writing, then reclaimed his original Hui 
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ethnic minority origin and Muslim identity in the novel Spiritual History in the early 
1990s.  
In fact, the search for self-identity goes hand in hand with the search for a 
mature national subject. Rather than a born member of a minority imagining oneself to 
be the subaltern, Zhang situates himself at the cultural center trying to find a national 
cure from a position in a minority world. No one is more radical than Zhang Chengzhi 
in identifying with the minority subaltern to criticize the cultural mainstream. As 
Yibing Huang points out, as a former Red Guard, in fact the creator of the name “Red 
Guard” (hongweibing, 红卫兵 ), Zhang Chengzhi has always followed his 
revolutionary idealism and attempted to find the maturation and redemption of his 
generation in the representation of the subaltern people. 382   Zhang Chengzhi’s 
reinvention of himself may seem sudden to some critics, but for Huang, Zhang’s 
identity shift manifests his continuous pursuit for the romantic sublime rooted in the 
revolutionary tradition and his endeavor to find an alternative form to renew Chinese 
culture, which in Zhang’s eyes, has been contaminated by materialism, nihilism, 
cynicism, and spiritual void. Claiming to be “the son of the People,” he has 
transformed himself from a former Red Guard into a cultural hero or heretic. This 
transformation, however, is not an abrupt break from the past, but rather, carries on the 
revolutionary legacy from the Maoist period. In Huang’s words: 
 
While for the others, this overcoming of alienation between the 
individual and the people [to become the socialist new man] has been, from the 
beginning, a doomed socialist fantasy, for Zhang Chengzhi, it remains a viable 
path and a historical mission for the individual subject to take on. In other 
words, what Zhang Chengzhi self-consciously pursues is not modernist irony 
or post-modernist cynicism, but the romantic sublime in the guise of a 
“primitive, tragic beauty.” Facing contradictions, dilemmas, and paradoxes, he 
                                                             
382 Yibing Huang, “Zhang Chengzhi: Striving for Alternative National Forms, or, Old Red Guard and 
New Cultural Heretic,” in Yibing Huang, Contemporary Chinese Literature: From the Cultural 
Revolution to the Future (Macmillan: Palgrave, 2007). 
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chooses not deconstruction but sublimation; and only through such trial can his 
own subjectivity finally be tempered.383 
 
In this light, his conversion to a Jahriyya seems more understandable. For 
Zhang, Jahriyya “not only stands for an obscure Sufi Islamic sect in China but also 
mirrors a new alternative for the self-generation or self-renewal of Chinese culture.” 
Huang continues: 
 
Consequently, through writing Heart History, Zhang Chengzhi 
discovered the possibility of a work that creates its own form, “modes history, 
religion, and literature into one and withstands challenges from these three 
sides at the same time.” That is to say, content and form merge into one—heart 
(xinling) or spirit (jingshen)—which also serves as “the protagonist of this 
work of my life.” And Zhang Chengzhi’s goal was no longer to be an ordinary 
individual writer among his peers, but “to be a pen of the Jahriyya, to write a 
book that they will use their lives to protect!”384 
 
Huang’s analysis is insightful, that it does not matter whether Zhang claimed to 
be the adopted son of the Mongolian people or the pen of the Jahriyya Muslim group, 
he has always been searching for the romantic, the idealistic, the sublime, and the 
redemptive that would combat the currents of political cynicism, nihilism, defeatism, 
and the frenzy of economic capitalism. And all his pursuit has reached a culmination 
and been clearly articulated in Spiritual History.  
As much as Huang provides insights on Zhang Chengzhi’s search for 
individual identity and an alternative national form through the representation of the 
subaltern people (rather than the ethnic minority people), he probably still needs to 
stress the significance of the minority in Zhang’s works. Indeed, the subject of 
Zhang’s literary adventure has always been the ethnic minority groups: the Indigenous 
Mongolian, the Hui, and later the Xinjiang Uigurs. In 1999, he published a new book, 
                                                             
383 Ibid. 113. 
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Lands and Feelings，which consists of photos and excerpts from many of his 
previous works about the three Chinese northern minority regions—the Mongolian 
grassland, the Hui Minority’s Yellow Earth Plateau, and the civilization of Xinjiang. 
The goal is to “illustrate the support, friendship, and nurturance” he has received 
“from the people of these three lands. The writer is only the son and the plot thread 
that connects them, while the people themselves are the real subject and 
protagonist.”385 Even though Zhang indistinctly put all three minority groups into one 
category “the People” and once again articulated his own position as the “son” of them, 
it is hard to dismiss the fact that he has always rooted his literature in the minority 
Other. The relationship between the cultural mainstream and the cultural margin is 
manifested in the relationship between the Han center and the minority periphery. For 
Zhang, the geographic, linguistic, and religious specificity of the minority cultures 
appears to be a contrasting color on the cultural canvas, on which the mainstream 
cultural landscape appears dull and degenerate. Rather than the politically-, 
economically-, and culturally-underprivileged groups, minority serves to unmask the 
spiritual scarcity of the Han and complements what the Han lacks. In this regard, the 
marginal position Zhang Chengzhi takes nonetheless reflects a self-critical Han-
centered perspective and manifests the at once centripetal and centrifugal tendencies 
of becoming-minority. These tendencies, contradictory as they seem, are mostly laid 
bare in Spiritual History. 
Spiritual History was published in 1990, at a time when the market economy 
started encroaching on the intellectual, scholarly space. Zhang made the Jahriyya, a 
Sufi Islamic Sect in northwestern China, the subject of his book and continued his 
spiritual journey through the discovery of a religious group. The book documents the 
                                                             
385 Zhang Chengzhi, Dalu yu qinggan (Lands and Feelings) (Jinan: Shandong huabao chubanshe, 1998). 
Preface. Also cited and translated by Yibing Huang.  
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silence and sacrifice of the Jahriyya during their more than two hundred years’ 
struggle to preserve their history and belief. From the beginning, Zhang has already set 
up a series of binary oppositions between the Han cultural center and the Jahriyya: 
material abundance vs. material scarcity; official written history vs. orally transmitted 
history; hypocrisy vs. faith; spiritual void vs. religious purity and so forth. And it is 
precisely against these binary oppositions that the portrayal of the Jahriyya seems 
significant. What Zhang seeks is not poverty and ignorance, nor religion in the narrow 
sense, but faith and humanism that he believes the Han Chinese lacks:  
 
No, you should not think that what I have described is just religion. 
What I have been describing has always been the ideals that you have been 
pursuing. Yes, ideals, hopes, and pursuits—all these that have been abandoned 
by the world yet loved by us. I will also formally describe the humanism that I 
have finally found; after reading the book you will find that this kind of 
humanism is much more authentic than the one sold cheaply by those from the 
Chinese intellectual class.386   
 
Nevertheless, “ideals, hopes, and pursuits” are attached to the specific 
geography, its material scarcity only evokes in Zhang the feelings of awe and the 
sublime:  
 
You don’t need to go deeper inside. As long as you don’t turn around 
and continue staring at it, the reddish brown cracked earth and bare mountains 
will burn your eyes. In the cruel straight sun light, your eyes will dry, crease, 
congest, and an unspeakable drought will penetrate into your heart and lungs, 
making you feel forever thirsty.387 
Here is a real remote and backward place. The landscape is severe and 
miserable, and the people’s character is rigid and bold. Except for Sufism 
(mysticism), there is no force that fits here.  
The natural conditions and the social customs are unthinkable—I can 
only use prose or poetry to express my provoked imagination; I cannot 
comprehend it. The incapacity of the intellectuals [to understand it] is the 
reason why this kind of religious yellow plateau has not yet been understood. 
                                                             
386 Zhang Chengzhi, Spiritual History, preface.  
387 Ibid. Chapter 1. 
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It is incomprehensible, you can only worship it—the region of drought 
can only survive the summer with melted snow preserved in the vault during 
the winter; yet the villages spread for three li, mules and cattle are plenty, and 
the big villages containing thousands of people adjoin each other, what do they 
drink? –the region of illiteracy lacks informed people; because of a far-
sightedness as well as parochialism, the Hui people here don’t encourage 
children to learn Chinese script, but they are all versed in the history of the past 
two hundred years. Do you know the history during Emperor Qianlong’s reign, 
Jiaqing’s reign, Tongzhi’s reign, or the 28th year of the Republic?388 
 
Incomprehensibility induces awe and the feeling of the sublime, which creates 
a sense of violent aesthetics. The land is not inhabitable. It is their religion that helps 
the Jahriyya to survive the severe environment. Yet on the other hand, to preserve 
their religious belief, they refuse to leave the non-inhabitable land and to be 
assimilated. For the outsider, it is a circle of misery. To live is to suffer, and in the 
history of the Jahriyya that Zhang documents, to live is to be killed. Religious wars 
between different sects and political suppression from the imperial court only 
reinforce the internal determination for preservation of their identity and sacrifice. 
Zhang finds in this unspeakable violence sublime spirituality. It is beyond morality, 
beyond rational choice, and debunks the hypocrisy of all other beliefs—religious or 
Confucian. It is pure spirituality. For Zhang, this awe-inspiring spirituality has been 
detached from its material condition, or more precisely, transcendent of the material 
condition. It is the universal value that the materialistic, pragmatic Han Chinese lacks. 
Moreover, instead of keeping it within the Jahriyya, Zhang believes that this 
spirituality has transcended linguistic and ethnic boundaries, and should be embraced 
by all Chinese. Contrary to the Jahriyya’s determined refusal to be assimilated by the 
Han culture, Zhang chose to write the Jahrriya history with Chinese language. On the 
surface, he attempted to find the alternative language to substitute for the lost “mother 
tongue,” the use of the Chinese language nonetheless incorporates the Jahriyya culture 
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into the Chinese cultural landscape and expands Chinese vocabulary and linguistic 
scope. In Zhang’s own words:  
 
Losing a mother tongue—Chinese and the other minority groups which 
have been assimilated would never understand the pain of losing a mother 
tongue. I am a writer. I changed the form of my novel time and again, until it 
became poetry, then this Spiritual History—I only have one desire: to make 
my Chinese escape from the limit of the square Chinese characters!389 
 
Yet Chinese is still Chinese. The desire to create a language that goes beyond 
Chinese only proves to expand the Chinese language in terms of its vocabulary. The 
identification with the marginal Jahriyya is therefore ultimately offset by his 
positionality in the Han center. In other words, he positions himself in the Han cultural 
center yet identifies with the Jahriyya. Moreover, Zhang made it clear that even 
though the book was written for the Jahriyya people, the target readers were the 
majority Han Chinese.390 As the literary critic Zhou Zexiong sarcastically pointed out, 
some ethnic Hui people are actually unable to read the book they will “protect with 
their lives!”391 Despite the original opposition Zhang sets up between the Jahriyya and 
the Han, between the spiritual and the material, despite the tracing of the Hui history 
from Middle East to China where they lost their homeland and mother tongue, Zhang 
in the end turns the contradiction into incorporation, and takes the Jahriyya as part of 
China:   
I want to tell friends, especially those youths in Shagou and Banqiao: 
Jahriyya is our own and China’s treasure. When the cyclical historical shi-
trend turns to the point where reunion is the trend again, be sure to remember, 
after losing homeland and mother tongue, don’t lose Jahriyya. 392  
 
                                                             
389 Zhang Chengzhi, Spiritual History, Part seven.  
390 Zhang Chengzhi, Preface to Spiritual History. 
391 Zhou Zexiong, “Zhang Chengzhi de jiexian” (The limits of Zhang Chengzhi), Shuwu (Study room), 
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392 Zhang Chengzhi, Spiritual History. Part seven.  
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Here, “reunion” refers to the unification of different religious groups 
worldwide. However, here also lies Zhang’s deepest ambiguity. The desire to preserve 
Jahriyya is accompanied by the desire to fuse Jahriyya into China, to have Jahriyya 
recognized and adopted by the mainstream Chinese. Rather than advocating division 
and parochialism, Zhang borrows the notion of the shi-trend and takes religious 
unification as the normal and foreseeable historical trend. Ironically, Zhang never 
bothers to ask how to achieve the cultural and religious unity yet preserve the 
uniqueness of Jahriyya as a religion. Implicitly, Jahriyya here has been detached from 
its religious essence, but becomes a transcendent cultural value in contrast to 
materialism and nihilism. In this regard, Jahriyya is not fundamentally different from 
the Mongolians on the grassland. It functions as the marginal, critical, yet 
supplemental material of the Chinese civilization. Shifting the focus from the material 
to the spiritual, from the religious to the cultural, and from the marginal to the central, 
Zhang Chengzhi not only incorporates Jahriyya into China, but also re-centers himself 
as a cultural hero. 
 
Jiang Rong’s Wolf Totem: the balance of lupine-sheeplike character 
In many ways, Jiang Rong shares similar life experience with Zhang Chengzhi: 
both born in Beijing; both sent down to Inner Mongolia as educated youths during the 
Cultural Revolution; both finished advanced education later; both identify with 
minority people and write about minority culture; and both appear to be cultural elites 
trying to discover the key to redeeming Chinese literature or history. Even the forms 
of their works look similar: neither Wolf Totem nor Spiritual History is a typical novel 
in the literary sense; rather, they both appear hybrid, incorporating historical 
documents and lengthy lectures into fictional writing. The difference is that Jiang 
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Rong did not make his literary appearance until much later, with the unprecedented 
success of Wolf Totem. 
Like Spiritual History, Wolf Totem attracted broad attention for various reasons, 
which stirred up a heated discussion on different aspects of the book. Some regard the 
book as a rare achievement of superb quality. For example, social celebrities from 
different fields articulated their admiration for the book from different perspectives: 
basketball star Yao Ming confessed that he was inspired by the collective and 
courageous spirit of the wolf.393 Business tycoon, CEO of Haier Group Zhang Ruimin 
said that the business world could benefit from the wolves’ military talent. 394 
Mongolian singer Tengger saw the spiritual connection between his music and the 
wolf’s howl to Heaven.395 Most significantly, literary critics promoted the book for its 
insightful reflection on Chinese national characteristics. They saw it as a self-reflexive 
dissection of the defect of Chinese Confucian culture in comparison with nomadic 
culture. Characterizing them as an agricultural, sheep-like culture and a nomadic 
lupine culture, supporters of the book considered Wolf Totem an epic cultural 
discovery that brings to life the suppressed wolf totem essential for the blossoming of 
Chinese civilization.396  
For the same reasons, however, the success of the book and the articulation of 
the lupine spirit also pushed the warning buttons of the other critics. They saw it as a 
                                                             
393 Yao Ming: “We want to be a pack of wolves, and I will be the head. All the wolves need to move 
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reactive book, that it promotes the law of the jungle, “confuses Chinese history, 
contradicts ethnic relations, and is anti-humanity.”397 
Indeed, from its inception, the book has been treated as more than a literary 
piece. Critics questioned the book both from literary aspects (whether it is a novel), 
historical (whether the nomadic people worshipped the wolf), and socio-cultural 
aspects (whether it is appropriate to promote a lupine spirit),398 all of which ironically 
served to boost its unparalleled success. Between its publication in April 2004 and 
August 2005, its sales surpassed one million copies. Penguin Publishing House bought 
the copyright for the English version,399 and Hollywood director, Peter Jackson, 
director of the Lord of the Rings series, also participated in the “wolf” family and 
bought the movie rights to Wolf Totem. Haiyan Lee vividly portrayed how controversy 
has constituted its success:  
 
Since hitting the bookstores in China in 2004, Wolf Totem has been a 
most unlikely bestseller and a phenomenon to be reckoned with. From the 
start, it has been riddled with paradoxes: it was written by a political science 
professor who had to remain anonymous because of his run-ins with authority 
in 1989; it went on to win ten domestic literary prizes with the endorsements 
of party officials, scholars, and business tycoons alike; the audio version was 
serialized on Radio Beijing; its sales figure is dwarfed only by that of Mao’s 
Little Red Book in the history of modern publishing in China; the author (Lu 
Jiamin) has come out of hiding after winning the inaugural Man Asian 
Literary Prize, but is not allowed to travel abroad to promote his book. 
The novel also has the distinction of attracting unprecedented 
international attention after and largely because it had become a mass cultural 
sensation within China, thereby breaking the pattern of writers and their 
works achieving fame overseas only to be ignored or spurned by mainland 
readers and critics—thanks usually to censorship, but not always. It is perhaps 
one of very few bestselling Chinese novels that has genuinely stirred up some 
                                                             
397 Long Xingjian, Lang tuteng pipan (The critique of Wolf Totem) (Shanghai: Xuelin chubanshe, 2007), 
6. 
398 See Ibid. 
399 Long Xingjian, Lang tuteng pipan, 2. 
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controversy among international critics and managed to split critical opinion 
(almost always strongly-worded) pretty much down the middle.400 
 
Needless to say, the outside, contextual controversies come from the inside, 
textual paradox—given that any single piece of work invites multiple readings. The 
novel tellingly portrays the life experience of Chen Zhen, an educated youth from 
Beijing sent down to the Inner Mongolian grassland during the Cultural Revolution. 
During his stay, he discovers that the wolf enjoys a godlike status on the grassland—
the Mongol people take the wolf as the messenger of Tenggri (Heaven) to keep the 
balance of zoology on the grassland. Moreover, there is an intriguing relationship 
between the people and the wolf—they hate the wolf, kill the wolf, yet also admire the 
wolf, and worship the wolf. Fascinated by all these, Chen Zhen decides to raise a wolf 
cub to study the wolf’s behavior. Later he indeed steals a pack of newborn wolf cubs 
and saves one to nurture with dog milk.  He takes good care of the cub and keeps a 
keen eye on him to observe him growing up. However, the little wolf cub refuses to be 
domesticated. He gradually discovers his own wild nature and more and more 
resolutely attempts to escape the leash even at the risk of his own life. To avoid being 
hurt by the growing cub, Chen Zhen cuts the cub’s fangs, which eventually leads to 
serious inflammation, only to be worsened by the cub’s constant attempts to flee. In 
the end Chen Zhen has to kill the cub as the cub’s illness has become incurable. In 
Chen Zhen’s understanding, wolf nature cannot be tamed, and to kill him as a warrior 
is to save his dignity as a wolf. The heartbreaking experience of raising the wolf cub 
enlightens Chen Zhen on two accounts. One is wolf’s decisive importance to the 
grassland and the “heavenly principle” underlying this relationship. With the project 
of socialist modernization encroaching, Chen Zhen painfully witnesses the 
                                                             
400 Haiyan Lee, “The Lord of the Wolves?” in the online source: The China Beat: blogging how the 
East is Read, June 19, 2008. Electronic access:  
http://thechinabeat.blogspot.com/2008/06/lord-of-wolves.html 
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disappearance of the wolf, the gradual loss of the grassland, and nature’s punishment 
to human beings. The other is the “wolf nature” that he learns from the cub, which he 
believes is the key to understanding Chinese civilization as well as world history. 
There is, first of all, a certain level of nostalgia, not only about the educated 
youth’s lost life experience, but also about the fading of the natural landscape, that 
evokes reader’s reminiscence. Just like the early modernist literature that mourns the 
disappearance of the “pastoral beauty” in nature during the process of industrialization, 
Wolf Totem reminds one of the retrogress of civilization when ignorant human 
behavior continually destroys the grassland against “heavenly principle,” of which 
Beijing has become a direct victim, suffering severe dust storms and air pollution. In 
other words, the articulation of the “heavenly principle” is convincing enough to win 
some environmentally-conscious people’s hearts to reflect on the project of 
modernization, which, accidentally, is in accord with the government slogan of 
“strategy of sustaining development.”  
On another level, however, by linking the “heavenly principle” with the “wolf 
totem,” the novel shifts its focus from critiquing modernity in general to critiquing 
Chinese civilization and national characteristics, which understandably stirs up deep 
water. In addition to the seemingly objective, detailed portrayal of the exotic life in the 
grassland, the life struggle between man and nature, between man and wolf, between 
human principle and heavenly principle, the book offers a provocative grand thesis on 
Chinese civilization: that the wolf totem is the precedent of the dragon totem, that 
Chinese civilization originates from nomadic culture, that the lupine spirit in the 
nomadic culture offers constant, much-needed energy to the static, passive, Han 
agrarian culture and reincarnates Chinese civilization in a cyclical manner. In a word, 
the nomadic culture is not only not the lower stage of the agricultural culture that 
represents material, technological inferiority, as the imperial history or Marxist 
332 
 
historical materialism interprets it, but is separated from its material basis and 
abstracted in a transcendent, spiritual level. It is the lupine spirit in the nomadic 
culture that constantly transfuses self-driven, competitive energy to the agrarian 
culture, thereby keeping the Chinese civilization from declining for centuries. 
Similar to Gao Jianqun’s observation in The Last Xiongnu Hun, the argument 
in Wolf Totem is nevertheless more articulate, beyond the regional boundary, and 
bolder in its theoretical speculation. It is no surprise that such a grand argument 
engenders both applause and questioning. As the critic Lei Da comments:  
 
As a literary work, Wolf Totem assembles plenty of creative elements, 
therefore it is among the precious grand narratives with epic characteristics; as 
the advocate of a certain cultural outlook, however, it claims having found the 
key to understanding the world civilization only via grasping the “lupine 
character” (狼性性格), and thus attempts to romantically, emotionally, and 
touchingly reinterpret and rewrite the entire history of humanity, of civilization, 
and of China. Even though the author has a laudable motive, is thoughtful and 
full of wisdom, the book still cannot avoid many defects.401  
 
By confirming the literary achievement of the book, Lei Da praises Wolf Totem 
for its creative portrayal of grassland life, yet meanwhile criticizes its attempt to 
rewrite history. Indeed, the major controversy that is both the book’s blessing and 
curse reside in the thought-provoking discussion of the “lupine character” (langxing 
狼性) and its essential function in history.  “Lupine character,” subverting the 
normally accepted connotations associated with the wolf as cruel, selfish, double-
hcanted, and crafty, is now defined by the characteristics that are very positive: brave, 
motivated, determined, collective-minded, disciplined, strategic, and free-spirited. It 
                                                             
401 Lei Da, “Chongdu Lang tuteng de the ruogan sikao” (Some thoughts on rereading Wolf Totem) 
originally in Guangming ribao (Guangming Daily); retrieved from www.XINHUANET.com, August 
15, 2005, “Lang tuteng zheshe Zhongguo dangdai wenxue que linghun” (Wolf Totem reflects that 
contemporary Chinese literature lacks soul). Electronic access: 
 http://news.xinhuanet.com/book/2005-08/15/content_3354950.htm. ; 
also quoted in Long Xingjian, Lang tuteng pipan, 15. 
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has been detached from the animal wolf, but abstracted into a cultural symbol—wolf 
totem. The narrator suggests that the wolf totem is the “elder brother” of the dragon 
totem. Insofar as Chinese civilization originated from the northeast where the nomads 
lived, Chinese people, majority Han and otherwise, are all descendents of the nomadic 
people from the steppe. It is the agricultural mode of production that gradually 
transformed the “lupine character” into “sheeplike character,” which represents the 
weakness of the Chinese “national characteristic.” Yet to define the Chinese “national 
characteristic” solely as sheeplike is biased, for the lupine character has always existed 
in the Chinese blood, which only needs to be accentuated once in a while via nomadic 
transfusion. In history, whenever Chinese civilization entered an inert, stagnant stage, 
the nomadic people would come to transfuse their energy to help rejuvenate the 
civilization. The cyclical dynastic shifts were all owing to the nomadic transfusions to 
perpetuate the Chinese Empire. On the other hand, the “lupine character,” sometimes 
characterized as “the grand nomadic spirit,” is also associated with the modern 
Western powers (including Japan). Therefore, it not only determines the fate of a 
civilization, but also shapes the modern world order. For instance, in the novel, right 
after the protagonist Chen Zhen starts raising the wolf cub, he has a conversation with 
his friend Yang Ke, when both of them are observing the newborn cub fighting with 
puppies for dog milk: 
 
 Chen, mesmerized by the sight, was deep in thought. “We’ll have to 
study him closely,” he said finally. “There’s a lot we can learn from this. Our 
dog pen is a microcosm of world history. I’m reminded of something Lu Xun 
once wrote. He said that Westerners are brutish, while we Chinese are 
domesticated.” 
Chen pointed to the cub. “There is your brute.” Then pointed to the 
pups. “And there’s your domestication. For the most part, Westerners are 
descendants of barbarian, nomadic tribes such as the Teutons and the Anglo-
Saxons. They burst out of the primal forest like wild animals after a couple of 
thousand years of Greek and Roman civilization, and sacked ancient Rome. 
They eat steak, cheese and butter with knives and forks, which is how they’ve 
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retained more primitive wildness than the traditional farming races. Over the 
past hundred years, domesticated China has been bullied by the brutish West. 
It’s not surprising that for thousands of years the Chinese colossus has been 
spectacularly pummeled by tiny nomadic peoples.” (173)402 
 
Chen Zhen then goes on suggesting that the other three of the world’s oldest 
civilizations (Ancient Egypt, Ancient India, and Ancient Babylon) all died out because 
they were agrarian empires lacking “lupine spirit;” whereas China survived because of 
the “contributions of the nomadic peoples of the grassland.” (174) 
There are, no doubt, both nationalistic sentiment against Western imperialism 
in the modern world and nationalistic pride in the continuous Chinese civilization. By 
attributing both the modern shame and the pre-modern glory to the “lupine spirit,” 
Chen Zhen establishes his argument on a morally neutral ground while maintaining 
the Chinese national boundary. In the meantime, rather than simply characterize 
Chinese culture as a sheeplike culture against the Western lupine culture, as some 
critics mistakenly understand, Chen Zhen incorporates the “nomadic spirit” into 
“Chinese characteristics,” suggesting that Chinese civilization comprises both agrarian 
and nomadic cultures. Whenever the lupine character and the sheeplike character were 
in balance, or the lupine character slightly overtook the sheeplike character, the 
Chinese Empire was prosperous; whenever the lupine character was completely 
suppressed by Confucian doctrines, the Chinese character was reduced to the 
sheeplike one and the Empire was in decline.       
Implicitly, this argument continues Lu Xun’s discussion of national 
characteristics in the early twentieth century, and echoes as well the controversial 
documentary film He Shang (River Elegy by Su Xiaokang) made in the 1980s.  
Assuming binary opposition of China and the West, of the sheeplike Chinese 
characteristic based in agrarian culture and the lupine Western characteristic based in 
                                                             
402 Jiang Rong, Wolf Totem, trans. Howard Goldblatt, (New York: The Penguin Press, 2008), 173. 
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nomadic and maritime cultures, this argument carries on the intellectual legacy that 
has been inexhaustibly searching for reasons for China’s modern lag since the last 
century. The difference, however, resides in the cure. Instead of looking for the 
national cure from outside, Wolf Totem suggests that the fundamental remedy has 
always been deeply rooted within China yet has been suppressed by feudal despotism, 
which is the Chinese nomadic spirit (Zhongguo youmu jingshen, 中国游牧精神). 
The shift of attention from the West to minorities to search for inspiration to 
improve national character signifies the shift of national imagination. On the one hand, 
Wolf Totem incorporates a minority group into China, not only as the subaltern or the 
supplement, but as the origin and the savior of the Chinese civilization; not only as the 
source of material diversity, but as the source of spiritual inspiration. It celebrates the 
minority position, and deconstructs the domination or totalization of the mainstream 
Han culture. On the other hand, however, it is both critical and constitutive of the 
totality of the Chinese culture, which is not defined by Confucianism, but determined 
by the connection between wolf and dragon, by the common worship of Heaven, and 
by the balance between lupine and sheeplike characters.  
It is not hard to see Jiang Rong’s struggle on the relationship between mode of 
production and relation of production, between the material and the spiritual, and 
between the spatial and the temporal. He seems to believe that the “nomadic spirit” is 
determined by the geographically-specific nomadic mode of production. Once the 
mode of production changes, the relation of production also changes and the “nomadic 
spirit” withers. Yet on the other hand, he also believes that the “nomadic spirit” can be 
detached from the specific material condition—the grassland, and be preserved and 
perpetuated in a transcendent level. In this sense, the spatial narrative, the discussion 
of minority culture, is extended to a national, historical level, and meant to serve the 
temporal analysis of Chinese history and civilization.   
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Lu Xun’s legacy: dialectical return to the imperial history 
This chapter has examined minority historical fiction, which more or less 
reflects on, rather than faithfully represents, Chinese imperial history. Despite their 
diversity, the narratives all revolve around the following questions in one way or 
another: Confucianism-dominated imperial culture, minority contribution, and Chinese 
characteristics. Implicitly or explicitly, they have carried on Lu Xun’s legacy to 
investigate the influence of Confucianism on Chinese society and dissect Chinese 
characteristics as derived from the agrarian culture. Yet, rather than being overtly 
iconoclastic toward the imperial culture and ashamed of Chinese characteristics from 
an self-Orientalistic view, minority historical fiction manifests a more dialectical, self-
reflexive, and deconstructive nature. On one level, these works don’t simply deny or 
abandon imperial culture as a whole. For instance, Su Tong’s My Life as Emperor 
presents a more ambivalent, agnostic attitude toward Confucianism. Wang Anyi 
celebrates both the martial and civil achievements of the Chinese Empire in Fact and 
Fiction. On another level, nevertheless, they deconstruct the homogeneous portrayal of 
the civility-oriented Confucian culture. They reinterpret the imperial past by 
incorporating the minority culture into the Chinese culture, and re-define the Chinese 
characteristics as the blend of the nomadic, spiritual, and the sedentary, pragmatic 
qualities. For example, the narrator in Fact and Fiction and the protagonists in The 
Last Xiongnu Hun inherit both the nomadic and the Han blood; the Jahriyya presents 
the minority Chinese who embody pure spirituality; and the Mongolian grassland 
nourishes the “Chinese nomadic spirit” crucial for Chinese civilization.  
Indeed, these works at once echo and negate iconoclasm toward history 
prevalent during the May Fourth period, and more self-reflexively and dialectically re-
examine the imperial culture. They are not simply against iconoclasm or 
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wholeheartedly embrace imperial culture. Rather, it is a dialectical return, a repetition 
with difference. Contrary to what Gilles Deleuze has discussed in the critiquing of 
theater by subtraction and amputation, e.g. Carmelo Bene subtracts some elements 
from Shakespeare’s play to make a critical statement about Shakespeare and the power 
of theater,403 minority historical fiction adds and elevates minority to the totality of the 
imperial culture. It starts from the consciousness of the “lack” in the cultural center, 
and finds a cure from the margin to compensate for the “lack” by addition. If 
contemporary “empire fever” in the mass culture manifests the dialectical return to the 
Chinese Empire by re-articulating the universalistic discourse “Tianxia,” minority 
historical fiction implies the same dialectical return by becoming-minority.  
In this light, to borrow the metaphor of the automaton chess game again, 
minority historical fiction creates alternative histories that reflect the countermoves of 
the Chinese Empire directed by the imperial-time regime in contemporary ethnic-
national-global encounters. As a result, becoming-minority signifies the consciousness 
of becoming-empire, the empire that returns with continuous variations, the empire 
that is still becoming.  
 
                                                             
403 Gilles Deleuze, “One Less Manifesto,” in Mimesis, Masochism, and Mime, ed. Timothy Murray, 
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997), 239. 
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EPILOGUE 
 
In recent years, besides the popular representations of the past empires and 
emperors, there also emerged academic or semi-academic works participating in the 
“empire fever.” Not to mention that the word “di guo”(empire) flooded into the market 
across media, bearing a positive rather than negative connotation, some Chinese 
scholars also engaged in the serious or quasi-serious writings on Chinese empire. 
Among them, Wang Hui’s Xiandai Zhongguo sixiang de xingqi (The emergence of 
modern Chinese thoughts), Zhao Tingyang’s Tianxia tixi (The System of all under 
Heaven), and Han Yuhai’s Tianxia—jiangshan zoubi (All under Heaven—discursive 
writings on rivers and mountains) deserve attention.404  Investing their scholarly 
insights in the discussion of Chinese intellectual history, or in general, imperial history, 
in connection with the contemporary domestic and global atmosphere, these authors 
started reflecting on China’s present position in the world. They all suggest that on the 
foundation of the rich yet complex imperial history, modern China cannot be 
constrained within the boundary of a nation state defined by its national borders, or a 
sovereign country defined by the global market and international law. This 
phenomenon, I believe, is the product of the “imperial-time regime.” The re-
articulation of Tianxia, the re-imagination of the Chinese empire, all point to the shi-
trend that encompasses modern China to revisit modern and imperial histories, and to 
redefine China in the contemporary world.  
                                                             
404 Wang Hui., Xiandai Zhongguo sixiangde xingqi (The emergence of modern Chinese thoughts) 
(Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2004); Han Yuhai, Tianxia-jiangshan zoubi (All under Heaven—discursive 
writings on rivers and mountains) (Beijing: Zhonguo haiguan chubanshe, 2006); Zhao Tingyang, 
Tianxia tixi—shijie zhidu zhexue daolun (The system of all under Heaven—the guide for the world 
philosophy of regimes) (Nanjing: Jiangsu jiaoyu chubanshe, 2005). 
339 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
A Ying 阿英 (Qian Xingcun, Wei Ruhui). A Ying quanji 阿英全集 (The complete 
anthology of A Ying). Ed. Ke Ling. Hefei: Anhui jiaoyu chubanshe, 1999. 
------. Wanqing wenxue congchao 晚清文学丛钞 (The collection of late Qing 
literature). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1960.  
An Zuozhang 安作璋 and Meng Xiangcai 孟祥才. Qinshihuangdi da zhuan 秦始皇帝
大传 (The grand biography of Qin Emperor). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2005. 
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. Revised edition. London & New York: Verso, 2006. 
Ba Ren 巴人(Wang Renshu 王任叔). “Zhongguo qipai yu Zhongguo zuofeng” 
(Chinese style and Chinese manner). Wenyi zhendi (Post of literature and art). 
September 1, 1939. Reprinted in Chen Shouli. Ed. Zhongguo xiandai wenxue 
yundong shiliao zhaibian 中国现代文学运动史料摘编. Beijing: Beijing 
chubanshe, 1985. 
Bal, Mieke. Narratology. Toronto, Buffalo, and London: University of Toronto Press, 
1997. 
 Benjamin, Walter. Illuminations. Edited and with an introduction by Hannah Arendt. 
Trans. Harry Zohn. New York: Schocken Books, 1968. 
Bergson, Henri. Matter and Memory. Trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott 
Palmer. Mineola and New York: Dover Publications, 2004. 
Bhabha, Homi. ‘DissemiNation: time, narrative, and the margins of the modern 
nation.” In Nation and Narration. Ed. Homi Bhabha. London & New York: 
Routledge, 1990. 
Bonta, Mark & Protevi, John. Deleuze and Geophilosophy—A Guide and Glossary. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004. 
340 
 
Bourdieu, Pierre. Language and Symbolic Power.  Edited and Introduced by John B. 
Thompson. Trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1991. 
------. On Television. New York: The New Press, 1998. 
Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the Twenty-first 
Century. New York: Arobert Stewart Book, 1993. 
Cao Wenxuan 曹文轩. Ershi shijimo Zhongguo wenxue xianxiang yanjiu 二十世纪末
中国文学现象研究 (A Study on Chinese literary phenomena in late twentieth 
century).Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2002. 
Chang, Hao. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and Intellectual Transition in China. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1971. 
------- Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis: Search for Order and Meaning (1890-1911). 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987. 
Chen Chi-yun. “Immanent Human Beings in Transcendent Time.” In  Notions of Time 
in Chinese Historical Thinking. Eds. Chun-chieh Huang and John B. 
Henderson. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2006. 
Chen Shouli 陈寿立. Ed. Zhongguo xiandai wenxue yundong shiliao zhaibian 中国现
代文学运动史料摘编 (Selection of historical documents of modern Chinese 
literary movements). Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1985. 
Chen Sihe 陈思和. Zhongguo dangdai wenxue shi 中国当代文学史 (A history of 
contemporary Chinese literature). Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 1999.  
Chen, Xiaomei. “Occidentalism as Counterdiscourse: ‘Heshang’ in Post-Mao China.” 
Critical Inquiry, 18. No.4. 686-712. 
Chen Yongzhi 陈永志. Guo Moruo sixiang zhengti guan 郭沫若思想整体观 (A view 
on the whole of Guo Moruo’s thought). Shanghai: Shanghai wenyi chubanshe, 
1992. 
341 
 
Cheng Fangwu 成仿吾. “Xin wenxue zhi shiming” 新文学之使命 (The mission of 
the new literature) Chuangzao zhoubao (Creation weekly) May 20, 1923.  
Reprinted in Chen Shouli, ed, Zhongguo xiandai wenxue yundong shiliao 
zhaibian (The selection of historical documents of modern Chinese literary 
movements). Vol 1, 67. 
Cheng Guangwei 程光炜 et al. Zhongguo xiandai wenxue shi 中国现代文学史 
(Modern Chinese literary history). Beijing: China Remin University Press, 
2000. 
Cheng Huaping 程华平. Zhongguo xiaoshuo xiqu lilun de jindai zhuanxing 中国小说
戏曲理论的现代转型 (The modern transition in theories of literature and 
musical theater). Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue chubanshe, 2001. 
Choy, Howard Yuen. Remapping the Past: Fictions of History in Deng’s China 1979-
1997.  Ph.D dissertation, University of Colorado at Boulder, 2004.  
Cohen, Paul A. Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the 
Recent Chinese Past. New York: Columbia University Press, 1984, reprinted 
with new preface in 1996. 
Culler, Jonathan.  Literary Theory: a very short introduction. New York: Oxford 
University Press Inc, 1997.  
Dai Jinhua戴锦华. “Ci Qin xingdong.” 刺秦行动 (The action of assassinating the Qin 
Emperor). A Talk at China Central Television Station (CCTV) on April 5, 
2005. Electronic access: 
http://www.cctv.com/program/bjjt/topic/education/C13808/20050405/101615.
shtml.     
Dai Jinhua 戴锦华and Meng Yue 孟悦. Fuchu lishi dibiao: xiandai funü wenxue 
yanjiu 浮出历史地表：现代妇女文学研究 (Emerging from the horizon of 
history: modern Chinese women’s literature). Beijing: Renmin daxue 
chubanshe, 2004. 
Deleuze, Gilles.  Cinema 2: The Time Image. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert 
Galeta. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989. 
342 
 
------. Cinema 1: The Movement Image. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989. 
------. Repetition and Difference. Trans. Paul Patton. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1994. 
------. The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque. Trans. Tom Conley. Minneapolis:  
University of Minnesota Press, 1993.  
------. Bergsonism. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. New York: Zone 
Books, 1988. 
------. “One Less Manifesto.” In Mimesis, Masochism, & Mime: The Politics of 
Theatricality in Contemporary French Thought. Ed. Timothy Murray. Ann 
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997. 
Denton, Kirk. Introduction to Modern Chinese Literary Thought: Writings on 
Literature, 1893-1945. Ed. Kirk Denton. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1996.  
Dirlik, Arif. Revolution and History: The Origins of Marxist Historiography in China, 
1919-1937. Berkeley, Los Angles, and London: University of California Press, 
1978. 
Doane, Mary Ann. The Emergence of Cinematic Time: Modernity, Contingency, the 
Archive. Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press, 2002. 
Dobkin, Matt and Ken Smith. “Tan Dun’s Operatic Odyssey.” In Playbill of the opera: 
The First Emperor. New York: Playbill Incorporated, 2006. 
Dong Jian 董健. “Lishi zhenshi, yishu zhenshi he xianshi qingxiangxing de tongyi—
ping lishiju Qinwang Li Shimin” 历史真实、艺术真实和现实倾向性的统
一—评历史剧《秦王李世民》(The unity of historical truth, artistic truth, and 
contemporary realistic tendency—on historical play The Prince of Qin Li 
Shimin). In Dong Jian. Wenxue yu lishi 文学与历史 (Literature and history). 
Nanjing: Jiangsu wenyi chubanshe, 1992. 
343 
 
Duara, Prasenjit. Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of 
Modern China. Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995. 
------. “De-constructing the Chinese Nation.” Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 30 
(July, 1993): 1-26. 
Eryuehe二月河 (Ling Jiefang 凌解放). Yongzheng huangdi 雍正皇帝 (Emperor 
Yongzheng). Wuhan: Changjiang wenyi chubanshe, 1998. 
------. Kangxi da di 康熙大帝 (The great Emperor Kangxi). Zhengzhou: Huanghe 
wenyi chubanshe, 1985. 
-------. Yongzheng huangdi 雍正皇帝 (Emperor Yongzheng). Taipei: Babilun 
chubanshe, 1999.  
------. Eryuehe zuopin zixuanji 二月河作品自选集 (The self collection of Eryuehe). 
Zhengzhou: Henan wenyi chubanshe, 1999. 
Feng Xingge 冯兴阁 et al eds. Jujiao “huangdi zuojia” Eryuehe 聚焦“皇帝作家”
二月河 (Focus on the “emperor writer” Eryuehe). Guangzhou: Guangdong 
renmin chubanshe, 2003. 
Foucault, Michel: Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison. New York : 
Pantheon Books, 1977. 
------. The History of Sexuality. New York: Pantheon Books, 1978. 
Gao Jianqun 高建群. Zuihou yige xiongnu 最后一个匈奴 (The Last Xiongnu Hun). 
Beijing: Zuojia chubanshe, 1993). 
Gao Yang 高阳. Hu Xueyan quanzhuan 胡雪岩全传 (The grand biography of Hu 
Xueyan). Beijing: Zhongguo youyi chuban gongsi, 1992. 
Gardner, Charles. Chinese Traditional Historiography. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1938. 
344 
 
Goddard, Michael. “The Fold, Cinema and Neo-Baroque Modernity.” Impacts of 
Modernities (Traces 3). Eds. Thomas Lamarre and Kang Nae-hui. Hong Kong: 
Hong Kong University Press, 2004. 
Grosz, Elizabeth. The Nick of Time: Politics, Evolution, and the Untimely. Durham 
and London: Duke University Press, 2004. 
Gu Ertan. “Rencai nande—du huaju Qinwang Li Shimin you gan” 人材难得—读话剧
《秦王李世民》有感 (The talent of one in a thousand—some thoughts on the 
play The Prince of Qin Li Shimin). Zhongshan,1981. Vol. 1. 61-63. 
Gunn, Edward M. Unwelcome Muse: Chinese Literature in Shanghai and Peking, 
1937-1945. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980. 
Guo Moruo 郭沫若. “Xin guojia de chuangzao” 新国家的创造 (The creation of the 
new nation). Hongshui 洪水 (Torrent), Vol1, issue 8. 1925. 
------. “Makesi jin wenmiao”马克思进文庙 (Marx came to the Confucian temple). 
Hongshui 洪水 (Torrent) 1925, Vol1, Issue 7. 
------. “Wei meidi furi xiang aiguo qiaobao huyu” 为美帝扶日向爱国侨胞呼吁 (To 
the overseas patriotic compatriots about American imperialists supporting the 
Japanese). Yingjie xin Zhongguo: Guo Moruo Xianggang zhandou shiqi yiwen  
迎接新中国: 郭沫若香港战斗时期佚文 (Welcome New China: Guo Moruo’s 
essays written in Hong Kong ). Shanghai: Fudan xuebao bianjibu, 1979. 
------. Sange panni de nüxing 三个叛逆的女性 (Three rebellious women). Shanghai: 
Guang hua shu ju, 1926. 
------. Guo Moruo lun chuangzuo 郭沫若论创作(Guo Moruo talks about creative 
writing). Shanghai: Shanghai wenyi chubanshe, 1982. 
------. Moruo juzuo xuan 沫若剧作选 (The collection of Guo Moruo’s plays). Beijing: 
Remin wenxue chubanshe, 1978. 
------. Zhu 筑. Shanghai: Qunyi chubanshe, 1946 
345 
 
------. Gao Jianli 高渐离. Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 1970. 
Habermas, Jurgen. Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere:An Inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society. Trans. Thomas Burger with the assistance of 
Frederich Lawrence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991.  
Hall, Stuart. Introduction to The Formations of Modernity. Eds. Stuart Hall and Bram 
Gieben. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers Ltd and the Open University, 1992. 
Hampton, Timothy. Writing from History: the Rhetoric of Exemplarity in Renaissance 
Literature. Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1990. 
Han Yaoqi 韩耀旗. Juedai zhengshang Lü Buwei 绝代政商吕不韦 (The 
unprecedented politician- merchant Lü Buwei). Beijing: Guoji wenhua chuban 
gongsi, 1996. 
Han Yuhai 韩毓海. Tianxia-jiangshan zoubi 天下—江山走笔 (All under Heaven—
discursive writings on rivers and mountains). Beijing: Zhonguo haiguan 
chubanshe, 2006. 
Hansen, Valerie. The Open Empire: A History of China to 1600. New York and 
London: W.W.Norton & Company, 2000. 
Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri. Empire. Cambridge and London: Harvard 
University Press, 2000. 
Haroontunian, Harry. Overcome by Modernity. Princeton & Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2000. 
------. History’s Disquiet: Modernity, Cultural Practice, and the Question of Everyday 
Life. New York: Colombia University Press, 2000.  
Harrell, Stevan. Cultural Encounters on China’s Ethnic Frontiers. Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 1995. 
Hessler, Peter. Oracle Bones: A Journey between China’s Past and Present. New 
York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2006. 
346 
 
Huang, Chun-Chieh. “ ‘Time’ and ‘Supertime’ in Chinese Historical Thinking.” In 
Notions of Time in Chinese Historical Thinking. Eds., Chun-chieh Huang and 
John B. Henderson. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2006. 
Huang, Yibing. Contemporary Chinese Literature: From the Cultural Revolution to 
the Future. Macmillan: Palgrave, 2007. 
Huters, Theodore. “Ideology of Realism in Modern China: the Hard Imperatives of 
Imported Theory.” In Politics, Ideology, and Literary Discourse in Modern 
China: Theoretical Interventions and Cultural Critique. Eds. Liu Kang and 
Xiaobing Tang. Durham: Duke University Press, 1993. 147-74. 
Jameson, Fredric. The Political Unconscious. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981. 
Jiang Rong姜戎 (Lu Jiamin). Lang tuteng 狼图腾 (Wolf Totem). Wuhan: Changjiang 
wenyi chubanshe, 2004. 
------. Wolf Totem. Trans. Howard Goldblatt. New York: The Penguin Press, 2008. 
Jiang Xiaotian . “Ping Li Zicheng” 评《李自成》(On Li Zicheng). In Guanyu 
changpian lishi xiaoshuo Li Zicheng 关于长篇历史小说《李自成》.Ed. 
Zhang Youhuang. Shanghai: shanghaiwenyi chubanshe, 1979. 
Jin Guantao 金观涛. Zai lishi de biaoxiang beihou—dui Zhongguo fengjian shehui 
chao wending jiegou de tansuo 在历史的表象背后—对中国封建社会超稳定
结构的探索 (Behind the phenomena of history—an exploration of the 
ultrastable structure of the Chinese feudalist society). Chengdu: Sichuan 
renmin chubanshe, 1983. 
Jin Han 金汉 . Zhongguo dangdai xiaoshuo yishu yanbian shi 中国当代小说艺术演
变史 (The evolution of the art of contemporary Chinese fiction). Hangzhou: 
Zhejiang daxue chubanshe, 2000.  
Jun,Tosaka. “Nichijosei no genri to rekichiteki jikan” (The Principle of Everydayness 
and Historical Time) (1934). In Tosaka Jun zenshu (Complete works of Tosaka 
Jun), vol.3. Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1966.  
347 
 
Katzenstein, Peter, J. A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium. 
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005. 
Knight, Sabina. The Heart of Time: Moral Agency in Twentieth-Century Chinese 
Fiction. Harvard East Asian Monographs. Cambridge and London: Harvard 
University Press, 2006. 
Lan, Feng. “Zhang Yimou's Hero: Reclaiming the Martial Arts Film for ‘All under 
Heaven.’"  Modern Chinese Language and Culture, vol. 20, no. 1 (Spring 
2008), 1-43. 
Lee, Leo Ou-fan. Voices from the Iron House: A Study of Lu Xun.  Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987. 
Lee, Haiyan. “The Lord of the Wolves” in the online source: The China Beat: 
Blogging How the East is Read, June 19, 2008. Electronic access: 
http://thechinabeat.blogspot.com/2008/06/lord-of-wolves.html 
Levenson, Joseph. Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: A Trilogy. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1965.   
------. Revolution and Cosmopolitanism. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: 
University of California Press, 1971. 
Li Zehou 李泽厚. “Qimeng yu jiuwang de shuangchong bianzou” 启蒙与救亡的双重
变奏 (The doubling practices of enlightenment and national salvation). In Zou 
xiang weilai 走向未来  (Toward the future). Chengdu: Sichuan renmin 
chubanshe, vol. 1, 1986. 
Li Dazhao 李大钊. “Bolshevism de shengli” Bolshevism 的胜利 (The victory of 
Bolshevism). Xin Qingnian (New Youth), Nov 15, 1918. Reprinted in 
Zhongguo xiandai wenxue shiliao zhaibian. Ed. Chen Shouli. Beijing: Beijing 
chubanshe, 1985. Vol.1: 25. 
------. (Shouchang 守常) “Shumin de shengli” 庶民的胜利 ( The victory of the 
ordinary people). Xin qingnian (New youth), Oct. 15, 1918. Reprinted in 
Zhongguo xiandai wenxue shiliao zhaibian. Ed. Chen Shouli. Beijing: Beijing 
chubanshe, 1985. Vol. 1: 23-4. 
348 
 
Liang Qichao 梁启超. “Ershi shiji Taipingyang ge” 二十世纪太平洋歌 (The Song of 
the Twentieth Century Pacific). In Liang Qichao quanji (The complete collection of 
Liang Qichao’s works). Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1999. Vol. 9: 5426-7. 
------. “Lun xiaoshuo yu qunzhi zhi guanxi” 论小说与群治的关系  (On the 
relationship between fiction and the government of the people). In Liang 
Qichao shiwen xuanzhu 梁启超诗文选注 (Selection and annotation of Liang 
Qichao’s poems and essays). Edited and annotated. Wang Quchang. Beijing: 
Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 1987. 244-63.  
------. “Shaonian Zhongguo Shuo” 少年中国说 (On the young China). In Liang 
Qichao shiwen xuanzhu (Selection and annotation of Liang Qichao’s poems 
and essays). Edited and annotated by Wang Quchang. Beijing: Renmin wenxue 
chubanshe, 1987. 
------. Xinzhongguo weilai ji 新中国未来记 (The future of new China). In Wanqing 
wenxue congchao (The collection of Late Qing literature). Ed. A Ying. Beijing: 
Zhonghua shuju, 1960. Vol 1.  
Lin Qingxin. Brushing History against the Grain: Reading the Chinese New Historical 
Fiction (1986-1999). Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005. 
Ling Li 凌力. “Cong Xing xing cao dao Shaonian Tianzi de chuangzuo fansi” 从《星
星草》到《少年天子》的创作反思 (Reflecting on the writing from Xing 
xing cao to Shaonian tianzi). In Ling Li. Duo Qing Wu: Shunzhi chujia zhi mi 
多情误：顺治出家之谜 (Handicapped by being sentimental: the mystery of 
Emperor Shunzhi’s becoming a monk). Beijing: Jingji ribao chubanshe, 1998. 
------. Qing cheng qing guo 倾城倾国 (Topple the kingdom and the city). Beijing: 
Beijing shiyue wenyi chubanshe, 1996. 
------. Son of Heaven. Trans. David Kwan. Beijing: Chinese Literature Press, 1995. 
------. Shaonian Kangxi 少年康熙 (Young Kangxi; title of Taiwan edition of Mu gu 
chen zhong 暮鼓晨钟). Taipei: Guojicun wenku shudian, 1993. 
349 
 
Lipman, Jonathan N. Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China. 
Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997. 
Liu, Lydia He. Translingual Pratice: Literature, National Culture and Translated 
Modernity—China, 1900-1937. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995. 
------. Clash of Empires. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004. 
Liu Shu-hsien. “On the Formation of a Philosophy of Time and History through the 
Yijing.” In Notions of Time in Chinese Historical Thinking. Eds. Chun-chieh 
Huang and John B. Henderson. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 
2006. 
Long Xingjian 龙行健. Langtuteng pipan 狼图腾批判 (The critique of Wolf Totem). 
Shanghai: Xuelin chubanshe, 2007. 
Lu, Sheldon H. and Emilie Yueh-yu Yeh, “Introduction: Mapping the Field of 
Chinese-Language Cinema.” In Chinese Language Film: Historiography, 
Poetics, Politics. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2005. 
Lu Xun 鲁迅. Lu Xun quanji 鲁迅全集 (The complete collection of Lu Xun’s works). 
Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 1991.  
Lyotard, Jean-François. The Inhuman: Reflections on Time. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1988. 
Ma Yuancai 马元材. Qinshihuangdi zhuan 秦始皇帝传 (Biography of the first 
emperor of Qin). Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe, 1985.  
Ma Zhenfang 马振方. Zai lishi yu xugou zhijian 在历史与虚构之间 (Between history 
and the fictitious). Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2006. 
Mao Zedong 毛泽东. “He meiguo jizhe Anna-luyisi-sitelang de tanhua” 和美国记者
安娜-路易斯-斯特朗的谈话 (The talk with American journalist Anna Louise 
Strong). In Mao Zedong xuanji (the Selective Works of Mao Zedong).vol. 4. 
Electronic access: 
http://www.hlxc.cn/Class/RedClassic/study/20080612200385.shtml 
350 
 
------. Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, vol. 2. London: Lawrence & Wishart LTD, 
1954. 
Marx, Karl. Grundrisse. Trans. Martin Nicolaus.  Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973. 
------. “Address and Provisional Rules of the Working Men’s International 
Association” (London, 1864). Reprinted in Karl Marx. The First International 
and After: Political Writings. Vol. 3. New York: Vintage, 1974. 73-84. 
Meisner, Maurice. Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism. New York: 
Atheneum, 1979, copyright 1967 Harvard University Press. 
Mencius. Li Lou 1. In The Works of Mencius. Trans. James Legge. The Chinese 
Classics, vol.2. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960. 
Meng Zhuo 孟琢. Liu da lishiju pipan 六大历史剧批判 (Critique of six historical 
dramas). Beijing: Zhongguo gongren chubanshe, 2005. 
Messaris, Paul. Visual Literacy, Image, Mind, and Reality. Boulder, San Francisco, 
and Oxford: Westview Press, 1994. 
Metzger, Thomas A. Escape from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China’s 
Evolving Political Culture. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. 
Mitchell, Timothy. “The Stage of Modernity.” In Questions of Modernity. Ed. 
Timothy Mitchell. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000.  
Nie Hualing. “Qishi niandai de gushi” (The story of the 70s). Interview with Yao 
Xueyin by Nie Hualing and Paul Engle in 1978. Guanyu changpian lishi 
xiaoshuo Li Zicheng 关于长篇历史小说《李自成》(About the historical 
novel Li Zicheng). Ed. Zhang Youhuang. Shanghai: Shanghai wenyi 
chubanshe, 1979. 335-336. 
Nylan, Michael. The Five Confucian Classics. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2001. 
351 
 
Plaks, Andrew. “The Problem of Structure in Chinese Narrative,” Tamkang Review, 
Vol VI, No. 2 and Vol VII, No.1, Oct, 1975-Apr, 1976, 429-440.  
Price, Don. Russia and the Roots of the Chinese Revolution. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1974. 
Pulleyblank, E. G. “Chinese Historical Criticism.” In Historians of China and Japan. 
Eds. W.G.Beasley and E.G.Pulleyblank.  London: Oxford University Press, 
1971. 
Qian Liqun 钱理群. Gushi xinbian man tan 故事新编漫谈 (A casual reading on Old 
stories retold). A Talk given in Guolinfeng bookstore. Nov. 27, 2004. 
Electronic access: http://www.univs.cn/univs/hust/content.php?id=101551  
Rodowick, David. N. Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine. Durham & London: Duke 
University Press, 1997. 
Sharff, Stefan. The Elements of Cinema: Toward a Theory of Cinesthetic Impact. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1982. 
Shen Yanbing沈雁冰 (Mao Dun 茅盾). “Wenxuejie de fandong yundong” 文学的反
动运动 (The reactionary movement in literary circles). Wenxue (Literature) 
May 12, 1924. Reprinted in Chen Shouli. Ed. Zhongguo xiandai wenxue 
yundong shiliao zhaibian (The selection of historical documents of modern 
Chinese literary movements). Vol. 1:110. 
------. “Guanyu changpian lishi xiaoshuo Li Zicheng” 关于长篇历史小说李自成
(About the historical novel Li Zicheng). In Guanyu changpian lishi xiaoshuo Li 
Zichen关于长篇历史小说《李自成》(About the historical novel Li Zicheng). 
Ed. Zhang Youhuang. Shanghai: Shanghai wenyi chubanshe, 1979.  
Sheng Heyu 盛和煜 and Zhang Jianwei 张建伟. Zouxing gonghe 走向共和 
(Marching towards the Republic). Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2003. 
Shi Cuntong 施存统. “Weiwu shiguan zai Zhongguo de yingyong” 唯物史观在中国
的应用 (The application of historical materialism in China). Shehui zhuyi 
taolun ji 社会主义讨论集  (Discussions on Socialism). Shanghai: Xin 
Qingnian Society, 1922. 
352 
 
Shih, Shu-mei. The Lure of the Modern: Writing Modernism in Semicolonial China, 
1917-1937. Berkeley, Los Angeles, & London: University of California Press, 
2001.  
Sommer, Doris. Foundational Fictions: The National Romances of Latin America. 
Berkeley, Los Angles, and Oxford: University of California Press, 1991. 
Spence, Donald P. Narrative Truth and Historical Truth: Meaning and Interpretation 
in Psychoanalysis. New York & London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982. 
Su Tong 苏童. Hou gong 后宫 (The imperial palace). In Su Tong wenji 苏童文集 
(The collection of Su Tong’s works). Nanjing: Jiangsu wenyi chubanshe, 1994. 
------. My Life as Emperor. Trans. Howard Goldblatt. New York: Hyperion East, 2005. 
Tang Haoming 唐浩明. Zeng Guofan 曾国藩. Changsha: Hunan wenyi chubanshe, 
1990. 
Tang, Xiaobing. Global Space and the Nationalist Discourse of Modernity: The 
Historical Thinking of Liang Qichao. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1996. 
Tang Zhesheng 汤哲声. Zhongguo dangdai tongsu xiaoshuo shilun 中国当代通俗小
说史论 (History of Chinese contemporary popular fiction). Beijing: Beijing 
daxue chubanshe, 2007. 
Tian Han 田汉. Guan Hanqing 关汉卿. Beijing: Zuojia chubanshe, 2000. 
Toffler, Alvin. Powershift: Knowledge, Wealth, and Violence at the Edge of the 21st 
Century. New York: Bantam Books, 1990. 
Twitchell, James B. Carnival Culture—the Trashing of Taste in America. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1992. 
Wagner, Rudolf. The Contemporary Chinese Drama: Four Studies. Berkeley, Los 
Angles, and Oxford: University of California Press, 1990. 
353 
 
Wang Aisong 王爱松. Zhengzhi shuxie yu lishi xushi 政治书写与历史叙事 (Political 
writing and historical narrative).  Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo dianshi 
chubanshe, 2007. 
Wang Anyi 王安忆. Jishi yu xugou 纪实与虚构 (Fact and Fiction). Beijing: Renmin 
wenxue chubanshe, 1993. 
------. Shangxin Taipingyang 伤心太平洋 (The Heartbreaking Pacific). In  Xianggang 
de qing yu ai 香港的情与爱 (Sentiment and love in Hong Kong). Beijing: 
Zuojia chubanshe, 1996.  
Wang, David Der-wei. Xiangxiang zhongguo de fangfa: lishi, xiaoshuo, xushi 想像中
国的方法：历史、小说、叙事 (The ways to imagine China: history, fiction, 
narration). Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1998. 
Wang, Edward. Inventing China through History: The May Fourth Approach to 
Historiography. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001. 
Wang, Huazhi.  Problematizing the Nation: The “Wang Shuo Phenomenon” and 
Contemporary Chinese Culture. Ph. D Dissertation, Cornell University, 1999. 
Wang Hui. “Depoliticized Politics: From East to West.” New Left Review, Vol.41. 
Sept-Oct. 2006. 41. 
------. Xiandai Zhongguo sixiangde xingqi 现代中国思想的兴起 (The emergence of 
modern Chinese thought).  Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2004. 
Wang Xunzhao 王训诏, et al. Guo Moruo yanjiu ziliao 郭沫若研究资料 (Research 
Materials on Guo Moruo).Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1986.  
Wang Zheng 汪政 and He Ping 何平. Su Tong yanjiu ziliao 苏童研究资料 (Research 
materials for the study of Su Tong). Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 2007.  
White, Hyden. Metahistory: the Historical Imagination in Nineteeth-Century Europe. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. 
354 
 
Worthen, William B. “Drama, Performativity, and Performance.” PMLA, Vol. 113, No. 
5 (Oct., 1998). 1093-1107.  
Wu Jianren吴趼人. Wu Jianren quanji 吴趼人全集 (The complete collection of Wu 
Jianren’s works). Beijing: Beifang wenyi chubanshe, 1997.  
Xie Shijun. Shangsheng—Fan Li quanzhuan 商圣—范蠡全传 (The Merchant saint—
the grand biography of Fan Li). Beijing: Beifang wenyi chubanshe, 1997. 
Xu Shen 许慎. Shuowen jiezi (说文解字). Annotated by Duan Yucai.  
            Electronic access: 
            http://www.gg-art.com/imgbook/index.php?bookid=53&columns=&stroke=5. 
Xunzi 荀子. Tian Lun 天论. Trans. John Knoblock. Xunzi—A Translation and Study 
of the Complete Works. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994. 
Yan Haiping 颜海平. Qin Wang Li Shimin 秦王李世民 (The Prince of Qin Li Shimin). 
Zhongshan. (Nanjing). 1981. Vol. 1: 6-60. 
Yan Jiayan 严家炎. “Li Zicheng chu tan” 《李自成》初探 (A preliminary discussion 
of Li Zicheng). In Guanyu changpian lishi xiaoshuo Li Zicheng Zichen 关于长
篇历史小说《李自成》(About the historical novel Li Zicheng). Ed. Zhang 
Youhuang. Shanghai: Shanghai wenyi chubanshe, 1979.    
Yao Xueyin 姚雪垠. Li Zicheng 李自成. Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 
1977. 
Ye Shi (叶适 ). “Zhishi” (治势 ). In Shuixin xiansheng wenji 水心先生文集 
(Collection of essays by Ye Shi). Sibu congkan jibu. Shanghai: Shangwu 
yinshuguan, 1922. Vol 2, juan 4. 
Zhang Chengzhi 张承志. Dalu yu qinggan 大陆与情感 (Lands and Feelings). Jinan: 
Shandong huabao chubanshe, 1998. 
------.Xin ling shi 心灵史 (Spiritual History). Guangzhou: Huacheng chubanshe, 1991. 
355 
 
Zhang, Jingyuan, Psychoanalysis in China: Literary Transformations, 1919-1949. 
Ithaca: Cornell East Asia Series, 1992. 
Zhang, Xudong, ed. Whither China: intellectual politics in contemporary China. 
Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2001.  
------. Chinese Modernism in the Era of Reforms. Durham & London, Duke University 
Press, 1997. 
Zhang Youhuang 张有煌,  ed. Guanyu Changpian lishi xiaoshuo Li Zicheng关于长篇
历史小说李自成. Shanghai: shanghaiwenyi chubanshe, 1979. 
Zhao Tingyang 赵汀阳. Tianxia tixi—shijie zhidu zhexue daolun 天下体系—世界制
度哲学导论(The system of all under Heaven—the guide for the world 
philosophy of regimes). Nanjing: Jiangsu jiaoyu chubanshe, 2005. 
Zhongguo dianshiju shichang baogao 2003-2004 中国电视剧市场报告 (China TV 
drama report 2003-2004). Beijing: Huaxia chubanshe, 2004. 
Zhou Zuoren 周作人. “Ren de wenxue” “人”的文学 (Humane literature). Xin 
Qingnian (New Youth), vol. 5, No.6. Dec 15, 1918. Reprinted in Chen Shouli, 
ed. Zhongguo xiandai wenxue yundong shiliao zhaibian (The selection of 
historical documents of modern Chinese literary movements). Beijing: Beijing 
chubanshe, 1985. Vol 1. 30-31. 
Zhu Xi (朱熹). Zhuzi yulei （朱子语类） (The discourse of Zhu Xi). Ed., Li Jingde. 
Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981.  
Zhu, Ying. Television in Post-Reform China: Serial Dramas, Confucian Leadership 
and the Global Television Market. London & New York: Routledge, 2008.  
Zhu Ying 朱影and Qu Chunjing 曲春景. Eds. Zhongmei dianshiju bijiao yanjiu 中美
电视剧比较研究 (Comparative Research on Chinese and American Television 
Drama). Shanghai: Shanghai sanlian shudian, 2005.  
356 
 
Zizek, Slavoj. “Mao Zedong: The Marxist Lord of Misrule.” Introduction in Mao: On 
Practice and Contradiction (London & New York: Verso, 2007). Electronic 
access: http://www.lacan.com/zizmaozedong.htm.  
 
 
 
  
